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This thesis examines the relationship between urban civil society 
actors and information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the 
technologising and globalising city of Bangalore, India. Recent 
academic work on ICTs and civil society has focused on the “spectacle” 
of urban protests and social movements around the world, including 
India. These collective actions, amplified by the interconnectedness of 
digital and mainstream media, have often dominated the discourse on 
ICTs for democratic engagement. The thesis moves away from a study 
of protests and activism to focus on the more routine—but equally 
important—use of ICTs for civic and political engagement. Highlighting 
the rise of a new set of civil society actors in urban centres that 
leverage ICTs for various engagement activities, the thesis notes the 
relevance of examining motivations and interactions of these actors 
with new technologies.    
Employing a qualitative research framework, the thesis uses 
multiple methods of data collection, including case study research, in-
depth semi structured interviews, and online and offline observation, to 
understand the emerging relationship between ICTs and civil society in 
Bangalore. Bangalore was chosen as the site of the study due to its 
status as a preeminent information technology (IT) hub. The city is 
known as the “Silicon Valley/Plateau” or the “information capital” of 
India, due to its large concentration of telecommunications and high-
technology industries. Moreover, its vibrant civil society, an increased 
role of the middle classes in civic engagement activities, its global 
connections and ambitions, and the resultant divisions within the city, 
make it a fitting location for a study of ICT–civil society connections. 
The two case studies chosen for in-depth examination are: (a) 
environmental network and email discussion group, Hasiru Usiru, and 
(b) blog-based citizen-interaction platform, Praja.in (Praja), and its 
advocacy arm, Research, Analysis and Advocacy Group (RAAG). 
 xi 
These case studies, as well as interviews conducted with a wide range 
of government and non-government actors, examine the perceptions 
and use of ICTs for democratic engagement, particularly within the “IT 
City” context. This ethnographic representation highlights the social 
innovations currently underway in Bangalore, and the impacts of the 
city's IT base on civil society initiatives and activity.  At the same time, it 
dispels notions that ICTs are value neutral, and that civil society actors 
willingly and unproblematically embrace ICTs in their activities. It shows 
that access to ICTs does not translate automatically into a willingness 
or ability to engage deeply with new technologies by civil society, 
despite being in a media-rich environment. Moreover, by discussing 
ruptures between traditional and new, ICT-enabled civil society, the 
thesis highlights complexities arising from intersections between the 
online and offline spaces of civic engagement. By highlighting strengths 
and limitations of ICT-enabled civic and political engagement in 
Bangalore, the thesis provides a grounded account of the role of ICTs 
in the lives of urban civic actors in a developing “high-tech” city.  
Finally, the thesis identifies the emergence of a “new civil 
society” in India, whose members are largely from new economy 
industries and corporate backgrounds, and who emphasise 
information- and technology-based solutions to civic and political 
issues. As the variety of ICT-based civil society initiatives in Bangalore 
demonstrate, new civil society members are either tech-savvy or 
believe in the potential of ICTs for change. This new civil society 
consists of new brand of ICT-enabled civic activism, as witnessed in 
the anti-corruption and anti-rape protests that occurred across the 
country in 2011 and 2012. However, it is also characterised by a 
“techno-middle class”, which comprises tech-savvy actors engaged in 
the more routine aspects of civic and political engagement. This new 
civil society is distinguished from “developmental” or “old civil society” 
by dint of its emphasis on middle-class priorities and ICT-enabled 
action. In defining and clarifying differences between these civil society 
categories, the thesis sheds light on the changing landscape of civil 
society in India and the significant role of new technologies in this 
 xii 
evolution. By placing the middle classes at the centre of new ICT-
enabled engagement efforts, this study contributes to the emerging 
literature on ICTs and civic and political engagement in India, and it 










CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
As information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become 
more accessible to individuals and communities the world over, there has been 
an extraordinary surge in ICT use for greater civic and political engagement. 
Nowhere has this trend been more evident than in cities, particularly those 
embedded in the global system, which are shaped by interactions among 
technology, society, and space (see Castells, 1989). The torrent of protests and 
mass movements from 2010 onwards have two elements in common: they are 
intricately connected and facilitated by the Internet, but often also occupy 
politically potent spaces in the city, where they gain political leverage for pursuing 
reform (Marolt, 2014; Padawangi, Marolt, & Douglass, 2014). The “spectacle” of 
urban protests and social movements, amplified by the interconnectedness of 
digital and mainstream media (Lynch, 2011; Nanabhay & Farmanfarmaian, 
2011), have produced images that often dominate mainstream discourse on ICTs 
and democratic engagement. However, away from the glare of the media 
spotlight, a new set of civil society actors in urban centres has been leveraging 
ICTs for more routine—but no less important—matters of civic and political 
engagement. As in protests, in these activities as well, “traditional” political 
actors, such as politicians, activists, journalists, and academics have been joined 
by ordinary citizens and a wide range of civil society actors to affect change.  
This thesis examines synergies between such civil society actors and 
ICTs, particularly the Internet, in Bangalore City, India, focusing on dynamics of 
this interaction from the point of view of the shaping forces or actors themselves. 
The emphasis, therefore, is on how actors view the role of ICTs in their civic 
activities, including ICTs’ strengths and limitations; how those actors understand 
their digital experiences; motivations/philosophical orientations directing their 
technology use (or non-use); and ways in which new technologies feature in 
discourses on participatory democracy and civic and political engagement. 
Bangalore was chosen as the site of the study due to its status as a preeminent 




or the “information capital” of India, due to its large concentration of 
telecommunications and high-technology industries. Moreover, its global 
connections and ambitions, its vibrant civil society, and an increased role of its 
tech-savvy middle classes in urban governance make it a fitting location for a 
study of ICT–civil society connections. Moreover, as Bangalore has nurtured 
greater global aspirations, it has struggled with important consequences of 
increased internal contradictions and tensions as a result of its participation in the 
global information economy, precipitating citizen action in physical and virtual 
spaces. These, and other reasons, for choosing Bangalore as the site of study 
are discussed in the literature review chapter.   
Defining Key Terms  
Before proceeding any further, key terms are defined, and distinctions 
between certain concepts are highlighted.  
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs): Defining this term has 
proved to be a challenging task, given its diverse applications, and the multiplicity 
of its meanings in various contexts and disciplines.1 To narrow the task, I first 
undertook a preliminary review of literature related to ICTs and civic and political 
participation, democratic engagement, and social work. In many cases, ICTs 
were not defined at all or were referred to vaguely, which further complicated 
matters. I finally settled on a comprehensive but simplistic definition, which 
seemed to resemble closely the idea that civil society actors had of ICTs during 
fieldwork—and matched the description that I had provided to those who were 
unaware of the term. Here, ICTs are broadly defined as technologies that are 
used to record, store, and communicate data/information by electronic means, 
including the Internet, e-mail, short message service (SMS) text messaging, 
video chat, and social media. ICTs also include all the various computing devices 
(e.g., laptop computers and smart phones) that carry out a wide range of 
                                                             
1For instance, Zuppo (2012) found that although there was some degree of 
commonality, ICTs were understood very differently in relation to socioeconomic 
development, as an economic sector, in the fields of education and business, and by 




communication and information functions (IGI Global, n.d.; Perron, Taylor, Glass, 
& Margerum-Leys, 2010).  
Civic and political engagement: Civic and political engagement refers to citizen 
participation in civic and political affairs, with the aim of enhancing accountability 
and democratic decision making by political actors. In democratic societies, such 
as India, the tradition of citizen–government engagement and citizen involvement 
in public affairs has been given a boost by the introduction of ICTs. In the specific 
context of ICT-enabled engagement, political engagement includes activities 
related traditionally to the political sphere, such as voting and elections, 
advocating for human rights, and influencing legislation and public policy. Civic 
engagement is seen as being broader than political engagement, involving 
information dissemination and participation in a wider range of spheres of 
activity, such as the environment, transportation and mobility, and identity politics 
(Banaji & Buckingham, 2013; Foth, Forlano, Satchell, & Gibbs, 2011). The 
distinction between civic and political engagement is not always clear-cut, an 
issue that is discussed further in the literature review.  
Social movements and activism: ICT-enabled civic and political engagement is 
distinguished from activism, social movements, and grassroots cultural politics, 
with the former largely being more mundane and less spectacular than the latter 
(Banaji & Buckingham, 2013). Social movements involve spontaneous or 
planned protest activities, with ICTs playing a critical role in the mobilization of 
participants and resources, and in internal and external communication strategies 
(Garrett, 2006; Van De Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). Whereas urban 
social movements originated in popular uprisings and insurrections against 
authority in the city (Castells, 1983; Leontidou, 2006), newer social movements 
are characterized by the creation of broad global coalitions, with transnational 
networks that, simultaneously, are local and global, and whose movements 
overlap and coincide in the city (Leontidou, 2006; Mayer, 2006). Activism is a key 
component of social movements, and it is also associated with certain forms of 




Civil society: Foley & Edwards (1996) pointed out several versions of the “civil 
society argument”, and noted that these versions and definitions are reflective of 
the particular contexts to which they have been applied. In light of these versions, 
civil society is understood as a sphere of power autonomous from, but intricately 
connected to, both state and market, enabling citizen engagement for a more 
robust democratic polity and as a counterweight to excessive state and corporate 
power. In the Indian context, civil society traditionally has comprised non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and activist and other groups working with 
poor and excluded populations. This sphere, generally, is associated with the 
tradition of voluntary action, is seen as contributing towards the public good, 
operating within the framework of the country’s constitution, and has tended to 
revolve around institutions of representative democracy (Goswami, Tandon, & 
Bandhopadhyay, 2012; Singh, 2014a). Social movements and activist networks 
constitute a prominent face of this civil society, which Singh (2014a) has referred 
to as “developmental civil society”. In the thesis, developmental civil society is 
used interchangeably with “old civil society”, and refers to groups and projects 
that work on issues of democracy and rights, and whose primary modes of claim-
making include activism and collective action. This old civil society is 
distinguished from the “new civil society” that is characterised by the rise of new 
ICT-enabled citizen action/activism of the (mainly) urban middle class (Singh, 
2013; Singh, 2014a). In practice, these categories are not always entirely 
indistinguishable from each other but this working definition provides a way to 
distinguish between the wide range of formations within the overarching sphere 
of civil society.  
Establishing the Context: The ICT Landscape and Civic Activism 
in India 
In Asia, where rapid urbanisation and technologisation have gone hand-in-
hand, producing new fissures and reproducing old ones, new types of activism 
and engagement have emerged in digital and urban spaces. The increased use 




elite and marginalised groups, has become the subject of much recent scholarly 
work. In India, Internet-based activism is a recent phenomenon, surging in the 
mid-2000s, and restricted initially to the predominantly English-speaking urban 
middle classes. Whereas the mobile phone revolution has since enabled greater 
inclusion of the urban and rural poor in collective actions, Internet-based activity 
and social media in particular, still are skewed toward relatively affluent and 
English-educated middle classes located in the cities. It is unsurprising, then, that 
the rapidly evolving Internet landscape in India has impacted the largely middle-
class dominated realm of civil society in several ways.2 The most obvious ways 
are the changing forms of civil society organisations (CSOs), with a wide range of 
formations, including networks of associations, facilitated by the Internet; 
changing composition, with the entry of a wide range of actors who are not allied 
traditionally to conventional or developmental civil society; increased networking 
and virtual interactions among CSOs and entities; and greater interactivity and 
negotiation with mainstream media for news and agenda setting.3   
India has the third-largest Internet population in the world at about 243 
million users, accounting for 19% of the country’s population (Internet live stats, 
2014; We are social, 2014). Although the overall penetration is low and Internet 
speeds are still slow (Akamai, 2014), the rising number of mobile Internet users 
is rapidly altering the Internet landscape in the country. With an estimated 185 
million mobile Internet users in June 2014, urban India continues to lead the way 
in mobile Internet usage (an estimated 153 million users), with rural India making 
late, but significant progress in this regard, with 32 million users (IAMAI, 2014). 
Given that mobile phones are poised to become the primary access channel for a 
majority of Internet users across the world, including India (Avendus, 2013), 
increasingly mobile media will be an important means of political participation 
                                                             
2The middle class nature of “civil society” in India—and Chatterjee’s (2001) famous 
distinction between it and the ‘political society’ of the masses—is discussed in the 
literature review.  
3These statements are based on observations and personal experiences in the field, 
as well as general literature related to changing civil society in India (Goswami, Tandon, 
& Bandhopadhyay, 2012; Singh, 2014), which highlights the lack of a unified approach to 




(Martin, 2014). The crucial role of mobile phones was evident during the Arab 
Spring revolutions, and, closer to home, in the new wave of protests and 
collective action in India (Bute, 2014; Parashar, 2012).4 In recent times, the two 
most prominent examples of ICT-enabled citizen activism in India have been the 
Anna Hazare-led anti-corruption/Lokpal Bill campaign in 2011, and the anti-rape 
protests that occurred in several metropolitan cities simultaneously in 2012. 
These protests have been referred to as a new type of citizen activism, with 
urban middle class constituents participating in the political arena outside the 
space of State and conventional/developmental civil society (Singh, 2014a). This 
new citizen activism in India, notably in its most spectacular and visible form of 
new protest movements, has been able to forge alliances and plan modalities of 
social action via the connective power of ICTs (Ahmed & Jaidka, 2013; Bute, 
2014; Singh, 2014a). Desai & Joshi (2012) have noted that these protests were 
motivated by a confluence of three major stresses facing contemporary India: 
crime, government ineffectiveness and gender inequality. They also pointed out 
that the crowds bore more than a passing resemblance to Arab Spring 
protestors, being comprised predominantly of urban middle class youth, 
mobilised through social media, whose collective anger was being directed at 
various targets all at once (see also Ahmed & Jaidka, 2013; Zakaria, 2013). 
These campaigns are discussed further in the literature review chapter, in the 
section on “new civil society” in India.   
Relevance of the Study 
Not unexpectedly, given the vast digital divide that still exists, critics have 
highlighted the exclusionary nature of ICT-based civil society activities, including 
new protest movements, whose campaign strategies and tactics have catered 
largely to urban, middle class youth, and have excluded the urban and rural poor 
(Harindranath & Khorana, 2014; Sitapati, 2011). Moreover, given that social 
                                                             
4 Bute (2014) also highlights the ways in which mobile phones and social media were 
used to spread rumours and misinformation, and to create panic and chaos in India, 
noting that in the absence of a mature and discerning audience, new technologies can 




media-based information and action are skewed toward the opinions of a narrow 
demographic, online platforms run the real risk of marginalising the voices of the 
vast majority of unconnected citizens (Belair-Gagnon, Mishra, & Agur, 2013). 
Although acknowledging that Internet-based citizen action is largely still the 
preserve of urban middle-class actors, I argue that its potential for 
communication, collaboration, and coordinated action suggest that its study holds 
value for a more nuanced understanding of changing civil society in India. In 
particular, there is a real need to highlight the creative use of ICTs for civic and 
political engagement by civil society groups outside the arena of activism and 
protests.  
While India in general, and Bangalore in particular, is replete with 
examples of ICT-led innovations by civil society, academic research in this area 
has lagged behind actual developments. Goswami et. al. (2012) alluded to a 
similar problem when they pointed out the double-edged role of the media in 
bringing civil society into the public discourse from the time of the anti-corruption 
movement. They notes that although media have played a considerable role in 
bringing the world of CSOs into public currency, the greater focus on protest 
activities had sidelined the creative and innovative work of CSOs, which gained 
only limited visibility. It is against this background that this thesis gains relevance, 
by examining interactions between ICTs and civil society actors—old and new—
who are engaged in the more ‘routine’ matters of socio-political reform. By 
mapping attitudes, experiences, and practices of these civil society actors, this 
thesis contributes to the growing body of literature on the role of ICTs in the lives 
of urban civic actors in a developing country context. In particular, the thesis 
examines attitudes of actors toward the democratic potential of ICTs in the first 
place, and then maps their ICT use and experiences. Although ICTs are lauded 
for their democratic potential and play an increasingly central role in public life, 
an important factor influencing ICT adoption is how actors perceive new 
technologies, and how they use them in their specific contexts. Raman (2006, 
2008) adopted a similar approach in her study of the adoption of ICTs by the 




crucial to understanding the importance of ICTs vis-à-vis citizen engagement and 
democratic deepening. She pointed out that citizen participation and engagement 
was not driven deterministically by adoption of IT; rather, it was contingent upon 
individual resources, capacities, and predispositions, and on how collective 
action organisations and other groups used the greater access to information 
now available to them to influence and mobilise people. Additionally, effective 
deployment of ICTs rests on a complex interplay of factors, such as government 
and corporate investment priorities, market conditions, and the way that 
governments use ICTs for better governance, and sociocultural values. Although 
Raman (2006, 2008) focused on ICT use within the physical spaces of 
institutionalised CSOs and government offices, this study examines the nature 
and activities of CSOs as they adopt or operate increasingly on ICT-based 
platforms and spaces.  
Research Focus and Objectives: ICT–Civil Society Relationships 
in an ‘IT City’    
The focus of this thesis always has been the interactions between civil 
society and new technologies in Bangalore, India’s “IT City”. The initial research 
topic centered on investigating the rising influence of technology-enabled elites in 
Bangalore, a group that has been labelled positively as the “new barbarians” 
(Angell & Ezer, 2006), and critically as the “new techno-class” (Sreekumar, 2010) 
and “new civil society” (Benjamin, 2010). An early study direction was to examine 
the influence of this group on urban governance priorities, and the subsequent 
imaginations of the city, particularly the aspiration to make Bangalore a “global” 
or “world-class” city. The study of the rise of new political entities, such as expert-
led task forces, and their influence on urban policy, was to be an extension of 
research on Bangalore’s role in the global information economy or “information 
society”. Another aspect of the planned research was the resistance by civil 
society groups to elite-led imaginations of the city, and the socioeconomic-spatial 
fallout of Bangalore’s global aspirations.  However, upon commencement of 




academics, and observations convinced me to modify the research focus, for 
several reasons. First, I became aware that others already were conducting such 
research, particularly with respect to the role of the IT industry and other elites in 
the State government-appointed task forces, BATF (Bangalore Agenda Task 
Force) and its successor, ABIDe (Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and 
Development Task Force).5 Second, in light of the extensive literature on the role 
of elites, including individuals and NGOs, informants and interviewees 
encouraged me to undertake research on other, less-researched aspects of 
Bangalore’s IT paradigm.  
A Snapshot of the Case Studies 
As I grappled with potential research directions, preliminary interviews with 
a variety of key government and non-government actors pointed me in the 
direction of ICT-enabled civic and political engagement by civil society. Because I 
had decided to employ a case study approach—which is suitable for an 
exploratory investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin, Case study research: Design and methods, 2014)—the next step 
was to establish criteria and to identify cases that fit these criteria. The two 
chosen case studies emerged gradually in response to Internet searches, 
literature reviews, data gathered during fieldwork, and preliminary data analysis. 
The environmental network Hasiru Usiru was the first case to be shortlisted, as it 
already had been identified as an activist civil society group that had emerged to 
tackle challenges associated with haphazard IT-led growth, including the 
emphasis on “global” or “world-class” infrastructure priorities at the cost of lives, 
livelihoods, public spaces, and greenery (Benjamin, 2010; Goldman & Longhofer, 
2009; see also Enqvist, Tengo, & Bodin, 2014). Because that network functioned 
largely through a mailing list of almost 900 members, was characterised by a 
high level of online activity, and occupied a prominent space in the public sphere, 
it also met the requisite case study criteria. The blog-based discussion platform 
                                                             
5Sami (2013) undertakes a detailed examination of how elite groups of urban actors 
have exercised power by participating in city planning and policy processes under the 




Praja.in (Praja), with its social media presence and rising public profile, emerged 
as the second case that would make for a comparable case study. The table 
below provides a brief description of both cases.  
 
Case Study Description 
Hasiru Usiru 
(meaning “greenery is 
life”) 
A network of individuals and city-based 
community organisations working to protect 
public spaces, public commons, and urban 
greens in and around Bangalore. Members 
interact through a yahoo discussion group 
(HasiruUsiru@yahoogroups.com), which has 
been a real-time source of information and 





“citizen” or “public”) 
A networking platform for active and 
concerned citizens, which aims to act as a 
bridge between such responsible citizens and 
the government. Towards that end, it has 
established an Internet-driven community to 
make the connection at local levels. With the 
creation of its advocacy arm, Research, 
Analysis and Advocacy Group (RAAG), in 
2011, Praja has moved from the online to 
offline realm by taking crowd-sourced ideas 
from the platform towards execution on the 
ground. 
 
Both cases shared certain defining characteristics: they were highly visible 
in online and offline public spheres, both were primarily comprised of middle 
class actors, and both were closely involved in urban transport and mobility-
related issues, which dominated the online discussion at the time of data 
collection. Hasiru Usiru was a more established civil society entity, having 
emerged as a collaborative effort among established conventional CSOs in the 
early 2000s. The network’s core mandate was environmental protection, with a 
thrust on preservation of urban commons, such as street trees, lakes, and other 
public spaces. Hasiru Usiru’s more current focus on sustainable public transport 
and mobility, while related to the network’s ‘green’ objectives, was also reflective 
of its concern for the urban poor and other marginalized groups, as well as its 




primarily through a moderated Yahoo mailing group that provides a common 
platform for discussion and enabled the sharing of archival, human and other 
resources.   
Praja, founded in 2007, was designed as a platform to enable greater 
citizen engagement and citizen-government interaction in Bangalore. Co-created 
by three software professionals, it was originally conceived of as a purely 
Internet-based platform for members to discuss issues of mutual interest and to 
address local civic problems. Posts cover a wide variety of topics, including 
garbage management, lake preservation, political reforms, public hygiene, 
community events, solar power, pedestrian safety, and sustainable public 
transportation. At the time of fieldwork, conversations on the site pertaining to 
transportation and mobility appeared at regular intervals and often dominated 
discussions, which allowed for comparisons with Hasiru Usiru. From 2009 
onwards, key members began to initiate the move toward greater lobbying and 
advocacy activities on the ground, and undertook important advocacy projects in 
the areas of public transportation, such as rail, bus, and cycling. 
Although further examination of the case studies revealed salient 
differences in agendas and modes of claim making, their interests converged 
around the common theme of sustainable development. Towards this end, both 
groups were advocating for sustainable public transportation as the key to the 
city's sustainable development. Hasiru Usiru's activities in this regard included 
protest and advocacy campaigns against road widening projects and the 
proposed elevated rail system, the Metro. A study of the public bus system was 
also undertaken with the objective of making it a more user-friendly, comfortable, 
and affordable mode of transportation, particularly for the city's vulnerable 
groups, who often had no other means to commute. Praja's efforts in this area 
focused on non-motorized transport (NMT) advocacy, including cycling, the bus 
priority system to speed up public buses, and the suburban train service that was 
approved by the Central government in 2013 after sustained lobbying by RAAG. 
The corresponding thrust on sustainable development and emphasis on 




compare the two Internet-based civil society entities. The criteria for selecting the 
case studies and the process of identifying these cases are explained in the 
methodology chapter.  
Once the case studies were identified, initial interviews suggested that 
issues that generally were considered unproblematic, such as attitudes toward 
and perceptions of ICTs for democratic engagement, needed to be explored 
further. Additionally, questions regarding strengths and limitations of ICT use, 
particularly within the IT City context, raised several unexpected and interesting 
themes. These early findings, and the limited literature in this area, convinced me 
that the study was both timely and relevant.  
Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the following research 
areas/theories: (1) ICTs and civil society, including literature on ICTs and social 
movements, protests and activism, and ICTs and civic and political engagement; 
(2) ICTs, civil society and democratic engagement in India, including the 
evolution of civil society, distinction between civil society and political society, 
and the rise of “new” civil society in India; and (3) the relationship between new 
technologies and cities in the age of globalisation and informatisation. The 
chapter also includes a section on Bangalore, with a detailed description of the 
city's historical evolution relating to technological/IT context and its civil society 
sphere, which explains its significance as the site of the study. These various 
approaches are combined to create a framework within which the attitudes and 
uses of ICTs by civil society actors for civic and political engagement in 
Bangalore can be examined. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology, 
including methods of data collection and analysis, and it describes ethical issues 
that cropped up at various stages of the research. Chapter 4 presents the 
findings related to the civil society context in Bangalore, which focuses on the 
contextual factors that emerged as important in the worldview of participants with 
regard to the ICT–civil society relationship in the city. This provides a detailed 




detailed case studies of Hasiru Usiru and Praja respectively, and Chapter 7 
undertakes a comparison of the two case studies. Chapter 8 sums up the 
discussion of the previous chapters, presents the conclusions for the study, 
discusses its theoretical and practical contributions, and identifies some of its 




























CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic framework for 
understanding the findings that emanate from this study, which is at the 
intersections of the relationship between ICTs and civic and political 
engagement, civil society and democratic activity, and between ICTs and cities in 
the contemporary knowledge or information economy. Secondly, this chapter 
also includes a section on Bangalore, with a description of the city's 
IT/technological context and its civil society sphere, which explains its 
significance as the site of the study. The literature review and description of 
Bangalore also serve to highlight the research gaps regarding ICTs for civic and 
political engagement, particularly in the Indian context, which provide the basis 
for the research questions that are presented at the end of the chapter.  
ICTs and Civil Society for Democratic Engagement  
ICTs and Social Movements, Networked Communities, Protests and 
Activism 
Literature on civil society is increasingly focused on its mobilisations 
through new technologies, particularly in the form of new social movements and 
new forms of activism. In fact, the increased access to, and use of, new ICTs for 
social and political activism by citizens’ groups, civil society movements, and 
NGOs is often cited as an important step towards effective action in their relevant 
fields. The unprecedented popularity of the Internet has resulted in a new wave 
of studies focused on its impact on civil society, mostly in relation to community 
associations and contentious democratic politics (Carty, 2010; Ester & Vinken, 
2003; Jensen et. al, 2007; Wellman, 2010). The role of the Internet as a temporal 
space for political and communicative action, participation, and mobilisation has 
also been described in terms of a ‘bottom up’ approach of self-initiated civic 
activism that is active elsewhere than the traditional sphere of institutionally 
organised participation (Häyhtiö and Rinne, 2008). The thesis reviews literature 




of ‘politics’” (Van De Donk et al., 2004, p. 2), in which social movements, 
networked communities, and other loosely structured civil society groups play an 
important role. In particular, this section focuses on ICT-enabled, social 
movements, communities and activism, focusing on their contributions to 
enhancing democratic engagement.    
A vast array of academic scholarship has examined the impacts of ICTs 
on social movements, where political activity and political struggle have been re-
conceptualised. Castells (2007) has noted that social movements, which are a 
permanent feature of society, act on the global network structure that is currently 
prevalent, and enter the battle over minds by intervening in the global 
communication process. Social movements and new forms of political 
mobilisation of the information age, while rooted in offline spaces, are evolving 
towards a new organisational model built around the networked and mediated 
communication realm of the Internet (ibid).6 Pointing to the proliferation of studies 
and the diversity of perspectives examining the relationship between ICTs and 
social movement, Garrett (2006) organised existing scholarship within a common 
framework, to provide a coherent overview of the field at a glance.  
The study of what people do online is important, and one aspect of social 
movement and contentious politics research involves empirical examination of 
prevalent forms and tactics of online activism (see Van De Donk et al., 2004). 
Earl (2006) examined four protest tactics on the Internet, viz., petitions, letter-
writing and email campaigns, and boycotts, and pointed to the reappropriations, 
or repurposing, of classic social movement tactics. Although the Internet can 
                                                             
6 Castells (2001) had earlier identified three reasons for the indispensability of the 
Internet for social movements emerging in the network society: firstly, where 
communication of values and mobilisation around meaning become fundamental, 
movements can reach out to those who would adhere to their values, and from there 
affect the consciousness of society as a whole. Secondly, with the decline of vertically 
integrated organisations inherited from the industrial era, loose coalitions, semi-
spontaneous mobilisations, and ad hoc movements of the neo-anarchist brand substitute 
for permanent, structured, formal organisations. Emotional movements, often triggered 
by a media event, or by a major crisis, seem often to be more important sources of 
social change than the day-to-day routine of dutiful NGOs. The third factor is the 
increasing globalisation of social movements, while simultaneously being rooted in their 





replicate and complement current collective action repertoires, there are also 
perceptible differences between the two mediums. For instance, Postmes & 
Brunsting (2002) have noted that motivations and forms may differ for online and 
offline collective action. Their study showed that cognitive calculations, rather 
than movement identification, drove online action, and that the Internet affected 
the nature of collective action and social movements, due to the influx of 
peripheral members and traditional non-activists. Similarly, Van Laer & Van Aelst 
(2010) have distinguished between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of collective action, and 
describe the former as ‘Internet-supported’ actions, i.e. traditional tools of social 
movements that have become easier to organise and coordinate with the advent 
of the Internet. New forms, on the other hand, are called ‘Internet-based’, as they 
exist only because of the Internet. However, they also recognise that this 
distinction is often blurred, since the online and offline spheres are heavily 
interdependent, with action groups drawing on a myriad of tactics at a time (ibid, 
p. 234). Carty (2010, 2011) critically examined the ways in which novel 
repertoires of grassroots mobilisation have been applied to institutional politics, 
thereby reconceptualising political struggle and the public sphere. She has 
highlighted that e-experiments in mobilisation and fundraising by social 
movement and grassroots organisations have enabled net activism to be 
combined with meaningful political engagement. 
Central to the success of networked social movement activity has been 
the rise of new types of online communities, and linkages between online and 
offline communities in the pursuance of democratic goals. The Internet has 
created two types of online communities that may facilitate a public sphere: (1) 
physically based online communities, and (2) geographically dispersed online 
communities (Nah, 2010). In recent years, there has been a re-conceptualisation 
of the concept based on online and/or offline social network ties rather than just 
shared geography (Haythornthwaite, 2007; Haythornthwaite & Kendell, 2010), as 
well as in terms of networks (Bennet, 2003; Wellman, Boase, & Chen, 2002). As 
a growing body of research is addressing the synergies between online and 




and offline communities is increasingly described in terms of ‘networked 
communities’ (Biddix & Park, 2008; Nah, 2010). In general, the term ‘networked 
community’, which evolved from Castells’ (2000) ‘network society’, Rheingold’s 
(2000) ‘virtual community’, and Wellman’s (2001) ‘networked individualism’, 
refers to the use of ICTs by groups with converging interests to achieve social 
and development goals. These networked communities of interest can, in 
themselves, be considered a form of collective action, and have a potentially 
important role as democratic agents, within and as civil society (see Rao, 2012). 
More recently, academic research has focused on the strengths and 
limitations of the wave of public protests and collective actions that have swept 
large parts of the world since 2009. This includes the pro-democracy protests in 
Iran, the Arab Spring protests and ‘revolutions’, the various Occupy protests, the 
anti-corruption and anti-rape protests in India, and countless other forms of 
activism and demonstrations, both civil and the less democratic or ‘uncivil’ forms. 
Castells (2012) explored the role of Facebook, Twitter, and the Internet in 
general, during the political crises and uprisings that took place across the world 
in 2011, and the subsequent impacts on the movements themselves. He also 
identified some common, emerging patters of these protest movements: they 
were networked simultaneously in various ways, including mobile and personal 
networks; they had the hybrid ability to connect via online networks and to 
occupy important urban public spaces; they were spontaneous and viral, which 
triggered fear, outrage and hope; their horizontal nature undercut the need for 
leadership, which also promoted flexibility of goals and demands; and that they 
were political in essence, espousing democracy and public participation. 
Although the Internet has undoubtedly played a central role in the upsurge of 
global protests and activism in recent years, it important to move beyond entirely 
optimistic or sceptical accounts, and to maintain a critical, contextualized 
perspective on the relation between technology and politics at the local, national, 
and transnational levels (Christensen, 2011). Axford (2011) attempted to move 
beyond reductionist accounts by re-examining the role of social media in the 




These were the different local conditions within the MENA countries; the extent to 
which ‘old’ media, such as print and broadcast journalism, were displaced or 
downgraded as forums for public talk; the relative prominence of different 
technologies and formats in the uprisings; variations among the actual players 
(activists and the audience), including their composition and motivations; and the 
varied effects of social media on the conduct and impact of the uprisings. 
Similarly, noting the limited range of studies that provided a holistic blend of 
social and political movement theory and media and communication theory and 
practices, Cammaerts, Mattoni, & McCurdy (2013) have examined protest 
movements from the point of view of the processes and practices of interacting 
with and through media, and the communication practices of activists. The 
tensions and challenges in the relationship between protest movements and 
mediation point to the continued relevance of offline media and face-to-face 
communication, and the need for scholars to focus on the interactions and 
interfaces between online and offline environments during mobilisations (Rucht, 
2013).   
Although much of the literature discussed in this section has originated in 
and is about ICTs, civil society and socio-political change in the North American 
and European contexts, there is a plethora of scholarship emerging from other 
parts of the world as well. In recent years, the increased penetration of the 
Internet has also been associated with a spurt of social action in Asia, producing 
rich literature on the relationship between ICTs and civil society in the Asian 
context. Nowhere is this more apparent than in China, which, with the largest 
number of Internet users in the world, has seen has explosion of literature on the 
social, cultural, and political implications of China’s ICT revolution (Yang, 2003; 
Zhang & Zheng, 2009). More recently, the role of new media technologies in 
fuelling Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Revolution”, and its challenge to China’s 
authority, including its control of the Internet, has been widely discussed in the 
mainstream and alternative media (Fang, 2014; Parker, 2014). In India, in recent 
years, ICT-enabled protests in urban centres, such as the anti-corruption 




academic and mainstream media interest (Ahmed & Jaidka, 2013; Barn, 2013; 
Bute, 2014; Harindranath & Khorana, 2014).  
In general, a defining feature of new ICT-enabled protests has been the 
visuals emerging from them, which has provided immediate publicity and 
galvanised support for their myriad causes (Axford, 2011). Images and videos 
taken by protestors or passers-by using mobile phones have become the modus 
operandi (MO) for street protests, and the interplay of mainstream and social 
media turning them to grand spectacles (ibid; Lynch, 2014; Nanabhay & 
Farmanfarmaian, 2011). The spectacle of these collective actions have tended to 
dominate academic and media attention, and shaped the discourse on ICTs and 
democratic activity. It is for this reason—as I mentioned in the introduction—that 
the thesis focuses, instead, on acts of ICT-enabled civic and political 
engagement that often occur away from the media spotlight. 
ICTs and Civic and Political Engagement  
Banaji & Buckingham (2013, p. 1-2) have noted that civic activism and 
new social movements, which have generated a considerable amount of 
academic commentary, “need to be set within the wider context of civic and 
political uses of new media, many of which are more mundane and less 
spectacular”. Civic and political engagement can be defined in relation to “civic 
culture”, which Banaji & Buckingham (2013) saw as a continuum, ranging from 
organised public activities and associations of various kinds, through 
“parapolitical” activities such as campaigning, volunteering, and community 
activism, to politics in the more formal, official sense of parties and governments. 
In their usage, political engagement implies an adversarial relationship, and 
involves solidarity with certain groups, while civic engagement is a broader 
concept, involving some form of involvement in the public sphere. They 
highlighted various forms and degrees of ICT-enabled participation, noting that 
some experiences may be well sustained and profound while others could be 
brief and episodic (such as signing a petition), some could be frustrating, while 




has noted that civic engagement via social media, in particular, urban media, 
includes grassroots and institutional participation on a wide range of issues, from 
crisis management to issues of food, gardening, and environment conservation. 
Such concerns, including sustainability, have been at the forefront of political 
agendas in cities, technology-enabled forms of organising have great potential to 
contribute to healthier and more sustainable cultural practices (Foth, Forlano, 
Satchell, & Gibbs, 2011).  
An area in which there is growing interest is the study of how young 
people use the Internet for civic and political engagement (Banaji & Buckingham, 
2013; Loader, 2007; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014; Olsson & Dahlgren, 2010), 
including in developing countries of South and Southeast Asia (David, 2013; 
Ilavarasan, 2013; Zhang & Lallana, 2013). These studies report on the variety of 
ways in which ICTs enable youth to (re-)engage with political and social issues, 
outside the formal arena of politics, and in a manner that they are comfortable 
with. Banaji & Buckingham (2013) have focused on how young people use and 
interpret a range of youth-oriented civic sites. David’s (2013) study investigated 
how already engaged Filipino youth used ICTs to bolster their advocacy and 
lobbying activities. Loader’s edited volume (2007) has provided several empirical 
analyses of young people’s online activities, as well as initiatives designed to 
engage young people in democratic politics. This scholarship notes that ICTs, 
particularly social media technologies such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, 
provide a channel for youth to voice their opinions and connect with other like-
minded individuals and groups, often through networks that they had a part in 
creating and sustaining. At the same time, there is a recognition of the 
complexities and limitations of such engagement, such as the continued 
persistence of digital divides, chaotic information gluts that overwhelm and 
isolate users, the promotion of extremist or anti-democratic discourse, and a 
tendency for dominant voices to shape discussions, which could alienate users 
and further disengage them political and civic issues and processes (Banaji & 
Buckingham, 2013). Further, the offline context plays an important role in 




his study lacked motivation to participate in political affairs, due to reasons such 
as corruption, and a perceived inability to effect political change. While the 
community service (engagement) dimension was greater that the political 
activism dimension, he did not rule out the possibility of political engagement, 
citing the capabilities and opportunities available to Indian youth.  
The role of ICTs in fuelling instances of civic and political engagement in 
Asia has been another area of scholarly interest in recent years. In China, state 
surveillance, censorship, intervention and intimidation has not stemmed the rising 
tide of civic engagement and collective action, particularly on environmental, 
livelihood and civil rights issues (Hassid, 2012). Noting that most studies have 
examined digital activism in China, Chen (2014) has highlighted the importance 
of conducting research on civic and political engagement, and pointed to recent 
studies that serve as useful examples in this endeavour. In Singapore, a South 
East Asian nation with a limited democratic set-up, the Internet has played a dual 
role in civil society and politics. On the one hand, alternative news sites, bulletin 
boards, discussion groups, and political blogs have mushroomed, emboldened 
by the government’s lighter touch approach to new media use (Baber, 2002; 
Soon & Cho, 2014). In addition, political parties and the ruling elite have begun to 
adopt a variety of e-engagement measures, including personal blogs, Facebook, 
and Twitter, to bridge the gap between them and an increasingly IT-savvy and 
critical electorate (Soon & Soh, 2014). These initiatives point to the gradual 
blooming of civil society and the expansion of the public sphere in Singapore. On 
the other hand, increased surveillance, auto control or self-censorship by 
citizens, and recent convictions of bloggers point to the limitations of the Internet 
for free speech and civic and political engagement in the city-state (Baber, 2002; 
Lee, 2005, 2013; The Online Citizen, 2015). In democratically robust South 
Korea, the rapid pace of informatisation and spread of the Internet have 
contributed to an active civil society, which, supported by ‘digital citizens’, has 
challenged the state in various ways (Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2014). In South Asia, civil 
soceity within the democratically fragile state of Pakistan has benefitted 




use hacking as a disruptive political communication tool (Hussain & Howard, 
2012). In addition, mainstream political parties have also been able to read and 
respond to public opinion online, helping them to activate large networks of 
voters (ibid). 
India is home to wide range of ICT-enabled initatives that have aimed to 
adress growing socio-economic inequities and the digital divide, to revitalise 
governance and public policy, disrupt existing gender relations, with varying 
degrees of success (Saith, Vijayabaskar, & Gayathri, 2008; Sreekumar, 2011). 
There has also been a proliferation of online communities, e-forums, mailing 
groups, and other e-civil society forms collaborating with local and global actors 
to network and build solidarity on a wide range of issues, such as health, 
enviornmental protection, transparency and good governance, among others 
(Desouza & Dutta, 2008; Enqvist, Tengo, & Bodin, 2014; Rao, 2012). However, 
despite the plethora of initiatives that have emerged in recent years that leverage 
ICTs for civic and political engagement, a combined and sustained effort is yet to 
be made to document and analyse these. As the introduction has made clear, 
there is a growing body of evidence that charts the relationship between ICTs 
and activism, (new) social movements and protests in India. However, as my 
fieldwork and data collection efforts have revealed, accounts of civic and political 
engagement initiatives are often anecdotal, confined to organisational reports 
that are not easily accessible, and whose existence is made known primarily 
through personal contacts, social networks and word-of-mouth, rather than 
existing (academic) literature. This requires some level of immersion in civil 
society activity, and acquaintance with civil society groups and networks. The 
complexities of changing civil society in India, and its relationship to ICTs, is 
explained in the following section.    
Civil Society: Old and New, the Middle Classes, and ICTs in India 
While the concept of ‘civil society’ has a long history in European and 
American thought, an upsurge of global interest in civil society in modern times is 




growth of democracies in the post-Cold War era (Cox, 1999; Hajnal, 2002; 
Tandon & Mohanty, 2003). More recently, the pervasiveness of ICTs has 
precipitated a revival of interest in civil society, with the possibilities and impacts 
of new technologies on civil society’s democratic activity and credentials being 
endlessly debated. Civil society is defined and understood in various ways, which 
Foley and Edwards (1996) point out, are reflective of the particular contexts to 
which they have been applied. Two prominent versions of the ‘civil society 
argument’ include firstly, the positive effects of associational life in fostering 
patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity. The second 
version emphasises the importance of civil society as independent of—and 
therefore, as an effective counterweight to—the (non-democratic) state (ibid). In 
the Indian context, civil society comprises a variety of organisations and 
institutions that occupy the space between state and market, such as protest 
movements, developmental NGOs, religious organisations, and lobbies for 
different market-based actors such as chambers of commerce, and social and 
cultural clubs (Sreekumar, 2011). The relationship between the state and these 
entities is characterised by continuous vicissitudes, and varies according to 
place/region, nature of the state, and whether interests converge or diverge at a 
particular point in time (ibid; Goswami et. al., 2012). This section begins with a 
brief historical outline of the development of civil society in India, with an 
emphasis on the distinction between “old” and “new” civil society, and the 
intertwining relationship between civil society and the middle classes in India. 
This section also examines the role of the middle classes in increasingly 
leveraging ICTs for democratic engagement, and points to the rise of a new 
“techno-middle class” in the context of the knowledge/information society.  
Historical Evolution of Civil Society in India  
Civil Society in the Colonial State  
In the Indian context, the history of civil society is usually traced back to 
the colonial period, which witnessed extensive civil activities and a wide 




categories of civil society activity during the mid-to-late colonial period, the first 
being the philanthropy of Christian missionaries, who built schools, colleges, 
dispensaries, and colleges. The second category was initiated by an Indian 
bourgeoisie that had become well versed in English literature, culture, 
associational life, liberal politics and associated practical orientations (see also 
Chatterjee, 2001; Kaviraj, 2001; Sahoo, 2013).7 Roy (1993) has pointed out that 
the introduction of English produced urban elites, as well as an aspiring urban 
middle class that adopted English for the resultant social and economic gains. 
This middle class, with its access to European worldviews, also became 
concerned with age-old practices and customs that were deemed counter to 
human rights and social justice (Behar & Prakash, 2004; Sahoo, 2013). This 
period saw the establishment of voluntary and social reformist organisations, and 
from the late nineteenth century, political associations that began to demand 
inclusion of Indians in the governing structure and access to civil and political 
rights (ibid). English and vernacular papers that mushroomed during this period 
provided socio-political spaces for critical discussion, and mobilised public 
opinion against the British rule (Ahooja-Patel, 2001). Although the British 
introduced English to maintain and consolidate British economic and political 
power, it was, paradoxically, the English educated who led the nationalist 
movement from its inception (Roy, 1993). Although the Indian National Congress 
(INC) had been established in 1885 to facilitate greater share in government for 
educated Indians, the entry of M.K. Gandhi transformed the Congress from an 
elite organisation into a mass-based party that was at the forefront of the 
freedom struggle (Sahoo, 2013; Varshney, 1998). Gandhi gave impetus to the 
third kind of civil society activity, based on voluntary action and constructive work 
leading to the self-reliance of villages (Behar & Prakash, 2004). During this time, 
several organisations for the welfare of women, lower castes and tribals, and 
generally for the rural poor came into existence, which drew these hitherto 
excluded sections of society into the national movement, as well as into the 
                                                             





growing voluntary sector (Sheth & Sethi, 1991). As a result of the efforts by 
Gandhi and the Congress party, voluntary civil society organisations began to 
flourish in the 1920s and 1930s, and by the time of independence, the entire civil 
society space was occupied by the party and affiliate organisations inspired by 
Gandhian ideals (ibid; Sahoo, 2013).    
Civil Society in Post-Colonial India: Development NGOs and the Era of “Old 
Civil Society” (1947-1989) 
Religious and Gandhian organisations working on a variety of welfare and 
development issues, such as health, education, village industries, handicrafts, 
training of government officials, famine relief, etc., continued to dominate the civil 
society landscape after independence. The early decades also saw the rise of a 
new strain of civil society actors, who preferred to distance themselves from their 
parent political parties, and undertake issues considered unimportant from an 
electoral point of view (Sheth & Sethi, 1991). A concern about the exploitation of 
the poor became the central agenda item for these activists, who focused on 
social and economic justice rights, land reforms, tenancy rights, minimum wages 
for landless labour, removal of bondage and slavery, tribal rights, and the rights 
of slum dwellers and destitutes (ibid). The development of civil society during the 
tenure of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister (1947-1964) was inspired 
by his vision of an ideal socialist state, centralised planning and modernisation 
(Sahoo, 2013). Nehru’s belief in a scientific consideration of the problem of social 
welfare resulted in the state morphing into a “developmental state”, directly 
intervening in the voluntary sector, with an emphasis on professional expertise, 
science, technology, and planning for economic development (ibid; Watt, 2011).8 
Accordingly, as Nehru’s visions of state-led capital-intensive development and 
poverty reduction gained precedence, NGOs largely served to provide welfare 
and relief (Kudva, 2005). Thus, during the Nehruvian period, voluntary groups 
and activities, particularly Gandhian NGOs, were promoted and funded by the 
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state’s welfare budget. As the NGOs moved closer to the state and their reliance 
on government funds increased, they were incorporated as “silent partners” into 
the state structure, and acted as its implementing agencies (ibid; Sheth & Sethi, 
1991; Sahoo, 2013). The state also launched community development and 
panchayati raj (PR) institutions in 1959 to create self-governing village structures, 
and to encourage people’s involvement in planned development (ibid; Sahoo, 
2013; Sheth & Sethi, 1991). Gandhi’s vision of self-sufficient and self-governing 
villages, and the new Indian state’s commitment to the reduction of poverty, 
greatly influenced the thrust on decentralisation in rural areas (Johnson, 2003; 
Singh, 1994). Accordingly, a three-tier PR system was introduced: gram 
panchayat (GP) at the village level, panchayat samiti at the block level, and zilla 
parishad at the district level. Members of all three units were elected by residents 
of the village they represented, and were responsible for all the planning and 
development work in their jurisdictions (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Singh, 
1994). Over a period of time, as it became clear that the PR system had failed to 
achieve the objectives of people’s participation and self-government, various 
committees and commissions were set up to revitalise its institutions (Johnson, 
2003; Singh, 1994). These efforts were instrumental in the drive to give 
panchayats constitutional status in the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution 
in 1993, which established the framework of a three-tiered panchayat system 
with regular elections throughout India (ibid; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004). The 
73rd Amendment Act gave the GP primary responsibility for implementing 
development programmes, as well as identifying the needs of villages under its 
jurisdiction. The Act also provided for reservations for weaker segments of the 
population, notably women, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, in proportion 
to their population in a panchayat area. The actual impacts of the PR system on 
decentralisation, rural development, and the empowerment of marginalised 
groups is a much debated issue, and several studies, including the ones cited 
above, have highlighted a myriad of factors undermining the power and 
autonomy of PR institutions. The relative merits and demerits of reservations in 




The period of the first Indira Gandhi government (1967-1977) witnessed 
the emergence of a mass-based civil society in response to the failures of the 
conventional institutions of planning, politics and development. Although the 
increasingly authoritarian government restricted civil society activity, factors such 
as growing populist policies, increasing corruption scandals, and the worsening 
economic situation resulted in a spate of anti-government agitations and political 
violence (Kaviraj, 1986; Sahoo, 2013). During Mrs. Gandhi’s imposition of a state 
of emergency (1975-1977) citizens’ civil and political rights were suspended, 
political activities were banned, free associationalism was cancelled, and press 
censorship was enforced. Ironically, the emergency also gave rise to thousands 
of grassroots movements protesting various acts of government-sponsored 
repression, and expanded the sphere of civil society to include rural and other 
marginalised populations (ibid). These new micro-movements were led by young 
men and women, many of whom left their professional careers to take up issues 
and constituencies that were abandoned or ill-represented by political parties, 
trade unions, and the bureaucracy (Sheth, 2004). These social movements of the 
1970s and 1980s highlighted issues of environmental sustainability and social 
justice, and were united in their opposition to the dominant ideology of 
development, which was identified as the root cause of persistent poverty and 
increasing inequalities in Indian society (see also Nilsen, 2007) In this way, the 
emergency played a fundamental role in the resurgence of the civil society 
discourse, and human rights movements grew rapidly during this period (Jobert, 
2011).  
The excesses of the emergency resulted in Mrs. Gandhi’s electoral defeat 
at the hands of the political opposition, which went on to form the government 
under the aegis of the Janata (meaning “people”) party. As part of the Janata 
government’s (1977-1979) emphasis on rural improvement, voluntary agencies 
assumed an important role in citizenship training, health education, family 
planning, upgrading of vocational skills, physical education and cultural activities 
in the countryside (Sahoo, 2013). The vastly increased funding and bureaucratic 




India, including Hindu nationalists (ibid). While participatory policies were 
boosted, the new government disappointed those hoping for an alternative model 
for civil society involvement in the political sphere (Jobert, 2011). Ultimately, the 
infighting among various factions of the Janata government, ideological 
differences over secularism, and the lack of a clear and dominant leadership 
paved the way for the return of a resurgent Indira Gandhi (ibid; Hewitt, 2008). 
During this tenure (1980-1984) as well, Mrs. Gandhi began to restrict the 
functioning of the NGO/voluntary sector, which became increasingly confined to 
welfare service delivery and apolitical development activities (Sahoo, 2013). This, 
however, did not stem the resurgence of thousands of informal grassroots 
organisations and people’s movements as a response to the failure of the state 
and political parties (ibid). The assassination of Mrs. Gandhi brought her son, 
Rajiv, to power with a massive electoral victory, and during his tenure as Prime 
Minister (1984-1991) assistance to the voluntary sector, particularly in social 
development, was significantly increased (Sahoo, 2013; Sinha, 2013). In order to 
improve service delivery to combat rural poverty, NGOs were actively promoted 
as service delivery agents, active partners in development, and as watchdogs. 
During this period, there was a shift from the state-centred, top-down approach to 
a civil society-oriented participatory approach towards development (Sahoo, 
2013). Detection of frauds and misuse of funds led to a suspicious of NGO 
activity, and necessitating that NGOs look for funding from abroad. While some 
did not want to seek foreign funding on account of their principles, others 
changed their ways to survive. This gave rise to a new form of NGO action—the 
Government Organised NGOs (or GONGOs!)—resulting in flourishing 
partnerships between governments and NGOs across the country for capacity 
development, advocacy, community action, and service delivery to remote 
regions (Sinha, 2013). Despite Rajiv Gandhi’s untimely demise in 1991, 
successive governments continued to recognise the role of NGOs as partners in 
development, in the belief that NGOs would be effective and efficient public 




Liberalisation, and the Changing Face of the “Old Civil Society” from the 
1990s 
With the implementation of liberalisation policies in the 1990s, there was a 
redefinition of the role of the state and the opening up of various sectors of 
governance to non-state actors, including CSOs. Economic liberalisation also 
effected an acceleration of state and foreign donor funding, as well as an 
increasing diversification among NGOs (Kudva, 2005). Goswami & Tandon 
(2013) have identified the changes in composition, roles and relationships in civil 
society as a result of the socio-political and economic changes the country has 
undergone since the 1990s. They noted that the mushrooming of voluntary 
organisations produced a variety of civil society forms, including religious 
organisations, societies formed by the central and the state governments, 
registered groups of micro-entrepreneurs, popularly known as self-help groups 
(SHGs), and corporate social responsibility (CSR) promoted by the burgeoning 
private sector, among others. Chandhoke (2011) has noted that in the 1990s, a 
striking shift from the vocabulary of social service and reform to that of 
empowerment, rights, development, governance, and accountability heralded the 
advent of new forms of civil society organising and activism. Consequently, a 
large number of CSOs became involved in development, and the field came to 
be increasingly dominated by professionalised NGOs, often sponsored and 
funded by donor agencies in the West, and more than willing to partner with the 
state in the delivery of social goods. This “professionalization” of civil society in 
India  brought a qualitatively different way of doing things, with campaigns 
replacing social movements, lobbying government officials replacing politicising 
the population, working through networks rather than civic activism, and a high 
degree of reliance on the media and the judiciary rather than on direct action 
(ibid). The changed nature of NGOs is also highlighted by Jayal (2001), who had 
described them as modern, bureaucratically structured organisations working in a 
wide range of areas, the most significant of these being development NGOs, 
through which international donors channel development aid for poverty 




hand over development tasks and of multilateral funding agencies to channel 
funds directly to NGOs. While such a system is lauded for the ability and 
willingness of NGOs to reach poor and marginalised communities, the NGO 
sector is also dogged by questions of accountability to its members and publics, 
particularly in terms of reporting its decision-making and utilisation of funds (see 
also Biswas, 2009). 
Social movement activism, which has been traced back to the time of 
independence, also underwent a transformation in the 1990s, with the 
emergence of the twin forces of liberalisation and Hindu nationalism (Ray & 
Katzenstein, 2005). During the rule of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party or BJP (1998-2004), civil society became fragmented along religious lines, 
and minorities were subject to marginalisation and violence (Behar & Prakash, 
2004; Sahoo, 2013). With the ascendance of the BJP and majoritarian Hindu 
politics, its associated organisations—known collectively as the Sangh parivar 
(family)—reigned as the most powerful and energised social movements. These 
movements became stronger by substituting religious populism for class politics, 
drawing in segments of the middle classes who wished for an escape from the 
failed development politics of the Nehruvian State (Ray & Katzenstein, 2005). 
The ideological swing towards markets and the dismantling of state subsidies 
and guarantees influenced social movement activity, resulting in a reconstitution 
of claims, changing alliances with the state and the poor, the involvement of 
transnational actors, and other adaptations to the twin pressures of Hindu 
nationalism and neo-liberal globalisation (ibid). In the urban context, Kumar 
(2008) pointed to a shift in the nature and objectives of social movements and 
mobilisations owing to the radical transformation of urban space after 
liberalisation in the early 1990s. He termed this as a shift towards NGO-oriented, 
multiple mobilisations, which profess to be non-political and non-partisan, and 
comprise mainly middle-class actors. The multiple forms of collective actions and 
mobilisations, working on a broad spectrum of issues in urban India are 
sometimes referred to in terms of 'new social movements' (NSMs). While this is a 




are neither class based, unconcerned with state power, raising issues that cut 
across class interests (see also Shah, 2004). This includes women’s, peace, 
environmental, identity, human rights movements, newer mobilisations in cities 
around housing, transport and other amenities, as well as movements that are 
anti-establishment and/or advocate greater democracy (Singh, 2014).  
The 1990s saw community-based organisations (CBOs) gain prominence 
in urban areas, notable among them Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), 
Neighbourhood Associations, and Apartments Associations, which represent the 
interests of residents of a specific urban or suburban locality. These associations 
are overwhelmingly middle class, with large numbers using the language of 
consumer-citizenship, and engaging with the government to principally address 
the interests of middle class citizens (Harris, 2007; Nair, 2005). In the specific 
context of urban India, the involvement of CSOs in city governance was further 
facilitated by constitutional changes like the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act 
(CAA) in 1992, which emphasised decentralisation and public participation in 
urban local bodies (ULBs). By conferring constitutional changes on ULBs, 
transferring to them the responsibility of urban development, and by allowing for 
the participation of women and other weaker sections through reservation, the 
74th amendment was a crucial reform in urban governance (Dhar Chakrabarti; 
Dupont, 2007). The Act also provided for the formation of ward committees 
(WCs) to deal with local issues. These were committees at the level of municipal 
constituencies consisting of elected representatives, municipal officers, and from 
civil society. In this way, the Act was significant in releasing city governments 
from the shackles of state (provincial) governments, and in encouraging CSOs to 
participate more fully in the governance of the city (ibid). Civil society 
participation in urban governance was further bolstered by the good governance 
discourse propounded by international agencies like the World Bank, 
contemporary urban reforms envisaged in government programmes like the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), and a series of 




Thus, the changed political scenario of the 1990s precipitated participation 
by middle-class civil society formations across urban centres, and spawned the 
rise of a new type of civil society. Binti Singh (2013) had outlined certain 
characteristics of this “new civil society”, such as the propagation of the principles 
of efficiency in governance, the bypassing of elected representatives and 
electoral mechanisms, and the employment of new, ‘non-political’ strategies, 
such as partnerships and media visibility, to stake claims to urban space and 
influence political action. The rising influence of this new kind of civil society in 
Indian metros has been viewed with alarm by critics who see them as elitist, and 
increasingly active partners in neoliberal frames of action (Benjamin, 2010). The 
shift to a new civil society, and the role of the technology-enabled middle classes 
in this transition, is examined after a discussion of the limitations and ambiguities 
of the “civil society” concept in India (below).  
Diversity, Uncivil Society, and the Civil Society-Political Society 
Dichotomy  
The thesis deems civil society an indispensable element of democratic 
polity, particularly in established democracies such as India, where it has kept 
power holders in check, and performed a wide range of developmental, 
community and other voluntary activities for the public good (Haynes, 2013; 
Sahoo, 2013). At the same time, is it important to acknowledge the limitations 
and ambiguities that riddle this sphere, such as its fractured nature, and the fact 
it is not an inherently virtuous space (Chandhoke, 2003; Sahoo, 2013; Tandon & 
Mohanty, 2003). The weaknesses of civil society include the various types of 
'incivility' inherent in associational forms comprising citizens who enjoy political 
rights, but are not constrained by the norms of civil society (Whitehead, 1997).9 
Kopecky (2003) has noted that much of the literature distinguishes between 'civil' 
and 'uncivil' society mainly on the basis of the use of violence, the ideals of the 
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organisations involved, and the internal organisation of groups.10 In the Indian 
context, “uncivil society” includes closed associations that are organised around 
the principles of primordial and ascriptive identities, such as caste, religion, and 
ethnicity, and which single-mindedly pursue an interest at the expense of others 
(Chandhoke, 2003; 2011). Examples of uncivil society include Hindu nationalist 
groups that have propagated the vision of a Hindu nation at the cost of minority 
groups (Chandhoke, 2011; Jayal, 2007). Another weakness is that the civil 
society sphere is not easily receptive to the voices of the excluded, and hence 
must be recognised as an exclusive and exclusionary sphere. Jayal (2007) has 
alerted us to the upper class and urban bias of the leadership of many CSOs, 
and the limited access of poor people to these organisations. Such 
problematisation of the civil society concept is necessary, and at the same time, 
becomes complicated in the context of developing countries such as India, which 
are characterised by a complex relationship between state and society that is 
influenced by their own post-colonial trajectories. Kaviraj & Khilnani (2001) have 
suggested that the ambiguities of ‘civil society’ in the ‘Third World’ or ‘South’ 
arise due to the variations within that entity, as well as the lack of a singular idea 
of civil society in the history of Western thought itself. Pointing to the advent of 
colonialism as the entry point of the colonial civil society discourses into non-
Western political discourse, they noted the mismatch between the (near-uniform) 
language of civil society in the developing world and the varied actual political 
processes vis-à-vis the West (ibid). Kaviraj (2001) has pointed to the extreme 
diversity in regimes produced by European colonialism, and highlighted India as 
an interesting case, comprising high levels of political ‘civility’ that were relatively 
rare in the generally violent history of colonial empires, as well as the generally 
orderly transfer of power. Nonetheless, even in India, this civil society’s tacit 
acceptance of liberal individualist premises of social existence was partial and 
limited, as was the restricted nature of the colonial civil society (ibid). These 
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developments proved consequential in shaping the nature and composition of 
civil society in post-colonial India.  
According to Partha Chatterjee (2001), an important distinction in the 
study of state-civil society relations in post-colonial countries such as India is the 
restricted domain of civil society institutions to a fairly small section of ‘citizens’. 
He, therefore, makes a distinction between institutions of ‘civil society’ that 
embody the (Western) ideas and desires of nationalist elites, and ‘political 
society’ as an alternative site of the Indian nationalist movement, built around the 
framework of modern nationalist political associations, such as political parties. In 
this categorisation, the modes of protest by ‘political society’ are not consistent 
with the associational principles of civil society, often assuming forms that are 
neither ‘progressive’ nor ‘legal’ (ibid, see also Gudavarthy & Vijay, 2007). 
Chatterjee’s famous distinction is valuable in understanding the historical 
evolution of civil society in post-colonial India, as well as in emphasising the 
exclusionary (middle class) nature of civil society. This dichotomy, however, has 
come in for some scrutiny in the face of recent empirical studies. Gudavarthy & 
Vijay (2007), for example, noted the potentially radical idea of ‘political society’ in 
identifying subaltern populations that are neither agents of the state nor civil 
society, but point to the fallacies of assuming that this alternative site is 
homogenous and united. Another critique of the dualistic conception of civil and 
political society comes from Fernandes, (2007, as cited in Kamath & 
Vijayabaskar, 2009), who argued that one cannot assume, firstly, a naturalised 
identification between civil society and middle class interests, and secondly, that 
Chatterjee ignores the highly differentiated groups that constitute the middle 
class in India, and their varied interests.11 The sharply stratified nature of civil 
society in Indian metropolises is clearly seen in Harris’ (2006, 2007) ethnographic 
studies of associational spaces in Bangalore and Chennai. However, as 
Ranganathan (2011) pointed out, his portrayal of the middle class/elite as law-
abiding rights-bearing, technocratic-oriented ‘civil society’, and the mapping of 
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the poor/vernacular subaltern classes onto the legally ambiguous, politically 
manipulable realm of ‘political society’ is problematic. Such portrayals leave little 
room for hybrid variations of the two, such as RWAs in peri-urban Bangalore, 
which, as her study shows, reveals characteristics of both civil and political 
society.   
The New Middle Classes, New Technologies, and Democratic 
Engagement 
The shift from an ‘old’ to a series of ‘new’ Indian middle classes, as a 
result of the policies of economic liberalisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
has been the subject of much academic interest and debate. Mazzarella (2005) 
noted that this shift is most generally explained as a move “away from an older, 
relatively coherent understanding of what ‘middle class’ connoted—classically, a 
Nehruvian civil service-oriented salariat, short on money but long on institutional 
perks—to a bewildering (and, to some, distasteful) array of new, often markedly 
entrepreneurial pretenders to the title”. He pointed out that the significance of the 
category as an important marker of identification, aspiration and critique in 
contemporary Indian public culture has generated “an obsessive public concern 
with the category “middle class” in post-liberalisation India. Research on the 
emerging middle classes has encompassed a wide range of topics, including 
how to define the middle class (Sridharan, 2004); its relation to liberalisation, 
including its contradictory effects (Fernandes, 2000a); consumption, including the 
moral and cultural effects of consumerism (Lakha, 1999); and the role of the 
media in propagating certain images of the middle class (Fernandes, 2000). 
Pointing to the conceptual ambiguity about the new middle classes (NMCs), 
Sridharan (2004) adopted a definition that combined income levels with non-
manual occupational status. Accordingly, he estimated the size of the middle 
class (depending on how it is defined in income terms) in 1998-1999 to be either 




248 million people (the “broadest” middle class).12 The McKinsey Global Institute 
report calculated that in 2010 the urban middle class, defined as households with 
disposable incomes from 200,000 to 1,000,000 rupees a year, comprised 50 
million, or roughly 5% of the population (Beinhocker, Farrel, & Zainulbhai, 2007). 
It predicted that by 2025 a continuing rise in personal incomes will spur a tenfold 
increase, enlarging the middle class to about 583 million people, or 41% of the 
population.   
Fernandes (2000) pointed out that the growing visibility of the NMCs is 
based on two parallel trends in recent years: a shift in public political discourse 
away from a focus on poverty reduction, and a growing public culture of 
consumption, particularly of goods ‘from abroad’. Therefore, the visual 
representations of wealth that was earlier deemed contradictory to Indian values 
(such as the “vulgar” display of wealth) now represent the new symbols of 
national progress. This image of the Indian nation, based on an idealised 
depiction of the urban middle classes and new patterns of commodity 
consumption, is reproduced in a wide array of public cultural forms such as 
advertisements, publications in the print media, and television programming. She 
also described the rise of the “new” middle class as an “invention”, pointing out 
that the “newness” involved a discursive production of a new image of the middle 
class, rather than the entry of a new social group into this class (Fernandes, 
2000a). Further, this invention rested on the portrayal of the NMC as the social 
group that is able to negotiate India’s new relationship with the global economy in 
both cultural (a new cultural standard based on consumption) and economic 
terms (ibid). Lakha (1999) similarly argued that the middle class identity was 
constructed through the consumption of global commodities, and highlighted the 
following factors that have resulted in the creation of such an identity: the 
Western/global influences of economic liberalisation; the Western/English 
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education of this class that predisposes them to foreign influences; a higher 
purchasing power that enables the possession of status symbols; and the 
transnational character of this class, and its relation to diasporic Indians, who are 
regarded as reference points by many middle class Indians. However, he also 
notes that the rise of global consumer icons and Western-style consumerism is 
not entirely at the exclusion of local style and cultural sensibilities, and middle 
class cultural identity, therefore, is a curious blend of global and local affiliations. 
Another area of great interest—which is also a central concern of the 
thesis—is the role of the NMCs in relation to democracy, and its commitment to 
democratic deepening. The question of whether this class is a democratising 
force or merely concerned with its own rising economic fortunes has both 
intrigued and divided scholars and social commentators. In his seminal work on 
the evolution and future of the middle class in India, Varma (1998) lamented the 
decline of civic responsibility and rising apathy towards political life by an 
increasingly consumerist middle class. He noted that ‘democracy fatigue’ and the 
perception that the electoral system no longer serves its interests had reduced 
middle class support for democratic politics. His critique rested on the notion that 
the overarching focus on self-gratification of the middle class made it impervious 
to the palpable suffering of the poor and vulnerable in the “other India”. 
Fernandes & Heller (2006) highlighted the “hegemonic aspirations” of the NMC, 
whose “politics of reaction” blends market liberalism and political and social 
illiberalism. This contradiction of middle class politics arises from the projection of 
a dominant fraction as a central agent in India’s drive to open and modernise its 
market economy, whereas on the other hand, significant segments of the NMC 
have played a key role in the rise of Hindu nationalism. Further, the strong 
ideological affinity of the urban middle classes to the corporate capitalist sector 
has moved it away from political society to civil society modes of activism, aided 
by increasingly influential print and visual media, the judiciary, and other 
independent regulatory bodies (Chatterjee, 2008).  
By the early 2000s, rising civic and political engagement practices, as 




metropolitan cities, prompted social critics to take note of the changing role of the 
NMCs vis-à-vis democracy (Varma, The great Indian middle class, 2007). As 
mentioned earlier, RWAs and other associations that represented the interests of 
residents of a specific urban or suburban locality were overwhelmingly middle 
class, with large numbers using the language of consumer-citizenship, and 
engaging with the government to principally address the interests of middle class 
citizens (Harris, 2007; Nair, 2005). Varma (2007) contended that the realisation 
by some middle class sections that they would have to engage with other 
constituencies to further their own interests precipitated the rise of middle class 
activism. Prominent cases of activism in the mid-2000s were campaigns for 
justice for Jessica Lal, Priyadarshini Matoo and Nitish Katara. Given wide 
publicity by the English-language media, these campaigns sought justice for the 
three young people that were allegedly murdered by the sons of politicians and 
bureaucrats. These campaigns were critiqued as being essentially for and by the 
middle classes, and for the undue influence of the (English-)media power 
(Ganesh & Ganesh, 2013; Varma, 2007). Nonetheless, they were successful in 
bringing the famously apathetic urban middle classes onto the streets (Sanghvi, 
2006; Singh, 2014). Through these protests, the urban NMCs were able to 
highlight and mount pressure on the authorities to repair the country's faulty 
systems, and became the precursors of the new citizen activism being witnessed 
today. In the early instances of middle class activism, the communications 
revolution—particularly SMS and electronic media—was a valuable ally in 
conveying middle class anger and galvanising it into collective action (Pathiyan, 
2006; Varma, 2007). This brings us to a discussion of the relationship of the 
NMCs to new technologies, and their role in influencing new forms of civic and 
political engagement.  
New Citizen Activism & Emergence of a “New Civil Society”    
Lakha (1999) noted that the influx and circulation of businessmen and 
middle-class professionals between India and developed countries contributed to 




this point with the example of late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s collaboration 
with former non-resident Indian (NRI) engineer and entrepreneur, Sam Pitroda, in 
sponsoring the ‘computer revolution’ in India in the late 1980s. This collaboration, 
he said, “symbolised the aspirations of India’s middle class through their 
identification with modern technological development” (p. 256). The push for 
technological modernisation that began under Rajiv Gandhi's regime created a 
corporate technology culture, with the urban, educated middle class at its core 
(Sarkar, 2008; Upadhya & Vasavi, 2008). From the early 1990s, with the advent 
of what has alternatively been called the “information age”, “knowledge-based 
economy” or simply “knowledge economy” (KE), characterised by the centrality of 
ICT networks, the new Indian middle class became associated with knowledge 
intensive work (ibid). The KE is characterised by the recognition of knowledge as 
a source of competitiveness, the increasing importance of science, research, 
technology and innovation in knowledge creation, and the use of computers and 
the Internet to generate, share and apply knowledge, and for the purposes of 
producing economic benefits (Banerjee, 2005; Rooney, Hearn, & Ninan, 2005).  
In the Indian information or knowledge economy, one of the most 
prominent sections of the new middle class are professionals employed in the 
information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services (ITeS) industries. This has 
produced an expansive literature on IT professionals in India, and the social, 
political and cultural implications of the globalisation of the software industry. 
Salient areas of research include cultural practices within the IT industry, health 
and socio-economic implications of industry labour practices and working 
conditions, social mobility generated by the sector, and issues of self, identity, 
gender relations and the nature of women’s agency, among others (D’Mello, 
2006; Lakha, 2003; Nadeem, 2009; Upadhya & Vasavi, 2006). Another area of 
increasing importance to scholars relates to the forms of engagement of IT 
professionals in civic life (Nair, 2005; Sarkar, 2008; Upadhya, 2009b). The rise of 
a knowledge-based professional middle class in the 'knowledge economy', and 
its increased participation and influence in social and political life, has already 




(Brint, 1994, 2001). In India, where this is a relatively new area of research, some 
studies have emphasised the conflicts between the interests and practices of IT 
professionals and subaltern publics, such as the urban poor (Nair, 2005; 
Upadhya, 2009b). On the other hand, while Angell & Ezer (2006) acknowledged 
the limitations of the philanthropic work of the IT-enabled middle class, including 
IT professionals, they did not see this as a weakness or limitation. Noting that 
concern for the less fortunate was often overlooked in the rush to amass fortune 
and success in the information age, these “New Barbarians” were viewed 
positively as reflective of a new entrepreneurial spirit emerging in the country 
(ibid).   
The advent of the information age has re-energised discussions on the 
role of tech-enabled NMCs in civil society and urban governance. Recent surges 
of ICT-enabled collective action, notably the anti-corruption and anti-rape 
campaigns, as well as the swell of support for the Aam Aadmi (“common man”) 
party, have brought a “new civil society” into focus. Comprising mainly urban, 
young, middle class citizens, with no specific political affiliation, and driven by a 
sense of morality (rather than ideology), this new civil society is stirred to action 
via visual and social media (Singh, 2014a). In defining the “new civil society”, the 
thesis combines Binti Singh’s (2013) “new civil society” that was discussed 
earlier with the new citizen activism highlighted by Richa Singh (2014a). This 
new civil society includes CSOs whose members are drawn from the urban, 
English-speaking, upper and middle classes, that seek re-engagement with civic 
and political life, although in ways that often exclude existing government and 
political systems (Jodhka & Prakash, 2011; Singh, 2013). This follows an 
increasing pivot of these classes towards a “new politics” centred on 
organisations in civil society, rather than political parties or trade unions (Jodhka 
& Prakash, 2011). Accordingly, new civil society groups are often—but not 
always—distant from developmental or “old” civil society, comprising NGOs, 
activist groups and other CBOs that have been traditionally associated with the 
civil society space in India. Gowda & Gupta (2010) have suggested that the 




are doing so in a non-traditional way, using ICTs to mobilise politically, influence 
policy and regain some measure of control over a changing political sphere.  
Both old and new civil societies in India are comprised primarily of 
segments that are urban, young, middle- and upper class, and English-speaking. 
NGO actors of the development era were drawn to civil society because it 
provided idealistic young professionals a means to express their commitment to 
the poor, and was also reflective of a lack of jobs among the educated youth, as 
well as a growing dissatisfaction with existing institutional arrangements in the 
country (Sheth, 2004; Sen, 1993). The professionalisation of the voluntary sector 
in the 1970s and 1980s attracted highly educated, qualified and cosmopolitan 
professionals, particularly to specialised and sometimes technical NGOs (Singh, 
n.d.) This changed the nature of the voluntary sector, which expanded to include 
working educated people from middle income groups, who earned a modest 
living out of the sector, although less than what they would have earned from 
work elsewhere (ibid). From the 1990s, with the maturing of the NGO sector, 
young professionals that entered the scene were motivated more by job 
prospects than by the commitment to social change (Sen, 1999). The difference, 
then, between the “old” and “new” civil society is not one of socio-economic 
distinction, or class. Rather, the thesis posits that what distinguishes the new civil 
society is: (a) activism by the new middle classes on issues of middle class 
significance, rather than for the poor and marginalised sections of society, as 
was the case historically, and (b) new civil society engagement is enabled by 
ICTs, as many of its actors either belong to technology-related professions, or 
are comfortable with new technologies. The popularity of Internet spaces for 
discussion, planning and mobilisation assumes greater significance with the 
almost total absence of mechanism for participatory involvement of citizens and 
accountability of local self-governance structures in cities (see Ramanathan, 
2007). This is explained further in the chapter “Civil Society Context in 
Bangalore”. Before moving on to explain this, however, it is imperative to first 
highlight the relationship between ICTs and cities in the knowledge or information 




The Relationship between ICTs and Cities  
The condition of cities that are deeply embedded in the global economy 
has occupied much scholarly attention since the ascendance of global capital in 
the 1980s. Economic globalisation and related processes, particularly the 
revolution in new technologies, have resulted in the weakening of the nation-
state, and the subsequent rise of sub-national spatial units, particularly at the 
level of the urban (Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2001). These new urban entities have 
been referred to variously as world cities (Friedmann, 1986), global cities 
(Sassen, 2000, 2001), and informational cities (Castells, 1989), to name a few. 
The restructuring of cities based on economic globalisation has close links with 
the growth of information technologies and high-technology information centres, 
wherein the technological and information ‘revolution’ has served to intensify 
globalisation and vice-versa (Castells, 1989). More recently, Sassen (2010) 
noted the resurgence of the city as a key research site due to the complex 
interactions of major new trends that reconfigure the urban order. She has 
pointed out that globalisation and ICTs undermine a key traditional duality in the 
social sciences, viz., that of the national and the non-national. In the changed 
global scenario, the city does not fit neatly into the scalar hierarchy that puts it 
beneath the national, regional and global. Instead, major cities comprise the 
spaces of the global, engaging the global directly, often by-passing the national. 
In this regard, Spivak (2000) referred to Bangalore’s “siliconization”, noting that 
its role in ‘electronic capitalism’ meant that “Bangalore is not in India, it is the 
open end that goes way out of a national left argument” (p. 13). She noted the 
“virtual” nature of software production that connects the city directly to the circuits 
of global capital, and points to the primacy of globalisation over the nation-sate in 
shaping the city.  
Authors have also highlighted the contradictions that arise in cities directly 
connected to the world economy, such as skewed income and occupational 
distribution (economic); a new class alignment, reflected in increased class 
cleavages between the new high-income urban elites and other categories of 




over-valorised sectors of the economy, i.e. the corporate economy, and their 
main beneficiaries (spatial); and increasing struggles between groups for their 
social reproduction needs, and the role of the state in these conflicts (political) 
(Castells, 1989, 1999; Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2000). While globalisation and 
related processes are not the sole factors in polarisations within the city, they 
have undoubtedly exacerbated existing divides, resulting in the rise of new socio-
economic and spatial structures.13 Castells (1989) pointed to a new form of urban 
dualism that arises as a result of the impact of high-technology industries on 
labour and the city, and the distinctly different usages of urban space that 
privilege the new professional-managerial class at the cost of lower-level labour. 
Hence, the informational city is by and large a “dual city”, characterised by social 
and spatial polarisation. This polarisation induces increasing integration of the 
social and spatial core of the urban system at the same time that it fragments 
devalued spaces and groups, and threatens them with social irrelevance 
(Castells, 1989, 1999).14 Such divisions are apparent in the 
downgrading/displacement of neighbourhood shops and businesses, the rise of 
gated communities and privatised public spaces kept under constant 
surveillance, the displacement and dispossession of poor and marginalised 
communities, rising job insecurity and the downward spiral of working and wage 
conditions, the loss of a sense of space among communities, etc. (ibid; Harvey, 
2008; Sassen, 2000).  
In the developing world, this situation is exacerbated by the new, 
influential role of local tech-savvy elites in setting the urban agenda, which 
involves the perpetuation of ideals and images that further marginalise 
disadvantaged city groups. One such near-homogenous imaginary being 
promoted around the world is that of the “global city”, which is used to promote 
                                                             
13 An important process that impacts the shaping of urban space is neo-liberal 
urbanisation, which, critics argue, moulds urban spaces in ways that enhance the city’s 
image at the cost of marginalised groups. See Brenner & Theodore (2002), Harvey 
(2008), and Jessop (2002) for more on the implications of the neo-liberal turn on the 
form of cities and the sites of resistance from embattled communities and sub-cultures.  
14 Castells (1999) notes that new informational technologies enhance the power 
relations that underlie pre-existing inequalities that have prevailed as a result of the 




and justify all manner of policies and programs (Dupont, 2011; Ellis, 2011; 
Goldman, 2010; Short, 2012). In India, the initiation of global/world city-oriented 
solutions and projects has resulted in development priorities shifts that have 
triggered mass displacements and mounting inequality. However, groups that 
arise to challenge prevailing development trajectories contest the hegemony of 
such visions in urban planning and practice. Hasiru Usiru and its affiliated groups 
are examples of sites of resistance in Bangalore, who struggle to reclaim city 
space from the on-going restructuring (Benjamin, 2010; Enqvist, 2012; Enqvist 
et. al., 2014; Goldman & Longhofer, 2009). Often, actors struggling for 
recognition and entitlement resort to political violence, but their claims lack the de 
facto legitimacy enjoyed by the new "city users" (Sassen, 2000, 2010). In 
emerging as a site for new claims by global capital and disadvantaged sections 
of the urban population, the city becomes a strategic terrain for a whole series of 
struggles and contradictions (Sassen, 2000; Harvey, 2008).  
As discussed in the Introduction, cities are also important as sites for 
protests and other types of collective action. As cities provide the basic elements 
for contention to develop, social movements and protests usually express 
themselves in public spaces of cities, particularly in capital and other ‘global’ 
cities (Therborn & Ho, 2009; Uitermark, Nicholls & Loopmans, 2012). Loopmans 
(2012) has maintained that cities must be viewed as constitutive of social 
movements, rather than as a blank canvas on which social movement activity 
unfolds. Pink (2009) notes that much of the literature on urban social movements 
has thus far focused on their manifestation in big cities, which are financial and 
political power centres.15 As cities are also sites of symbolic and social power, it 
is no coincidence that protests and other systemic challenges have claimed 
public space exactly where economic and political power concentrates 
(Uitermark, Nicholls, & Loopmans, 2012). Recent protest sites, such as Tahrir 
Square in Cairo, Puerta del Sol in Madrid, and Wall Street in New York are 
                                                             
15 She highlights the limited nature of such studies, noting the need to expand the 






reflective of this strategy. Further, while contention and mobilisations emanate 
from cities, they also stretch outwards to other geographical areas, linked by 
ideological and technological connections (Loopmans, 2012). Increasingly, the 
role of new media and ICTs are an additional dimension with which to analyse 
urban ‘insurgencies’ in Asia, particularly in mega-urban regions where social 
discontent has been fuelled by rapid and often haphazard transition to urban 
societies (Padawangi et. al., 2014). The Arab Spring protests, and street protests 
in Malaysia and India have started and been most visible in megacities, 
“acquiring a ‘dazzling’, larger-than-life image” (Singh, 2014a), with the support of 
old and new media channels. Lim (2014) has noted that as digital media and 
physical urban spaces have become interdependent dimensions of social and 
protest movements, more research is needed on the various inter-linkages 
between the two. She makes the association between urban space, digital media 
space and movements in terms of networks, which increasingly take the form of 
digital networks with the decline of traditional ways of social networking. With 
digital media, especially social media, integrally linked to the rhythms of daily 
sociality, digital urban networks can be potentially translated into social 
movement participation, as well as civic and political engagement (ibid).  
Setting the Context: Bangalore City  
In November 2006, Bangalore, the capital of Karnataka state in southern 
India, officially reverted to its pre-colonial and original city name, Bengaluru. 
Litterateurs and historians have pointed out that those speaking and writing in 
Kannada, the regional language of Karnataka, have always referred to the city in 
this way. Among other things, this section highlights the imagination of Bengaluru 
and Bangalore through the times, and the role of technology in these 
imaginations. With an estimated population of over 10 million in its urban area, 
Bangalore is the 18th most populous city in the world, and is one of the fastest-
growing cities in India (Francis, 2013; World Population Review, 2014). Along 
with population growth, the city’s boundaries have expanded as well. In 2007, the 




divisions or wards of the city’s municipal administration, the Bangalore 
Mahanagara Palike (BMP), with surrounding municipal and town councils, and 
villages to form a single administrative area. The newly formed Greater 
Bangalore Metropolitan Area covered an area of 741 km2, consisted of 198 
wards, and was governed by the BMP’s successor, the Bruhat Bengaluru 
Mahanagara Palike or BBMP (Nagendra, Nagendran, Paul, & Pareeth, 2012). 
Bangalore is significant as the site of the study for several reasons; the foremost 
being that the city has gained international recognition by virtue of the role its 
information technology (IT) industry has played in the global information 
economy. It is variously known as the “Silicon Valley/Plateau”, “IT City”, or the 
“information capital” of the country, due to its large concentration of IT (and other 
high technology) companies.16 This has made it an important focal point for 
software development in the Asian region and also the global arena. 
Management consultant Zinnov’s report on soft infrastructure in Bangalore 
(Zinnov, 2011) highlighted the following factors as crucial to the city’s leading 
edge in software, IT and R&D: its talent pool, R&D centres, cost arbitrage, its 
position as a hub for technical education, a hospitable start up landscape, and 
strong focus on innovation and research, among other factors.  
Often referred to as a “megacity” (Spivak, 2008) or modern “metropolis” 
(Nair, 2005), the city has built its software and high-tech industrial and research 
base upon its public sector and defence moorings (Heitzman, 1999, 2004; Nair, 
2005). Public sector undertakings (PSUs), such as Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), were established in the 
1950s and 1960s as part of Jawaharlal Nehru’s plan to turn Bangalore into 
India’s city of the future. Together, with national defence laboratories and the 
Indian Institute of Science, these PSUs formed the crux of Bangalore’s scientific 
foundations (Basant, 2006; Yahya, 2008). For these reasons, the promise of 
                                                             
16While there are several definitions of “high technology” industries, it is generally 
taken to mean the production of IT devices. A useful definition is provided by Markusen, 
Hall, & Glasmeier (1986), who identify high-technology industries on the basis of a 
greater-than-average proportion of engineers and scientists in the sector’s labour force 




Bangalore as a model for modern India, implicit in the concentration of science, 
technology and public sector industries, has loomed large in the national 
imagination since independence in 1947 (Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005). The city 
once again attained national and scholarly attention since the late 1980s, this 
time with regard to its role in the global information society via the IT industry, 
and subsequent impacts on the city. In addition, the development of the 
biotechnology (BT) industry17, and the crucial role of education and research 
institutes in its technological success, placed IT and software at the centre of 
debates on Bangalore. 
Historical Evolution of Bangalore  
Bangalore’s evolution as an IT hub, and its relationship to civil society, can 
only be fully understood in relation to its past. Accordingly, key turning points in 
the city’s history are divided into three broad eras: (i) Origins as a fortress town, 
and the city’s fortunes as a princely State and under British rule (1537-1947), (ii) 
Post-independence (1950s-1980s), and (iii) Post-liberalisation (1990s-present). 
By highlighting the continuities and ruptures between the past and present, this 
section provides the context within which to understand the emergence of 
Bangalore as a cosmopolitan and IT city. This section also provides insights into 
the dominant imaginations of Bangalore at various times, their influence on the 
city’s development, and the contested nature of these imaginations. Bangalore's 
history, including the origins of its name and imaginations of the city at various 
times, has been well documented by scholars and historians. In providing an 
overview of the city's historical, cultural and political evolution relevant to the 
objectives of this thesis, this section relies primarily on the works of Heitzman 
(2004), Srinivas (2004), Nair (2005), and Pani, Radhakrishna, & Bhat (2010). 
Bengaluru, the Princely State and the Colonial Legacy (1537-1947) 
                                                             
17In 2009, Bangalore was the country's largest bio-technology cluster, with 200 of 
India's 370 biotech companies having set up shop in the city (Mazumdar-Shaw, 2009). 
While Mumbai overtook Bangalore to become India's top biotech city in terms of revenue 
in 2010, Bangalore-based bio pharmaceuticals major Biocon earned the highest revenue 




“Bengaluru” was founded in 1537 by Kempe Gowda, a local military chief 
who owed allegiance to the Vijayanagar empire in south India. While historical 
evidence shows human habitation long before Kempe Gowda built and named 
this fortress town, this period is significant as the commencement of Bangalore's 
political history (Chandramouli, 2002). Kempe Gowda's rule is also linked to the 
development of a new urban form: a fortified settlement linked to a network of 
temples and tanks, later attracting many merchants and artisans who took up 
residence there. The fall of the Vijayanagar empire in 1565 saw the old 
settlement, also called the “City” or Pete (market), change hands in quick 
succession, as different kings granted the city to favoured generals (see also 
Raman, 2006). The changing fortunes of the city led to the in-migration of various 
cultural groups, including Tamil and Marathi speakers from neighbouring regions 
and new Muslim communities. The Pete has always been marked by ethnic, 
linguistic, regional and national diversity; communities, religions and economies 
have coexisted here—although not without tensions (see also Rajagopal, 2008). 
The area also developed commercially, and the settlement was divided into 
zones for trade by specific communities in various goods, many of which 
continue till date (ibid). Under Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, Bengaluru 
occupied a central role as the commercial and manufacturing capital of Mysore 
state. The city was famous for its textiles manufactures, including fine and coarse 
cotton, silks, and wool. The fall of Tipu in 1799 to the British, who handed the city 
over to the Wodeyar kings of Mysore, was the first phase of indirect colonial rule.  
In 1809, the British moved to Bangalore, and set up a military base of their 
own, the “Cantonment”, which was to be completely under British control. The 
new center was built around Halasur Lake, a few miles from the Pete, and grew 
by absorbing several villages in the area. It had its own municipal and 
administrative apparatus, although it was technically a British enclave within the 
territory of the Wodeyar kings. Care was taken to limit the possibility of people-to-
people contact between the Cantonment and the Pete, and the rough terrain 
physically constrained access to the former. Divisions between the two entities 




provide services for the army were Hindus from outside Mysore, as well as 
Tamil-speaking populations and Urdu-speaking Muslims. The aspiration to be 
accepted by the British also contributed to the Cantonment residents distancing 
themselves from the Pete, which they rarely saw or experienced. In the initial 
years, the Cantonment grew very rapidly as European and Indian pensioners 
settled within its boundaries. The close proximity of these two races saw the 
emergence of a mixed race—the Eurasians—who are now better known as 
Anglo-Indians. Experiments in education in the early 1850s resulted in a spike in 
attendance at schools among boys and girls. By the late nineteenth century, 
English education, instead of being the preserve of the elite, was accessible to 
children of all classes in several Cantonment schools. In the nineteenth century, 
the Cantonment grew steadily and placidly, and by 1891 it dominated Bangalore.  
During this time, the Pete was marked by several transitions and 
transformations: in 1831, the British took over the administration of Mysore State, 
believing that the king was leading the state into an economic and social crisis. 
From this time until 1881—when the British agreed to return power to the king in 
return for complete control of the Cantonment—the British fundamentally altered 
the functioning of the system while retaining old nomenclature and individuals. 
Under British commissioners, state government offices were relocated to 
Bangalore, administration was streamlined, departments specializing in revenue 
administration functioned under British heads and the city became an important 
node within a colonial information network (see also Raman, 2006). Other 
important changes during this period included the shift in administrative language 
of state documents and official interactions towards a single state language, 
Kannada, alongside English; the establishment of an extensive postal system; 
inauguration of the first railway line in the state; and the electrification of the 
city—the first in India—in 1900. A reorganisation of public spaces and services 
also took place under the commissioners, who expanded the tank system that 
was used for garden irrigation and drinking, and introduced a new model of town 
planning that saw layouts more strictly 'zoned', so that space was designed and 




city's mostly non-built environment at that time, replete with horticultural plots 
(tota) filled with vegetables and groves alternated with open fields, virgin forests, 
Lal Bagh botanical gardens, and well-tended compounds of bungalows set the 
stage for Bangalore's reputation as 'Garden City'.  
When Bangalore City/Pete was handed back to the Wodeyar king in 1881, 
the new government strove to promote industry, particularly textiles and 
manufacturing that could tap the city’s traditional economic strengths. From 1880 
to 1940, the Wodeyar kings appointed prime ministers (diwans) to conduct the 
administrative business of the State. Their interest in modernization led to an 
accumulation of administrative and technological prowess. The thrust toward 
industrialisation received the greatest boost from M. Visvesvaraya, who was 
diwan from 1912–1918. Visvesvaraya's emphasis on technology and higher 
education paved the way for the establishment of the Indian Institute of Science 
(IISc) in the northern suburbs of the city. The IISc, along with other higher 
education institutions, helped develop the technical education base of the city 
upon which the future 'science city' was premised. Bangalore's industrial profile 
also expanded with the outbreak of World War II, when the British need for an 
aeronautics station resulted in the creation of Hindustan Aircraft Pvt. Ltd. (HAL) 
in 1940. Former diwans Mirza Ismail and Visvesvaraya played an important role 
in the establishment of HAL, especially the latter, who arranged for the land 
required for the company. HAL became the first of many public sector enterprises 
that were to be established in Bangalore, which would give the city a crucial 
advantage in independent India's economic policy. The interest of the Mysore 
kings and diwans in modernisation gave the kingdom a reputation as a 'model' 
princely state during the late colonial period.  
By the early twentieth century, the City/Pete and Cantonment had 
developed as independent entities, with their own central markets, railway 
stations, hospitals, and wholesale and retail areas. These entities were merged 
together in 1949 under a single municipal administration, the Bangalore City 
Corporation (BCC), which later came to be known as the Bangalore Mahanagara 




remains an unfulfilled task, and in many ways Bangalore continues as a 'divided 
city', with some divisions continuing between its eastern and western parts. The 
tensions emanating from the deep divisions between the City and Cantonment, 
and the resultant conflicts in the post-colonial period, are discussed in the next 
section.  
Bangalore in Independent India: Growth and Contestations (1950s-1980s) 
In the immediate post-independence phase, Bangalore's growth was 
influenced by the national government's policy emphasis on public sector 
institutions for research and production. The government supported the 
establishment of four large public sector units in the city, viz., HAL, Indian 
Telephone Industries (ITI), Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), and Hindustan Machine 
Tools (HMT), whose units attracted workers of varying skill levels, and in whose 
self-contained townships children had access to English based technical 
education. Bangalore proved to be an attractive location for these units due to 
the tradition of state-sponsored industrialisation, a pleasant climate—commonly 
referred to as ‘salubrious’, the presence of the IISc and other engineering 
colleges that provided an educated workforce, and the availability of cheap 
electric power. In addition, placing important military and technology facilities out 
of the range of potential Pakistani air raids was an important contributing factor. 
The period from 1950-1980, when the public sector dominated Bangalore's 
political economy, also saw the intensification of employment in government 
bureaucracy, growth in educational and research institutions, and electrical and 
small-scale industries. The textile industry continued to be important to the city, 
as was the informal economy, which employed more people than all the formal 
sectors combined.  
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a vibrant private sector, with the 
development of local microelectronics, information-based and software 
industries, such as Infosys Consultants and Informatics. Among multi-national 




Instruments (TI) in 1985, paving the way for the forthcoming IT 'revolution'.18 TI’s 
success in software services resulted in Bangalore becoming an attractive 
destination for foreign and Indian companies engaged in software development. 
Heitzman (2004) provides a detailed account of the emergence of the information 
technology (IT) industry in Bangalore within the larger political economy of the 
Indian State (see also Parthasarathy, 2005). Buoyed by Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi’s personal interest in microelectronics, private enterprises responded to, 
and benefited from, new policies that paved the way for the liberalisation of the 
electronics sector. Wipro Infotech became the first IT success story in Bangalore, 
followed by a number of other firms, such as Infosys, which leveraged the lower 
wages earned by Indian professionals to tap into the software outsourcing 
business. The success in software, along with the Karnataka state government’s 
thrust on high-technology industries, enabled Bangalore to earn an international 
reputation in IT. In addition to software and IT, the 1980s also saw several large 
private sector units, notably manufacturing, textiles, automobiles, electronic and 
electrical units, matching the public sector in size and employment. The 
burgeoning number of industrial units—public and private—produced a 
comparable growth of workers in the city, and the city’s growing informal sector 
attracted an increasing stream of migrants, intensifying the city’s cosmopolitan 
mix. Such population surges, as discussed below, provided fertile ground for 
simmering contestations over competing interests, ideologies, and identities, 
which often spilt over into public spaces.      
After 1951, Bangalore witnessed a phenomenal increase in population as 
a result of the migration of a number of new social groups, which added to the 
city's existing linguistic and religious diversity. The second major spurt in 
population growth occurred during the 1970s, particularly among the middle 
classes associated with the formal sector industries, national research 
organisations, scientific establishments, and state bureaucracy. While different 
communities have lived cohesively for the most part, linguistic and communal 
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riots and agitations have broken out at sporadic intervals (see also Engineer, 
1994; Nair, 2000b). Tensions between Kannadigas and Tamils have existed 
since the colonial period, but were largely confined to the politics of the 
bureaucracy at that time (Pani, Resource cities across phases of globalization: 
Evidence from Bangalore, 2009). The complete isolation of the City and 
Cantonment in the colonial period produced a noticeable distinction between 
Tamilians in the City and Tamilians in the Cantonment. While the former were 
comfortable with the Kannada language and local culture, and functioned within a 
bureaucracy in which Kannada had a prominent place, Tamilians in the 
Cantonment were more familiar with English, having little or no knowledge of 
Kannada. In the post-independence period, as the Cantonment was still 
perceived as largely Tamil-speaking vis-à-vis a Kannada-speaking City, 
language was central to the challenges of integration. This was especially so as 
the Kannada culture of the City came into direct and daily conflict with the Tamil-
dominated culture of the Cantonment with the integration of the two areas in the 
post-colonial period (ibid). The issue of language burst to the surface with the 
Gokak agitation of 1982, which crystallised an identity based on language for the 
first time. The cultural concerns soon gave way to a more militant and exclusive 
form of Kannada nationalism, which focused on Kannada as the language of 
employment, and identified its enemies among the subaltern classes. This new 
belligerent Kannada activism became associated with the occupation of public 
spaces: poles sporting the Kannada flag dominated established Tamil localities, 
while newer Tamil-dominated slums were targets of rioters and looting. 
Thereafter, Kannada-Tamil tensions, always simmering beneath the surface, 
flared up on several occasions, the most notable being: (a) widespread anti-
Tamil violence during the Cauvery river water-sharing dispute between 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in 1991, (b) vociferous protests against the proposed 
installation of a statue honouring Tamil poet and cultural hero, Thiruvalluvar, in 
the city in 1991, and (c) violence that followed the kidnapping of actor Rajkumar 
in 2000 by forest brigand Veerapan, which was staged as a dramatic encounter 




The other contentious—if less visible—language issue was the division 
between Kannada and English, with the former, like all Indian languages, side-
lined during the colonial period. Under British rule, English acquired a hegemonic 
status as the language of science, technology and capitalism, while Kannada 
strove to make its presence felt in the politico-cultural sphere. Although 
nationalist intellectuals made few isolated efforts, the English hegemony 
gradually grew in private life, becoming the administrative language and the 
language of power. In the post-independence phase, there was widespread 
growth of English in areas traditionally dominated by Kannada in the city. The 
international hegemony of English and the requirements of the global 
marketplace resulted in the burgeoning of English-medium schools in the city. In 
both urban and rural districts of Bangalore, families who could afford to began to 
avoid the Kannada-language government school system in favour of private 
institutions. Kannada protagonists' attempts to stall the forward march of English 
have usually been through appeals for state intervention. The issue of 
reasserting Kannada as the medium of education in all schools in Karnataka can 
be traced back to the Gokak committee's recommendation to this effect in 1981. 
Subsequent efforts by the Karnataka state government to give primacy to 
Kannada in primary education were challenged in the courts by an association of 
private and unaided English-medium schools. This association argued that as 
private entities they were exempt from the state’s policy (see also Sonntag, 
2009). In May 2014, the Indian Supreme Court decided in favour of the private 
schools, saying that imposition of a mother tongue as the medium of instruction 
violated the fundamental rights of parents and children (Bangalore Mirror, 2014; 
CNN-IBN, 2014). However, in an indication of the emotive nature of the issue, 
the Karnataka government in January 2015 restated its intention to make 
Kannada compulsory in all primary schools, reviving the decades-old conflict 
between the languages (News Karnataka, 2015). Sonntag (2009) noted that this 
language conflict, particularly in its current form, is indicative of the issues and 
controversies surrounding linguistic globalisation, characterised by the increasing 




the English-Kannada controversy as tussle between two main competing 
narratives. The first comprises those who see English as the language of 
technology and modernity, crucial for Bangalore’s success in the global 
information economy. The contrasting narrative projects Kannada as crucial tool 
to build political community and invest it with a moral content, with the recognition 
of mother tongue as identity. Sonntag differentiates this inclusive politics from the 
particularistic, xenophobic strains of some pro-Kannada groups, although it is the 
latter that often dominates the media discourse.  
Another pattern of violence that emerged during the colonial period and 
surfaced time and again in post-independence Bangalore is Hindu-Muslim 
conflict. The Bangalore Disturbances of 1928, which were a series of clashes 
over a Ganesha idol, considered sacred to Hindus, recast the old city as a zone 
of contention between the two communities. Nair (2005) has noted that the 
Bangalore Disturbances were significant in revealing the fragility of the ties that 
bound the two communities together. Further, although the socio-economic and 
cultural differences between the City and Cantonment Muslims were well-known, 
the discourse on the Bangalore Disturbances cast them as unified by religion—
with profound consequences for years to come. Muslim alienation was reinforced 
when the more militant and exclusive Kannada nationalism that emerged in the 
1980s began defining Kannada identity in ways that excluded Muslim (and Tamil) 
residents of the city. The politics of space and ethnicity erupted on several 
occasions in the form of property disputes during the 1980s and 1990s, with 
Muslims, as citizens-in-the-making (ibid), particularly vulnerable during moments 
of crisis. This was apparent during the riots of October 1994, triggered by the 
introduction of a 10-minute Urdu bulletin on Doordarshan, the national public 
service broadcaster, during the prime time slot. The toxic combination of 
Kannada and Hindu chauvinism unleashed mob fury and communal frenzy that 
resulted in extensive loss of life and property in Muslim areas of (mainly) south 
Bangalore (see also Engineer, 1994).  
From the 1990s onwards, Bangalore’s rapid rise as an IT centre was 




between ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’. Engineer (1994) has noted that the cosmopolitan 
nature of big cities results in the loss of ethnic identity of the city, making the 
dominant ethnic group defensive about its language and culture. In Bangalore, 
Hindi and English have overtaken Kannada as the favoured language (The 
Economist, 2012), providing fertile ground for societal antagonisms that created 
new divisions or exacerbated existing ones. This is discussed further in the 
section below, as well as in Chapter 4, ‘The Context of Civil Society in 
Bangalore’.   
Post-liberalisation: Becoming the ‘IT City’ (The 1990s onwards)  
The take-off of Bangalore as an IT hub was the combined result of 
favourable liberalisation policies, access to multiple information systems as a 
result of global liberalisation and the ICT revolution, the combined efforts of 
transnational and Indian businesses, and the presence of a qualified workforce 
that could be readily tapped into (Heitzman, 2004).19 Upadhya (2009) has noted 
that economic reforms ushered in the opening up of the economy, which allowed 
the nascent software outsourcing industry to take full advantage of the 
dismantling of state controls. In the initial stages, leading companies like Infosys 
concentrated on ‘body shopping’, and then ‘offshore’ production of software, 
which allowed them to exploit the relatively cheap labour available in the city.20 
Bangalore became a leading site for companies specialising in technology-based 
and mediated work for clients located in advanced post-industrial countries (see 
also Upadhya & Vasavi, 2008). Companies like Wipro benefitted from the Central 
government’s reformed electronics policy, which enabled hardware imports, 
allowing it to compete effectively with public sector units, and to branch out into 
software and consulting. Simultaneously, small-scale enterprises began to offer a 
wide range of products and services for other organisations that utilised 
                                                             
19 For a detailed examination of the history, economics and structure of Bangalore’s 
software industry see Parthasarathy (2004, 2005), Basant (2006), and Saxenian (2007). 
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telematics technology for their core businesses. The exponential increase in IT 
jobs produced training companies that vied with engineering schools in churning 
out thousands of trained workers for the growing IT and IT-enabled services 
(ITeS) industry. By the late 1990s, IT and ITeS accounted for close to 60,000 
jobs distributed over 1,400 firms, which expanded to nearly 3,000 firms at the 
beginning of the new millennium (Nair, 2005).  
While banking and engineering MNCs had been present in Bangalore, the 
1990s saw the emergence of new MNCs that built on a local, vibrant, high-
technology sector as well as the older, largely public, engineering-electronic 
base. Initially, many hi-tech companies had offices located in the central 
business district (CBD). Towards the end of the decade, most began moving to 
the fringes of the city, because of inexpensive land and government 
encouragement. In 2000-1, the 25 km long ‘IT corridor’, stretching from the 
International Tech Park in Whitefield on the east side of the city to Electronic City 
to the south-east, was designed as a self-contained project, with its own 
infrastructure, including schools and colleges, and a ‘world class’ environment 
(see also The Hindu, 2001). Within these tech parks, which together employed 
around 26,000 people in 2003 (Nair, 2005), employees work in swanky glass and 
steel structures, “corralled in comfort” (ibid, p. 86), and with workplaces defined 
as lifestyle.21 A significant number of smaller firms situated themselves in low-rise 
structures in residential localities, often in violation of zoning and building laws. In 
addition to such enclaves that spilt beyond the designated ‘IT corridor’, new 
IT/ITeS corridors developed in the city, such as the Outer Ring Road (ORR) 
spanning from Hebbal to the Silk Board Junction. ORR’s IT corridor growth 
commenced in early 2000s, and gained importance with the inauguration of the 
new international airport in 2008 in Devanahalli, serving as the main artery 
between the airport and the major IT hubs of Whitefield and Electronic City. BY 
2010, the ORR IT corridor accounted for almost 25 per cent of Bangalore’s total 
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education and as empowerment in the Indian call centre industry—techniques that are 




IT space, making it one of India’s fastest growing IT/ITeS growth corridors 
(Business Standard, 2010).  
While the sudden influx of IT companies into Bangalore in the 1990s gave 
the city its “Silicon Valley” reputation, Heitzman (2004) pointed out that the hype 
surrounding this image was due to aggressive marketing techniques, rather than 
any true display of information society characteristics. The propagation of an IT 
City was in line with the imagination of Bangalore as a city of the future, where 
technology, industry, and planning could propel the city forward as a model for a 
modern India. A decade later, however, Bangalore had come closer to achieving 
its vision of becoming Silicon Valley, although comparisons between the two 
were still premature.22 By 2005, Bangalore alone accounted for about one-third of 
India’s software exports, and, with 265,000 workers, nearly one-third of total 
employment in ITeS-business process outsourcing (BPO) services (The 
Economist, 2005). However, by then it had also become apparent that the 
dramatic growth of the metropolitan region had created social and economic 
problems that exceeded managerial capability. 
Being an ‘IT City’: Boon and Banes of the New Metropolis  
High-tech and knowledge industries have greatly influenced Bangalore’s 
economic growth through direct employment and the export revenue generated 
by these workers. At the same time—for better or worse—these industries have 
significantly influenced the city’s social, urban, cultural and political landscape. 
Consequently, several studies have examined the planning, contested politics, 
and fallouts of the informational/network/IT city project in Bangalore 
(Chakravartty, 2008; Dittrich, 2007; Heitzman, 2004; Madon, 1997; Saxenian, 
2007). Proponents have hailed the industry as a leveller, enabling Indian 
intellectual expertise to compete on a global level, and integrating the country 
successfully with the global market (see Dasgupta, 2008; Friedman, 2006; 
Upadhya, 2009). These arguments also tended to represent IT as symbolising a 
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new and resurgent India, free from corruption, and moving the country in the 
direction of a desired “global” status (ibid). However, these narratives were also 
contested by a wide range of groups that pointed to the industry’s deleterious 
effects on the city, which are explained a little later in this section. Meanwhile, 
one of the less controversial effects of the IT industry has been the growth of a 
“cyber culture”, particularly among young people, who access the Internet from 
“cybercafes” and salons that have mushroomed across the city (Srinivas, 
2004).23 Nisbett (2006, 2009) has pointed to the role of these cybercafes, with 
their relatively low prices, in widening Internet access to the urban, educated 
middle classes in the city. Particularly for young, middle-class males, cybercafes 
were social spaces that allowed them to hang out and build social relationships 
away from the parental gaze. Cybercafes were described as ideal places to do 
this, and their association with modernity, progress, and global networks of 
technology, made them sites of middle-class status (ibid).  
The IT industry—and associated IT/cyber culture—captured the 
imagination of the middle classes, particularly in its representation as a middle 
class success story (Dasgupta, 2008). Nisbett (2009) has noted that the 
knowledge society discourse, and accompanying excitement over the production 
and consumption of new media, is inextricably linked to the rise of the middle 
classes in the popular imagination. The IT industry also resonated closely with 
the middle classes for another reason: as the prime beneficiaries of the IT boom, 
they experienced unprecedented levels of social mobility (Lakha, 2003). The 
substantial purchasing power of IT professionals allowed them to engage in high 
levels of consumption, spawning a new consumerist lifestyle. Clothing, consumer 
goods, real estate, and private vehicles were major consumption items, and 
consumer industries, local and international, responded to this demand 
(Upadhya, 2009b). This manifested itself in the mushrooming of malls and 
upmarket shops, pubs and bars, expensive real estate properties, including 
gated communities, and glass and chrome business towers in various parts of 
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the city. Consequently, the growth of the IT industry produced massive urban 
restructuring, which profoundly impacted city spaces, including architecture, 
public places, and city form (Aranya, 2003; Shankar, 2012).24 The impact of the 
IT industry on the urban form was particularly evident in the creation of enclaves 
with exclusive facilities for ICT businesses, domination of the real estate and 
construction industry for IT industry purposes, marginalisation of local planning 
and local bodies in the spatial decisions for the city, and involvement of the 
private sector in civic and infrastructure works (ibid).  
One of the most significant consequences of rapid urbanisation has been 
haphazard development, and the infrastructural bottlenecks arising from the 
steady stream of migrants into the city. Bangalore’s rapid population growth 
rate—from 5.7 million in 2001 to 8.4 million in 2011—is indicative of the large 
inflow of migrants, both from within and outside Karnataka State  (DNA, 2011). 
With rapid population growth and unplanned urban sprawl, great pressure was 
placed on infrastructure and resources, like water supply, electricity, public 
transportation, sanitation, land, etc. The inability of planning institutions to limit 
unplanned growth and inefficient land use patterns, the jurisdictional confusion 
arising from the existence of many parastatal organisations created to manage 
various services, and the resulting lack of coordinated effort on the part of these 
agencies, compounded existing infrastructural constraints (Sastry, 2008; Sudhira, 
2008). In Bangalore, infrastructural deficits continue to be most visible in the 
city’s notoriously clogged traffic, with frequent traffic jams, road accidents, and air 
and noise pollution rising to alarming levels. In addition to urban sprawl and 
ineffective planning and implementation mechanisms, traffic congestion 
worsened due to inadequate public transport systems, shortage of road space, 
and absence of disincentives for personal vehicle use (see Pangotra & Sharma, 
2006). Further, the growth of household and personal incomes precipitated the 
growth of personal vehicles in the city: with an estimated vehicular population of 
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2.6 million in 2007, Bangalore had the highest vehicle to person ratio in the 
country (ibid; Sudhira, Ramachandra, & Bala Subrahmanya, 2007). By 2010, 
Bangalore’s traffic problem had impinged on its residents’ quality of life and 
dented its clean and green reputation. In 2011, the city was named as the sixth 
most painful city in the world for commuting (Prashanth, 2011a), and the fourth 
most polluted city in India (The Indian Express, 2011).25 With the deteriorating air 
quality contributing to rising levels of asthma and respiratory diseases among 
adults and children, Bangalore has been dubbed the “asthma capital” of the 
country (Charan, 2004; Vyas, 2012). The situation was made worse by the 
depleting tree cover and loss of green spaces, particularly in the city’s periphery 
(Nagendra & Gopal, 2010; Nagendra et al., 2012). Ironically, while migrants 
came to the city for its balanced climate and greenery, the demands of a fast 
growing metropolis denuded the city’s street trees and vegetation, precipitating 
rising temperatures and air pollution (ibid; see also Vailshery, Jaganmohan, & 
Nagendra, 2013).  
With Bangalore’s rapid transition to a metropolis accompanied by an array 
of structural, institutional, and environmental problems, a wide range of CSOs 
emerged to tackle these issues. Hasiru Usiru and Praja—the two cases chosen 
for this study—are among a spectrum of organisations and communities that 
focused on sustainable development solutions for the city. In the case of the 
city’s disappearing street trees, groups like Hasiru Usiru joined hands with 
various CSOs and citizens’ groups to organise protests and other advocacy 
activities, and file public interest litigations (PILs) against tree felling. As the 
Hasiru Usiru chapter explains, the network expanded its activities to expound 
sustainable development, including sustainable public transportation, which was 
also a focal area of Praja’s activities. The influential role of civil society in 
enhancing citizen participation in urban affairs, and the rise of a new class of 
techno-elites is described in the next section.  
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Civil Society, Middle Class Modes of Engagement, and Techno-Elites 
in Bangalore   
Bangalore is often lauded for a proactive and networked civil society that 
has emerged as an important actor in the urban agenda, working to make the 
state more accountable to its citizens (Madon & Sahay, 2000; Nair, 2005; 
Sudhira et. al., 2007). Sudhira et. al. (2007) have noted that Bangalore’s vibrant 
civil society sector comprises NGOs working on a spectrum of activities ranging 
from literacy and green brigades to urban governance, as well as RWAs, trade 
and commercial organisations, and professional organisations that have played a 
major role in some local body activities and influenced their decision-making. 
While Bangalore has a rich history of associational life and public activism dating 
from the early post-Independence years (Nair, 2005), the 1990s saw increasing 
visibility of NGOs and CBOs in developmental and urban governance processes 
on an unprecedented scale (see also Heitzman, 2004). At the turn of the 
twentieth century there was also a corresponding change in the nature of 
citizens’ participation in city affairs, reflected in rising middle-class modes of civic 
activism. Nair (2005) has noted that this change is reflected in the emergence of 
citizens’ groups and NGOs that increasingly turned into owners of rights or 
‘stakeholders’, participating in the city’s management. CSOs that emerged on the 
scene during that time introduced an array of tools to enhance citizen 
participation and government accountability (Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005; Paul, 
2002). Swabhimana (meaning self-respect), a state-sponsored forum of NGOs 
and concerned citizens, was one of the most important experiments to link 
representative citizens’ groups with bureaucrats to deal with problems of service 
delivery (Heitzman, 2004). Launched by progressive bureaucrat A. Ravindra in 
1995, Swabhimana spurred the development of new non-government institutional 
forms to enhance citizen participation in their (middle–class) localities (Nair, 
2005). Another notable initiative was the NGO CIVIC (Citizens’ Voluntary 
Initiative for the City), which played a key role in governance debates, with an 
emphasis on devolution in local urban governance, as specified in the 74th 




prominent initiatives, established to forge closer linkages with key government 
and bureaucratic actors, described in terms of a local ‘network’ of stakeholders 
involved and the information flows between them. Public Affairs Centre (PAC) 
was another key civil society actor during this period, known for its ‘citizen report 
cards’ on the assessment of service agencies, its participatory budgeting 
activities, and its efforts to galvanise citizens’ groups on transparency issues ( 
(Ackerman, 2005; Ravindra, 2004). Nair (2005) noted that these ‘stakeholders’—
reflective of middle-class interests—preferred to manage the city in ways that 
differed from modes of civic mobilisation in the past, which involved modes of 
mass agitation. Thus, a new kind of ‘non-political’ civic engagement was 
emphasised by this civil society segment, which contrasted itself with the civic 
activism that was more closely tied to electoral politics.  
The civil society space in Bangalore is also marked by the rise of a new 
class of techno-elites, whose power, critics argue, is apparent in the shaping of 
public policy through networks of influence, and in the allocation of resources and 
services to mega-projects that favour corporate interests (Benjamin, 2000, 2010; 
Dasgupta, 2008; Scoones, 2007). Nair (2005) has argued that the rise of middle-
class modes of engagement, as discussed above, the gradual abdication by the 
state of its developmentalist roles and redistributive functions, the ascendance of 
the market—and, I add, the emergence of the knowledge economy—gave rise to 
a new parastatal managerial elite, embodied in institutional innovations such as 
the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) and NGOs such as Janaagraha. The 
now-defunct BATF was a public-private partnership constituted in 2000 to play an 
advisory role for improving the city. Championed by then Chief Minister, S.M. 
Krishna, whose primary ambition was to make Bangalore the best city in India, 
the task force was constituted as an advisory body with enormous executive 
powers, with members drawn from the IT industry, corporate world, and middle- 
and upper-class NGOs, including PAC and Janaagraha. Powered through by 
Krishna, the BATF originated from the idea that corporate entities had a role in 
urban governance, and could benefit the city through sharing ideas and best 




Raman, 2006; Sami, 2013). Closely connected to the BATF was Janaagraha, a 
“citizens’ movement” founded in late 2001 by Ramesh and Swati Ramanathan.26 
Janaagraha gained widespread attention for its efforts to energise citizen 
participation in urban local self-governance, community-led participatory 
budgeting, and innovative ways of tackling corruption (Klitgaard, 2012; Raman, 
2008; Ramanathan, 2007). The task force soon ran into trouble when it began to 
replace conventional spaces of the traditional civil society in Bangalore in 
dictating directions for urban governance, bringing it into conflict with 
representatives of traditional civil society of the urban poor and subaltern groups 
(Benjamin, 2010; Ghosh, 2005). While the BATF was effectively disbanded 
following Krishna’s electoral defeat in 2004, the influence of its individual 
members continued at the state and national levels, resulting in what Benjamin 
(2010, p. 94) called a “morphing of the elite’s circuit of power” (see also Ghosh, 
2005).  
The role of the new techno-elites, including in the creation of an IT-NGO 
nexus in governance—such as the Janaagraha-Infosys partnership (Benjamin, 
2005; Dasgupta, 2008)—is hotly debated. Proponents have highlighted the 
benefits of such unique partnerships between political leaders, services 
providers, private sector entrepreneurs and civil society leaders and thinkers in 
improving government performance and contributing to a more liveable city 
(Manor, 2009; Paul, 2007). On the other hand, critics have pointed to the 
detrimental effects of such initiatives, including the hegemony of the capitalist 
class (Nair, 2005); the creation of an ‘exclusive citizenry’ that bypasses political 
systems and excludes elected representatives (Ghosh, 2005, 2006; Nair, 2000a); 
and an institutionalised form of ‘middle class activism’ that serves as a “Trojan 
horse” to de-politicise and dilute claim making by poorer groups (Benjamin, 
2005). This new techno-class is also criticised for supporting visions of the city as 
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of ‘ordinary’ citizens giving back to their homeland. In fact, the critically acclaimed Hindi 
movie, Swades (2004), starring superstar actor Shah Rukh Khan is inspired, to a 




‘global’ or ‘world-class’, which were then translated into reality via public policy 
emphasis on sectors that fit into the imaginary of IT as ushering in a ‘modern and 
resurgent’ India.27 The ideological success of IT and a new globalised English-
based imagination of Bangalore produced an aspiration for a new identity for the 
city, which reached a peak during the BATF’s tenure.28  
Research Questions  
The role of civil society in Bangalore, then, assumes significance not only 
because of its vibrant participation in the urban agenda, but also because of 
criticisms levelled against the mainly middle-class politics of civil society. 
Bangalore has often been at the forefront of innovative online initiatives for social 
and political change (see Gowda & Gupta, 2010), reflecting its history of active 
citizenry as well as the leveraging of ICTs for democratic engagement. The 
thesis posits the rise of a new ICT-enabled civil society in Bangalore, 
distinguished from developmental or old civil society by virtue of the non-political 
nature of its goals and claim-making modes. An informal conversation with 
Prabhat, a director of a research NPO, introduced me to the notion of “IT as a 
paradigm” in Bangalore, where IT perpetually impacts the city, in visible and 
invisible ways (personal communication, June 8, 2011). The thesis works within 
this notion of ‘IT as paradigm’ in Bangalore, arguing that one of the outcomes of 
Bangalore’s unprecedented growth as an “IT hub” has been the extension of IT, 
and subsequently ICTs, from the preserve of the IT industry into other realms of 
urban life. This “technologisation” of the city, and its impact upon various 
information/technology ecologies (connected as well as unconnected to the IT 
industry), is an under-researched aspect of the IT phenomenon in Bangalore. 
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28 In the quest to project Bangalore as a global city, a series of models have powered 
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A preliminary review of policy documents and pronouncements reveal the 
prominence accorded to capitalising on the existing IT ‘ecosystem’: Bangalore is 
being simultaneously promoted as a destination for the development of 
biotechnology (BT), nano science/nano technology, animation and gaming, as 
well as the premier knowledge and innovation hub in India29. Hence, in working 
within the concept of ‘IT as paradigm’, the thesis moves beyond equating IT with 
the industry or in terms of its much-touted extension into governance, via 
mechanisms of e-governance. Rather, the attempt is to delve into the other ways 
in which IT has impacted the urban fabric of Bangalore, viz., in terms of civic and 
political engagement. In describing the rise of the ‘IT city’, the literature review 
has acknowledged the negative or unintended consequences of IT-led 
development. However, the thesis also argues that this IT base has played a 
critical, albeit indirect, role in the mushrooming of ICT-based and -driven civic 
and social entrepreneurial initiatives in Bangalore city30. While civic and activist 
groups across the country are increasingly leveraging ICTs in their activities, the 
sheer number of ICT-driven social entrepreneurial activities in Bangalore makes 
it a question worth exploring in greater depth. Bangalore is the ideal setting for 
this type of study for another reason: the cosmopolitan composition of the city 
has made it an exemplar for “New India”31, a city driven by pioneering 
personalities who are either familiar or proficient with new technologies. The 
thesis traces the efforts of this new ICT-enabled civil society in creating new 
spaces for citizen participation in local urban affairs. This holds particular 
significance in light of the lack of formalised structures of participation in urban 
                                                             
29The website of the state government’s Department of Information Technology, 
Biotechnology and Science and Technology provides policy pronouncements and event-
related information to this effect - http://www.bangaloreitbt.in/ 
30Prominent examples include, but are not limited to Citizen Matters 
(http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/), eGovernments Foundation 
(http://www.egovernments.org/), India Together (http://www.indiatogether.org/), Mapunity 
(http://mapunity.in/), and Praja (http://praja.in/). In addition, non-government 
organizations such as Janaagraha (http://janaagraha.org/) and citizens’ initiatives are 
increasingly incorporating IT into their work for greater outreach and mobilization of their 
core constituents (see Gowda & Gupta, 2010).    
31For a critical look at the perceptions and realities of the “new India”, and its relation 




India, which, in tandem with the generally apathetic middle classes, serves to 
disenfranchise a large section of the urban citizenry. Against this backdrop, the 
rise of new ICT-based initiatives, as an unintended consequence of Bangalore’s 
IT base, are examined in terms of their attempts to foster greater civic and 
political engagement.  
The overarching research question, then, is: what are the ways in 
which the ‘IT Paradigm’ in Bangalore influences civic and political 
engagement activities by civil society?  
This overarching research problem is divided into three specific research 
questions: 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What practices, forms and styles of ICT-
enabled civic and political engagement are being practiced?  
 RQ1a: In what ways do online and offline spaces of civic and 
political engagement interact and intersect?  
As the literature review has shown, there is an increased interest in 
empirically examining what people do online, including forms and tactics, styles 
and strategies of engagement and activism (Earl, 2006; Van De Donk et al., 
2004; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010). Recent literature has also pointed to the 
significance of examining the communication practices, interactions with media, 
and the interfaces between online and offline spaces of action (Cammaerts, 
Mattoni, & McCurdy, 2013; Rucht, 2013). Accordingly, the thesis examines these 
aspects of civic and political engagement within the techno-social context of 
Bangalore.  
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What are the attitudes towards ICTs for 
democratic engagement expressed by middle class civil society actors?  
• RQ2a: What are the benefits (real and perceived) of ICT use? 
• RQ2b:  What concerns are expressed about ICT use? 
These questions are based on what has been discussed in the literature 
review section, and to fill the gap in the literature on the ways in which civil 
society actors interpret and grapple with new technologies in their civic and 




society actors to ICTs, I relied on studies that examined civil society attitudes and 
use of ICTs. One such study was by Dilevko (2002), in which Southern NGOs 
were asked about their use of and opinions about ICTs, and how they managed 
and defined their relationship to ICTs and international NGOs. Additionally, 
Ganesh and Stohl’s (2010) study, which traced experiences and attitudes of 
global justice activists in New Zealand regarding their use of ICTs, was another 
useful starting point. Accordingly, in examining civil society actors’ reflections on 
and interpretations of ICT use, the thesis gave primacy to personal narratives 
and stories, and was open to new and under-explored perspectives that emerged 
from the interviewees themselves. 
Research Question 3: Which factors influence the ways in which 
ICTs are/are not used for civic and political engagement? 
As preliminary fieldwork indicated ambivalence and scepticism about the 
Internet for democratic engagement among a portion of interviewees, this also 
prompted questions about what factors influenced non-use of ICTs. This led me 
to literature on technology non-use, media avoidance, refusal and ambivalence in 
an increasingly wired world  (Portwood-Stacer, 2012; Reisdorf, Axelsson, & 
Söderholm, 2012; Ribak & Rosenthal, 2011). This third line of investigation, 
therefore, aimed to uncover the various factors that influenced ICT use and non-
use among civil society  actors, thereby providing an acount of the real and 
imagined barriers to ICT use.  
The findings for these research questions are detailed in chapters 4 to 7. 
The methods used to answer these questions are discussed in the next chapter 












CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
A Qualitative Research Paradigm 
The study employs a qualitative research framework, using multiple 
methods of qualitative data collection to understand the emerging relationship 
between civil society and the Internet in Bangalore. Given the paucity of research 
in this area, qualitative research was deemed best suited to unearth the multi-
dimensionality and complexity of the topic, through the experiences and 
imaginings of the research participants (Mason, 2002; Richards & Morse, 2007). 
As Bangalore is a city that I am familiar with, having both lived and worked there 
in the early–mid 2000s, qualitative research methods were considered ideal to 
build upon this contextual and experiential knowledge. In particular, the 
advantages of qualitative research in this regard were in terms of capturing the 
point of view of the actors’ themselves, embedding the findings within the 
constraints of their social world, and securing rich descriptions (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2003). 
Qualitative research is particularly useful to understand groups and 
organisations, relationships, and virtual and mediated contexts, which are the foci 
of this research (Tracy, 2013). Further, qualitative research was selected due to 
the active and engaged role of the researcher, including the flexibility to make 
decisions on the basis of changing research contexts and situations (Mason, 
2002; Patton, 2002). This was particularly important due to the open-ended 
nature of the study, which, as discussed in the introduction, resulted in the 
pursuit of new areas of enquiry based on emerging data. Overall, therefore, the 
study followed an inductive approach to qualitative research, where the final 
research focus emerged after a certain amount of data collection and analysis 
(Fox, 2008; Maxwell, 2013)).  
Data collection in Bangalore occurred in two phases: phase 1 (May-
August 2011) focused on a deeper understanding of the context and the 
identification of possible case studies, while phase 2 (December 2011-January 




depth qualitative interviews were the main source of data, supplemented by 
online and offline observation, and secondary data. The first round of fieldwork 
(phase 1) was spent re-familiarising myself with the city and its civil society and 
political scene, as well as gathering data towards finalising case studies. The 
general direction of the data collection was based on the results of an exploratory 
visit to Bangalore in June 2010, during which I informally spoke to seven 
resource persons, mainly prominent academic and/or civil society actors in the 
city. This preliminary field visit achieved the following: it helped to identify critical 
issues involving technology, civil society, and governance in the city; provided a 
better understanding of the realities (policies and issues) on the ground; provided 
access to relevant literature on the city, and highlighted literature gaps; and, 
through networking, enabled the identification of potential respondents for the 
actual fieldwork that was to follow. 
During phase 1, a total of 30 formal, in-depth interviews, most of which 
lasted at least an hour, were conducted with various government and non-
government actors in the city, including key policy actors. These included 
members of the ABIDe (Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and Development) 
task force, urban planners, high-ranking IT and BT industry executives, senior 
government officials and journalists, and a cross-section of civil society actors. In 
addition to the formal interviews, I had informal discussions with academics, 
people connected with the IT industry, retired government officials, and members 
of CSOs. These conversations provided a rich source of information on the 
current ground realities and policy environment in the city. I was also able to 
attend conferences and meetings organised by the IT industry and civil society32, 
which provided avenues for discussions with participants and opportunities for 
snowballing.  
                                                             
32 As a result of my old and new networking contacts I was able to attend the India 
Against Corruption (IAC) Bangalore public consultation meeting held on May 27, 2011, 
and IT industry-oriented Globalization Summit 2011 
(http://zinnov.com/globalization/index.php) on July 7, 2011, both of which were invitation-




As the literature review has shown, civil society in India is neither a 
homogeneous nor a cohesive sphere—a condition that became clear during the 
fieldwork as well. Among the interviewees, traditional or old civil society actors, 
such as members of RWAs, NGOs, and activist groups could be distinguished 
from the newer, often new media-based, civil society forms such as e-magazines 
and -newspapers, citizen interaction platforms, sites for crowd-sourced solutions, 
etc. This, however, was not a clear-cut distinction, as the more conventional civil 
society actors varied greatly in their use of and attitude towards new 
technologies, including the use of the Internet, for civil society activity. These 
observations on the intersections between civil society and ICTs in Bangalore 
provided preliminary insights for an emerging research agenda, and developed 
into a critical aspect of the research.  
The choice of case studies for the research emerged from an analysis of 
data collected during the first phase of fieldwork. Thereafter, phase 2 (December 
2011-January 2012) was focused on bolstering the description of the two cases 
that were chosen, viz., (1) environmental network and email discussion group, 
Hasiru Usiru and (2) blog-based citizen-interaction platform, Praja.in (or Praja). 
During this period, I conducted 22 in-depth interviews, of which four were follow-
up interviews with key actors from both organisations. Majority of interviews 
during both rounds of fieldwork were conducted face-to-face, with email, Skype 
and telephone interviews conducted with interviewees I was unable to meet in 
Bangalore, or as a follow-up when preliminary data analysis revealed gaps or 
required clarifications. Between field visits and after the last round of physical 
data gathering, I continued to be in touch with interviewees via email, which 
helped to quickly clarify doubts or gain access to relevant information or 
secondary data. Such contact also helped to consolidate trust among 
interviewees, which in turn helped facilitate three new interviews and three 
follow-up interviews via telephone during 2012-2013. I also corresponded with 
key respondents interested in the research progress via email, which helped to 
fill in data gaps and facilitated member checking of the cases. Throughout, a 




society in an IT/media-rich city. The methods of data generation and analysis are 
described below, beginning with a discussion of the case study method.  
Case Study  
The thesis involves a case study research design to explore the 
experiences and ICT practices of civil society actors in India’s ‘IT City’, 
Bangalore. Here, a case study research method is taken to mean an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
over which the investigator has little or no control, and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used (Yin, 2014). Stake (2009) defined a case as a ‘bounded 
system’ that is of interest to the researcher, which can be an individual, 
institution, a programme, an event, a collection or a population. He notes that in 
the social science literature, most case studies involve complex and holistic 
description, contain data that are gathered at least partly by personalistic 
observation, and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, with 
quotations and illustrations. These qualities are best suited to adding to existing 
experience and humanistic understanding, and allow for “naturalistic 
generalizations”, which develop within a person as product of experience, and 
guide expectations and actions (ibid, p. 25). Gerring (2006) has described case 
study research design as constructing its observations from the intensive study of 
a single case (or a small set of cases), to shed light on a broader class of similar 
cases. Stake (2006) pointed out that even a single case study is meaningful, to 
some extent, in terms of other cases, and cannot be developed entirely in 
isolation. Nonetheless, depending on the objectives of the research, the 
qualitative researcher must decide whether to conduct a single or a multicase 
study.  
The double case design of the thesis was chosen to enable an exploration 
of similarities and differences between the cases, which would provide a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The 
double case study design was not predetermined at the start of data collection 




gathered during fieldwork, and preliminary analysis.33 To begin with, I determined 
that potential case studies would need to fulfil the following basic criteria:  
 High ICT use: Actors that actively use ICTs, including the Internet  
 Focus on local issues: Actors that engage in issues pertaining either to 
specific areas in Bangalore or issues affecting the city as a whole (rather 
than state or national-level issues) 
 Emphasis on participatory democracy/governance: Actors that stress the 
centrality of citizen participation in a functioning democracy      
 Prominence: Actors who dominate the public and media discourse of the 
city 
Based on these criteria, environmental network Hasiru Usiru was the first 
case study to be selected after a preliminary online review and a first round of 
fieldwork. As a precursor to the first round of fieldwork, I had conducted Internet 
searches on CSOs in Bangalore with active online spaces as potential case 
studies. Hasiru Usiru featured prominently during these searches, due its 
activism on sustainable development, particularly mobility and transportation, 
which were (and continue to be) hot-button issues due to the city’s infamous 
traffic jams and pollution. During the first round of fieldwork, interviews with 
respondents associated with Hasiru Usiru revealed interesting connections 
between the network and the Internet for activism. This, combined with the 
network’s prominence in the public sphere, the high level of online activity in its 
email discussion group, and the willingness of members to participate in the 
research, made it an ideal case for the research.  
The choice of the second case study, in turn, emerged in relation to data 
gathered during fieldwork, rather than as a predetermined choice. As I was 
shortlisting possible cases I was advised by those knowledgeable in the field, 
including academics and civil society actors, to avoid the more obvious initiatives 
and organisations, like Janaagraha, whose activities had already been 
scrutinised to a great extent. Instead, they encouraged me to focus on a newer or 
                                                             
33 See Lloyd-Jones’ (2003) argument about making more explicit the arguments and 




under-researched case that would highlight the emerging linkages between the 
Internet and civic and political engagement in Bangalore. Further, after selecting 
Hasiru Usiru as the first case, I needed to identify a second case that would 
make for a comparable study. Praja emerged as the obvious choice for several 
reasons: firstly, like Hasiru Usiru, Praja was a central player in the discussion on 
sustainable transport in the city, with online discussions and several offline 
projects focused on improving mobility. This had raised Praja’s public profile, 
making it a prominent actor in the online and offline public spheres, and brought 
both organisations into intersecting spheres of activism. Secondly, during round 1 
of fieldwork, some interviewees juxtaposed the two entities, and a further line of 
questioning during round 2 highlighted salient disjunctures in attitudes towards 
and use of the Internet, despite what appeared to be overlapping goals. 
Thereafter, interviews, along with observation of the platform’s activities and 
discussions, served to reinforce the choice of Praja, fitting the criteria that I had 
identified for Hasiru Usiru as a case study. Further, in addition to the high level of 
online activity on the platform, Praja used a variety of new media to increase its 
online and offline base, including Facebook and Twitter, which made it an ideal 
case for new media research.  
While both cases occupy a prominent place in the online and offline public 
sphere in Bangalore, there is a dearth of publicly available records regarding 
their origins and evolution. My experience of having worked in the civil society 
sector in Bangalore suggests that this is a common problem for organisations in 
this sector in India, due to the limitations of manpower and financial resources. 
This situation is particularly dire for organisations operating on an informal basis 
such as Hasiru Usiru, whose founder members, by and large, were not actively 
involved in its daily activities. In this situation, as I was unable to access the 
proper documentation, interviews and online observation (of mailing list archives 
and discussions) played a crucial role in building up the case study. In the case 
of Praja, a co-founder generously provided me access to records that he had 
meticulously created and archived, making the task of writing up the Praja case 




information on alternative viewpoints between and among members and non-
members.      
Interviews  
In-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews were employed with the 
intention of describing and interpreting the meanings of central themes in the life 
world of the subjects (Kvale, 1996). In this study, interviews were conducted to 
gain a deeper insight into individuals’ experiences with the two-fold objective of 
understanding their narratives on: (1) issues confronting them as citizens of a 
technologising and media-rich city, and (2) how civil society and the Internet 
interacted and intersected within the online and offline spaces of action. The 
emphasis on qualitative interviewing follows the rationale that as online 
engagement entails multi-site communications, what is communicated online 
may be different from what is communicated offline by the same person or 
organisation (Soriano, 2012).  
Potential interviewees were initially identified through purposive sampling 
from research papers, online newspapers, NGO reports and information 
available on CSO websites, as well as personal contacts. Thereafter, once initial 
contact was established and interviews underway, most respondents were 
identified through snowball sampling, which proved to be the most effective 
means of locating interviewees in an online setting. Expert interviewees, too, 
were initially chosen from personal contacts, which are discussed further in the 
section on ‘Sampling’.  
Potential interviewees were initially contacted via email, with an 
introductory letter attached that explained the study’s broad research goals and 
invited them to participate (see Appendix A for sample invitation letter to resource 
persons). Once a potential respondent had indicated s/he would participate, a 
Participant Information Sheet & Consent Form was sent via email, which detailed 
the purpose of the study, the participant’s role in the research, and the ways in 
which his/her data would be kept confidential (see Appendix B for sample 




and/or telephone calls, respondents were interviewed at their place of work, or 
home or a mutually convenient location decided by both of us in advance. 
Interviewees were also sent a copy of the tentative interview guide to help 
prepare them for the interview (see Appendix C for sample interview guide for 
resource persons). All documents were in English, as it was anticipated that 
translation into Kannada was not needed due to the middle-class demographic of 
the interviewees. Having worked in the civil society space, I was, by and large, 
aware of the socio-economic profile of interviewees, either through my personal 
interactions with them or by conducting basic profile checks on the Internet as 
part of the interviewee identification process. Three different prototypes of 
interview guides and invitation letters were designed keeping in mind the three 
main sets of interviewees, viz., (i) resource persons, (ii) Hasiru Usiru-related 
respondents, and (iii) Praja-related respondents (see Appendix D for sample 
interview guide for the case studies). For the first round of fieldwork, the interview 
protocols developed were largely based on the literature review, guided by the 
initial research questions, and open-ended and exploratory in nature. Interview 
guides for the second round of interviews were much more focused, with an 
emphasis on collecting data relating to the two case studies, as well as filling 
data gaps from the previous round of data collection.    
Although interview guides were made available to participants, the 
questions were tentative and semi-structured, allowing for the appearance of new 
and unexpected information. Accordingly, the interviewing followed an inductive 
frame, wherein questions were initially broad and open-ended, and then 
narrowed down once I got a sense of emerging themes. I realised, during the first 
round of fieldwork, that some of my initial ideas did not fit with the reality on the 
ground. For instance, it soon became clear that the global/world city influences 
were waning in the public discourse, and no longer had quite the hold on the way 
the city was imagined by politicians and corporates. While the negative effects 
and subtle hold of these imaginations persisted, it was an important, but not a 
burning issue. Similarly, an investigation of ABIDe (Agenda for Bengaluru 




ABIDe in shaping urban governance priorities, the task force’s relationship with 
civil society, its role in ‘worlding’ the city, etc. was discontinued in subsequent 
rounds of fieldwork. This was due to the weakened position of the beleaguered 
task force, which no longer made it an influential player in city affairs. 
Accordingly, questions were amended to suit this new knowledge and 
understanding of the context. Consequently, as greater time spent on the ground 
enabled greater clarity regarding the research focus, interviews became more 
focused.34 This was particularly the case for the follow-up and later interviews, 
most of which were conducted via email, telephone or Skype.  
Mediated Interviews 
As already indicated, after each round of data collection, email, Skype and 
telephone interviews were conducted with interviewees who were unavailable 
during the fieldwork or to conduct follow-up questioning. Email interviews enable 
the conduct of asynchronous individual interviews, overcoming issues of time 
zone differences, and are suitable for persons with time constraints (Meho, 
2006). However, it was the least preferred method among interviewees, with only 
one interview conducted in this manner. Several participants expressed 
apprehension about typing out answers, particularly as the questionnaire 
consisted of semi-structured, open-ended questions that required detailed 
responses. It also proved to be the least information-rich source of data 
collection, as the lone email interviewee provided cursory answers, which could 
not be probed due to the absence of real-time interaction. Despite these 
limitations, the email interview allowed me to obtain the views of a senior 
government official who may not have otherwise had the time to meet me.  
Most of the remote interviewing was done through Skype and telephone, 
with Skype proving to be an excellent tool for data collection. Skype allowed for 
in-depth conversation, and the video facility provided a sense of intimacy with the 
interviewee, akin to trust established during face-to-face interviews. However, 
                                                             
34 Elliot & Higgins (2012) provide a useful account of how graduate students can 




there were certain difficulties associated with Skype that compelled me to 
conduct the remaining mediated interviews via telephone: firstly, interviewees did 
not always have access to the internet, but could be easily reached through their 
mobile phones. Secondly, technical issues such as poor sound quality and slow 
Internet speed made telephone interviews a more suitable alternative. Telephone 
interviews were a convenient source of data collection as respondents were 
easily accessible on their mobile phones, and interviewees were comfortable on 
this medium. However, on a few occasions, issues of poor sound quality made 
interviewing very difficult, and forced me to reduce the interview time. Overall, of 
the three types of technology-mediated interview, Skype proved to be the most 
valuable medium, providing the greatest opportunities for rapport building and 
eliciting rich replies from participants.35    
Audio Recording  
Respondents were informed beforehand that the interview would be 
audio-recorded, and that recorded conversations would be strictly confidential, 
with audio data managed in accordance with prescribed university guidelines 
(this is discussed in detail in the Ethics section). As none of the participants 
objected to this, all interviews were recorded, initially by a digital mini tape 
recorder, and later through the voice memo feature of my iPhone, both of which 
allowed audio files to be uploaded directly to a computer, making transcribing 
easier. I tried my best to make recording unobtrusive, so that the focus was on 
the actual interviewing process, rather than the recording that was happening 
simultaneously. However, this was not always possible, and some interviewees 
took a longer time to warm up to the idea that the conversation was being 
recorded. 36 Some interviewees asked for certain portions of their interview to be 
“off the record”, and while I transcribed these portions, they were not included in 
the data analysis. By and large, recording went smoothly, although it required 
                                                             
35 See Tracy (2013, chapter 8) for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
computer-mediated communication in qualitative research.  
36 King & Horrocks (2010, p. 44-46) provide helpful tips on maximising the benefits of 




practice sessions, and it was only after several initial interviews that I was 
comfortable with the process. Note-taking was an essential part of the process, 
and served me in good stead in cases of poor recording, and in the one or two 
cases when recording stopped (when the tape recorder’s batteries needed to be 
replaced and I had not thought to bring along a spare set of batteries!), and in the 
singular case when the interviewee mistakenly deleted the recording while 
checking the audio quality! Notes were also useful in highlighting main points that 
I thought needed to be followed up at a later time, either during the interview or at 
a later date.  
Sampling  
During the first round of fieldwork, interviewees were initially identified 
through purposeful sampling from literature reviews, online newspapers, NGO 
reports and information available on CSO websites, as well as personal contacts. 
Sampling in qualitative research is almost always purposeful, with the sample 
intentionally selected according to the needs of a study (Coyne, 1997; Patton, 
2002). Similarly, King & Horrocks (2010) noted that purposive or targeted 
sampling is crucial in qualitative research, where the sample needs to relate in 
some systematic manner to the social world and phenomena that a study seeks 
to research. Patton (2002) noted that a few key names or incidents that are 
mentioned repeatedly take on special importance, as they are recommended as 
valuable by a number of different informants. This process, he said, produces 
key or core actors or cases that are “information rich”, i.e. good examples for 
study or good interview participants.  
Accordingly, as the research got underway, snowball sampling became an 
important means of recruiting participants, as interviewees were asked or offered 
to locate more participants. Here, personal contacts—professional and private—
played an important role in gaining access to new participants directly, or to new 
acquaintances who helped connect me with potential participants. In the early 
2000s, during the course of my employment with a prominent CSO, I had the 




servants and bureaucrats. Upon re-establishing contact, many of them took the 
time and effort to talk to me during fieldwork, while others referred me to contacts 
they considered useful for my emerging research. My professional background, 
my knowledge of the city and my familiarity with civil society issues, along with 
referrals from known sources, provided credibility to my research, which was 
crucial for the success of snowball sampling. Additionally, in terms of personal 
networks, friends and family members connected me with persons in government 
and non-government circles, resulting in a growing set of potential contacts. By 
taking advantage of my own social networks and those of participants, snowball 
sampling was especially useful in connecting with the movers and shakers in the 
city, who are often difficult to contact. This is akin to Atkinson & Flint’s (2004) 
observations that snowball sampling offered advantages for accessing 
populations that were difficult to reach, including the elite.      
Snowball sampling also proved to be the most effective means of locating 
interviewees in an online setting, who are hard to reach because of anonymity or 
pseudonymity of online spaces, and who are therefore ‘invisible’ or ‘hidden’ to 
some extent (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Browne, 2005). This was the case for both 
Hasiru Usiru and Praja, as their online spaces revealed limited information about 
members, and only partially identified who the key actors were. Additionally, in 
Hasiru Usiru, it was a challenge to identify important members, as (I found out 
later) many were less active on the online spaces, whereas in Praja, the high 
level of activity by different members on the platform made it difficult to identify 
who the key actors were. Snowball sampling, therefore, made access to potential 
interviewees less cumbersome, and helped in identifying the government officials 
to interview. Interviewees from both groups referred to, and sometimes 
connected me with, senior officials. Not surprisingly, these names overlapped, as 
the officials concerned interacted with a range of CSOs on urban issues, 
including transportation and mobility. These experiences showed that the 
usefulness of snowball sampling to locate hard-to-find groups (Atkinson & Flint, 




and groups on the Internet, elite actors, and government officials, where higher 
levels of trust may be required to initiate contact.37  
At the same time, it is also important to consider the limitations of snowball 
sampling in general, and for Internet research in particular. The most common 
criticism of this sampling strategy is sample bias, as participants tend to 
recommend people who share their point of view (King & Horrocks, 2010), or 
because samples are not representative enough of the population under study 
(Browne, 2005). Another potential limitation is the bias that stems from a higher 
participation of individuals with huge networks and strong ties (Baltar & Brunet, 
2012). In this study, as I did not intend to use my sample for statistical 
generalisation, the range of people included was not exhaustive of the 
populations I was studying. The smaller number of respondents, however, made 
the inclusion of alternative viewpoints among participants even more crucial, and 
efforts were made to incorporate a variety of opinions, to reduce sampling bias. 
Towards this end, I attempted to follow King and Horrock’s (2010) advice to 
“recruit participants who represent a variety of positions in relation to the 
research topic, of a kind that might be expected to throw light on meaningful 
differences in experience” (p. 29). I went about doing this by interviewing a wide 
spectrum of civil society, academic, corporate, bureaucratic and political actors, 
with varying goals, methods, motivations, composition, expertise, and 
perspectives. Finally, as the section on sample size (below) shows, given the 
practical constraints such as time, geographical distance, and available 
resources, in-depth focus with a smaller group of participants was considered 
ideal to investigate the emerging topic.  
Sample Size 
Patton (2002) has noted that there are no rules for sample size in 
qualitative inquiry, which depends on “what you want to know, the purpose of the 
inquiry, what's at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what 
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can be done with available time and resources” (p. 244). In deciding the sample 
size, therefore, a researcher has to make trade-offs between breadth and depth, 
with the final choice of sample size depending on the research goals and 
practical considerations. In determining the sample size I was guided by the 
principle of data saturation (also called informational redundancy), which, in 
qualitative research, is reached when data collection does not contribute to any 
new or relevant data (Saumure & Given, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data 
saturation depends on a number of factors, such as the scope of the study, the 
nature of the topic, the quality of data, the study design, cohesiveness of the 
sample, as well as the ability, experience and knowledge of the researcher, 
among other things (Mason, 2010; Morse, 2000; Saumure & Given, 2008; 
Thomson, 2011). The factors mentioned above played an important role in 
guiding the choice of sample size in this study, and are discussed below.  
While heterogeneous populations require greater data collection, due to 
the need to incorporate variability in experiences and worldviews of sub-groups, 
homogeneous sampling reduces variation, which is inevitable in purposive 
sampling, as participants are chosen according to some common criteria (Baker 
& Edwards, 2012; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). With regard to both case 
studies, saturation was achieved relatively quickly (13 interviews for Hasiru Usiru 
and 15 for Praja) since the sample was cohesive, with participants sharing socio-
economic characteristics, and with roughly comparable experiences of 
participating in civil society activities. The sample size was also influenced by the 
quality of information obtained in the interviews, which was rich and experiential, 
as most respondents were willing to talk at length and reflect on issues. In 
addition to the amount of useful information derived from each participant, key 
actors were interviewed more than once, to clarify doubts, as well as to gain 
further insights on emerging issues. (Morse, 1991, 2000) has emphasised that 
quality of data and number of interviews per participant play a key role, 
particularly as a small number of rich responses by “good informants” requires 
fewer participants to reach saturation. In addition, Thomson (2011) has noted 




allows him/her to bypass unnecessary data and formulate questions to guide the 
interview more effectively. In this regard, my familiarity with the context provided 
sufficient background data that was able to guide the initial interviews. While this 
prior knowledge was useful during the early stages of data collection, I tried to be 
mindful to let the emerging data guide me in the field. Overall, while the small 
sample size (vis-à-vis actual membership of the organisations) could affect 
results by limiting the ability to generalise, the attempt was to provide a rich 
description and analysis of the cases, which required depth rather than breadth.  
Privacy, Confidentiality & Other Ethical Issues 
Before fieldwork could begin, the research proposal and supporting 
documents had to be approved by the university’s ethics review committee, the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB)38, only after which formal contact could be made 
with potential respondents. Tracy (2013, p. 243) has referred to the ethical 
actions that are prescribed by organisational review boards as procedural ethics, 
which are necessary to protect research participants. As per the IRB’s 
procedures, interviewees were informed in advance about how their privacy 
would be protected, and the ways in which confidentiality of research records 
would be maintained. The research protocol made all identities confidential, and 
at the time of signing the consent form, interviewees had the choice to be 
identified by their designation/department/organisation name or no personal 
identifiers at all. While this seemed relatively straightforward at the start of the 
research, once actual fieldwork began, I had to battle with issues of interviewee 
and organisation confidentiality at several stages. The tensions arising out of the 
ethical considerations of privacy and anonymisation are discussed below.  
To begin with, prior to the start of the interview I reviewed the information 
sheet and consent form details with participants before they signed the form. All 
interviewees were agreeable with the terms of the form, and some stressed that 
their employing company not be named, as they were speaking in their capacity 
as volunteers of a CSO. A few participants requested their identity be revealed 
                                                             




while presenting results, which I declined, as I wanted to be certain that our 
discussions were not aimed at publicity. I was also worried, as Thomson, Bzdel, 
Golden-Biddle, Reay, & Estabrooks (2005) pointed out, that failure to protect 
identities could raise several challenges in the future, such as the welfare of 
participants vis-à-vis their own community. Such situations could arise, as many 
spoke to me on a personal level, discussing in detail other persons and 
organisations that could affect their relationships with those entities (see 
Guenther, 2009). In addition to concealing real identities from outsiders, I began 
to realise that participants’ identities needed to be concealed from each other, to 
avoid jeopardising existing relationships (ibid). Moreover, participant welfare was 
also of the utmost importance in order to maintain bridges with the organisations 
and actors under study, without which the research could not be undertaken with 
the required level of rigour.  
As I began to write up the research findings I was confronted by another 
aspect, viz., how much information to disclose about interviewees, as personal 
identifiers, such as age, gender and organisation could sometimes easily reveal 
identities. This aspect worried me as Bangalore was a small city, and civil society 
actors (and the government officials they interacted with) were well known to 
each other. This, in effect, meant that being negligent about confidentiality could 
easily compromise the identity of respondents. Being allowed into, and 
interacting with them in, their life-world built relationship of trust between myself 
and interviewees, and I slowly began to realise the imperative of not betraying 
this trust while writing their stories. One way I tried to avoid inadvertently 
identifying people was to exclude parts of quotations that could reveal their 
identity, even though this would often water down the impact of the quote. 
Another way was to try, as far as possible, to avoid mentioning personal 
identifiers that could give away identities. However, this process came with its 
own share of stresses and complications, as I had to review interviewee 
descriptions a few times in case I had been lax in this area. In cases where 




been removed or changed, while reference to age has been, by and large, 
removed.  
A related issue is what Guenther (2009) termed “the politics of naming” 
individuals, places and organizations, which she noted is a complex and 
problematic issue that “is rife with overlapping ethical, political, methodological, 
and personal dilemmas” (p. 412). I grappled with the issue of naming as well, 
beginning with how to choose pseudonyms for respondents, and whether to hide 
or reveal the identities of the organisations chosen as case studies. The issue of 
naming location (city) was a straightforward one, with Bangalore as the context 
being a crucial aspect of the research, and could not be concealed per se. In 
choosing names for individuals, I was guided by Guenther’s (2009) advice that 
names should be chosen with courtesy and empathy. Towards this end, I tried to 
choose names that were reflective of participants’ religious identities, but which 
would simultaneously avoid any inadvertent identity disclosure. For example, 
majority of the respondents were Hindus, and I chose Hindu names as 
pseudonyms for these participants. However, in the case of participants from 
other religious denominations, such as Muslims and Christians, I selected names 
that were representative of these religions but could also be Hindu names— 
thereby preventing any accidental exposure. With regard to government and 
public officials, I was initially undecided about how to proceed. While Guenther 
(2009) pointed out that in the social sciences public officials were often identified 
by their real names, I finally decided to keep their names concealed, revealing 
only selective information about them. The decision to anonymise arose from the 
fact that many officials spoke frankly to me about the government and civil 
society in the city, and I did not want to jeopardise their relationships with others 
or with me, nor did I wish to draw what may be construed as undue or negative 
publicity to them. I applied the same rationale for keeping experts’ identities 
confidential.   
The next dilemma appeared in the form of whether to hide or reveal 
organisations’ identities, which had not appeared to be a problem before I left for 




IRB guidelines did not mention anything about organisation confidentiality, and 
the issue did not arise during fieldwork, I was only confronted by this issue when 
I returned to Singapore and started writing up the case studies. I decided to 
resolve this issue by re-contacting the key members of Hasiru Usiru and Praja 
that I had interacted with, and asked their opinion. In Hasiru Usiru’s case, 
majority of its core group either preferred the actual name or did not mind either 
way. Some members pointed out that the prominence of the network would make 
it difficult to conceal its identity anyway, while others mentioned that since it was 
an open network, revealing its identity might be beneficial to its cause. Only one 
member preferred a pseudonym, out of concern for negative publicity in the 
mainstream media. I assured her that my writings would be disseminated in the 
academic field, and explained the reasons (above) for choosing to name the 
network. This issue was not a concern in the case of Praja, as members were 
comfortable with being identified, particularly as they were keen to publicise their 
efforts. Upon careful consideration, I decided not to reveal the identity of other 
CSOs, as members had spoken frankly and entrusted me with information that 
would not ordinarily be made available to an outsider. To avoid any unpleasant 
publicity or repercussions, I kept these organisations anonymous, providing 
pseudonyms wherever necessary.   
An additional ethical issue that arose at the time of writing concerned the 
ethics of what to include and what could be avoided to prevent conflict with and 
among respondents. This was particularly so as I was either in close proximity to 
key collaborators and/or developed a sense of mutual trust with interviewees 
over a period of time. Interviewees often told me their personal stories and 
trajectories, and commented on other individuals and organisations, as well as 
on issues that were of a sensitive nature. This was more so in the case of Praja, 
where I had the opportunity to attend events, and interactions became more 
personal, rather in terms of a researcher-subject relationship. I have tried not to 
include such personal and potentially awkward information in the results/findings, 
guided by considerations of what would be best for my research subjects, as well 




(2013, p. 243-245) has referred to these decisions in terms of situational and 
relational ethics—while the former refers to ethical issues that arise in specific 
contexts or sample populations, relational ethics involves treating participants 
with care and respect as whole people, rather than as subjects from which to 
wrench a good story. Thus, in choosing to highlight some aspects and 
withholding other pieces of information, I had to make a trade-off between all that 
could be written about the organisation or individual versus their interests.  
Observation: Online and Offline  
Most of the observation was conducted online, which involved observation 
of the interactions between members in the online spaces at regular intervals, as 
well as review of archived content. This was supplemented by offline observation 
of events and activities, mostly related to the Praja case, but which involved other 
civil society actors, including Hasiru Usiru. Observation of the online spaces of 
the two cases was deemed necessary to interpret the communicative behaviours 
of its members within the context of its natural ‘setting’, as well as to better 
understand the setting itself (see Mason, 2002). By undertaking observation of 
the online spaces, I tried to enhance my experiential knowledge of the setting, 
familiarise myself with actors’ perspectives, as well as to better understand 
actors’ motivations by being more aware of their social world.39 Observation was 
also a more ‘neutral’ or impartial way to compare participants’ accounts, as 
discussed in interviews, and actual proceedings or behaviour (see McKechnie, 
2008), to see patterns of convergence or divergence between the two types of 
data.   
With regard to the online setting, I did not participate in any discussions or 
activities being observed, thereby assuming the role of a non-participant 
observer (see Liu & Maitlis, 2010). While observation was unobtrusive, it was not 
covert, as key interviewees/collaborators had been informed that observing the 
online spaces would form a central part of my research. This was an important 
ethical consideration, arising out of both a procedural obligation (as per IRB 
                                                             




requirements) to make participants aware that I was observing the proceedings, 
as well as a personal compulsion to do so. As both were closed groups, requiring 
moderator action to include me in the list, I clearly stated my intentions to 
observe the online spaces at the outset.  
I similarly conducted non-participant observation of Praja’s activities 
offline, which involved attending events (workshops, symposiums, etc.) and 
joined participants in on-the-ground projects, which allowed me to observe a 
range of actions, behaviours and interactions, and to establish contact with 
potential interviewees. Along the way, being in close proximity to my informants 
or collaborators, and having developed a mutual sense of affinity and trust, 
changed the equation to a certain extent, making me a less passive participant in 
the observation process. This resulted in a move from non-participant to a 
degree of participant observation (see Spradley, 1980), wherein I interacted with 
and shared in the participants’ activities. For the most part, however, observation 
was conducted on the sidelines, and always with full knowledge of the 
interviewees.   
As my research design was inductive, based on a bottom-up approach, 
unstructured observation was considered ideal to gain as much information about 
the setting and the actors in it, in order to determine the foci of interest. In 
unstructured observation, researchers usually enter the field with some general 
ideas of what may be salient, but no predetermined notions about the discrete 
behaviours they might observe (McKechnie, 2008; Mulhall, 2003; Nørskov & 
Rask, 2011). Unstructured observation differs from structured observation in that 
what is considered salient may change over time as the researcher gathers data 
and gains experience in the particular setting (McKechnie, 2008; Mulhall, 2003). 
Unstructured observation was also considered suitable for this study as it is not 
constrained by checklists and coding schemes, thereby allowing the researcher 
substantial flexibility and freedom regarding data collection and recording (ibid; 
Nørskov & Rask, 2011). These advantages were magnified by the fact that 
observational data existed in a recorded/written format, minimising the risk of 




search functions. On the other hand, the disadvantages of online observation 
generated from the reduced social presence and cues (see Nørskov & Rask, 
2011), were minimised through offline data collection, such as interviews.  
Overall, the combination of online and offline observation (and interviews) 
provided a more rounded or complete understanding of the cases under 
investigation, including their structure and functioning, roles of the online and 
offline entities, organisation aims and objectives, and their (perceived and actual) 
civil society role and position in the city. Further, observation also enabled 
greater familiarity with the main and peripheral actors in the organisations, their 
roles, perspectives and contributions, making it easier to identify similarities 
and/or disjunctures between interviewees’ assertions and their online words and 
actions. Observations were noted down in field notes, which were either hastily 
scribbled notes on a note-pad or on my IPhone, which enabled instant 
documentation and recall. While field notes did not form a major aspect of my 
analysis, they helped in making comparisons before and after interviews, and in 
instances where major themes were emerging, but I did not quite know what to 
make of those ideas. Field notes were also important in providing some sort of 
chronological sequencing of my fieldwork, and to see which ideas appeared 
during what point of the data collection.  
Secondary Data: Filling in the Blanks   
Primary information was supplemented by various sources of secondary 
data, such as academic papers, NGO reports, census statistics, and newspaper 
articles. Digital sources, such as civil society e-magazines or newsletters, blogs, 
CSO website archives, and policy data on government websites, were crucial 
sources of information that threw greater light on the context within which the 
study was situated. Secondary data was also useful in piecing together the 
history and origins of the cases, particularly as neither had any comprehensive 
document that detailed the evolution of the cases. As I was unable to obtain 
historical records regarding Hasiru Usiru’s origins, secondary data played a key 




historical records were readily available, and I was provided access to internal 
newsletters and other documents by one of the co-founders, which greatly 
helped in enhancing the descriptive nature of the case study. In this way, various 
data sources, including Hasiru Usiru and Praja archives, enriched data collected 
through interviews and observation, and helped fill in numerous information gaps.   
Data Analysis  
The primary objective of (the many approaches to) qualitative data 
analysis is the imposition of some form of organisation and ordering of one’s 
data, comprising multi-faceted data records, and personal accounts of 
experience and interaction (Mason, 2002; Richards, 2005). In this study, data 
was analysed using qualitative data analysis methods underpinned by an 
inductive approach in general, and incorporating elements of Grounded Theory. 
Like other qualitative analysis approaches, a general inductive approach is 
suitable for research that aims to develop a model or theory about the underlying 
structure of experiences or processes which are evident in the text or raw data 
(Thomas, 2003). This involved an emphasis on various rounds of coding and 
memoing to identify categories, the relationship between categories, and 
emerging themes, and thereafter to finalise the categories that were most salient 
for the main research objectives.  
The process of data analysis began with the manual transcription of 
interview data, wherein entire data sessions were transcribed. Words were 
transcribed verbatim, and non-verbal cues such as pauses, laughter, and 
gestures were also included in transcriptions. Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2006) have 
recommended that transcribing data should be an interactive process, which 
engages the researcher in the process of deep listening, analysis, and 
interpretation. In this way, transcription was not just a passive act. Moreover, as 
the transcription was done manually, the process allowed greater familiarity with 
the research material, which helped in generating rough ideas of categories and 




interviews ran close to 500 pages, and 54 transcripts were studied in their 
entirety and coded line by line, as described below. 
The next stage in analysis was coding, or assigning tags or labels to the 
data, both during and after the transcription of interviews. Coding has been 
identified as a core physical activity of developing analysis, as it allows for the 
labelling, separation, and organisation of raw data into relevant categories 
(Lofland & Lofland, 1995). By alerting the researcher to certain patterns, and by 
creating linkages between the data and ideas, coding enables data simplification, 
data retention, and data complication (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Richards, 2005; 
Richards & Morse, 2007).40 The coding process combined and adapted various 
approaches to qualitative data analysis, and involved initial, intermediate, and 
focused coding cycles.  
The initial or first cycle of coding, based upon the researcher’s expertise 
and relevant topic and aspect considerations, is the process of remaining open to 
discovering whatever theoretical possibilities can be discerned in the data 
(Charmaz, 2006; Lofland & Lofland, 2006). For this study, initial coding 
(sometimes called “open coding”) comprised descriptive, topic, in vivo, and 
sociologically constructed codes. Descriptive coding involves storing information 
(characteristics or attributes) about the case being studied, while topic coding 
involves allocating passages to topics, thereby enabling later retrieval and 
description, categorisation, or reflection (Richards, 2005; Richards & Morse, 
2007). In vivo codes refer to codes that derive from the terms and language used 
by social actors in the field or in the course of interviews, and sociologically (or 
any other academic discipline-) constructed codes are a combination of the 
researcher’s scholarly knowledge and the field under study (Charmaz, 2006; 
Strauss, 1987). Once this initial coding was done, I created a table whereby 
similarly coded data was grouped together, which enabled the identification of 
broader categories or “families” because they shared some characteristics 
(Saldana, 2009). In this way, the initial cycle of coding enabled the identification 
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of emerging patterns of thought and actions, similarities and differences in these 
patterns, as well as preliminary categories and themes.  
During this phase of data exploration and data reduction (Hesse-Biber & 
Leavy, 2006) I began writing memos, reflecting on the participants’ experiences 
and motivations, my choice of codes, identifying the linkages between codes, 
linking data excerpts to existing theories and literature, and highlighting the 
emerging patterns and/or themes. Memos, which are written records of the 
researcher, along with diagrams, are part of the analytic process, and are an 
integral part of Grounded Theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2006). While I was not using Grounded Theory per se, I found the process of 
memoing useful to organise my thoughts and to move towards some initial 
analytical thought. Memoing also alerted me to gaps in the data, enabling me to 
prepare for subsequent data collection and analysis, which fed into the next cycle 
of coding— which is referred to as intermediate coding (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
Thereafter, during the subsequent cycle of coding and memoing, memos shifted 
from a focus on various aspects of individual interviews to comparing and linking 
these memos and developing a storyline, as well as further review and 
refinement of categories.41 Following Coffee and Atkinson’s (1996) advice about 
ensuring data display and easy data retrieval, data bits that were assigned the 
same code or category were brought together in a word document. This allowed 
greater exploration of a category, easier identification of relationships among and 
between categories, and the emergence of significant themes.   
The final stage of coding involved the process of focused coding, which 
Saldana (2009) has described as a second cycle coding method that builds upon 
the data coded in the initial and intermediate phases. Focused coding involves 
searching for the most frequent or significant codes to develop the most salient 
categories in the data corpus (Charmaz, 2006; Saldana, 2009). By enabling the 
separation, sorting, and synthesis of large amounts of data, focused coding 
allows for the building and clarifying of concepts (Charmaz, 2006; Hesse-Biber & 
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Leavy, 2006). This process involved the re-organisation and categorisation of 
data, following Rubin & Rubin’s (1995, as cited in Saldana, 2009) 
recommendation of simple organisational outlining of categories and 
subcategories. This process also involved the subsequent identification of 
properties (characteristics or attributes) of a category.42 Thereafter, by applying 
Saldana’s (2009) focusing strategy of identifying a study’s “trinity” (in what he 
describes as the post-coding and pre-writing stage, p. 186), I identified three 
main categories and/or themes and how they interacted with each other. This 
became the starting point for the presentation of the findings, although data 
analysis never really stopped, nor were categories entirely final while the writing 
process was ongoing. See Appendix E for an example of coding and memos.    
Validity, Verification & Credibility 
Finally, in addressing qualitative work, it is important to consider notions of 
validity and credibility, which are not related to methods alone, but refer to ways 
in which the correctness of an account can be assessed (Maxwell, Qualitative 
research design: An interactive approach, 1996). While validity is a contested 
concept in the social sciences, particularly between quantitative and qualitative 
researchers, there has been increasing recognition that the same labels of 
validity need not apply for both kinds of research.43 For instance, Janesick (2000) 
has pointed to the limitations of assessing the rigour of qualitative work through a 
quantitative lens, pointing out that reliability, validity and generalizability should 
be replaced with qualitative referents. She pointed to arguments that highlighted 
how traditional thinking of generalisability falls short in individual cases, where 
value stems from their uniqueness, and whose results cannot be replicated or 
generalised (ibid). A variety of techniques to assess the validity and quality of 
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43 See Winter (2000) for a comparison of the notion of validity in qualitative and 




qualitative research can be found in academic literature of which this study 
employs but a few. The first technique is member validation or member checks, 
which is a process whereby the researcher solicits feedback about her/his 
research from the people being studied (Bloor, 1997; Maxwell, 1996; Patton, 
2002). Despite the weaknesses of member validation (see Bloor, 1997), review 
by inquiry participants is relevant to the issue of validity, to the extent that if 
participants can relate to and confirm the analysis and results of a study, its 
credibility is greatly enhanced. With regard to the case studies, key actors of both 
cases were interested in knowing the main findings, particularly as they wished to 
see how a neutral third party viewed their organisation. A few participants were 
interested in vetting the research before it was formalised in order to verify that 
their opinions were being accurately portrayed. Accordingly, the first drafts of the 
case studies were sent to a small group of key actors in Hasiru Usiru and Praja 
for their feedback. The four Praja members who reviewed the study said it 
correctly portrayed their viewpoints, and that it helped to understand themselves 
better, and to review their future actions. One member took the effort to provide 
comments on various aspects of the document, related to definitions, factual 
clarifications, and editorial aspects that reflected his academic credentials. He 
had worked for several years in a US university after obtaining his PhD there, 
and was happy to share his expertise while reading the case thoroughly. In 
Hasiru Usiru’s case, while several core group members had expressed an 
interest in vetting the document, and despite several reminders, no feedback was 
provided. This was probably due to the severe time constraints within which key 
members functioned, although a condensed version of the thesis (in the form of a 
journal article) was also sent for comments.  
The thesis has attempted to be credible or valid in other ways as well, 
such as by the provision of “rich” data (Maxwell, 1996), which is data that is 
detailed and complete enough to provide a comprehensive picture of the context 
and participants’ meaning-making within it. A description that is complete, rich 
and accurate counters threats to validity that arise from inaccurate or incomplete 




whereby I coded a set of data, and returned to re-code it after a period of time, in 
order to compare the results. Krefting (1991) has noted that this code-recode 
procedure is one means for a qualitative researcher to enhance the dependability 
of the study, which in turn enhances its rigour. While I was not aware that this 
process was related to validity while I was coding, I intuitively performed double 
coding as a means of verifying that existing codes were ‘accurate’, or as a means 
to fine-tune codes.  
This chapter has described the various methods for data collection and 
analysis employed in this research, the strategies adopted to inject rigour in 
qualitative research (Krefting, 1991), as well as the ethical considerations 
required of such research. The results appear in the following chapters: chapter 4 
is an examination of the context of civil society in Bangalore, and interviewees’ 
perceptions of the ‘IT City’ environment with regard to civic and political 
engagement. Chapters 5 and 6 are detailed case studies of Hasiru Usiru and 
Praja respectively, followed by a comparison of the two cases in chapter 7, and 
discussion and conclusions in chapter 8. Findings of the cases are presented in a 
manner that allows for a meaningful comparative analysis between cases, and 















CHAPTER 4: CONTEXT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
BANGALORE 
This chapter deals with the worldview of participants as they consider the 
possibilities and implications of ICT use by civil society within the larger context 
of Bangalore as an “IT City”. This relates to the significance of context in 
qualitative research, as it attempts to understand human attitudes and behaviour 
in relation to the research participants’ social, cultural, economic and political 
environments (Hentschel, 1999; Holloway, 2005). As discussed in the 
Introduction, the context of this study is Bangalore’s techno-social environment, 
which derives from the city’s historical role as a knowledge and science hub, and 
it’s more recent avatar as an ‘IT city’ with global aspirations. Bangalore’s 
descriptions as a ‘network city’ (Heitzman, 2004) and ‘virtual megacity’ (Spivak, 
2000) are reflective of a new and emerging techno-social paradigm (Gurumurthy, 
2008). In this paradigm, associated with an information society, the 
technological/informational and social aspects of life are interwoven in new and 
complex ways (ibid; see also Fuchs, 2008; Webster, 2006). In exploring how 
interviewees view the city in relation to its IT context, and the implications for civil 
society activity, I was introduced to a multitude of viewpoints, which reinforced 
the notion of ‘multiple realities’ in qualitative research (see Yin, 2011). These 
various perspectives alerted me to the numerous ways in which interviewees 
situated themselves within the larger context, and how these positions influenced 
their beliefs and actions.   
Findings in this section are based on informal conversations and formal 
interviews conducted with government and non-government actors in the city, 
including key policy actors, over several rounds of data-collection from June 
2011-January 2013. Interviewees included prominent civil society actors, senior 
IT-BT industry officials, urban planners, government officials, a Member of 
Parliament, academics, and a senior journalist. Data from 38 formal interviews, 
including Praja and Hasiru Usiru members, was compiled and coded, and 
qualitatively analysed, as explained in the Methodology chapter. With regard to 




analysis revealed three main perspectives: (1) a positive view of Bangalore as an 
IT City, and optimism about its benefits for civil society, (2) a consideration of 
both positive and negative consequences of the IT thrust on the city, and (3) a 
denunciation of the notion of Bangalore as IT City, and critique of its detrimental 
effects on civil society and governance. This variety of viewpoints was expected, 
as I had interviewed a wide range of people to try and acquire a deeper 
understanding of the spectrum of opinions surrounding this issue. The chapter 
begins with a discussion on civil society itself, viz., how interviewees perceive 
civil society in Bangalore, its complex and fractured nature, and an examination 
of the underlying reasons for the contrasting attitudes towards and use of ICTs 
for civil society activity.  
Civil Society in Bangalore 
Social Innovation and Citizen Participation 
Bangalore’s civil society is known for its vibrant community participation, 
and has been described as an important stakeholder in the urban agenda (Nair, 
2005; Sudhira et. al., 2007; Sudhira, 2008). Almost all interviewees described 
civil society in Bangalore as active, committed, and integral part of its liberal, 
cosmopolitan identity. Some pointed out that a sense of ownership of the city 
was high among its residents, as evident in the mushrooming of civic initiatives. 
Others pointed to the commitment of citizens' groups and organisations, whose 
members devoted considerable time and energy to improving the city. Senior 
journalist Meenakshi noted that CSOs in Bangalore played a crucial role in 
highlighting issues such as good governance and accountability, and engaging 
with the government on critical issues. She highlighted several examples, and 
noted that newer, informal groups had energised the civil society space. One 
such initiative singled out for praise was “The Ugly Indians”, a Bangalore-based 
group of anonymous volunteers who cleaned up the city's streets and fixed filthy 
spots (Hariprakash, 2011; Rediff.com, 2014 ).44 She added that The Ugly Indians 





was one of many examples of how ordinary citizens across the country were 
galvanising themselves into action, translating their love for their cities into 
concrete initiatives. In Bangalore, where civic interest and activity was already 
high, new technologies had spurred the entry of more actors into civic affairs, and 
energised existing initiatives. A prominent civil society actor highlighted the high 
level of civic activity and “social entrepreneurial energy” emanating from 
Bangalore over the years, which matched my observations:  
I don’t know whether anybody has studied this—I suspect that 
Bangalore’s social entrepreneurial energy is a lot higher than many 
other cities. And there’s a lot more social innovation happening in 
Bangalore, and I don’t mean only with respect to urban issues: if you 
look at Akshaya Patra, what they are doing on mid-day meal 
programmes, it’s all over the country and they’ve started in Bangalore; 
you look at what’s happening with Devi Shetty and the heart work; you 
look at urban education issues with Akshara Foundation, there's a 
whole range of – there's Solomon who’s doing fascinating work on 
Labour Net, which is bringing blue collar workers together and giving 
them collective bargaining platforms. So there’s—I don’t know what it 
is about Bangalore—but there certainly seems to me, anecdotally at 
least, more social innovation taking place in Bangalore than in many 
other cities. (Prakash, male, Skype interview, August 1, 2011) 
In the above excerpt, the interviewee referred to “social innovation” as a 
hallmark of Bangalore, an idea, which along with the term “social 
entrepreneurship”, has captured the imagination of citizens and netizens alike 
(see Krishnamurthy, 2012; Norohna, 2007). Increasingly, “the flat, hot and 
crowded social entrepreneurial space in India” (Prasad, n.d.) has been the 
subject of academic scrutiny as well, with an exploration of the history, 
approaches, theories and concepts, and case studies of social innovation in the 
country (Datta, 2011).45 A cursory Internet search revealed the presence of a 
large number of dynamic and active social innovation forums and organisations 
in the city, lending some evidence to the descriptions of Bangalore as a hub of 
social innovation. The blogosphere, too, has indicated positive references to 
social innovation in Bangalore, particularly the harnessing of entrepreneurial 
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energy to tackle “the miseries and injustices of the old India” (Krishnamurthy, 
2012). Prakash’s claims that Bangalore had a leading edge in social innovation 
were buttressed by Rao (2012a), who noted that the city's ecosystem (along with 
Mumbai's) was most amendable to testing new models of social innovation in 
India.  
A factor that works in Bangalore’s favour is the high level of citizen 
engagement with public affairs, which Simon & Davies (2013) have cited as 
critical to the development and implementation of social innovation. Interviewees 
put forth several explanations for the vibrancy of civil society in Bangalore, such 
as the largely tolerant atmosphere within which civil society operated. Former IT 
executive Vishal (personal interview, August 15, 2011) noted that the threat of 
retaliation or violence, or limits to free speech, seen in other parts of India were 
largely absent in Bangalore. He attributed this conducive environment to a 
combination of factors, including the soft-spoken nature of local Kannadigas, and 
a cosmopolitan culture that was enhanced by the arrival of the IT industry. The 
argument that the city's relatively open culture reduced violence and made civil 
society a safe space was echoed during informal conversations with academics 
and civil society professionals, who noted that a comparison of Bangalore with 
other Indian megacities made this point sufficiently clear.  
Corporate leaders who were actively involved in public affairs also echoed 
the idea that citizens in Bangalore were proactive in civic life. These interviewees 
noted that their appointment to government committees and task forces was 
controversial, but described their involvement in terms of contributing to the city 
through the provision of expertise, networks, funding, etc. Another argument put 
forth was that they represented a mediating class in urban governance, which 
was indispensable due to the gulf between new economy citizens and the 
political class. As Eshwar, an active RWA member explained (personal interview, 
May 26, 2011), the lack of political will or inability to tap into the wealth of 
available citizen expertise had facilitated the rise of task forces and elite CSOs to 
fill this void. He explained that while Bangalore had a highly educated and 




action because of the disconnect between them and the political class. In such a 
situation, new civil society initiatives like Janaagraha and Public Affairs Centre 
(PAC) were lauded for providing interested citizens the opportunity to participate 
in public affairs. Whereas these and other ‘high-powered’ initiatives were praised 
for invigorating the civil society space in the city, another section of interviewees 
expressed opposition to these organisations, describing them as elitist and 
exclusionary.   
Critique of Apathy and ‘Elite’ Civil Society  
Among those critical of middle and upper class CSOs was Vinayak, 
secretary of a non-profit organisation (NPO), who distinguished elitist, pro-(World 
Bank-initiated) reform organisations from the grassroots initiatives that prioritised 
decentralisation over middle class participation (male, personal interview, May 
24, 2011). Harris (2006) and Nair (2005) have pointed out that the class 
composition and claim-making strategies separate elite CSOs from those 
focused on the informal working class, which further marginalises weaker groups 
in the city. As a network championing the cause of marginalised groups in the 
city, the Hasiru Usiru core group was critical of middle- and upper class oriented 
modes of civil society activity. The group’s efforts to provide its ‘political society’ 
constituents access to consultative spaces is discussed in the case study 
chapter. The dominance of upper-middle class CSOs, RWAs, think-tanks, task 
forces, etc., in urban governance, and the limited interactions between these and 
‘political society’ organisations deeply alarmed the core group. The core group’s 
close involvement with the local administrative bodies, including its active 
participation in Bengaluru Janara Vedike46 campaigns, stemmed from the 
concern that very few CSOs actually engaged with the urban local body to 
improve urban governance. Hasiru Usiru core group members also lamented 
what they viewed as limited citizen engagement in the city, with some members 
refuting the notion that Bangalore was characterised by an active civil society at 
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all. Instead, the lack of support for their causes, and the limited response to 
mobilisations prompted some members to lament about the general apathy they 
witnessed in the city.  
The varied responses to civil society and its influence as a force for good 
in Bangalore is unsurprising, given the vast spectrum of civil society actors, 
institutions and organisations in the city. Academics and civil society actors I 
spoke to pointed out the need to be aware of the heterogeneity within Indian civil 
society, and to avoid a superficial or one-dimensional discussion of the concept. 
Srinivas, a researcher in a prominent NGO, encouraged me to undertake a more 
nuanced understanding of civil society in Bangalore, which was possible only 
with a deeper examination of the motivations, composition, claim-making tactics, 
etc. of the various actors that the research was concerned with. Understanding 
this would also help me move beyond my middle-class bias, and my largely 
middle-class experience and knowledge of civil society. In this research, while 
interviewees were predominantly middle and upper-middle class, they included 
individuals who were actively working with or advocating for the rights of the 
working-class and urban poor. In this way, the understanding of civil society 
includes organisations and institutions representing an array of interests and 
stakeholders in the city. The complexities of civil society in India, including the 
presence of ‘uncivil’ actors, the lack of unified and homogeneous ‘political 
society’ or ‘civil society’ categories, and the increasing role of middle-class 
groups in urban governance has already been discussed in the Literature 
Review.  
The diversity of civil society also explained the contrasting responses to 
issues of middle-class participation in civic life, the role of experts in urban 
governance, attitudes towards new technologies, and varying ideological 
motivations. During an informal conversation, a researcher pointed out that the 
diversity of perspectives in a vibrant civil society had its benefits and drawbacks. 
She noted that while the diversity was crucial to represent a plurality of interests, 
it was hard, if not impossible, for civil society to converge on a common vision on 




the interests of the government, as civil society groups were pitted against each 
other for limited resources, influence—and for ideological reasons. As I 
discovered, the experiences of using ICTs, and the ability and willingness to 
leverage new technologies varied depending on which civil society category 
interviewees most closely identified themselves with. Another important aspect of 
the relationship with ICTs was how interviewees defined themselves in relation to 
the techno-social context of the city, and the extent to which it impacted their 
activities. In order to better understand these relationships, interviewees were 
asked how the IT City context affected their organisation and its activities, and 
their experiences of being a civic organisation in an IT city. As mentioned earlier, 
the three main perspectives among interviewees were: (1) a positive view of 
Bangalore as an IT City, and optimism about its benefits for civil society, (2) a 
recognition of both positive and negative consequences of the IT thrust on the 
city, and (3) a denunciation of the notion of Bangalore as IT City, and critique of 
its detrimental effects on civil society and governance. The rest of the chapter is 
focused on these main responses, beginning with the positive associations 
between the city’s IT paradigm and civil society activity.    
Bangalore as IT City: Ecosystem, Knowledge and Innovation  
Those who expressed the opinion that Bangalore was an IT City attributed 
this identity to the industry’s global success, the positive effects on the city’s 
development, and the subsequent international recognition it brought to the city. 
Unsurprisingly, strong supporters of this view included IT-BT industry executives 
and a senior government official at the IT-BT department, who described 
Bangalore as the premier IT and innovation city in the country. They pointed to 
several factors that indicated Bangalore’s position as India’s IT capital, including 
the critical mass of talent and R&D firms, number of expatriates, and global 
technology companies headquartered in Bangalore. Other interviewees, 
including key Praja members, cited Bangalore’s “ecosystem” as a prime factor in 
attracting and retaining talent, and in encouraging investment in the technology 




world, several commentators and business leaders have attempted to 
understand and define this new buzzword (Hwang, 2014; Siewert, 2013). Simply 
put, an ecosystem is about the dynamic interactions between business 
components, and how various strengths and collaborations determine prosperity 
and economic growth for companies within the ecosystem (ibid; Harvard 
Magazine, 2012). Silicon Valley is touted as a prime example of an innovation 
and start-up ecosystem, where innovators and leaders collaborate with their 
competitors to improve not just products, but provide opportunities for 
participatory innovation (Harvard Magazine, 2012; Schrage, 2014). Over the 
years, the ‘Silicon Valley model’, based on networks and a ‘deconstructed’ or 
distributed model of innovation, has become an inspiration for innovation 
ecosystems around the world, including India (Maira, 2011).  
The Silicon Valley model had a huge impact on Bangalore, and played an 
extremely influential role in imagining the city and shaping its identity. Heitzman 
(2001, 2004) pointed out that in the early days leading to the IT boom, as the 
“informational city” began to be seen as the ideal template and Silicon Valley as 
the ideal type, the city began to be aggressively marketed as the Silicon Valley of 
India/Asia. Other researchers have similarly noted how the promotion of such an 
image was misleading, as Bangalore in the early 1990s did not possess the 
characteristics that had made Silicon Valley a successful software centre 
(Parthasarathy, 2004; Saxenian, 2007).47 The lack of a technical community that 
fostered innovation through interactions, the emphasis on low costs, 
questionable working conditions, and employees’ routine and repetitive tasks 
spurred critics to describe the city’s software industry as glorified sweatshops 
(Ferus-Comelo, 2008; Parthasarathy, 2004; Rao, 2007; Sandhu, 2006).48 Over a 
period of time, however, as the critical mass of companies and talent built up in 
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48 See D’Cruz & Noronha (2007) for an alternative viewpoint, based on their 
qualitative study of technical call centres in Mumbai and India. The authors reject the 
perspective that call centres are electronic sweatshops, and argue instead that they are 





Bangalore, a new thrust on innovation added greater value to the ecosystem, 
and marked a new phase in the city’s technological evolution (interviews; 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2011; Viswanath, 2009; Yeung, 2013). While clearly 
inspired by the Silicon Valley model, Bangalore has begun to gain recognition as 
an innovation hub in its own right, emerging as one of the world’s top technology 
innovation clusters and start-up ecosystems in recent years (CXOtoday News 
Desk, 2013; John & Phadnis, 2013). The presence of well-established 
educational and research institutions, an existing technological base, a critical 
mass of talent and companies, IT-BT finishing schools, government-entrepreneur 
networks, and good weather have contributed to the creation of a successful 
ecosystem for technology enterprises (interviews; see also John & Phadnis, 
2013; Mazumdar-Shaw, 2009; Yeung, 2013). Manohar, a senior technologist at a 
leading multinational technology firm, had worked in Silicon Valley for 15 years 
before relocating to Bangalore in 2010. He explained that as Bangalore had 
become a tech hub with a critical mass of talent, multinational companies were 
increasingly choosing the city as the leading site for innovation in India (personal 
interview, July 1, 2011). While noting that Silicon Valley was unique and 
unmatched by similar hubs across the world, he acknowledged that certain 
similarities between it and Bangalore had favoured the latter’s IT thrust. Such 
factors included the city’s education and research base, supported by a large 
number of technical and engineering colleges, a history of technology dating to 
the city’s colonial days, and its pleasant climate, which attracted foreign 
companies and foreigners to live and work in the city. The first three factors were 
also cited by interviewees as crucial in the development of Bangalore’s 
historically cosmopolitan base, which is discussed in the section on 
‘Cosmopolitanism’.  
Shiv, director of a prominent management company, explained the 




the sidelines of a global summit (personal communication, July 7, 2011).49 He 
concurred that while Bangalore was the leading IT hub in India, there was 
growing recognition that more needed to be done in terms of innovation. He 
highlighted several initiatives that were being seeded towards this end, and noted 
that companies were beginning to leverage their presence in the ecosystem to 
innovate. Shiv also pointed to the greater efforts by the state and local 
governments to increase Bangalore’s competitiveness by focusing on innovation, 
particularly in light of increasing competition from within and outside India. 
Rakesh, an urban affairs expert, explained that the evolution of the technological 
hub had paved the way for an emphasis on innovation and knowledge industries 
in Bangalore (personal interview, July 5, 2011). He explained that the IT industry 
was more than just the presence of IT companies; its multiplier effect was felt on 
the economy, the standard of living, and a subsequent emphasis on knowledge 
and innovation in Karnataka state. Rakesh and Manohar both pointed out that 
corporate businesses had been investing heavily in these areas for some time, 
and the government had more recently begun to play an active role in promoting 
these industries. The thrust on innovation and knowledge was evident in the 
mainstream media and public discourse during the time of fieldwork, particularly 
with the establishment of the Karnataka Innovation Council in June 2011 (The 
Times of India, 2011).50 A high-powered commission, the Karnataka Knowledge 
Commission, had been functioning since 2008, with the mission of transforming 
the state into a vibrant knowledge society (Singh, Gurumurthy, & Nandini, 
2012).51 The reconstitution of these two institutions in December 2013 is 
reflective of their significance in the current climate of innovation and knowledge 
                                                             
49 In simple terms, Bangalore’s ecosystem was defined as comprising: (1) MNCs 
doing research & development (R&D) work, such as Microsoft, Google, Cisco, Intel, etc. 
(2) Indian companies doing R&D or Indian start-ups, such as Infosys or Subex, and (3) 
IT service providers, such as Wipro, Mindtree and Accenture (Shiv, personal 
communication, July 7, 2011).  
50 The Government Order constituting the Karnataka State Innovation Council is 
available on the Council’s website at 
http://www.innovationcouncil.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65
&Itemid=44   




production (Times New Network, 2013). A preliminary review of policy 
documents and pronouncements also revealed the prominence accorded to 
cashing in on the existing IT ecosystem. This was made evident during my 
meeting with Manjunath, a senior official of the IT-BT department (personal 
interview, July 11). He discussed Bangalore’s IT-BT achievements at length, and 
highlighted that the city was being simultaneously promoted as a destination for 
the development of BT, nano technology, animation and gaming, as well as the 
premier knowledge and innovation hub in India. He echoed Rakesh’s opinion that 
the government’s emphasis on nano technology, and animation and gaming, 
where “everything’s related to IT”, was indicative of the city’s move from its 
IT/software focus, to an expanding array of knowledge-based expertise. Overall, 
what the interviewees and the secondary data seemed to suggest was that while 
innovation was a buzzword across India, the internal and external threats to 
Bangalore’s status as a prominent tech hub made the drive for innovation and 
knowledge critical. 
In general, interviewees who concurred that Bangalore could be equated 
with “IT City” referred to the emphasis on knowledge and innovation as stemming 
from its technological base. While they were describing the influence of the city’s 
IT environment mainly in terms of corporate and government agendas, this was a 
starting point for my investigation into the impact of technologisation on other 
aspects of city life. As mentioned earlier, an informal conversation with Prabhat, 
a director of a research NPO, introduced me to the notion of “IT as a paradigm” 
in Bangalore, where IT perpetually impacts the city, in visible and invisible ways 
(personal communication, June 8, 2011). This was an intriguing perspective, and 
was suited to my research goal of investigating how the city’s technology-
enabled environment influenced civil society activity. While the case study 
chapters discuss civil society actors’ attitudes towards and use of the Internet 
within the IT context of Bangalore, the next section specifically considers the role 





Civil Society: Leveraging the City’s IT/Knowledge Base 
The positive impact of Bangalore’s IT base on civil society initiatives was 
first highlighted by a key member of Janaagraha, who described this in terms of 
“tapping into the technological competence of the city”:  
Look at the amount of social entrepreneurial initiatives that have come 
up in Bangalore which are driven by IT, which are harnessing the IT 
knowledge base, either in terms of technology or in terms of the 
volunteer base of the people in the IT sector. And that’s not an 
insignificant thing; there are lots of people who have, there are lots of 
IT-based initiatives that have started up in Bangalore. There’s e-
Government’s Foundation, there’s Mapunity, we ourselves in 
Janaagraha use a lot of technology for what we do, and we certainly 
couldn’t do it if we were in any other city, because we’re tapping into 
the technological competence of the city. So there are things that are 
positive, which are unintended positive consequences of having an IT 
base in Bangalore. (Prakash, Skype interview, August 1, 2011) 
Prakash described the rise of IT-driven social entrepreneurial initiatives in 
Bangalore as “unintended positive consequences” of the city’s IT base. He 
observed that the sheer number of CSOs in the city leveraging ICTs was 
reflective of the technological expertise of its knowledge workers, who either 
founded new civic organisations and programmes, or volunteered with existing 
ones. Prakash highlighted prominent tech-based initiatives, such as the e-
Government’s Foundation, an NPO that uses scalable and replicable technology 
solutions to help local governments improve their municipal operations.52 He also 
cited the example of Mapunity, an organisation that uses and develops a range 
of ICTs to tackle social problems and development challenges, in collaboration 
with government and other CSOs.53 These initiatives, while seeded in Bangalore, 
have expanded their operations, and gained national recognition for their 
innovative application of ICTs for improved governance and social change 
(Mishra, 2009; Shrikumar, 2012).  Prakash also explained that Janaagraha’s 
positive experience of using ICTs during the 2008 Jaago Re campaign—which 
encouraged urban residents to register themselves to be eligible to vote—was a 






turning point for the organisation wr.t. ICT use. His emphasis on the positive 
outcomes of the technological environment in Bangalore was a rebuttal of the 
anti-development language propagated by a vocal section of civil society and 
academia. Equating technological progress in such starkly negative terms, he 
stressed, stifled meaningful conversation about change and development in the 
city. While he acknowledged the harmful consequences of the IT paradigm, he 
opined that this aspect was disproportionately highlighted by researchers and 
activists, and encouraged me to consider the positive effects of the city’s 
technologisation.  
His ideas lent credence to my early postulations that the city’s IT base 
positively influenced civil society activity, although there was little or no academic 
literature to support this. One of the few documented cases of CSO use of ICTs 
was by Janaagraha, and I had shortlisted it as a case study at the start of the 
research. However, I decided against this when informants pointed out that 
Janaagraha’s activities were already well-publicised, and that I should choose 
cases that had yet to be explored in detail. However, as Janaagraha’s 
experiences of using ICTs to promote participatory democracy are important to 
the research, they are briefly described below.  
Civil Society and ICT-based Innovations: The Case of Janaagraha 
Raman (2006, 2008) examined Janaagraha’s efforts as part of a larger 
study of how civic groups in Bangalore used ICTs and participated in 
governance, despite pervasive digital divides. She came to the conclusion that 
while ICTs did not play a major role in citizen-government interactions at that 
time, the PROOF and Ward Works initiatives spearheaded by Janaagraha and 
partner NGOs benefitted from ICT use by the city corporation (Raman, 2006).54 
As the BCC’s new computerised fund based accounting system (FBAS) made 
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information sharing easier, campaign members could track public works projects 
and expenditure, which enabled them to participate in the decision making 
process.55 In this way, the use of IT by the local government empowered 
Janaagraha and its campaign partners to engage with the government in an 
informed way, fundamentally altering citizen-government relations (ibid). Over the 
years, Janaagraha’s efforts have evolved from an incidental use of ICTs to a 
more concerted effort to integrate them into its activities. One of its most widely 
discussed initiatives was Jaago Re! (meaning “wake up”), in which it partnered 
with corporate house Tata Tea in a nation-wide campaign to motivate and enable 
India’s youth to participate in the electoral process (Gowda, 2011; Tata, 2008).56 
By creating a website that allowed voters to register online, the campaign aimed 
to overcome the hurdles associated with physical process of voter registration 
(Sanjukta, 2009; Tata, 2008). The campaign was well-publicised on old and new 
media channels, with the latter especially geared towards encouraging the youth 
to register, and to spread the word to their friends via social media (Sanjukta, 
2009; Tewari, 2009). The website received over 16 million visitors and 5 million 
registrations, prompting some commentators to term the campaign a success 
(Gowda, 2011).  
Since then, Janaagraha has increasingly leveraged ICTs for its various 
projects, such as the ‘I Paid a Bribe’ (IPAB) initiative, which enables citizens to 
report and analyse acts of corruption on the portal in real-time.57 Implemented in 
August 2010, the program has been hailed for transforming data into knowledge 
to inform the government about gaps in public transactions, and for strengthening 
citizen engagement to improve the quality of service delivery (Lahiri, 2010; 
OneWorld Foundation India, 2011; Pain, 2011; Strom, 2012 ). The site provides 
an opportunity for citizens to share their experiences, which in turn enables the 
organisation to get a sense of the cost of corruption, and influence processes to 
reduce opportunities for bribe giving and taking (see image 7.1 in Appendix G). 
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56 http://www.jaagore.com/vote/main.php 




Another creative example of ICT use is the ‘I Change My City’ (ICMC) platform, 
which connects citizens locally, and scales up collaborative efforts through the 
Internet, social media, mobile and geographic information systems or GIS (Jha, 
2013; Times News Network, 2012).58 The platform allows users to post 
complaints related to civic issues, mobilise the community to prioritise the 
complaint online, and to liaise with civic authorities and elected representatives to 
get the complaint resolved (see image 7.2 in Appendix G). In 2013, Janaagraha 
was awarded the Google Global Impact award for this initiative, which a co-
founder described as a validation of it’s ‘[inter]net plus roots’ strategy (The Hindu, 
2013; Times News Network, 2013).  
However, the organisation was not always so savvy about or inclined to 
use the Internet and other new technologies to effect grassroots-level changes. 
Prakash described how the Jaago Re campaign reversed their formerly negative 
or sceptical attitudes about the possibilities of using ICTs for civil society action:  
We did not [use new technologies] when we started. We ourselves, 
frankly, did not understand the power of technology until three or four 
years ago, when we did the campaign with Tata Tea for Jaago Re. And 
that was the first time we really used a web-based approach for our 
community outreach work. But then, that was an eye opener for us, 
because we always felt that people on the ground, in grassroots work, 
where’s technology? Only 20% of the people are enabled, and so on. 
So we actually turned our back on technology for the first five or six 
years of our work. But that was from a community outreach standpoint. 
We did try to use GIS and so on, but more for working on our own 
internal programmes, not mass mobilisation. But over the last two or 
three years, we’re certainly using new technologies, we’re learning to 
use technology more from a public outreach standpoint. (Prakash, 
Skype interview, August 1, 2011) 
Noting that the organisation had only recently begun to appreciate the 
value of using ICTs for its outreach activities, Prakash referred to the factors that 
had inhibited early ICT use for mobilisation-related activities. This included an 
inadequate appreciation of the power of ICTs for public outreach, due to the 
belief that ICTs could not be used to connect to the grassroots. Hence, until the 





Jaago Re campaign, Janaagraha had used ICTs for its internal programmes, but 
had shied away from its use for mass mobilisation. While the overwhelming 
response to the campaign resulted in a shift in attitude among Janaagraha’s key 
members, several barriers to successful ICT use have persisted. The limitations 
faced by CSOs in effectively leveraging the Internet in Bangalore are discussed 
in the section ‘Weaknesses in the ICT-civil society relationship’. 
Interviewees that I spoke to were divided about Janaagraha’s impact on 
the city, with some hailing its success in harnessing the power of new media, 
while others were critical of its “elitist” character and urban focus. Discussions 
about Janaagraha arose in conversations with key actors and informants during 
the preliminary stage of data collection, when I was establishing the research 
context and (re-)familiarising myself with the key players in the city’s urban 
governance sphere. Supporters of Janaagraha that I spoke to included members 
of an RWA in the southeast of the city who had participated in its activities. They 
cited the crucial need for such spaces that bridged the gulf between citizens and 
the political class, and also spoke of skills accrued during their association with 
Janaagraha (personal interview, May 26, 2011). Others praised its technology-
driven efforts to air alternative voices and its efforts to reform governance 
systems. As majority of the interviews were conducted prior to the initiation of 
IPAB and ICMC initiatives, interviewees were referring to the Jaago Re 
campaign, as well the use of ICTs for coordination and networking. Only one 
interviewee, a prominent civil society actor, made a direct reference to the new 
initiatives, saying he disagreed with the model, and critiqued the creation of the 
ICMC platform as “a third party”, and questioned its need “just to communicate 
with the government” (Bhaskar, telephone interview, October 1, 2013).  
This section on Janaagraha has focused on its use of ICTs for civic 
engagement, and highlighted how the organisation has been a trend-setter in this 
area. The next section continues to investigate the viewpoint expressed by some 
interviewees that civil society in Bangalore has benefitted from the “IT-isation” of 




Networks, Community & Expertise  
The IT paradigm was referred to by some interviewees in terms of 
boosting civil society activities through the enhanced connections and networking 
opportunities provided by ICTs. Vishal (personal interview, August 15, 2011), a 
former senior IT executive currently active in social issues, noted that ICTs 
provided citizens a means to express opinions, obtain and exchange news and 
information, and enhance connections among similarly inclined groups and 
individuals. He cited the example of the India Against Corruption (IAC) campaign, 
which was largely social media-driven and supported by the IT industry, as a 
successful case of creating pressure groups through the Internet. In a similar 
vein, software professional Vineet highlighted the positive attributes of civil 
society networks in the city, and related them to the IT City background in two 
ways. Firstly, he said, people initiating and participating in networked initiatives 
were often software professionals or ‘techies’, who were exposed to global best 
practices when they travelled, and were keen to incorporate these practices in 
Bangalore. Secondly, as techies comprised a large portion of the audience 
online, efforts were made to reach out them in ways they were familiar and 
comfortable with. Pointing to the slew of Internet-enabled civil society initiatives in 
Bangalore, including e-magazines like India Together and Citizen Matters, and 
email discussion groups and social media-based communities, Vineet argued 
that their success rested on a large Internet-enabled membership/audience, 
including IT and ITeS workers. Civil society networks were described as crucial in 
providing competing points of view on current issues, building connections and 
trust between citizens interested in social issues, and facilitating offline 
participation. Vineet’s comments and enthusiasm about the prospects of civil 
society networks stemmed from his personal experience. He narrated how he 
had returned from his IT travel abroad with ideas that he had sought to replicate 
in Bangalore, particularly with regard to cycling, waste management, and tree 
planting. He noted that being an active member of several e-civil society 
networks and communities was crucial to the success of these initiatives, as they 




limitations of such networks and communities, he was confident that the 
advantages of Internet-enabled civil society far outweighed the disadvantages.  
Another—and more controversial—perspective centred around the rise of 
new actors, including a new IT-NGO nexus, in urban governance (see Dasgupta, 
2008; Ghosh, 2005; Scoones, 2007). Senior IT-BT figures, who were deeply 
involved in civic affairs, stressed that the rise of IT had presented alternative 
voices in the public sphere. Referring to the example of the BATF, Vishal 
(personal interview, August 15, 2011) opined that the IT industry had facilitated 
“greater democratisation”, as new actors were enabled to participate in public 
affairs. Similarly, senior BT executive Rajni (personal interview, July 8, 2011) 
noted that the collegial relationship between the government and IT-BT 
companies in Bangalore allowed for entrepreneurs to participate in governance, 
and provide viable solutions to civic issues. However, this was a contentious 
issue, with interviewees divided over the increasing role of corporates and 
‘experts’ in urban governance. The arguments for and against task forces as 
means to incorporate corporate/tech expertise into governing the city, is 
discussed in the section ‘The Controversy Over Task Forces’. While opinions on 
certain issues, such as the role of ‘elite’ actors in urban governance and the 
value of ICTs for civil society activity, varied greatly among interviewees, most 
extolled the value of civil society and its special role in Bangalore. The next 
section continues to highlight the perspective that the city’s technological 
environment bolsters civil society activity, focusing on the themes of globality and 
cosmopolitanism.  
Civil Society in the IT Ecosystem: Globality and 
Cosmopolitanism  
Other respondents who believed that Bangalore’s technological 
environment was important for civil society activity were some Praja members, 
who viewed the NPO as benefitting from the advantages that the IT ecosystem 
afforded. Of seven Praja interviewees, five categorically pointed to the benefits of 




I think the ecosystem plays a role in everything that we do. All the 
incubation that you do, all the ideas that float around, it’s a perspective 
you live off of. And if you have that buzz—you know Bangalore has 
that buzz of being able to start your own thing— we’ve all done that. 
We’ve created this small start-up, we want to do more of these things; 
that plays a very big role… (Murthy, Praja RAAG, interview, December 
16, 2011). 
Being a software professional, Murthy was familiar with the IT ecosystem, 
and noted that the city’s reputation as a supportive place for tech start-ups and a 
centre of innovation had been crucial in Praja’s founding and expansion. He 
explained that by providing a supportive environment, where ideas could be 
circulated and new technological solutions developed, the IT ecosystem 
facilitated the emergence of new ICT-based experiments, including Praja. As 
explained earlier in the chapter, the importance of a dynamic ecosystem to foster 
innovation is crucial for the success of companies within it. This concept is 
expanded to highlight the importance of a nurturing ecosystem for innovation in 
the realm of civil society as well. Like other tech start-ups, Praja benefited from 
the interactions and collaborations among like-minded software and other 
professionals. Praja gained in several ways from having IT professionals as 
members, whose tech-savviness kept the platform up-to-date and relevant in 
terms of software and moderation practices. Moreover, as the IT industry 
provided its employees vast opportunities to travel around the world, techies 
were able to incorporate the knowledge of global best practices into the 
platform’s discussions. Interviewees equated Praja’s discussions with a type of 
globality, as discussions were based on what members saw first-hand as best 
practices in other parts of the world, and whether and how to incorporate these in 
Bangalore.  
The IT ecosystem, therefore, contributed in direct and indirect ways to 
Praja’s activities through structures and networks that facilitated innovation, the 
provision of technical skills to fuel and manage social start-ups, and global 
exposure that encouraged techies to discuss and work to implement global best 
practices in Bangalore. Murthy also added that the type of people who resided in 




cosmopolitanism. By ‘cosmopolitan’, he meant that as that people from all over 
India and the world lived and worked in Bangalore, particularly in the IT and 
related industries, it provided a sizeable pool of talent that Praja benefitted from. 
RAAG member Yogesh (personal interview, December 16, 2011), also a 
software professional, was more sceptical of the idea that the IT ecosystem had 
contributed to Praja’s growth. However, he recognised that it was important 
insofar as it provided a large Internet audience, which played a key role in 
making Praja work. While interviewees spoke of cosmopolitanism largely in terms 
of the IT crowd, my personal experiences suggest that the diversity in the city’s 
population also accrued from its education and R&D institutions, its thriving 
theatre and arts scene, and other new economy industries. These attributes 
meant that a section of the city’s residents were well-educated, connected to the 
outside world, had access to various types of knowledge, and could contribute 
some part of their time and skills to civil society activity.  
The IT Industry and Cosmopolitanism  
Cosmopolitanism was a recurring theme in interviews, with 12 
respondents (of which two were Praja members) describing Bangalore with this 
term—in both positive and negative ways. Overall, however, the label of being a 
cosmopolitan city, perhaps the most cosmopolitan city in the country, was a 
source of pride to most interviewees who portrayed it in this way. One section of 
interviewees noted that the IT-ITeS industries had played a key role in shaping 
the city’s cosmopolitan character. The emigration of large numbers of young 
persons to Bangalore’s IT and related industries gave Bangalore the image of 
being a ‘young city’ (Bijoor, 2014; Kodkani, 2011). The presence of these young, 
upwardly mobile men and women from all parts of India, and a large number of 
expats, has resulted in changing patterns of cultural consumption and lifestyles, 
as evidenced in the mushrooming of pubs, malls, multiplexes, upscale apartment 
complexes and gated communities, a diverse array of food joints, multiplication of 
motor vehicles, and growth in foreign travel and other leisure activities (Shobha 




pointed out that the diverse array of cultures, languages, activities, and the 
opportunity to live an international lifestyle were key factors that differentiated 
Bangalore from other IT cities in India: 
There is [a difference between Bangalore and other IT hubs]—I think 
Chennai is more into auto related, and Hyderabad is a combination of 
software products and R&D. Microsoft has a huge base there. But 
Bangalore’s by far the most cosmopolitan. People prefer to come here 
because, from abroad, because they find climate very conducive, they 
find the people far more friendly, and there is no language barrier. Like 
there is in Chennai, so they have a much easier time here. Schooling, 
education available is terrific. You have all options from IB to ICSE to 
SSC to anything, you can choose.59 You have international schools, 
you have day boarding schools, you have everything you can possibly 
choose from. You have international schools as well, for the expatriate 
kids. So I think Bangalore is kind of becoming more like a New York. 
About 15 years ago, if you saw a white man on M.G. Road, you would 
stop by and give him a second look. Today nobody bothers, because 
you not only have Chinese nationals, you have Vietnamese, you have 
Koreans, nobody’s surprised these days— one expects it. (Meenakshi, 
senior journalist, personal interview, July 16, 2011)  
 
Meenakshi explained that Bangalore differed from other IT hubs in the 
country due to its cosmopolitan environment, which provided a variety of lifestyle 
choices to residents. The multiplicity of languages, entertainment options, 
educational systems, and above all, the pleasant weather, attracted migrants 
from other parts of India and expats in large droves. The ease of living in 
Bangalore was compared to another IT hub, Chennai, the capital of Tamil Nadu 
state, where locals are known to not accommodate other language speakers. 
She also underlined the relationship between Bangalore’s cosmopolitanism and 
the IT-ITeS boom, which had resulted in the city’s evolution from an R&D hub 
and pensioner’s paradise to India’s leading innovation and knowledge hub, and 
favoured location for global retail companies and gastronomic activity. Manoj, a 
former corporate leader who was now active in public affairs, noted that the large 
number of expats and Indians who had returned from abroad to settle in 
Bangalore, and the services geared towards this group, gave the city an 
                                                             




international feel (personal interview, June 21, 2011). He added that while this 
still held true today, the city’s heydays were undoubtedly in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, after which urban planning failed to keep up with the city’s 
requirements. The failing infrastructure, rising pollution, increased social 
tensions, and other limitations of cosmopolitanism are discussed in the next 
section.  
Limits of Cosmopolitanism: ‘Outsiders’, and the Dichotomy between 
‘Old’ & ‘New’ Bangalore 
The deteriorating quality of life was a common notion among interviewees, 
and even those who equated the IT industry with the cosmopolitan face of the 
city rued its drawbacks. ABIDe member Rakesh (personal interview, July 5, 
2011) noted that imaginations of Bangalore varied due to its cosmopolitan 
composition, resulting in multiple—and competing—notions of the city’s 
development among residents, which could not be easily resolved. Two RWA 
members lamented that the influx of new economy-related immigrants had 
strained the city’s infrastructure, exacerbated rich-poor divides, and changed the 
city’s cultural character for the worse (personal interview, May 26, 2011). Their 
colleague, who was reluctant to label all ‘outsiders’ as responsible for the city’s 
deteriorating conditions, pointed out that the lack of participation in local affairs 
was a serious by-product of the quickened pace of cosmopolitanism. For these, 
and other interviewees who played an active role in civic affairs, the lack of 
political engagement of new economy populations was an indication of their 
disinterest in the city’s welfare. The three RWA members agreed that the IT 
sector employees had benefitted immensely from the city, but that they did not 
contribute to it in a proportional manner. Eshwar argued that outsiders should 
make a greater effort to participate in local politics, but acknowledged that the 
quality of local representatives was a substantial barrier: 
Madhav: And these outsiders, the main thing is they want to work. I 





Eshwar: They don’t have long-term interests, you know? There is a 
problem for them also, they are all very intelligent, but how will they 
talk to (Mayor) Sharadamma, who knows only Kannada? Most of the 
corporators are semi-literate, they can speak only Kannada. So there 
is no communication at all. (RWA members, personal interview, July 5, 
2011) 
 
Whereas Madhav saw the disengagement of migrant professionals in 
stark black and white terms, as representative of a lack of interest in improving 
the city, Eshwar offered a more nuanced explanation. While apathy, lack of 
connection and commitment to the city was definitely part of the reason for 
disengagement, another major reason was the lack of communication between 
political representatives and a large portion of the city’s working population. This 
was attributed to, among other things, the language and cultural barriers between 
the two groups. This schism can be traced to the reservation of seats in ULBs, 
which was intended to provide political opportunities for historically oppressed 
societal groups, such as women, and persons belonging to backward classes, 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.60 While such reservation has 
undoubtedly empowered women and other disadvantaged groups, it has also 
raised misgivings on the quality of governance. This was a divisive issue that 
stirred emotions, and resulted in heated exchanges between proponents and 
opponents of reservations in the city council. While no one questioned the 
guiding principles behind reservations, critics pointed out that such policies often 
produced women councillors who stood in as proxies for their husbands, and that 
council members’ intentions were often questionable (interviews; Angad, 2012; 
Kumar, 2014). Others pointed out that the previous mayor’s limited English, lack 
of technical knowledge of the BBMP’s functioning, and poor general knowledge 
skills were serious liabilities, which diluted the spirit of decentralisation (see also 
Angad, 2012). In addition, these elected representatives were seen as poor flag 
bearers of, and incongruent with, Bangalore’s cosmopolitan and high-tech image 
in the global arena.  
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These weaknesses were evident to even staunch proponents of 
reservations in ULBs, such as the Hasiru Usiru core group, whose members 
were part of a broader coalition spearheading greater decentralisation in urban 
governance. While their priority was to prevent erosion of the legitimacy of ULBs, 
interviewees acknowledged the limitations of these bodies in planning for the city. 
Limitations included the narrow capabilities and vision of local officials and 
politicians, and the prioritisation of commercial and self-interest over public 
interest. These weaknesses, coupled with the lack of technical know-how, and 
the desire of the state government to control Bangalore’s coffers, were cited as 
reasons for the pre-eminence accorded to external bodies, such as task forces, 
in making decisions for the city.  
The Controversy over Task Forces 
The dichotomy between “old Bangalore”, represented by local, Kannada-
speaking politicians, and “new Bangalore”, represented by new-age industries 
and a cosmopolitan population, came up in conversations with several 
interviewees, including ABIDe members. Vinod, a prominent civil society actor 
and ABIDe member, highlighted that the rupture between the city’s political class 
and the new, cosmopolitan sections lay at the heart of the inevitability of expert-
led task forces in Bangalore:  
The city is—and this is the controversial part—the city is run by 
politicians from [a] specific background. The political leadership is 
overwhelmingly Kannadiga, even though the city is not. The political 
leadership is overwhelmingly old Bangalore, even though the city is 
overwhelmingly new Bangalore. So you have the structural imbalance; 
now how does the political leadership, which doesn’t have cache in 
most of the city, deal with that portion of the city? Who in the BBMP 
Corporation can go and talk in Electronic City? They need this bridge 
layer. So they appoint the bridge layer, to say: “you guys should be 
able to talk to these other people, and you are already able to talk to 
us, therefore you are the bridge”. (Vinod, personal interview, June 22, 
2011) 
 
Vinod highlighted that the gulf between old and new Bangalore was 




forces, arose in the in the absence of formal mediating structures.  The value of 
task forces such as ABIDe and the BATF, in acting as go-betweens lay in the fact 
that their members were comfortable with representatives of both old and new 
Bangalore. While there was opposition to the constitution of task forces or similar 
bodies, he argued that the divided nature of the city ensured that such structures 
would persist. He noted that as the influx into the “IT City” had made it more 
diverse than most metropolitan cities in the country, “Bangalore [had] to struggle 
with a lot of new Bangalore within Bangalore”. This presented a complex 
situation that did not exist to the same extent in other metropolises, where the 
political class was on a comparatively firmer footing with the local population. 
Hence, the unwieldy nature of governance in a vastly expanded Bangalore 
metropolitan area, as well as the fact that “IT is dominated by non-Kannadigas” 
were cited as factors for the continued reliance on task forces in the city. Past 
and present task force members highlighted their important role in providing 
expertise to political representatives, as coordinating bodies among various 
disparate agencies, as well as to propose ideas that local agencies may not have 
considered or have the expertise to implement. Prasanna, a former BATF 
member, also noted that the task force had provided technical assistance, 
galvanised media support, and raised resources for local agencies when 
necessary (personal interview, May 23, 2011).  
However, as discussed earlier, the issue of task forces and other non-
elected consultative bodies was a contentious one among interviewees, with 
some objecting to their increasing decision-making power, and the subsequent 
eroding of power of local bodies. Among this category were Hasiru Usiru core 
group members, who viewed task forces as ‘extra-constitutional’ bodies that 
enabled a technocratic elite to appropriate decision-making from the city's 
legitimate stakeholders. They rejected the notion that IT expertise could be 
unproblematically applied to running the city, and worried about the lack of 
accountability of new urban governance bodies: 
You need technical skills. I’m not saying you don’t need technical skills, 




Nilekani know how to run Bangalore?61 Because you run a software 
company, because you run any corporate [organisation], it doesn’t 
mean you know how to run the city, because the city is something else, 
right?...The idea that you run your company well, or you use your 
technology well, hence you can run your city well, that’s where I fail to 
see how will they make that jump. (Deepak, Hasiru Usiru core group, 
personal interview, June 15, 2011) 
 
The excerpt reveals Deepak’s concerns about the rising influence of IT 
and other corporate leaders in the city’s governance—a sentiment that was 
subsequently reiterated by other core group members. As the Hasiru Usiru 
chapter shows, core group members were alarmed about several aspects of the 
IT paradigm, including the notion that expertise could be unproblematically 
translated from the corporate/IT to the governance domain. Deepak went on to 
explain that Nilekani’s prominent position in the BATF, and the subsequent 
inclusion of middle and upper-class NGOs in decision-making, had eroded local 
democratic processes. Moreover, the lack of accountability of such structures, 
and the propagation of the idea that corporate success could serve as a blueprint 
for governing the city were other problematic aspects of the task force style of 
governance. Such critical views on the connections between the IT-BT industries 
and elite civil society in influencing public policy echoed critical perspectives that 
have been examined in the Literature Review. As these issues are discussed in 
the Hasiru Usiru chapter, they will not be repeated here. Instead, this section has 
highlighted the schisms arising from the city’s IT base in the realm of urban 
governance, notably the debate over the dominance of task forces in a 
cosmopolitan city.  
Cosmopolitanism and the IT City: A Chicken and Egg Situation  
The English-language mainstream media often describes Bangalore as 
‘cosmopolitan’, where residents imbue a variety of languages and cultures, and 
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are at ease with their local and global identities (Dutt, 2012; Prashanth, 2011b; 
see also (Sreekumar, 2010). The multiplicity of languages spoken in Bangalore, 
which is a key aspect of its cosmopolitan nature, can be traced in part to its 
location—as state capital of Karnataka, but located on the border of two other 
South Indian states, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and not far from a third, 
Kerala (Benjamin, 2000; Taeube, 2004). Taeube (2004) noted that being a 
‘border city’ meant that Bangalore’s population consisted of more than 50% of 
residents who were not originally from the city. While some interviewees 
highlighted the multitude of languages and cultures in a tolerant city as indicative 
of cosmopolitanism, others mentioned its historical evolution, which has been 
discussed in the section on Bangalore in the Literature Review. The climate, 
which drew the British to Bangalore in the early 1800s, continued to be a crucial 
factor in attracting local and foreign talent to the city’s R&D, technological, and 
software industries (Dittrich, 2007; Taeube, 2004). Another factor that enhanced 
the city’s cosmopolitan character was the central government’s push to locate 
national institutions there in the early 1950s, which brought researchers, IAS 
officers, and Indians from other parts of the country to Bangalore (Taeube, 2004; 
see also Heitzman, 2004). The historical and traditional openness towards 
outsiders has given Bangalore an image of openness and acceptance of global 
influences, paving the way for its place in the current global market-place 
(Taeube, 2004; Saldanha, 2002). Member of Parliament (MP) Girish noted that 
the IT industry had built upon the city's historical cosmopolitanism, and not vice-
versa:  
Bangalore is not an IT city, in my view—and I have been a resident of 
Bangalore for many, many years. Bangalore is essentially a city with a 
very, very rich heritage, rich history, it is a city of great character, in the 
sense that unlike most conventional cities, which are either on the 
coast, or by river, Bangalore is one of those unique cities in India that 
have actually developed in the middle of nowhere. And so it is a city, in 
my opinion, primarily a city of great history, great character, and has 
always been a city very different from other cities in that it has been 
very cosmopolitan. And it is only that cosmopolitan nature of the city 
that’s allowed it to absorb these various influences of IT, BPO, and 




and made Bangalore their home. (Girish, MP, personal interview, June 
21, 2011) 
 
In highlighting the city’s history, heritage, and character, Girish described it 
as a historically cosmopolitan city, which made it open to new influences and 
new migratory populations. He explained that until the 1990s, Bangalore was 
reputed for a variety of things, such as its public sector units, weather, laid-back 
environment, and local culture. The entry of the IT industry into this “quaint” and 
“relaxed” city, he noted, was possible due to its pre-existing cosmopolitan 
identity, which was accepting of new ideas and people. Taeube (2004) noted that 
his interviews with representatives of IT firms, universities and public sector 
entities in Bangalore revealed a similar notion, viz., that the city’s openness 
towards newcomers had a high impact on the IT industry, as it created a friendly 
investment climate for foreign companies. In the excerpt above, Girish also 
stressed that to him Bangalore represented a cosmopolitan city, rather than an IT 
City. Some interviewees expressed a similar view, arguing against the IT City 
label on the grounds that the data proved otherwise. Others pointed out that IT 
had not percolated down to citizens, and that civil society had yet to substantially 
benefit from the IT paradigm. These perceptions are discussed in the next 
section.  
“Not an IT City”: Exclusion, Invisibility and Contestations 
Among interviewees who expressed a negative attitude about Bangalore’s 
IT City status, there were three broad strands of thought, viz.: (i) those who were 
opposed the excessive focus on the IT industry as unjustifiable, for various 
reasons; (ii) those who argued that the limited impact on civil society, and citizen-
government interactions dispelled notions of an enabling technological 
environment; and (iii) those who highlighted the rise of new claims and 
contestations, and critiqued the entry of new elite and tech-enabled actors in 
urban governance. As the third category has been discussed earlier and will be 




Among advocates of the first category, some interviewees expressed the 
opinion that the excessive emphasis on the IT City status by government and 
industry was unjustified, as the evidence proved that other industries were 
equally—if not more—important to the city’s economy. Some interviewees 
referred to the garment industry as the city’s largest industry, but noted that it 
remained in the shadows of the more glamorous and prestigious IT industry. The 
garment industry, which emerged as a successful exporter in the 1970s, boomed 
once again in the late 90s/early 2000s, demonstrating its continued linkages with 
the global economy (Benjamin, 2000; Pani, 2009; RoyChowdhury, 2011). The 
garment industry is numerically strong in the Bangalore region, employing around 
450,000-500,000 workers, whose work accounts for 30% of the country’s apparel 
exports (TCLab , 2012). However, unlike the IT industry, the garment industry 
draws upon a labour pool that is low wage, fairly low skill, and primarily female 
dominated (ibid; Chaturvedi, 2014). These characteristics have rendered 
garment workers powerless, with little or no voice, or bargaining power as voters, 
making them prone to labour law violations and other forms of abuse (ibid; 
Bageshree, 2014; RoyChowdhury, 2011). This situation was exacerbated by the 
excessive spotlight on IT and other ‘global city’ industries, which rendered such 
informal economy workers invisible (Benjamin, 2000; RoyChowdhury, 2011). 
Interviewees pointed to various ways in which the excessive focus on the 
IT industry made other aspects of the city invisible: for example, researcher 
Prabhat (personal communication, June 8, 2011) noted how blue-collar workers, 
although indispensable, were often invisible in narratives of the IT City. Others 
pointed to how the focus on IT had rendered other industries invisible in terms of 
public policy priorities, resulting in a skewed development policy. Some opined 
that the association of ‘Brand Bangalore’ with IT was so strong that it 
automatically dominated the way the city was imagined:  
…from an economic perspective, IT was a technology, and call it old 
generation technology, with HAL and BEL, but it's always been that, so 
that [association with technology] is a very strong thing. So even 
though Chennai in numbers might come close to Bangalore— let's say 
it does, it's not there yet—but still it's a much bigger city, with textile 




hard to shake that off. Bombay’s another example; even if IT becomes 
big in Bombay, it's such a big finance [centre], and Bollywood, that it's 
not going to be known for IT…So these are the things that are tied to 
the image, something gets tagged to the city as being the main thing. 
So even if Chennai, in terms of numbers comes close to Bangalore, it 
has other things going for it to be just recognised as IT City; Bangalore 
has captured that, so that's not going to be shaken off, for at least 
generations. (Manohar, technologist, personal interview, July 1, 2011) 
 
Manohar noted that as Bangalore’s association with technology pre-dated 
IT, and the city was known for its technical and research prowess, its image 
naturally veered towards that of an ‘IT City’. This was in contrast to other IT 
centres such as Chennai and Bombay (also known as Mumbai), whose 
economies were associated with other dominant industries, such as textiles and 
automobiles, and finance and Bollywood respectively. His observations about 
dominant imaginations of the city rendering certain industries visible and 
powerful, while forcing others to remain invisible and powerless tie in with 
Sassen’s (2000) accounts of the ‘global city’. Yet another negative aspect of the 
IT City identity identified by interviewees was that of contestations arising from 
Bangalore’s bid to remain relevant in the global economy. Such contestations, 
and the “implications of maintaining an imagery of Bangalore as an ‘IT city’” 
(Ghosh, 2005), have been well documented. Critics have pointed to how funding 
has been diverted from basic needs to mega-projects, the widening of urban-
rural disparities, the further deterioration of the bargaining power of the urban 
poor, as well as the rise of assertions of particularity in response to global 
homogenisation (Benjamin, 2005; Dittrich, 2007; Ghosh, 2005; Heitzman, 2004; 
Kamath, 2006; Madon, 1997; Nair, 2000a, 2005). Similarly, some interviewees 
highlighted contestations that had bubbled up to the surface due to the rise of 
new and competing claims from ‘above’, i.e. elites and white collar professionals 
in IT and urban governance, and ‘below’, viz., localised movements centred 
around Kannada language and culture:  
...there is lot of influx of people from other states, especially from the 
North—IT, and other side migrant workers are there because 




resident welfare associations, technological people, i.e. designers, 
architects, IT, BT and all that. At the same time there is also localised 
kind of a movement which began, like Karnataka Rakshana Vedike 
kind of a thing, it is also a response to I think, the present situation. Of 
course, they have not gone to the extent of like in 
Maharashtra…somehow this has brought in a new dimension of claims 
or demands, and you’ll find various forms after Karnataka Rakshana 
Vedike, you have Jai Karnataka, you have Vijaya Karnataka, you have 
various forms.62 (Vinayak, personal interview, May 24, 2011) 
 
Vinayak, secretary of an NPO, noted that the changing composition of the 
city since the IT boom, the increased presence of migrant white and blue collar 
workers, and the greater role of new civic actors and “technological people” in 
urban governance had heightened social divisions in the city. The tensions 
between certain section of local Kannadigas and the ‘cosmos’ (short for 
cosmopolitans) of the new knowledge industries added a new dimension of 
claims and claim-making to long-existing cultural, social and economic conflicts 
and demands (David, 2005; Upadhya, 2009). The recent resurgence of pro-
Kannada groups, such as Karnataka Rakshana Vedike, were described as a 
response to the new forms of deprivation, and the perceived side-lining of 
Kannada identity associated with the rise of the IT industry in Bangalore. 
Researcher Srinivas (personal interview, May 23, 2011) similarly noted that the 
backlash against the industry reflected the anxieties of the original inhabitants of 
the city, who felt they were sidelined in favour of newer city residents. While 
interviewees were optimistic that Bangalore’s peaceful reputation would prevent 
Kannada nationalism from adopting an extreme identity, such as that of the Shiv 
Sena in Mumbai, they acknowledged that the issue continued to simmer, and 
could boil over into urban violence, as in the past (Gowda, 2010; Upadhya, 
2006).  
Another perspective among interviewees who argued against the IT City 
label was that IT was an incidental—rather than an essential—part of the city’s 
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character. Within this group, some viewed Bangalore more as a knowledge 
economy, which served as a fitting base for the IT industry to function. Among 
this group, the city was viewed more in terms of knowledge and information, 
rather than as just an IT centre. The IT phase was described as a temporal one, 
which benefitted from the large pool of human talent that had developed from 
successive governments’ emphasis on education, training, and R&D. These 
sentiments were a corollary of the view mentioned earlier, viz., that Bangalore’s 
historical cosmopolitanism provided an enabling environment for high-tech 
industries to establish and expand their operations. Another segment argued 
against the notion that Bangalore was an IT City due to the lack of innovation that 
had thus far characterised the industry. For instance, former IT professional Ajay, 
who had worked in the industry for more than a decade, noted that cost—rather 
than innovation—had thus far defined Bangalore’s relation to IT (personal 
interview, December 26, 2011). While the business models of local IT giants had 
been successful, and central, to putting Bangalore on the global map, he 
described IT as being an incidental part of their services. Thus, for the most part, 
Bangalore could not be compared to truly innovative ecosystems like Silicon 
Valley. Social critics lamented that the repetitive nature of coding had produced a 
generation who were akin to “cyber coolies”, which had corroded Bangalore's 
intellectual spirit (Bidwai, 2003; Srivastava, 2008).63 The comparison of the 
industry to a glorified sweatshop has been discussed earlier, with such concerns 
often swept under the rug in favour of the enthusiastic proclamations of 
Bangalore's 'information superpower' and 'knowledge society' appellations 
(Bidwai, 2003; Heitzman, 2004).  
This section has thus far described the various objections raised by 
interviewees in relation to the notion of Bangalore as IT City. In proclaiming their 
distaste for defining the city in this way, interviewees pointed to the negative 
effects associated with the industry, including the rise of new claims and 
contestations, the greater invisibility of certain industries and workers, the rising 
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influence of new, elite actors in urban governance, and the lack of innovation 
emerging from the industry. The final argument negating the IT City label was 
related to the limited impact of ICTs on civil society activity and citizen-
government interactions. Such observations dispelled notions of an enabling 
technological environment for civil society activity. While these interviewees 
viewed ICTs as important tools for public participation and engagement in civic 
affairs, they highlighted that the benefits of ICTs for civil society had yet to fully 
materialise.   
Weaknesses in ICT-Civil Society Relationship    
As the next chapter shows, Hasiru Usiru core group members displayed 
pessimism about the civil society-Internet relationship in Bangalore, citing the 
Internet’s limited penetration, its middle-class bias, and the lack of collective 
action as key factors. A combination of ideological objections and disillusionment 
with the limited success in leveraging the Internet for collective action resulted in 
the inability or disinterest in using the Internet for civic engagement. Interviews 
with non-Hasiru Usiru interviewees shed further light on the barriers to effective 
Internet use by civil society in Bangalore, including limited funds and access to 
new technologies, and the lack of an institutional space for citizens to participate 
in urban governance in the first place. While some of the concerns overlapped 
with the Hasiru Usiru core group, this section highlights the non-Hasiru Usiru 
voices, which were not prompted to the same extent by the ideological of the 
core group. The weaknesses in the Internet-civil society relationship in 
Bangalore, as perceived by civil society actors, are discussed below.  
As expected, access to ICTs and the limited percolation to the grassroots 
was cited by some interviewees as one of the key limitations of ICT use by civil 
society. They noted that new technologies could potentially boost civil society’s 
activities, but that low Internet penetration rates severely inhibited their 
usefulness. Similarly, Jaya, a senior associate in a prominent NGO, highlighted 
how limited access to ICTs among the general public lowered the value of 




Jaya and independent researcher Harsha (personal interview, May 30, 2011) 
directed me to examples of ICT-based initiatives that had sought to improve 
transparency and facilitate grievance redressal online, such as the Web-Based 
Global Project Management System (GPMS)64 to track BBMP’s projects online, 
Bangalore-one, and the Nemmadi and Bhoomi e-governance programmes 
through which various government services are made available to citizens 
(Aundhe & Narasimhan, 2012; Naik, Basavaraj, Sultana, & Prasanna, 2010). 
Referring to these examples, they stressed that new technologies needed to be 
easily accessible to the intended beneficiaries, particularly the urban and rural 
poor, to fully reap their benefits.  
Raman & Bawa (2011) also highlighted this aspect in their study of citizen-
engagement interaction through an analysis of Nemmadi Kendras (kiosks) in 
rural parts of Karnataka. They have pointed out that the introduction of ICTs 
added more layers, in terms of bureaucracy and middle-men, which rural citizens 
had to navigate before they could actually access services. This, in turn, 
adversely affected state-citizen relations. Researcher Srinivas (personal 
interview, May 23, 2011) spoke at length about the ramifications of incorporating 
ICTs into routine governance practices, particularly the subsequent 
inconvenience to, and exclusion of, marginalised groups. He provided examples 
of how new technologies were making urban governance impersonal and 
inaccessible by reducing opportunities for physical citizen-government 
interaction, which was crucial for the average Indian. He also pointed out that 
without the requisite educational and technical skills, and lack of access to new 
technologies, citizens faced substantial barriers to participate in basic 
governance processes, echoing Raman & Bawa’s (2011) findings.   
Another category of interviewees included civil society actors who were 
not averse to incorporating ICTs into their activities, but were limited by the 
various barriers to effective ICT use. One of these limitations included scarce 
financial resources, which afflicted informal, and/or small to medium CSOs. 
Members of these CSOs spoke of the difficulties of using new technologies 





efficiently due to the infrastructural and resource constraints within which they 
worked:  
Basically infrastructure resources—see we are a small group, we are a 
registered society, eight people have formed this, I’m the chief 
executive, I’m the secretary. From the beginning we are a very low key 
kind of organisation, even fundraising and all that. We feel that there is 
a lot of money with the government or private organisations, but we do 
not want to compromise on what we want to do, otherwise you know, 
you can always get projects to work. So right now, even the first time 
we had a website was in 2008, for 1 year, 1½ years it ran, am now 
trying again to look for people who can help us do it on a voluntary 
basis. And from last five years we have no funding, no funded projects. 
(Vinayak, personal interview, May 24, 2011) 
 
The interviewee explained that his CSO did not have adequate resources 
to fund a fully-functional website, and that the office-bearers were hesitant to 
accept funding from government or private sources that could jeopardise their 
independence. Under such circumstances, when existing funds dried they had to 
rely on volunteers to manage the website, which was an ad-hoc way of 
maintaining the organisation’s Internet presence. These difficulties were voiced 
by other civil society actors, such as Ramesh, who was deeply involved with a 
CSO that promoted cycling in the city (personal interview, December 26, 2011). 
He explained that the lack of time, and financial and human resources prevented 
meaningful and creative Internet use to promote the organisations objectives and 
activities. He also noted that with up-to-the-minute information defining the 
current information age, it was increasingly time-consuming to remain updated 
on news and information to share on a website. It also required time and 
resources that he or his civil society group did not possess, and the information 
overload inevitably associated with information-intensive activities online sapped 
him of energy. Such experiences can be contrasted to more professional CSOs, 
which often have dedicated funds and personnel to manage their image, 
activities, and correspondence online (personal observations). However, even 




to contend with translating event-based gains to a more sustained relationship 
with new technologies:  
I think there’s two forms of how people engage with IT: what has 
worked with us in the Jaago Re campaign was a very transactional 
engagement, that: “you have to go and register to vote”. Now that’s a 
very important thing from a democracy standpoint, but it’s an easy 
thing to do, you just have to go and register. But if you flip that and 
said: “you got to go and engage with your political system, you’ve got 
to participate in your neighbourhood, and fix your garbage and fix your 
roads, etc.”, that’s a much more complex, it’s more process oriented 
rather than event oriented. And I don’t think that the urban citizen in 
India feels empowered enough to do that. We’ve completely lost 
ownership of our public spaces in our cities, and so, technology by 
itself is not going to reawaken or rekindle that ownership. You need to 
do a bunch of other things to really get people to walk out of their home 
onto the street, and feel that they own that space. And technology can 
enable it but it certainly can't either be the driver of it or be the only 
thing that can make that happen. (Prakash, Janaagraha, Skype 
interview, August 1, 2011) 
 
While the Jaago Re campaign was significant as a civil society experiment 
in ICT use, Prakash noted that part of its success lay in encouraging a relatively 
simple aspect of democratic action, viz., to get out and vote. However, while ICTs 
could be used successfully for events, the more difficult task was to leverage the 
technology for sustained citizen action. He pointed out that Janaagraha’s efforts 
to move from ICT use for a transactional (one-time) engagement to process-
oriented involvement of citizens in public affairs was a very gradual process. 
However, he acknowledged that in the absence of spaces of citizen participation 
in cities, and the lack of a culture of participation, new technologies could only be 
of limited use. Once citizens understood how to participate in public life, and 
were truly empowered to do so, ICTs could be used more effectively for 
engagement. As the use of ICTs for systemic change would take time, he 
advocated that the ICT-civil society relationship be strengthened, starting with a 
focus on harnessing ICTs for better civil society-citizen networking among CSOs 




and the potential for ICT-enabled civil society to provide and participate in much-
needed spaces of engagement are briefly explained below.   
Limited Urban Decentralisation and the Value of Internet Spaces 
of Engagement 
The slow pace of translating sustained civic engagement via ICTs stems 
from the more fundamental issue vexing civil society groups, viz., the lack of 
formal venues for citizen participation in urban local government. The thesis has 
already referred to the landmark 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (or 
Nagarpalika Act) of 1992, which identified a set of reforms that would see 
improved civic participation in Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), including the 
formation of ward committees (WCs) in municipal corporations (Chamaraj & Rao, 
2006; Rani & Roy, 2009). In practice, however, ULBs face a wide range of 
problems that severely hamper the true spirit of decentralisation. Problems range 
from cases of maladministration, corruption, conflict among governing institutions 
of urban governance, to ineffective and unequal participation in decision-making, 
poor revenue sources, and lack of empowerment of WCs (Mathur, 2007; 
Sharma, 2011). In Karnataka, WCs were practically not functional, except in 
Bangalore, where committee meetings were infrequent, and the functioning 
ineffective (Mathur, 2007). WCs in Bangalore were also severely hampered by a 
debatable nomination process, limited citizen representation, and an ambiguous 
mandate (Ramanathan, 2007). It was only in 2013, after a series of fits and starts 
that the process of creating WCs began to truly get underway in Bangalore, 
largely due to the litigative and advocacy efforts of several CSOs (Malusare, 
2013a; The Times of India, 2013). Ramanathan (2007) has noted that the 
governance vacuum in Bangalore was indicative of the lopsided approach to 
devolution in the country, which had favoured rural over urban decentralisation. 
The absence of champions of urban self government, the lack of debate about 
the issue, and the urgency of the drafting and passing of the 74th amendment 
had created a situation where cities and towns did not have bottom-up structures 




In the absence of this “political kindergarten”, the urban voter is not only 
disconnected from government, but also illiterate about the politics of change, 
producing the apathy and cynicism that s/he is normally associated with (ibid, p. 
675). Reflecting on Janaagraha’s experiences—which reflect those of many 
other civil society and community-based organisations across the country—
Ramanathan (2007) noted that the urban citizens (including the poor) cared 
deeply about their city and wished to participate. If appropriate structures and 
forums were made available to them, the social energy witnessed in the variety 
of CSOs across urban India could be channelled toward this end. In the current 
situation, however, given the absence of grassroots forum for participation, urban 
citizens were unaware of what participation entailed. Prakash highlighted this 
aspect in the preceding excerpt, when he referred to urban citizens not being 
empowered in terms of civic and political engagement. Without the necessary 
structures to practice engagement, critical skills for participation, such as 
listening, negotiating, compromising, etc. were in short supply among urban 
citizens. In such a situation, Janaagraha had been more successful in engaging 
citizens in campaigns that were transaction and event based, rather than 
process-oriented, which involved long-term commitment. Whereas ICTs played 
an important role in terms of awareness and mobilisation, the real gains for ICT-
enabled engagement would accrue when urban citizens had formal opportunities 
to practice and participate in civic life.  
Although I concur with the above sentiments regarding the necessity of 
fostering political socialisation among urban citizens, I do not necessarily agree 
that ICT-enabled initiatives should appear at a later stage in the participation 
process. Instead, the value of Internet-enabled spaces of engagement lies in the 
fact that urban citizens, who are ordinarily apathetic and disenfranchised, have 
the opportunity to participate in civic life. As the case studies show, for middle 
class city dwellers, especially the vast numbers that have migrated to live and 
work in cities other than their birthplace, Internet spaces of engagement foster 
interest and participation in local affairs. Factors contributing to this phenomenon 




social media in cities, and the increased interest of tech professionals in social 
issues. Internet spaces of engagement have risen in cities to supplement the 
offline efforts of CSOs working to plug the gap in urban decentralisation, 
performing a critical—but as yet relatively unrecognised—role in city governance. 
These issues are central to the thesis, and are deliberated upon in greater detail 
in the case studies, as well as in the Discussion and Conclusion chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the various ways in which Bangalore’s IT City 
status, and the IT paradigm that it has fostered, influences ICTs-civil society 
interactions. The chapter has highlighted instances of positive ICT use, and 
identified other contextual factors that have contributed to the creation of an 
enabling environment for civil society in the city. At the other end of the spectrum 
lie CSOs and actors that decry the IT City status, and point to the considerable 
barriers for effective ICT use in a technologising city. Notable among the latter 
category is environmental network, Hasiru Usiru, whose core group 
demonstrated a pessimistic attitude towards the use of ICTs for civic 
engagement, and questioned the value of the IT City in their activities. These, 
















CHAPTER 5: HASIRU USIRU–A CASE STUDY 
Introduction: History and Evolution  
Hasiru Usiru, which means “greenery is life” in the Kannada language, is 
an Internet-based network working to protect urban greenery, public spaces and 
other urban commons in Bangalore city (Yahoo Group description, mailing list 
archives, interviews). The Yahoo mailing group 
(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/HasiruUsiru/) was created in 2005 to connect 
interested persons via a common platform, and to enable access to a shared 
database of archival, human, and other resources (ibid). While Hasiru Usiru 
occupies a prominent place in the online and offline public sphere in Bangalore, 
there is a paucity of records regarding its origins and its evolution as an important 
civic actor. My experience of having worked in a civil society organisation in 
Bangalore suggests that this is a common problem for organisations in this 
sector in India, particularly those operating on an informal basis. In the absence 
of proper documentation, interviews and the mailing list archives played a crucial 
role in building up this case study. This was supplemented by observation, as 
well as secondary data in the form of academic papers, NGO reports and 
newspaper articles. As information on Hasiru Usiru emerged primarily from the 
mailing list archives and interviews, only information from sources other than 
these are specifically cited.  
The Yahoo group built upon the efforts of the informal Hasire Usiru group 
founded in 2003 to save street trees from being felled for proposed road 
widening projects across the city. While the network comprised interested groups 
and citizens, three organisations were particularly involved in its activities and 
provided it various types of support: Environment Support Group (ESG), a not-
for-profit trust working on environmental and social justice issues, Alternative 
Law Forum (ALF), a collective of lawyers advocating an alternative law practice 
centred on issues of social and economic injustice, and CIVIC (Citizen’s 
Voluntary Initiative for the City), a citizen’s initiative working on urban issues such 




city authorities announced plans to widen several prominent roads, the network 
initiated a campaign to gather media and public support against indiscriminate 
tree cutting. Campaigners were worried that road widening—ostensibly for 
smoother vehicular movement—would be at a high environmental cost. 
Moreover, there was concern over the lack of public participation in decision-
making, as well as the privileging of private vehicle ownership over public 
transportation, cyclists and pedestrians. The campaign comprised a variety of 
publicity and advocacy-related activities and collective actions, including 
signature campaigns in neighbourhoods, awareness-raising events in colleges, 
as well as seminars, workshops, and public meetings to facilitate citizen input on 
sustainable traffic management solutions. Some members liaised with the print 
and electronic media to keep the issue in the public eye, while others wrote 
articles and letters to the editor of major newspapers, to ensure that their voices 
were not drowned out by the more powerful official view. Signatures collected 
were put together in the format of a spiral bound book and submitted to the 
Karnataka Governor65, and members continued to meet and lobby with local 
authorities and public representatives. A cycle rally was organised to highlight the 
struggles faced by cyclists and pedestrians in the city, and to generate support 
for the campaign. In addition, e-petitions were circulated, and signatories of the 
online and offline signature campaigns were asked to join the newly-formed 
mailing list, which became the lead player in the campaign to save Bangalore’s 
trees and green spaces. ESG also filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the 
Karnataka High Court questioning the city corporation’s decision to cut over 700 
trees for the road widening various (Writ Petition No. 14104/2005 (GM-PIL). In 
response, in December 2005 the High Court directed that any felling of trees 
must be done as per the provisions of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act 
1976, and that an opportunity should be given to representatives of Hasiru Usiru 
to inspect the area prior to any tree felling (The Hindu, 2006). In this way, 
bolstered by the court’s judgement and the support of an active and energised 
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citizenry, Hasiru Usiru emerged at the forefront of the battle to conserve trees, 
parks, and other open spaces in Bangalore.  
From 2005-2008, the network, in collaboration with partner groups, was 
involved in a wide range of activities aimed at preserving Bangalore’s famous 
tree cover, including its overarching “Campaign to Reclaim Bangalore’s 
Commons” (ESG website).66 As in the past, this included workshops, walks, 
research and information dissemination activities, peaceful public protests, and 
advocacy with public officials to highlight citizens’ opposition to projects 
considered environmentally unsustainable. In particular, the campaign was 
directed against road widening projects and the proposed elevated rail system, 
the Metro, which were being “aggressively promoted as solutions to traffic 
congestion” by city authorities (Namme Raste campaign flyer, November 2008; 
Hasire Usiru, 2008). It was during its anti-Metro campaign in 2008-09 that Hasiru 
Usiru achieved mainstream recognition from both media and citizens. The Metro, 
envisioned as a mass rapid system, was at the heart of impassioned debates 
about the rail system’s feasibility and appropriateness for the city. Hasiru Usiru 
members argued against the Metro, citing its overwhelming costs, devastating 
environmental effects, the disregard for alternative transport solutions, as well as 
the existing lop-sidedness in transport options in the city. During this period, the 
network was active in organising a series of awareness and protest campaigns 
against the adverse effects of the Metro on lives, livelihoods, greenery, and 
public spaces in the city (Hasire Usiru, 2009). Interviewees pointed out that their 
objections to the Metro arose from the adverse socio-spatial implications of this 
project, as well as the absence of public consultation or consideration for the 
environment in decision-making. Under the aegis of Hasiru Usiru, affected 
groups, such as traders, shopkeepers, cyclists, informal workers, residents, 
environmentalists, advocates of the poor, and concerned citizens congregated to 
voice their concerns and demand citizen-centric development (Hasire Usiru 
campaign, 2009; see also Goldman & Longhofer, 2009).  







In particular, the campaign against the proposed construction of the Metro 
inside Bangalore’s famous botanical garden, Lalbagh, and another green 
boulevard, the Lakshman Rao Park, significantly raised the network’s 
prominence in the public sphere—both offline and in cyberspace. In April 2009, 
the campaign witnessed hundreds gathering at several disputed sites to register 
their protest, forming human chains, holding candlelight vigils, interacting with 
government representatives, and a host of other protest and advocacy activities 
(Iyer, 2009; The Hindu, 2011). Protesters that gathered in Lalbagh and 
Lakshman Rao parks included regular walkers and runners, concerned citizens, 
college students, passers-by, as well as several city-based NGOs and citizens’ 
groups. In this campaign, the Yahoo group (hereby known as the ‘e-group’) 
played an important role in information dissemination, collaboration, and 
mobilising citizens to action. During the campaign, hundreds of new members 
were added to the list, thereby stimulating the online discussion and precipitating 
offline activity. Through a series of coordinated online and offline activities, and 
by informing citizens who were interested in the issue, but unsure of how to 
participate, the campaign witnessed a significant turnout.  
While there had been several anti-Metro protests organised since 2007, 
the series of events undertaken during this period, and the wider publicity and 
mobilisation via the e-group and other Internet channels, thrust the issue into the 
spotlight. These anti-Metro protests were described as the pinnacle of Hasiru 
Usiru’s activism efforts by interviewees, and their significance was acknowledged 
by a founding-member on the e-group: 
The past week has changed Bangalore so much, it is difficult to 
comprehend. The protests have garnered so much support for people 
centred planning, that this is truly unprecedented. (Message #6376, 
April 26, 2009) 
 
The presence of large numbers of people on the streets, the spectacle of 
the protests, and the publicity generated by social networking had generated 
unprecedented support for the issue. However, these efforts resulted in only 




gains from the campaign could not be translated into a sustained, large-scale 
movement (see also Enqvist, 2012). The lukewarm response from the larger 
online community to subsequent calls for collective action was partly a result of 
the onset of ‘fatigue’ due to the non-achievement of goals. The limited 
involvement of the majority of e-group members precipitated the rise of the 
present network structure, dominated by a smaller set of active actors, called the 
‘core group’. Subsequently, the waning response to calls for protest led to a shift 
in strategy from organising protests to conducting audits, undertaking public 
consultations, assisting legal actions, greater media coverage, and networking.  
Despite the lack of protest activities, the network has still been able to 
facilitate some positive instances of collaboration—both planned and 
spontaneous. This includes the “Come, Cross the Road” events held at various 
city junctions from July 2011 to highlight problems faced by pedestrians and 
cyclists on the city’s roads. Volunteers attempted to cross the road at major traffic 
junctions, observed time taken for pedestrians to cross the road, surveyed the 
amount of waiting time before pedestrians could cross, and noted the behaviour 
of motorists when pedestrians attempted to cross the road. Through a series of 
such events during the year, the organisers collected data with the intention of 
presenting it to the BBMP and traffic authorities to improve pedestrian safety in 
Bangalore (The New Indian Express, 2011; The Hindu, 2011a). A successful 
example of small-scale collective action occurred in November 2011 with the 
halting of the dredging of Yediyur Lake by a local corporator, who intended to 
build a statue in the lake centre. Upon being alerted of dredging activity on the e-
group, some members rushed to the spot, halted the dredging, and cleaned the 
lake. Thereafter, while some members pitched in to fill the breach, others liaised 
with the corporator, and urged him to revert his decision to dredge the lake (e-
group messages; Deccan Herald, 2011). More recently, in November-December 
2012, quick action by members was able to counter the proposal to build a nine-
lane car park inside Lalbagh (ibid). These examples show that despite not being 
able to build on the momentum generated by the anti-Metro protests in 2009, the 




that encouraged smaller-scale collaborative efforts (see also Enqvist, 2012). The 
pre-eminence of Hasiru Usiru in the public sphere is also reflected in the High 
Court’s directive to the BBMP in December 2011 to involve the network in all 
instances where trees would be felled for road-widening (ESG website; The 
Hindu, 2006).  
Participants and Motivations  
From the interviews, I was able to ascertain that the network was divided 
into an informal “core group” of eight active individuals at that time and the 
remaining e-group members connected primarily through the online medium.67 
Enqvist (2012) similarly identified the core and peripheral members based on 
interviews and social network analysis. He has described the core group as 
comprising active and well-connected members, and the peripheral group as 
heterogeneous actors with some links to the core but few among themselves. 
Interviews revealed that while the core group comprised the most active 
members in the network, ‘active’ referred to offline—rather than online—activity. I 
interviewed six core group members—three male and three female—all in their 
late twenties and early thirties. Of these, four consented to repeat interviews, 
enabling me to explore certain crucial or emerging issues in-depth over a period 
of time. During the first round of interviews, I was able to ascertain that in 
addition to age, the core group shared other demographic and attitudinal 
attributes. For instance, they could all be described as belonging to the middle 
class, proficient in English and one or more regional languages, and familiar with, 
and having easy access to, the Internet. Each member had one or more formal 
education degree, with five members having a background in some branch of 
engineering. While one participant was employed in the software industry, the 
other five were employed in the social/development sector. Of these five, three 
pointed out that they had quit their jobs in the software industry for the 
social/development sector. Subsequent interviews revealed that core group 
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members were also close friends, whose strong, personal ties motivated each 
other to join the network. Interviewees also shared broadly left-leaning or 
socialist political philosophies, which connected them with each other as well as 
to Hasiru Usiru’s larger goals.  
Core group members referred to this shared political thought as their 
“ideology”, and this ideological connect contributed to the development of a 
shared worldview. This included a preference for physical interaction, and a more 
traditional or ‘old civil society’ type of activism that emphasised inclusivity and 
participation of marginalised groups. The central role of ideology in influencing 
the core group’s worldview, including its attitudes toward the Internet, is 
discussed in the section ‘Expressions of Ideology’. The composition of e-group 
interviewees was more diverse, which was not surprising, given the size of the 
network. Seven e-group members interviewed (six male and one female) ranged 
in age from mid-twenties to mid-forties, and encompassed diverse educational 
and professional credentials. However, there were some shared characteristics, 
such as education and work attributes associated with a middle class profile, and 
a desire to participate in public affairs. This corroborates Enqvist’s (2012) 
observation of the predominantly middle-class—and therefore, largely 
homogeneous—nature of the network. As all e-group members were or had been 
involved in Hasiru Usiru’s physical activities, they were able to talk about the 
network with some sense of authority. This familiarity provided insights regarding 
the functioning of the network and the core group that were not evident in the 
mailing list discussions, and could be contrasted with opinions and observations 
of core group members.  
The reasons or motivations to join the network clustered around the main 
reasons of personal fulfilment and social ties, interest in the causes Hasiru Usiru 
was involved in, a commitment to the democratic ideals of participatory decision-
making, the importance attached to protests as a method of claim-making, and 
the opportunity to challenge the dominant imaginations of the city. As each of 
these reasons is discussed in greater depth in the section ‘Expressions of 




Interviewees were drawn to Hasiru Usiru due to its commitment to 
promote greater public participation in democratic decision-making. Interviewees 
noted that the lack of consultation by government and political authorities with 
marginalised groups and communities was contrary to the essence of democratic 
practice. Hence, one of the motivations for joining the network was to facilitate 
the working of democracy in actual practice. Interviewees said they also joined to 
lend support to causes that Hasiru Usiru was engaged in at that time, including 
campaign and protests to save lakes and trees, which focus on the protection of 
urban commons. Interviewees also expressed solidarity with other causes, such 
as the improvement of public transportation, and the protection of the rights of 
marginalised groups, such as public bus users, street vendors, disabled persons, 
etc. 
With specific regard to the core group, interviewees said they were drawn 
into contributing to Hasiru Usiru for a variety of personal reasons, including 
individual experiences, characteristics, and inspirations, which motivated one to 
participate in the rigorous—and yet unpaid and often unrecognised—activities of 
the civil society sector. For some former IT professionals, the disillusionment with 
the corporate sector and its lifestyle, the helplessness they felt as individuals in 
tackling societal problems, coupled with the inclination to contribute to society, 
and their youthful enthusiasm, played a role in drawing them towards Hasiru 
Usiru:  
See, the thing is, personally I was feeling quite a bit disillusioned with 
the IT sector. Now, that was a personal thing, of course, and I was 
being part of the corporate thing, I was having a very difficult corporate 
job, I would leave at 6.45 in the morning, get into the office bus, stay 
back at work till 10 in the night, came back home, and I had no life. 
But, yeah, I was feeling disenchanted and disillusioned with that kind of 
lifestyle, and personally I was inclined more towards doing something, 
to contribute towards society, though I know it sounds like a cliché, but 
it really was that. So there was this general feeling in mind that, “Oh 
God, I’m actually wasting my life, that I could be doing something much 
more useful”—which was a personal thing. And there were all these 
things that were happening around me, which was Hasiru Usiru 
gathering momentum, there were all these huge protests which came 
up—left, right and centre. (Anand, male, core group. Telephone 





Anand explained that life in the IT sector left him burnt out and 
disillusioned, and as he already had an inclination towards social issues, he felt 
that he no longer wanted to continue life in this meaningless way. These ideas 
combined with other factors, such as peer influence, to move him in the direction 
of Hasiru Usiru. As core group members were close friends, their strong ties 
motivated each other to join the group. As he met other core group members 
who had left their corporate jobs to join the development sector, he was inclined 
to do so as well. Another factor was their largely similar philosophical and 
ideological leanings, which matched those of the Hasiru Usiru leadership at that 
time. Meeting and learning from Hasiru Usiru members sharpened existing 
dormant ideological affiliations, and the collegial environment within which they 
honed their skills and knowledge encouraged a longer-term commitment with the 
network. Along with these personal factors, the charged atmosphere of social 
change and protest activity in the late 2000s caught the fancy of these idealistic 
youth, and drew them to Hasiru Usiru. Some interviewees also joined due to their 
conviction that protests were an essential component of democracy and a 
legitimate method of claim-making. For these members, the opportunity to 
participate in protests was seen as a way to engage in democratic processes. 
Core group members also noted that they were drawn to Hasiru Usiru as it 
provided an opportunity for them to challenge the dominant imaginations of the 
city. This included the imaginations of Bangalore as ‘global’ or ‘world-class’, or as 
an ‘IT City’, as well as the related development paradigm that focused on 
infrastructure development and mega-projects at the cost of social development. 
Hasiru Usiru activities that contested such imaginations, providing the opportunity 
to reclaim the city and make it more liveable for all socio-economic groups, was a 
prime motivating factor for some core group members as well.  
Structure and Functioning 
Hasiru Usiru was unanimously described as a “network” by interviewees, 




“network” comprised the physical group and activities, with an emphasis on 
informality and openness, based on voluntary contributions by members. To 
most e-group members, however, “network” referred to the Internet base, i.e. the 
e-group through which they were connected to Hasiru Usiru. The networked 
structure was described mostly in terms of being “informal”, “flexible”, and 
“loose”, sustained and shaped by voluntary participation. The decision to not 
register the network as a formal organisation or society was taken in the interests 
of remaining open and accessible, while creating an informal core group for 
decision-making purposes. While there was no formal organisational leadership, 
ESG provided logistical and other assistance, which supported the core group in 
its planning and execution of activities. This informal structure was described as 
enabling broad-based participation, thereby remaining rooted to the group’s 
democratic ideals of openness and public participation. The network’s 
transparency—wherein important decisions were either taken or shared 
collectively on the e-group—were cited as key strengths by interviewees. 
Respondents were forthcoming in their assessment of the strengths and 
limitations of Hasiru Usiru’s networked structure, and the core group was hopeful 
that this study could help it to identify and overcome existing weaknesses.  
With regard to structural strengths, the core group noted that the element 
of informality had the advantage of allowing the network to be broad-based, 
thereby avoiding the tag of being ‘elitist’. A few cited the ability to mobilise 
members at short notice as a key strength of the structure—but this was mostly 
with reference to the anti-Metro and other protests in the past. Members were 
also cognisant of the shortcomings of a loosely organised structure, particularly 
in terms of efficiency. Enqvist (2012) noted that this ‘looseness’ is a dilemma, 
because it attracted new members and ideas, but the absence of governance 
structures made it difficult to use either of them. The reluctance to change the 
operational and organisational aspects of the model meant that many of the 
vexing aspects of being a network continued without being addressed. 
Additionally, amongst the core group, there was some discomfort with its steering 




If we’re going to create this small coterie of five or six of us—which at 
some level is happening—but we are not very comfortable with that. It 
can’t be this way. We’re constantly questioning that: why has it 
become the eight of us? All of whom can speak English, all of whom 
have two degrees, all of whom are middle class: so, trying to move 
beyond that. (Sheela, female, 30s, core group. Personal interview, 
December 21, 2011) 
Sheela explained that one aspect of concern was that in the absence of 
formal procedures, some core group members questioned whether, in fact, they 
had the right to steer the network. While e-group members were convinced of the 
appropriateness and dedication of the core group, this issue was one that vexed 
the core group itself. Another reason for the core group’s discomfort lay in its 
composition, particularly its middle-class nature, which reflected a lack of 
diversity. This concern extended to the e-group’s composition, particularly as the 
absence of the lower-middle and poorer classes ran contrary to the group’s 
shared principles of inclusion and equality. Another problem that arose from the 
network’s structural limitations was the limited connection with the grassroots, 
particularly as the lack of popular support restricted its overall effectiveness. 
Although the core group had begun to involve itself in grassroots activities, the 
lack of a strong membership base and the informal structure continued to limit 
the core group to a handful of active individuals. Such issues made the core 
group keenly aware of the need to “re-imagine” Hasiru Usiru, resulting in efforts 
to incorporate a common vision, bring some structure into its activities, and 
streamline decision-making. Accordingly, a more formal, expanded core group 
was created in April 2012 (e-group message #15862, May 18, 2012; interviews), 
which divided tasks strategically among members to be more effective on the 
ground, and to increase and reinvigorate its membership base. The new core 
group also initiated a series of activities aimed at raising awareness of Hasiru 
Usiru and its work, and increasing physical interaction among members. 
Interviews revealed some major schisms between core and peripheral (e-
group) members regarding various aspects of the network’s structure and 
functioning, particularly with regard to its Internet base. For instance, core group 




members in network activities, and unease with its expanding and largely 
anonymous composition. Further, the core group viewed the e-group as 
impeding its activities due to the lack of deliberation and limited participation by 
majority of members. For e-group members, however, connected solely through 
the Internet medium, the platform provided a crucial space for them to be 
connected with and participate in civic affairs. This disconnect between the core 
group and e-group both reflected and perpetuated the structural weaknesses of 
the network, and is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
Focal Interest Issues  
Hasiru Usiru’s initial thrust was on environmental issues, such as 
preserving the city’s depleting tree cover from rapid and unplanned urbanisation, 
and countering city authorities’ brazen attitudes towards the environment in their 
quest for ‘development’. In recent years, the network has continued to focus on 
the environment, while expanding its mandate to include issues of participatory 
planning, decentralised local urban governance, and sustainable public transport 
(see also Enqvist, 2012). As Hasiru Usiru was a loose network, its priorities 
shifted according to those who were at its helm. Nonetheless, the core group 
worked within a shared set of objectives and norms based on a largely left-
leaning or socialist political thought, which they informally referred to as their 
“ideology”. The components of their ideology, the varying interpretations of the 
term between the core and e-groups, and the implications—both positive and 
negative—of the focus on ideology are discussed in the section ‘Expressions of 
Ideology’. Ideology, as a defining feature of the core group’s actions, guided the 
choice of focal areas and modes of engagement, which are are described below.   
The network was largely a ‘green’ group until the anti-Metro protests 
brought forth the issue of lack of consideration for the environment and lack of 
public consultation in the government’s drive for ‘development’. This resulted in 
an expansion of its mandate and focus areas to include greater democratic 
decision-making, and a thrust on inclusion, particularly of marginalised groups, in 




transport system in Bangalore undertaken in 2011 is an example of the thrust on 
public service users, particularly disadvantaged groups. Core group members, in 
conjunction with CBOs and NGOs, undertook the study of the bus system from 
the lens of access and equity (e-group message #13227, March 29, 2011). The 
study, perhaps the first of its kind in the city, focused on making public transport 
equitable and accessible to all, regardless of socio-economic status. Core group 
member Neha (female, personal interview, June 25, 2011) highlighted the 
inequities in public transport in Bangalore, whereby users of regular buses were 
constrained to travel in crowded and uncomfortable conditions. By focusing on 
making bus travel pleasant for all commuters—not just those who could afford to 
travel in air-conditioned buses—the study was directed at poorer urban 
populations in the city. Activities that emphasised public transport, such as anti-
road widening campaigns, focused on discouraging the indiscriminate use of 
private vehicles. Incentivising public transport was recommended as a more 
sustainable and long-term solution over cutting trees to widen roads for more 
private vehicles.  
In these activities, the core group was also guided by an overarching 
concern for the just use of the “urban commons”, a term that encompassed 
ecological/environmental as well as mobility/transport-related commons. In the 
case of the former, the emphasis was on preserving the commons that were 
being destroyed in the name of ‘development’, as well as making commons 
accessible to all sections of society. Mobility related commons were viewed in a 
similar way; improving the bus system was considered a means to protect the 
environment while simultaneously enabling all sections of society access to an 
improved transportation system. The extension of the notion of the ‘commons’ 
was related to the effort to connect with the grassroots in ways that would 
resonate with them. Further, by moving away from a purely environmental 
focus—which was often considered a middle-class or niche issue—the core 
group hoped to motivate and mobilise different groups of people to participate in 




At the crux of Hasiru Usiru’s activities lay a critique of the developmental 
paradigm of the city, with its thrust on infrastructure building at the cost of social 
development and welfare. The “hyper-capitalist” style of development that 
Bangalore, Karnataka, and India, in general, had embarked upon was critiqued 
as an imitation of developmental patterns seen in the West or the Tiger 
economies of East Asia. Such ‘modelling’ (Ong, 2011) or imitation was also 
attributed to global or world-city imaginations that had guided Bangalore’s 
development as an IT hub during the late 1990s/early 2000s. The fallouts of the 
“information society project” in Bangalore and current developments made the 
core group wary of the perils of reproducing other city’s imaginations in 
Bangalore. Global or world-class city imaginations were critiqued for promoting 
(transportation) infrastructure that was seen as wasteful and exclusionary, such 
as highways and skywalks that wouldn’t benefit majority of the city’s non-private 
vehicle using population, and for ‘cleansing’ urban spaces by clearing ‘unwanted 
citizens’ (such as roadside vendors, beggars, stray animals) from the public gaze 
(Saldanha, 2012; Sreenivasa, 2011). The core group perceived the pursuit of 
these imaginations as detrimental to the city and majority of its residents, and 
conducted activities aimed at countering such imaginations. For instance, the 
thrust on prioritising buses, and the rights of pedestrians and cyclists aimed to 
dispel notions that a global city was characterised by mega-infrastructure 
projects, such as the Metro or monorail, or signal-free corridors seen in the West.  
The chapter thus far has described the origins, composition, structure and 
functioning, as well as the core areas and modes of engagement of Hasiru Usiru. 
The next section answers the central research questions, i.e. how ICTs are used 
and their role in the network’s activities, and attitudes towards and ICT use by its 
members.  
Attitudes Towards and Use of the Internet for Democratic 
Engagement  
The objective of this case study was to explore attitudes towards and use 




City’. Initial interviews on attitudes towards ICTs revealed new—and 
unexpected—perspectives, which compelled me to change the focus of my 
research in the direction of emerging narratives. As I have discussed earlier, 
Bangalore’s high-tech reputation and the mushrooming of Internet-based civil 
society initiatives had led me to posit the emergence of new type of wired urban 
civil society actor. By using ICTs to create new spaces for citizen participation in 
local urban affairs, the assumption was that these actors embraced new 
technologies to further their causes. These assumptions were also based on 
studies that presumed that the intertwining of online and offline activity furthers 
democratic goals (Carty, 2010; Hayhtio & Rinne, 2008; Jensen, Danziger, & 
Venkatesh, 2007). A second set of assumptions was the willingness of civil 
society actors to adopt an increasingly affordable and accessible Internet in 
pursuance of these goals (see Dilevko, 2002). However, as I have explained 
below, initial interviews with core group members revealed scepticism towards, 
and refusal to engage deeply with, the Internet for activism. These perspectives 
forced me to re-examine certain taken-for-granted notions regarding the ICT-civil 
society relationship. While this disrupted my original notion of the Internet as a 
thriving site for engagement in an IT-rich city, it simultaneously brought to light 
other new and fascinating insights. As interviews progressed, novel concepts 
such as ideology and space emerged, which had not appeared in any secondary 
data or on the email list discussions. As new themes emerged, I followed 
Saldanha’s (2009) advice about diagrammatically representing main categories, 
and reflecting on the interconnectedness between them (see Appendix F for this 
diagrammatic representation). Finally, in shortlisting themes and categories for 
further analysis, I was guided by the research questions, which necessitated a 
focus on certain themes and issues at the cost of other (equally interesting) ones.    
In uncovering how ICTs were being leveraged by civil society, I had 
predicted that wired actors in Bangalore would make use of a variety of new 
technologies at their disposal, particularly mobile telephony, to achieve their 
goals. However, upon interviewing core group members, it soon became clear 




activities, and that there was no intensive use of other ICT tools. Despite the 
relatively high mobile phone penetration rate in the city,68 the core group 
highlighted several problems that prevented them from using mobile phones 
more intensively:   
Yeah, SMS definitely would work much better [than the Internet], you 
can reach many more people than you can with it. But then also, I’m 
not very phone savvy, and there is the issue of charges associated 
with SMS. It also requires somebody to be doing that stuff, I mean, if 
we are there on the streets, who’s going to be sitting at their computer 
and sending some SMSs? Who’s going to enter all those numbers? 
So, it’s definitely much more accessible [than the Internet], but…if I 
don’t have free SMS, why will I SMS you if I don’t have that much 
charge on my phone? Those kinds of things also, we need to look at 
that. (Sheela, female, 30s, core group. Personal interview, December 
21, 2011) 
 
The interviewee explained that as mobile phones could hypothetically 
connect to a larger audience, they were considered the more accessible ICTs for 
democratic engagement. However, even large-scale mobile phone usage 
presented challenges that the core group was unable to resolve, such as high 
costs and administrative difficulties involved in one-to-many communications. 
This was particularly so as the network did not possess extra financial resources 
and personnel for these activities. There was also the technical issue of using 
vernacular scripts to reach out to their main stakeholders. Although a vast 
majority of mobile users in India are primarily regional language speakers, there 
are not enough local language fonts, nor can all mobile phones support 
vernacular scripts for messaging, although this is slowly changing (Gupta & 
Sornlertlamvanich, 2007; Nair, 2013). Hence, due to the variety of issues to be 
considered before mobile phones could be used widely and efficiently, the Yahoo 
group remained the main communicating medium for members. For this reason, 
the Internet became the central focus of this study, and therein emerged two 
main areas of investigation: (1) attitudes towards and use of the Internet in 
                                                             
68 Vadlamani (2009) explained that as Bangalore does not get metro status, it comes 
under the Karnataka telecom circle, which makes it difficult to arrive at its tele-density. 




general for civic and political and engagement, and (2) role and function of the 
Yahoo group (e-group), and attitude of core group members towards the e-group.  
In terms of attitude towards, and use of, the Internet for Hasiru Usiru’s 
activities, the interviews revealed a schism between core group and the larger e-
group members. Although the core group recognised the importance of the 
Internet for its activities, it was evident from the outset that this was not a focal 
aspect. The core group displayed considerable anxiety that its Internet-based 
activities were dominated by the middle-classes, and frustration over the lack of 
active participation by majority of e-group members. Strains of pessimism were 
evident in the downplaying of the Internet’s role in its activities, despite the 
network’s online base. This largely negative attitude towards the Internet ranged 
from unease with to staunch opposition to extensive Internet use in its activities. 
A qualitative thematic analysis of the interview data, which enabled the 
identification of recurring themes and salient issues across the dataset (Boyatzis, 
1998; Howitt & Cramer, 2005; Ryan & Bernard, 2003), revealed that these 
negative attitudes clustered around four main themes. These are categorised as: 
(1) Internet as exclusionary, (2) Internet as amplifier, and (3) Internet as a space 
of ideas, not action. Among e-group members, attitudes towards the Internet 
were less uniform, with interviewees expressing both enthusiasm and uncertainty 
regarding the potential of networked engagement.  
These attitudes can be understood better when viewed in terms of Pippa 
Norris’ (2001, p. 11) tripartite framework of the various predictions surrounding 
the democratic potential of the Internet. Norris categorised attitudes towards the 
Internet in terms of cyber-optimism, cyber-pessimism, and cyber-scepticism. 
Cyber-optimists are those who hope that in affluent industrial societies, at least, 
the digital divide will eventually succumb to the combined forces of technological 
innovations, markets, and the state. Cyber-pessimists, on the other hand, 
emphasise the deep-seated patterns of social stratification and the growth of an 
unskilled underclass in technological access. Cyber-sceptics believe that 
technologies adapt to society and not vice-versa, and that societal divides will 




thesis explains attitudes of Hasiru Usiru members based on this framework, with 
the results of the data analysis discussed below:   
The Internet as Exclusionary 
Interviews revealed that the core group viewed the Internet as a limited or 
exclusionary realm, which worked in the interests of those with greater access to 
it, viz., middle and higher-income classes. By communicating mainly through e-
groups, they were limiting themselves to the middle classes, which they felt, 
distanced them from their real stakeholders at the grassroots. In this way, as 
Internet-based activities inhibited them in their overall work, interviewees 
discussed the need to move beyond Internet use. Interviews revealed the 
salience attached to physical spaces by the core group, demonstrating a 
perceptible preference for physical interaction and a more traditional style of 
grassroots activism. Core group references to physical or offline spaces of 
engagement were categorised into four broad activities, viz., monthly meetings 
where the larger Internet community could meet and establish a sense of 
familiarity; workshops and other public events informing citizens about pertinent 
civic issues and eliciting their involvement; public discussion series involving 
talks on pertinent city issues, as well as walks to familiarise citizens with 
Bangalore’s urban commons and public spaces; and engagement/consultations 
with public service users and groups impacted by government policies and 
decisions.  
Monthly meetings were initiated with the aim of forging a sense of kinship 
among members, and providing non-members an opportunity to attend, 
regardless of their personal or professional affiliations. Monthly meetings also 
afforded a way for the core group to compensate for its Internet reliance, 
particularly as it worked with vulnerable groups that had limited or no access to 
the Internet: 
And also, it’s always been important for us that we can’t be this 
Internet dependent…to some extent I believe that ICTs are 
empowering—but you also have to work with what you have today. 




I don’t like using it, so there are also people like that. Let alone people 
who don’t even have access to that. What about children, what about 
migrants, what about people who wake up at 7.30 am and get home at 
8 pm and have to cook and feed their kids? Are they going to be 
engaged on the Internet? No! So then, where do you find spaces for 
them to engage? (Sheela, personal interview, December 21, 2011)   
 
Sheela noted that ICTs were empowering—but only up to a certain point, 
given the large numbers in the city who were on the wrong side of the digital 
divide. Even among those with access, like her, there was a preference for 
physical activity. Offline spaces of engagement became even more critical when 
one considered that the more vulnerable groups in the city, such as women, 
children, and migrants, had little or no Internet access. Thus, one of the core 
group priorities was to find other spaces of engagement, which would allow for 
face-to-face communication and greater inclusivity. These considerations 
influenced the choice of centrally located parks and other open and accessible 
public spaces. The emphasis on public spaces was also reflected in the monthly 
series of conversations/walks about the city, which began in May 2013 (#17392, 
June 19, 2013). While the public discussion series focused on conversations 
among members regarding pertinent city-specific issues, other events such as 
tree walks organised in the city’s botanical gardens and lakes served to 
reconnect people with nature—and each other. The value accorded to physical 
spaces was often contrasted with the Internet base of the network, which core 
group members critiqued as restricting physical interactions among people, 
particularly within spaces of the urban commons.  
However, despite these efforts, sustaining the momentum of physical 
meetings and forums proved to be a serious challenge. The limited success is 
attributed to a combination of factors stemming from the structural limitations of 
the network. The initiative of holding regular monthly meetings, for example, 
faltered due to the lack of active contributors and limited instances of networking 
among civil society groups. The limited physical base of the network, which had 
thwarted collective action efforts, once again came into play here. Core group 




new participants each time, with no sustained follow-up actions by these new 
actors. The reluctance to impose directives to members to attend, as well as 
voluntary nature of the network, became problematic in this regard. For these 
reasons, despite efforts to the contrary, the Internet was still the primary source 
for publicity and coordination. This reliance on the Internet posed a dilemma to 
the core group, as its widespread use conflicted with the socialistic ideals of 
equity and accessibility: 
See, it is a privileged few who have access to these [new] 
technologies, and so, while it is easy for people in our strata and our 
communities to connect on this, we are not very gung-ho on using 
technology because there is a huge set of people, like regular users of 
public transport, who don’t have access to these technologies. If you 
use these technologies for coordinating, and for whatever action, then 
you’re reaching out to a very limited audience. (Neha, personal 
interview, June 25, 2011)  
 
As a large part of their communication efforts consisted of raising 
awareness about the rights and entitlements of marginalised groups, such as 
street vendors, public transport users, and slum dwellers, it was imperative that 
communication channels used were accessible to these groups. By 
communicating via the Internet, the core group was cognisant that they were 
excluding groups that could not access this medium, particularly those already at 
the fringes of urban society. Internet usage statistics indicate that the core 
group’s concerns were valid: in 2011, Bangalore had the least number of Internet 
users (2.2 million claimed users and 1.7 million active users) among the country’s 
metropolises (Business Standard, 2011). According to the 2011 Census, only 18 
per cent of households in the ‘IT City’ had Internet access, barely a third of 
households owned a computer, and of them, only 15.1 per cent had Internet 
access (Kurup, 2011). Such concerns about the digital divide, and its impacts on 
civic engagement, lay at the heart of the exclusionary or ‘elitist’ portrayal of the 
Internet by the core group, as well as some e-group members. A related area of 
concern was that this unequal digital playing field could exacerbate existing 




participation in policy-making, and other aspects of civic and political 
engagement.  
The Internet as Amplifier 
Interviews revealed that negative attitudes towards the Internet were 
further perpetuated by the core group’s assumption that the Internet worked as 
an “amplifier” (Agre, 2002). The amplification model discussed by Agre (2002) 
and Toyama (2011) posits that technology can have both positive and negative 
impacts, as it merely magnifies or amplifies underlying human and institutional 
intent and capacity, which can be either positive or negative. Expounding on this, 
Toyama (2011) suggested that technology cannot substitute for human intent or 
capacity where it is lacking, and when technology does have positive effect, it is 
only to the extent that people are willing and capable of putting it to positive use. 
Similarly, in analysing the Internet’s role in politics, Agre (2002) stressed that the 
Internet did not amplify all forces equally, and that its effect depended on the way 
it was appropriated, which existing forces were amplified, and which of these 
forces could then bring about some “change”. While the positive implication is 
that technology-as-amplifier can support local activist groups in their functions, 
the darker implication is the realisation that the Internet is dominated by the same 
interest groups that currently utilise other mediums, and that the Internet is of 
less value to those with less capacity (Rao, 2012). E-group members, who saw 
value in a networked civil society, confirmed the positive aspect: 
It [the Internet] is definitely potentially a great medium for people who 
are looking for that kind of thing [social issues]. Because if I had not 
come across Hasiru Usiru through a cross-post [on another e-group], I 
would have come across it in some other way. Because that is part of 
what interests me. I would have found it. (Ajay, male, e-group. 
Personal interview, December 26, 2011)  
 
As the amplifier model states, Ajay’s experiences suggested that those 
with greater capacity, reflected in education, social skills, and connections, and 
those with the motivation and interest (in this case, in civic and political issues) 




general sentiment of e-group members, who noted that the Internet provided 
them additional venues with which to engage in social issues that they were 
already interested in. Toward this end, the Internet was viewed as a convenient 
site of activity, and an indispensable means of connectivity, information sharing 
and dissemination. To the core group, however, the Internet largely functioned as 
an amplifier in a negative way, by perpetuating the prominence of Internet-based 
voices in public affairs. While the information imbalance had thus far benefitted 
Hasiru Usiru due to its strong online presence and English-base, the core group 
was uncomfortable with the primacy accorded to Internet and English-based 
groups in civic affairs. To counter this imbalance within civil society, it had 
intensified efforts to reach out to the non-Internet and non-English speaking 
sections of the population through various activities. These included holding 
public meetings in areas that were free and accessible, conducting surveys 
among groups affected by development projects, translation of all reports into 
Kannada, as well as incorporating visuals in their reports:  
If you’re going to participate, then we’re going to do it the right way; 
we’re doing it in a way in which the most vulnerable can participate. So 
if we create that structure—it’s difficult to create that structure, that 
structure is a very intensive process, it takes time...because of that [our 
structural limitations] it’s much more feasible to come up with a study 
and put it up on the HU list. But then [for] everything we insist on 
translating into Kannada, on having visuals, on having children 
appreciate these, so then the informing—which for many people is just 
putting on the e-group— that itself takes so much more time. At least 
make the outside communication [more accessible and universal], 
otherwise why are we in this city? (Sheela, personal interview, 
December 21, 2011) 
 
The above excerpt is reflective of the core group’s concern with 
overcoming the amplifier effect by making information more readily accessible in 
the public domain, and in a form easily understood by all stakeholder groups. 
This involved more than releasing a report in English on the e-group. Instead, the 
process included translating documents into Kannada, and simplifying the 
content so that children and illiterate persons could still be informed of their 




include people who had little or no access to the Internet, the core group aimed 
to enable participation among groups traditionally excluded from consultative and 
participatory processes in the city. This imperative also stemmed from battling 
what the core group described as the skewed nature of public consultation in the 
city, with consultative processes amplifying online civil society voices. The group 
saw itself as providing alternative inclusionary spaces for engagement, 
consultation and participation, which the thesis discusses in terms of civil society 
and political society dichotomies.  
The Internet and Civil Society-Political Society Dichotomies  
The core group stressed that existing processes of participation and 
consultation were stacked up against marginalised groups, in favour of English-
speaking and Internet-connected groups and individuals. Interviewees felt that 
while discussions on public issues were limited in general, the more active 
debates happened mostly on the Internet, which was a limited or exclusionary 
space. Some interviewees also pointed to the wide schism between the 
English/Internet groups and the largely vernacular, marginalised groups, and 
shared their concerns about the former’s attempt (unknowingly or otherwise) to 
exclude the latter from consultative processes:  
But also, when you talk about participation, you think of groups which 
are traditionally neglected. Because a lot of times, what RWAs and 
other civil society groups are doing, they are having participatory 
consultations and meetings—who is attending them? People who have 
access to the Internet, people who drive in cars primarily, and people 
who can speak English. Or maybe at best, are bilingual. And they are 
also, you know, civilised, the ways they have an answer, they don’t get 
angry and agitated. So there’s this “let’s not have people who don’t fit 
into our nice, little boxes, which make us uncomfortable”. That’s not 
participation. (Sheela, personal interview, December 21, 2011) 
 
Sheela’s assertions that ‘cultured’, English-speaking civil society actors 
were dominating participatory processes, to the exclusion of poor and 
marginalised city groups, were echoed by other core group members.  They 




that adopted similar methods of engagement and claim-making as them. This 
‘polite’ civil society excluded groups that did not fit these criteria, which diluted 
notions of equity and participation within civil society. Such sentiments are 
reminiscent of Partha Chatterjee’s (2001) civil society-political society dichotomy, 
which has been discussed in the Literature Review. The core group expressed 
concern about the exclusionary tendencies of civil society institutions, as well as 
the incompatibilities between civil and political societies in the city. An additional 
component fuelled this civil society-political society dichotomy—the Internet, 
which was viewed by the core group as a tool for continued civil society 
dominance.  
The anxiety regarding the Internet and (elite) civil society relationship lay 
in the core group’s fundamental critique of the civil society style of functioning. 
Main objections included the lack of internal democracy of institutions such as 
RWAs, the elitist nature of think-tanks and other ‘closed’ institutions, and the 
usurping of civil society by NGOs. The core group was critical of CSOs that 
bypassed constitutionally sanctioned spaces of participation in order to get work 
done quicker, by working with expert-constituted task forces and committees. 
While they were keenly aware of the lacunae in current systems of local 
governance, the lack of respect among some groups for the democratic process 
frustrated them. These sentiments are indicative of the complex—and 
unresolved—issues emanating from the rise of middle class CSOs in Indian 
cities, and their increasingly prominent role in civic and political life. As the 
Internet further pronounced the ‘elite’ character of civil society, portrayed as 
‘civilised’, ‘car-driving’, and ‘English-speaking’, the core group became more 
conscious of distancing itself from this civil society. This involved some 
movement away from members’ own positions of privilege to focus on improving 
systems that would benefit political society constituents of the city. This included 
supplementing the government’s limited efforts at public engagement 
consultation, which was described as shallow and inadequate. The local 
government often took decisions arbitrarily, and even in cases where public input 




affected communities. Often, consultations were held in affluent localities that 
were attended by middle class and elite CSO members, rather than in spaces 
where poorer groups resided. The core group attempted to overcome these 
shortcomings through an emphasis on giving ‘voice’ to groups that were 
otherwise powerless, such as slum dwellers, migrant workers, the urban poor, 
etc. This was done by interacting directly with these groups at their workplace or 
residence, conducting meetings and surveys, collecting their opinion on civic 
issues, and distributing these findings via reports and papers to the government, 
media, and civil society (e-group archives). For example, the project to document 
problems faced by pedestrians was an attempt to give voice to a large but 
powerless section of the population. Likewise, the bus study aimed to generate 
inputs from neglected groups, such as garment workers and women, in order to 
improve their user experiences. In these ways, the core group’s activities were 
efforts to reverse the imbalance in consultative and decision-making processes, 
which tended to amplify Internet-based voices.  
The Internet as Space of Ideas, but not Action 
Another recurring theme w.r.t core group attitudes towards the Internet 
was the notion that the Internet facilitated the exchange of ideas, but not action. 
This opinion was also expressed by some e-groups members, who praised the 
Internet as a site for information dissemination, but highlighted its limitations in 
generating collective actions. All interviewees concurred that the Internet played 
a crucial role as a repository of information, and as a source of alternative news 
that may not be covered by the mainstream media. By providing access to 
information that was closely guarded by corporations and governments, the 
Internet was lauded for spurring interested citizens into action. Interviewees 
viewed the Internet as a prime site for facilitating new ideas, sharing and 
learning, for circulating opinions and for building consensus (i.e. public sphere 
discourse), which were crucial for civil society action. The combination of 
information circulation, the ability to reach out and involve people on a mass 




greater connectedness between like-minded people and groups. While some e-
group members were convinced that such a networked civil society could lay the 
foundation for informed collective action, most interviewees opined that, by itself, 
the Internet could not facilitate meaningful actions. Rather, what was needed was 
face-to-face communication and physical contact, which produced greater 
bonding and a sense of intimacy, thereby facilitating collective actions. However, 
the pressures of modern city life, and the subsequent disconnect of (mainly well-
off) urban citizens from their social realities, often prevented such collaborations 
from taking place. E-group members noted that the paucity of time and other 
stresses of a metropolitan city were key obstacles to translating online ideas into 
offline actions: 
The group hasn’t discussed it in length why it [sustained collective 
action] hasn’t happened, but I’m sure everybody has their idea…the 
thing is, we’re so tied up in our own work that there’s no time for 
anything else. We don’t spend time for other things. We’re so tied up in 
work, family, our duties to our family—you don’t look at the bigger 
picture. So we don’t participate, which is the biggest problem, which is 
probably an Indian issue, which may change, I don’t know. (Ajay, 
personal interview, December 26, 2011)  
 
Interviewees such as Ajay pointed out that the precarious work-life 
balance in Indian cities, including arduous daily commutes and long working 
hours, were detrimental to collective action efforts. Moreover, in the Indian 
context, the notion of duty to family meant that busy professionals preferred to 
spend time with their families over the weekend and holidays, rather than engage 
in protest activities. Under such circumstances, with people being physically 
unable to participate due to personal and work constraints, the Internet provided 
a convenient means for e-group members to participate in online discussions, 
and keep abreast of civic affairs. In this way, the Internet undoubtedly facilitated 
the rise of an informed citizenry, who could engage in civic affairs via the 




However, other participants opined that the notion of ‘action’ being 
equivalent to an online act like sending an email, or signing an e-petition, 
impeded actual action on the ground:  
There is a mind set, that if you put it on the Internet it’s there, that’s the 
end. But that is what is limiting our thinking capacity, our ability to 
execute. I think the biggest thing in our country is the lack of execution 
of all the initiatives. So what this Internet is doing today is that, I sit in 
front of my laptop or whatever, hand-held device, and I will just plug in, 
do a few things and assume it’s done. Unfortunately, the back-end 
system has to kick in, it has to set up that thing, it has to make it work. 
That thing, that linkage, is not there today. (Sriram, male personal 
interview, January 7, 2012) 
 
E-group member Sriram noted that e-activism without the requisite offline 
follow up plagued civic activism today, as citizens mistakenly assumed that 
expedient online actions were sufficient in taking causes forward. He added that 
contributing on the Internet should be an initial— rather than last—step, and 
ideas and comments generously shared online should be taken forward as 
projects or initiatives on the ground. A related drawback of the Internet as a 
space of ideas was the circulation of ideas and opinions without adequate 
consideration of their actual implementation. In this regard, doubts about the 
ability of online action to produce change were also related to the concern that 
minimum-level engagement on the Internet could subvert real efforts to initiate 
change. E-group member Ramesh (male personal interview, December 26, 
2011) noted that by providing “a way to escape from action”, the Internet 
produced a shallow sense of engagement, enabling people to feel that once they 
sent an e-mail, they had done their job. This sentiment is akin to Van Laer and 
Van Aelst’s (2010) concern that this type of limited action, known variously as 
‘clicktivism’, ‘slacktivism’ or ‘keyboard activism’ (see Rotman et al., 2011) ran the 
risk of making collective action too easy, reducing actual commitment to social 
change, and thereby damaging the policy impact of civil society.  
The core group’s pessimistic outlook of the Internet a space of ideas, and 
not action, was reinforced by its limited success in achieving a conversion from 




group members spoke of their frustration with the substitution of online for offline 
activity by the majority of e-group members. This lack of conversion to offline 
action was considered a key limitation of the Hasiru Usiru network, and a factor 
that significantly influenced the core group’s pessimistic opinion of the Internet:  
…there are many people who are happy to contribute through email, 
are happy to engage in online discussion, so that they don’t have to, I 
mean, it just means that they don’t have to leave their desk, and they 
can just keep contributing. But when it comes to doing things on the 
ground, it’s much more difficult for people to come, much more difficult 
for people to get actively involved. So in some sense, the Internet has 
also been its [the network’s] limitation. Again, I’m pretty sure that other 
members you spoke to would have mentioned it—it’s very frustrating 
for them—because we keep thinking, there are 1000 members on the 
yahoo group, so if we call for a protest we would think, ok, at least we’ll 
get 300 people, you know, one-third of 1000. But it hardly ever 
happens like that. (Anand, telephone interview, January 14, 2013) 
 
Anand referred to the ease with which e-members participated online, and 
noted that this did not often translate into offline actions. This frustrated the core 
group, whose primary mode of engagement involved collective actions, such as 
street protests, as a show of solidarity. The expectation that the large e-group 
numbers would translate into offline actors stemmed from the success of the anti-
Metro protests in 2009. However, after the protests had died down there was a 
steady decline in the number of members gathering to protest, despite repeated 
calls to action. Interviews with Hasiru Usiru members, as well as informal 
discussions with academics and other civil society actors, yielded several 
explanations for this lack of collective action. A few core group members 
suggested that the deficiency in active citizenry could be attributed to the 
absence of a sense of belonging to the city among its sizeable migrant 
population, who did not have a direct stake in the city. Among this category, the 
limited participation of IT professionals, in particular, disappointed the core group, 
as these and other affluent citizens could take the time off to participate in 
events. On the other hand, less well-off city residents, such as those who 




be expected to participate on the same scale. The possible reasons for the lack 
of engagement among internet-enabled citizens are discussed below.  
IT Professionals and Lack of Engagement  
Although IT professionals comprised a relatively small portion of the 
migrant population in Bangalore69, their role in the city drew much attention from 
the media, civil society, as well as long-time residents. Some Hasiru Usiru 
members suggested that migrants did not really consider themselves as having a 
stake in the city, and thus preferred to abstain from engaging in civic activities:   
I think Bangalore’s problem is also a huge number of migrants have 
come in the last ten years, and I have a feeling—I mean, I am also one 
of them—but I have a feeling that may be a lot of them do not consider 
this as home, actually, feel like [they have] no stake in the city, that’s 
sort of more like my sense of it. Maybe it’s not fair to say that. But, I 
think there is a lot of apathy in Bangalore. (Shalini, female, core group. 
Personal interview, December 23, 2011) 
 
Shalini explained that although she too was a migrant, having arrived in 
Bangalore several years ago for higher studies, her path differed from those 
uninvolved in civic affairs. Over the years, having made Bangalore her home, she 
had become an active civil society member, dedicating herself to a range of 
social change issues. However, this was not the case with the vast majority of 
migrants, particularly IT professionals, whose general apathy prevented any 
meaningful engagement. Whereas one problem facing Hasiru Usiru was the non-
acceptance of its ideology and modes of claim-making among city residents, the 
bigger problem, she explained, was the lack of involvement among a huge chunk 
of the population. While they could engage with those opposed to their ideas and 
actions, the greater challenge lay in engaging those who had little or no 
awareness of civic issues, nor any inclination to initiate themselves in these 
matters. Tackling this apathy was problematic for a number of reasons, such as 
the nature of work in the IT and BPO industries in India, which involved long 
                                                             
69In 2008, it was estimated that employees in IT and BPO industries constituted just 




hours, an intense work pace, night shifts, and other “time arbitrage” processes 
(Nadeem, 2009), which depleted employees’ personal time and space, and took 
a considerable toll on their health and social relationships (see also 
Kesavachandran C, Rastogi, Das, & Khan, 2006). Core group member Anand 
(telephone interview, January 14, 2013) discussed in detail the difficulties of 
working in the IT sector, and how he, and some fellow core group members, had 
quit their jobs due to the negative impact on their personal and social lives. Other 
interviewees pointed out that the absence of work-life balance and the stressful 
working conditions in the IT sector gave its employees limited time and energy to 
think about social issues.  
A related explanation for the possible alienation of this group from civic 
activities was that the IT culture of living in one’s “cocoon” cut this group off from 
the city’s material practices:  
And what do the IT people do after the finish the day’s job? [Either go 
home or go out]. Basically they are consumers. After they finish their 
job they are consumers in one way or the other, either its TV or 
consuming something else. So Hasiru Usiru can’t reach out to them, 
because they are in a cocoon. I mean, a lot of us IT guys, it’s more like 
a cocoon. You go into Infosys campus, it’s no longer India. You pass 
the gate, people around you are Indian, but it’s no longer India. Then 
you come out, you go into your house. Their incomes are quite good, 
so they don’t meet reality that much—even I was like that. So it gives 
you a sort of shield against realising what’s happening. So when you 
say protest, they really don’t bother. They slog a lot, they work hard, so 
probably they don’t have the energies also. But it’s a sort of barrier 
between them [and Hasiru Usiru], at least for the IT workers. (Ajay, 
personal interview, December 26, 2011)  
 
E-group member Ajay, a former IT professional, discussed the possible 
reasons for the lack of civic engagement among IT employees sector, based on 
his own experiences. He depicted IT professionals as essentially ‘consumers’, 
who neither had the time nor energy to engage with civic issues. He described 
them as living in a “cocoon”, which neither Hasiru Usiru nor the grim reality of 
India could penetrate. NGO director Prabhat (personal communication, June 8, 




and so on, which alienated people from the material practices of the city. Moving 
between their “bubbles” of home and campus, the IT crowd was often shielded 
from the outside world, making them oblivious to the reasons for civic action. 
There is a great deal of literature on the bubble spaces of IT campuses, where 
superior images of work and vibrant ambience of the workplace serve to portray 
work as ‘fun’ and ‘trendy’, and as an extension of college life into the workplace 
(Upadhya & Vasavi, 2006, 2008). While such a portrayal of the workplace helped 
to recruit educated and fun-loving youngsters from the urban middle-class (ibid; 
Remesh, 2008), tech companies also went to great lengths to retain employees. 
The impetus to retain talent is most visible in the case of Google, which provides 
a long list of perks to employees, and thrives on a work culture that tries to 
optimise its people, in terms of personal development and happiness, and 
professional performance (Stewart, 2013; Levy, 2011). A senior technologist in 
Cisco Systems also highlighted this aspect as he took me on a tour of the 
networking giant’s Bangalore campus (personal interview, July 6, 2011). He 
explained that the campus, inaugurated in 2007, was built at a cost of around 
USD 1 billion and was the only Cisco campus outside the US. The Bangalore 
campus, called the Cisco Globalisation Centre East, was touted to be bigger and 
better than its US counterpart, with state-of-the-art amenities and technologies, 
including its multiple Telepresence facilities and an advanced Global Briefing 
Centre. As we walked through the campus, with its landscaping and well-
manicured lawns comparable to a five-star hotel, he pointed out various 
recreation and leisure facilities spread across the campus. Indoor amenities 
included a clubhouse, a state-of-the art gymnasium, golf simulators, and a 
contemporary cafeteria serving cuisines from all over India and the world, which 
was bustling with activity as lunchtime approached. In addition to leisure areas in 
each building, there were also a wide array of outdoor sports facilities, including 
cricket and basketball. My host informed me that such facilities were built 
specifically to appeal to the youth, and formed an important part of the strategy to 
recruit and retain workers. The wide array of perks also served to encourage 




campus and avail of all facilities, thereby interspersing their work and personal 
lives. 
Another reason forwarded for the apathy of IT employees was that their 
cocoon-like existence could have been exacerbated by the limited access to 
information on social issues. Recalling his unsuccessful efforts to mobilise 
volunteers at his former workplace, a local IT giant, he noted that IT companies 
could be wary of being seen as opposing the government. It was possible, he 
said, that IT companies filtered information related to protests or opposition to 
government policies—which could explain why his efforts at disseminating 
information within the company failed. In this context, therefore, it was suggested 
that the restricted or limited access of IT professionals to protest-related 
information could have contributed to their apathy. Yet another reason posited 
was that the lack of participation by the IT community in Hasiru Usiru’s activities 
could be due the absence of any incentive to participate, as it was supposedly 
benefitting from the government’s policies:  
And it also may be, because if you take IT, it is a migrant section, 
which is actually, from their point of view, they are benefitting, 
supposedly benefitting, from all these projects. So there is really no 
need for them to oppose, I mean, like they are not going to worry about 
what is happening. So, considering their salaries, each one of them is 
going to have two to three cars, so for them, they want wider roads for 
them to take their car. So, they are not going feel the pinch. The pinch 
they feel is a traffic jam; ok: “No, we want a wider road”, that’s a typical 
knee-jerk reaction from them. That’s the reason why, they are 
supposedly being helped, so they may not participate in what we feel. 
(Venkat, male, core group. Personal interview, December 23, 2011) 
 
Citing the example of the campaign to prevent road-widening, Venkat 
suggested that IT workers would prefer wider roads, as their higher purchasing 
power allowed them to buy cars relatively easily. With the ability to own a car or 
two, their primary concern would be to escape the perennial traffic jams plaguing 
the city. In this situation, they were likely to support the government’s road 
widening drive, rather than Hasiru Usiru’s anti-road widening campaigns, which 




tollway leading to Electronic City, a major technology hub, which was 
inaugurated in 2010 to provide IT workers a smooth journey to their workplace by 
avoiding the congested road below (Business Standard, 2010a; Sastry & Shastri, 
2012).70 Hasiru Usiru members described the flyover as an example of wasteful 
expenditure on an exclusionary space, which underscored how policies and 
infrastructure were skewed towards the IT sector as well as private vehicle 
ownership. In this case as well, IT groups that benefited from the flyover would 
have little or no reason to support Hasiru Usiru’s views. These examples 
highlight how Hasiru Usiru’s interpretations of government policies and projects 
varied significantly from IT employees, who would ostensibly stood to benefit. In 
such situations, interviewees noted, the IT community would naturally choose to 
support the government, rather than Hasiru Usiru, which could explain their lack 
of active participation in protests and other events.  
Some interviewees also pointed out that citizens’ apathy was exacerbated 
by a system wherein urban citizens were yet to find a formal voice in the city’s 
governance. The lack of experience in participating in urban governance was an 
additional impediment to the core group’s efforts to energise and mobilise 
Bangalore’s citizenry. As this issue has been discussed in the section ‘Limited 
Urban Decentralisation and the Value of Internet Spaces of Engagement’ in 
Chapter 4, it will not be repeated here.  
An entirely different explanation for the lack of participation by the e-
community related to the changed nature of the Hasiru Usiru network itself, and 
the resultant disconnect between the core group and the larger e-group. An 
investigation into the relationship between the core and e-group, which revealed 
contrasting understandings of the notions of membership and participation, is 
discussed below.  





Relationship between the Core Group and E-Group  
The changed nature of the mailing list was a result of its rapid expansion 
during the Metro protests in 2009, which drastically altered the character and 
nature of the group and its interactions:  
So initially how Hasiru Usiru (HU) was expanding was that I know you, 
you might be interested in this. But between that time [Metro protests], 
the numbers suddenly went [up], and we were handing out flyers in 
Lalbagh, and everybody was joining in. So different sorts of people 
came on; maybe people who didn’t believe in similar things, maybe 
some who did but believed in different nuances of the same thing. 
Then after that point, so suppose if [a core group member] wanted to 
speak at a conference then we would put it on HU, but nobody really 
responded. And why should they? Because people signed up thinking 
it was a listserv; we are considering them also as members of HU in 
that sense, so there is that disconnect with HU… (Sheela, personal 
interview, December 21, 2011) 
 
Sheela explained that the sudden influx of new members had transformed 
the network from a relatively close-knit group, which shared the same 
philosophical and political leanings, to a more heterogeneous and scattered 
entity. The absence of a common ideology, including the idea of protest as a 
legitimate means of dissent, was posited as a possible explanation for the lack of 
offline collective action. A related issue was that of differing notions of 
membership and belonging, which produced divergent understandings of 
organisational roles and responsibilities. Initially, the core group considered e-
group participants as equal “members”, and expected a degree of participation 
and a sense of ownership towards causes from them. To e-group members, 
however, the pressures of work and family often constrained physical 
participation, and the mailing list provided a space for them to be involved in 
ways and means expedient to them. Overall, the mailing list was described by 
peripheral members as a convenient means to connect with other members, to 
participate in and be privy to discussions, thereby overcoming time and space 




and contribution were described in relation to the relative flexibility that the 
Internet provided:  
[The internet] has helped Hasiru Usiru a lot, because it’s such a 
movement where you want you can apply your mind or subscribe, if 
you don’t want you can unsubscribe. Nobody forces you to come there, 
if you want to go, you go, otherwise you leave. If you want, you post, 
otherwise you don’t post. If you want, you come, otherwise you don’t 
come. So if there’s a call for a demonstration, everybody comes for 
that demonstration, if they don’t come, they don’t come. (Sandeep, 
male, e-group. Personal interview, December 12, 2011) 
 
Sandeep referred to the ‘voluntary’ nature of e-group participation several 
times, noting that members were not forced to participate, but did so as and 
when they could. Like him, other members were often unable to participate due 
to other commitments; in which case, there was no compulsion to do so. In such 
a situation, as the mailing list often remained the only connection to Hasiru 
Usiru’s activities, e-group members noted the utility of the Internet in enabling 
some level of involvement in, or at least knowledge of, the group’s activities. 
Such notions of membership and participation contrasted sharply with those of 
the core group, which insisted that such participation was limited or passive in 
the absence of more formalised or committed actions. As the core group viewed 
purely online contributions as meaningless without the corresponding offline 
actions, the e-group was conceived of as a space for online discussions rather 
than physical action:  
Actually, frankly I don’t think our online discussions are very active. I 
think online, what happens in our e-group is very informative. I mean, 
once in six months you probably have a discussion— whether or not 
the discussion is useful or substantial is a different issue. Even having 
a discussion is very rare. People just keep sending lot of mails. So I 
don’t think, I think I wouldn’t consider Hasiru Usiru as an e-platform or 
somebody that uses that internet a lot, because I don’t think we do. 
(Shalini, personal interview, December 23, 2011) 
 
Other core group members shared this critique of the e-group as a site for 




that could produce meaningful actions. Shalini described Hasiru Usiru as a 
“failed” internet group, due to its inability to leverage the Internet effectively to 
meet its objectives. Like her, some core group members indicated that the lack of 
deliberative discussion had steered them away from participating in online 
discussions, and that they preferred to communicate within the core group, either 
via telephone, email, or face-to-face, where action items were discussed and 
definitive plans chalked out. Some expressed a desire to see the deliberative 
character of the e-group enhanced, and rued that limited participation had 
severely dented Hasiru Usiru’s usefulness as an Internet forum. For these 
reasons and more, the core group viewed the potential of the mailing list to effect 
collective actions with scepticism, and began to distance itself from the e-group.  
By the second round of fieldwork, I noticed a change in the way the core 
group thought of and engaged with the e-group. Initially, the core group 
considered e-group participants as equal “members”, and expected a degree of 
participation and a sense of ownership towards causes from them. However, the 
disappointing response made it realise that e-group membership did not 
necessarily equate to active contribution or a sense of belonging to the network. 
Over a period of time, the core group identified that the poor online response was 
due to the very nature of mailing lists or listservs, which serve primarily as 
information dissemination spaces, and where moderators often undertook 
decision-making responsibilities. Thereafter, as the core group gradually begun 
to realise that expectations and experiences of participation were different online, 
it accommodated its style of functioning to suit this reality. A new and more 
formal core group was constituted in April 2012 with the purpose of strengthening 
and taking common agendas forward, thereby resolving the ambiguity in terms of 
doing work on the ground. From then onwards, the e-group was made privy to all 
decisions taken by the new core group, without the expectation that duties would 
be undertaken by it. Further, by streamlining its decision-making process, the 
core group was able to involve the e-group without compromising on its pace and 




actions, which impelled the core group to shift from protest activities to other 
advocacy and networking strategies.  
 
The Issue of Language and Structural Limitations  
 
A recurring theme with regard to the Internet and collective action was that 
of language, with a distinction made between Internet users as primarily English-
speaking versus non-Internet users as mainly vernacular speakers. Between the 
two categories, the vernacular group was described as being easier to motivate 
to action, as local groups and communities were intimately connected to their 
physical environment, rather than the virtual spaces that consumed the English-
speaking middle and upper classes:    
 
We are trying to do some things in the local language, Kannada. That 
is effective. We get real people there. Something happens. If you see, 
if you go for English-speaking, a thousand people will say: “I will 
come”, but nobody will come. Here only 20 people will say: “I will 
come”, and they will come. (Ramesh, personal interview, December 
26, 2011) 
 
E-group member Ramesh, who was associated with several civil society 
groups in the city, noted that local communities and grassroots groups were far 
more responsive to calls to action than Internet communities. The positive 
response of vernacular groups, bound by linguistic and cultural affinities, 
encouraged him to move from online to offline activities. He framed this in terms 
of a local (i.e. Kannada-speaking)/non-Internet versus English-speaking/Internet 
dichotomy, with groups belonging to the former category most likely to engage in 
civic and political activities. Similar experiences prompted the core group to 
engage with communities on the ground, rather than Internet communities. To do 
this, it was necessary for Hasiru Usiru to expand its offline membership base, 
which, however, was proving difficult in light of various structural limitations, 
including financial and human resources. In this regard, the shortcomings of 




fundamental problem confronting the network—its structural weaknesses. In 
particular, resource constraints, lack of volunteers, the absence of a formal 
mechanism to engage members, and the lack of incentives to participate were 
cited as key impediments in mobilising people. In the absence of a formal 
structure, the core group felt it was not in a position to enforce participation, and 
neither did it wish to. In order to overcome such limitations, and to reduce its 
Internet dependency, the core group initiated efforts to expand the network’s 
offline membership base and garner grassroots support. However, in doing so, it 
almost entirely neglected the online aspect, which, coupled with pessimistic 
attitude towards the Internet, diminished the potential for creative and strategic 
ICT use. This aspect is discussed in the section ‘Factors Influencing ICT 
Use/Non-Use by the Core Group’.  
E-group Attitudes: Sceptical, yet Optimistic    
Before discussing the factors that influenced how the core group used 
ICTs for their engagement activities, this section briefly examines the attitude of 
e-group members towards the Internet as a democratic engagement. There was 
some variation in the perception of the Internet’s utility for civic engagement 
between core and non-core group members. Attitudes among the e-group 
ranged from cyber-scepticism to –optimism, with a cautious recognition of 
strengths and weaknesses of networked activism. Some interviewees explained 
that the desire to use the Internet creatively to advance their pet causes were 
inhibited by the lack of time, and financial and human resources. Cycling 
enthusiast Ramesh (personal interview, December 26, 2011) added that keeping 
up with the up-to-the-minute information online was stressful, and required 
energy and resources that his CSO did not possess. Although he recognised the 
benefits of online spaces for civic engagement, such as a website, he was limited 
by the need to manage and update it. Further, using the Internet effectively was 
described as being a great ‘strain’, as it involved keeping up to date with ever-
changing information. He also pointed out that using the Internet was time-




before finding useful information. As information on the Internet was 
characterised by information redundancy and information overload, which 
required time, energy and resources that he or his civil society group did not 
possess, he was sceptical about how to leverage the Internet in a beneficial way.  
However, such limitations were overshadowed by the fact that the Internet 
provided a convenient—and sometimes the only—means for members to 
connect and participate. Vinita, who worked from home, described the Internet 
“an everyday necessity, as necessary as food and water” (female, personal 
interview, December 19, 2011), and refuted the idea that it was an elitist medium. 
Rather, ICTs were described as being part of a new reality, which required one to 
adopt and embrace in order to move ahead professionally. Like Vinita, other e-
group members with positive attitudes to the Internet were either connected to 
ICTs by virtue of their profession and/or intrinsically connected to the Internet in 
their personal lives. Vinita opined that as Indians were rapidly discovering the 
advantages of ICTs, their utilisation had quickly become a pan-India aspect, 
particularly in urban and semi-urban areas. Against this background, the 
proliferation of Internet-based civil society initiatives, such as Hasiru Usiru, was 
also seen as a sign of the Internet’s potential for greater outreach and 
coordination of civic actions.  
Amongst e-group interviewees, such optimism was tempered, to some 
extent, by the knowledge that there were several barriers to effective civil society 
use of the Internet. Interviewees pointed to the limited synergies between e-
groups due to conflicting egos and priorities, the omission of local (vernacular) 
groups from such initiatives, and the lack of political support in translating 
initiatives into actual offline projects. Overall, however, e-group members were 
optimistic, with a strain of scepticism, as they understood the limitations of 
Internet use in the country. The core group’s idea of an exclusionary and elitist 
Internet was refuted for a variety of reasons, notably the increasing Internet 
penetration in the country: 
No, that’s not very accurate, because although that perception is there 
that it [the Internet] is elitist, but still I see a lot of youngsters, lot of 




Internet enabled on it, so the penetration is increasing. So, although it 
was perceived as elitist in the beginning, maybe five years back, today 
that’s going away…And I see a lot of rural initiatives which are really 
helping people; and that’s where it’s going away from the elitist domain 
(Sriram, personal interview, January 9, 2013). 
 
Despite the limitations of the Internet in the Indian context, the interviewee 
was quick to dismiss the suggestion that the Internet was elitist, due to rising 
internet penetration, particularly among youth and via mobile phones, as well as 
the number of rural internet Initiatives. Even interviewees who conceded that the 
Internet did have elitist or exclusionary tendencies, noted that such limitations 
could be overcome by leveraging it strategically. Rahul, a young environmental 
activist, noted that with careful and creative planning, the Internet could be 
leveraged for effective collective action (male, personal interview, December 20, 
2011). With certain “basic precautions”, such as planning protests in accessible 
locations on Sundays, the Internet’s reach and instantaneity could be maximised.  
IT professional Vineet was optimistic about the future of online initiatives in 
Bangalore due to the relatively high concentration of techies in the city (personal 
interview, December 21, 2011). He pointed out that Bangalore’s online space 
was characterised by a large number of initiatives that encompassed a diverse 
range of social issues. These included the environment, theatre, cycling, waste 
management, as well as locality-specific groups and initiatives, which benefitted 
from online networking and information sharing. Other members were similarly 
optimistic about the potential of networked civil society, pointing to the 
mushrooming of online initiatives in the city, which had boosted connectedness 
between like-minded people and groups. What these e-group members were 
pointing out was that the way the Internet was used determined its usefulness or 
otherwise to (civil) society. Rather than focusing on its inherent limitations, they 
were interested in the ways the Internet could be leveraged for more meaningful 
individual and collective actions. Like older media such as television or radio, the 
Internet’s value lay in how it could be leveraged for the greater good. Thus, 
among e-group interviewees, there was recognition of the Internet’s limitations in 




was accompanied by a guarded optimism that such weaknesses could be 
overcome with a more purposeful and innovative Internet use by civic 
organisations.   
Factors Influencing ICT Use/Non-Use by the Core Group  
While the core group was pessimistic about the Internet’s ability to bolster 
democratic engagement, it is important to differentiate these negative attitudes 
from the more extreme reactions towards new technologies, such as Luddism or 
techno-phobia. For instance, some of the core group members were active on 
social media such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as on various e-groups 
related to Hasiru Usiru’s interest areas, such as the environment and urban 
mobility. All of them were also regular users of email in their personal, 
professional and civil society activities. Almost all my coordination for interviews 
was done via email, to which core group members responded promptly and 
positively. Further, the core group was not averse to incorporating new 
technologies to further its research and activities, and had discussed the 
possibility of using SMS for conducting surveys, and GIS mapping to gather data 
on pavements. There was also talk of using ICTs for data gathering and storage, 
as well for physical representation of data in a format amenable to various kinds 
of uses, such as maps, databases, blogs, etc. There was also an 
acknowledgment of the benefits of the network’s Internet base, notably with 
regard to mobilisation, information and guidance, as well as greater publicity of 
its efforts. While the Internet base may not have facilitated collective action to the 
extent envisioned by the core group, it played an important role in enabling small-
scale activities, both planned and spontaneous. The latter was mostly 
reactionary, in response to real-time issues like tree cutting or other actions with 
harmful environmental repercussions, such as the Yediyur Lake dredging case. 
In such circumstances, the Internet was used successfully to provide updates 
and guidance, as well as to aid small-scale and short-term collaborations. 




core group decision-making and strategizing, the reasons for which are 
examined below.   
During the later stages of interviewing, as I became more familiar with the 
case, another aspect of ICT use stood out, viz., the limited creative or strategic 
use of the Internet by the core group. Once interviewees became more 
comfortable and forthright with me, particularly during repeat interviews, I began 
investigating aspects of Internet use by the core group. With greater probing, 
conversations shifted from the limitations of the Internet to the fact that there had 
also been limited effort to utilise it more effectively, particularly after the failures 
of mobilisation attempts. Interviewees also acknowledged that there had been no 
focused discussions about ways to leverage the Internet, despite recognition of 
the need to do so. While all core group members were Internet-savvy, only those 
inclined to access various Internet platforms for Hasiru Usiru’s activities did so. 
For instance, core group member Sheela used email regularly, and had 
Facebook and LinkedIn accounts, yet she told me she was not keen on using the 
Internet for Hasiru Usiru activities. On the other hand, Deepak and Neha actively 
participated in e-group discussions, publicised the group’s activities on Twitter 
and Facebook, and strengthened networks and collaborations online. However, 
the core group as a whole accorded it low priority in planning and strategizing, 
due to the perception of the Internet being an elitist space. Instead, the focus was 
on fostering physical spaces and types of engagement and action. This 
emphasis on the offline stemmed from the core group’s focus on the poor and 
other disadvantaged groups in the city, which had limited or no access to the 
Internet. With core group members conscious of not being exclusionary, activities 
that demanded physical participation and proximity were prioritised over Internet-
based activities.  
Another reason for the limited use of the Internet, was its “taken for 
granted” acceptance by the core group:  
Nowadays, Internet is a given. Again, for a person who is privileged 
enough to be living in Bangalore, a person who’s privileged enough to 
have access to the Internet. I think the people who have the privilege 




mean, it’s just taken for granted…. Yeah, there are a lot of us who 
have access, but just take it for granted, and everything happens on 
email, and everyone has laptops, and BlackBerry phones and IPads, 
so that you’re connected all the time. So yeah, it’s a huge privilege. 
(Anand, telephone interview, January 14, 2013) 
 
The explanation of the Internet as taken for granted reflected its 
assimilation into the daily lives and activities of core group members. Given their 
middle class profiles, the Internet was easily accessible to them via a variety of 
mediums, and its use was accepted without deeper consideration. Additionally, 
the fact that Hasiru Usiru had always been an Internet-based group created a 
situation where the role of the Internet in its activities had not been 
comprehensively considered. Anand explained that as membership in Hasiru 
Usiru had always been equated to membership on the Yahoo group, the Internet 
aspect was just assumed as part of the process:  
And it’s just another aspect of work, and it’s not really a core aspect. 
But yeah, maybe it’s something that we should do, I don’t know? 
Maybe it’s something we should think collectively doing a little deeper 
engagement with. At the least, are we actively utilising the power of the 
Internet correctly or adequately enough, or should we do something 
more? So as far as I can recall, we’ve not really had discussions, in-
depth discussions about the role the Internet has played in Hasiru 
Usiru. It’s just been assumed that we have the Yahoo group, we keep 
sending out email, people respond to emails, and some decisions are 
taken. When we have to give out media releases, we give it out [via the 
Internet], it’s just been like that. (Anand, telephone interview, January 
14, 2013) 
Whereas the Internet had always been part of the network’s activities, it 
was never a core focal aspect, as members had not actually discussed how to 
integrate it effectively in its activities. As Anand explained in the first excerpt, the 
tacit acceptance of the Internet’s role also lay in their positions of privilege, 
wherein it was always available as a tool for engagement. Living in Bangalore is 
also considered a privilege, and is related to the notion of the various 
“information ecologies mediated by technologies” in the ‘IT City’. This was 
another valuable concept put forth by Prabhat (personal communication, June 8, 




suggested that the Internet was subsumed into all daily activities of the city. His 
view was that in the effort to transform Bangalore into an ‘IT City’, all aspects of 
city life—birth, death, education, employment, food, and even recycling trash—
were now intimately connected to information technologies. This often became 
so routinized that the Internet’s role was taken for granted, which in the case of 
Hasiru Usiru was one of the reasons that inhibited its strategic use  
Another reason for the reluctance to strategically engage with the Internet 
has already been discussed earlier, viz., the structural limitations of the network. 
Surman and Reilly (2003) have pointed to the opportunity confronting civil society 
regarding use of the Internet and other emerging network technologies to support 
its quest for social justice and other goals. With access no longer being quite the 
stumbling block it used to be for CSOs in urban centres, they have noted that the 
next—and pressing—step was for organisations to learn how to effectively 
appropriate new technologies. Many CSOs in the global South had “not yet 
dipped their toe into the pool of cultural and organizational change that comes 
when a group molds networked technologies in its own image, making these 
technologies a part of their very fabric and being” (ibid, p. 4). Hasiru Usiru fit this 
description: although there was increasing recognition that the Internet should be 
leveraged in a more productive way, there was no consensus amongst the core 
group regarding how to take this forward. Part of the reason for the lack of 
consensus lay in the structural limitations of the network itself, which compelled a 
small committed group to undertake a multitude of issues simultaneously. Core 
group member Deepak described this in terms of being in a “fire-fighting mode” 
all the time, as the state “continuously engages you in small, small battles” 
(personal interview, June 15, 2011). Under such circumstances, the core group 
had been hard-pressed to discuss issues other than the immediate agenda 
item(s) at hand, which entailed that many of their campaigns and activities were 
reactionary in nature, compelling them to put less immediate concerns, such as 
strategizing Internet use, on the backburner. This, combined with the pessimistic 
attitudes towards the Internet discussed earlier, combined to steer the core 




This section has shown that the interplay of a variety of factors resulted in 
the limited Internet use by the core group. These factors included the structural 
and organisational limitations of the network, the taken-for-granted nature of the 
Internet in the city, and pessimistic attitudes of the Internet’s role as a democratic 
agent. These factors, combined with the pressing requirements of day-to-day 
activism, steered the core group away from frank and constructive discussions of 
how to use the Internet “strategically, politically, creatively” (Surman, 2003, p. 4). 
Another factor that came up repeatedly with reference to Internet use was 
ideology, which is described as a separate section, due to its pervasive influence 
on the core group’s activities and actions, and its attitude towards the Internet. 
Expressions of Ideology  
Ideology, which was the second key category to emerge from the data 
analysis, came up quite unexpectedly during the first interview, and was used by 
a core group member as a key reason for the disconnect with the e-group:  
Lot of people in the Yahoo group are not people who share our 
ideology, there are researchers who are just there to see what’s going 
on, there are people who are just interested to see what’s going on, 
people who want to counter [our ideology]... (Deepak, personal 
interview, June 15, 2011)  
 
This was a new element in my research on the network, as the term had 
not appeared during observation of the e-group discussions. As the centrality of 
ideology to the core group actions became apparent in successive interviews, I 
decided to include it as key category, and conducted follow-up interviews on this 
topic. Based on in-depth interviews with core group members, ‘ideology’ is 
defined as the shared set of objectives and norms, based on a largely left-leaning 
or socialist political thought, which guided members’ activities in the absence of a 
formal mandate. The shared understandings of ideology and its principal 
components are described later in this section.  
Three core group members expressed surprise that the others had used 




discussions in this regard. In the absence of any formally stipulated ideology, 
members worked based on an implicit understanding of this aspect, based on 
their initial association or first impressions of interacting with Hasiru Usiru. Sheela 
(telephone interview, February 16, 2013) noted that the motivation to engage 
with Hasiru Usiru stemmed from a felt affinity with the network’s ideological 
orientation in the first place. Without this sense of larger ideological connect with 
her colleagues, she said, she would not have been able to work within the 
network. With further investigation, it became clear that the consensus regarding 
ideology was also the result of strong personal ties between core group 
members, who were close friends, and had similar philosophical orientations. I 
refer to this connection as an “ideological connect”, as it bound the group 
together. The main components of this ideology are discussed below.  
The inspiration behind the common worldview that the core group referred 
to as its “ideology” was a left-leaning or socialist philosophy that emphasised 
bottom-up democracy, public participation in decision-making, and inclusive 
planning. Another source of inspiration were the ideals enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution, particularly principles relating to social welfare and democratic 
engagement. Broad components of this ideology identified through data analysis 
are: enhancing democracy; the idea of development, including protection of 
urban commons; and the primacy of rights, including the right to peaceful protest. 
As these have already emerged in the course of the case study, and have been 
discussed at length, they are only described briefly here. 
Enhancing Democracy: Hasiru Usiru activities in this regard were focused on 
enabling greater public participation and decision-making of urban citizens. For 
example, the campaign to establish and operationalise ward committees in 
Bangalore was aimed at promoting genuine decentralisation and participation in 
local self-governance. Another aspect of the thrust on democratic engagement 
concerned the marginalised and vulnerable populations in the city, who were 
often referred to as “invisible” due to their exclusion in consultative processes. 
The core group opined that the welfare of these groups was paramount in a 




favoured people with Internet access. Accordingly, one of the central concerns 
related to the creation of more accessible spaces of consultation, whereby all 
stakeholders could be included in democratic processes.  
Inclusive and Sustainable Development: The core group was united in its 
opposition to the current pattern of development in Bangalore, which it felt was 
representative of a type of “uber-capitalist” form that favoured corporates, 
government and other elites at the cost of the common man or the environment. 
In addition, such development did not consider the cost of mammoth projects on 
the environment, ignoring questions of long-term environmental sustainability. 
The core group was critical of the equation of “development” with excessive 
infrastructure building, prioritising physical over social development, and the 
transfer of excessive governance powers to experts and other non-elected 
bodies in the process. An example of the skewed developmental model was the 
emphasis on roads and other transport projects leading to the international 
airport, which contributed to the neglect of bus terminals. This was objected to 
the core group on the grounds that buses were the dominant means of 
transportation for majority of the city’s population. Such “developmental” policies 
were criticised as being geared towards the corporate sector, and in their 
promotion of global or world city imaginations, to the detriment of poorer socio-
economic sections of the city. The core group described one of its priorities as 
challenging such dominant imaginations through an emphasis on the protection 
of the urban commons, both environmental as well as in terms of sustainable 
public transportation.  
Sustainable Public Transport: The emphasis on the protection of the urban 
commons extended from ecological to transportation commons, made evident in 
the prominence accorded to promoting sustainable public transport solutions. 
Here, expressions of ideology centred on the creation of a system that was 
universal, accessible, affordable, and comfortable for all residents of the city, 
regardless of their socio-economic status. Guided by the belief that “access to 
and use of public transport is a basic right”, promoting accessible and equitable 




of Reference for Bus Study, e-group message #13227, March 29, 2011). As 
large sections of commuters dependent on (regular blue) buses were from lower 
socio-economic classes, they were often excluded from policy related 
discussions. Further, as buses formed the backbone of Bangalore’s public 
transport system, Hasiru Usiru’s partnered with CBOs and NGOs working in 
various fields, such as the garment workers union, slum groups, and sexual 
minorities, to incorporate their viewpoints (ibid; interviews).   
Hasiru Usiru also joined the Bangalore Bus Prayaanikara Vedike 
(Bangalore Bus Commuters' Forum) or BBPV that was formed in 2013 in 
response to steep price hikes by the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport 
Corporation (BMTC). Since then, Hasiru Usiru has actively supported BBPV 
campaigns to roll back fare hikes (message #17418, June 27, 2013), campaigns 
against sexual harassment of women in BMTC buses (message #17644, 
September 3, 2013), and the recent “50Paise Campaign” urging a shift from a 
profit-oriented model of public transport to a service-oriented model (message 
#18200, February 17, 2014). The commitment to public transport was also 
deeply ingrained in the thoughts and actions of the core group members, most of 
whom did not own cars and used public transport for their travel needs. In this 
way, public transport emerged as one of the core issues of concern around which 
there was a sense of ideological unity among the core group, due to its 
underlying emphasis on equity and access.  
Primacy of Rights: Anand (telephone interview, January 14, 2013) described 
the group’s ideology as being “rights-based” as opposed to a “charity-based” 
approach, which was considered ideology-neutral. The emphasis on rights and 
equality, such as an equal opportunity to life and livelihood, equal use of urban 
commons, and the right to participate in democratic processes, among others, 
was juxtaposed to welfare. The charity-based approach, he stressed, was 
unsustainable in the long run, due to the incremental benefits of the trickle-down 
approach. The primacy of rights involved the right of citizens to actively 
participate in democratic governance through a variety of channels for 




which was considered a legitimate means of claim-making in a democratic 
system. The significance of protest in making one’s voice heard by the city’s 
decision-makers was explained by an e-group member who had participated in 
several protest-related activities: 
See, the main thing was, what I thought was: see, democracy is not 
just going and voting once in five years, so you have to basically get 
involved. So, I thought the way to make [a] change is [to] get involved, 
through protest. Protest is the main thing, still I believe that’s the main 
thing which will help, which will get our voice heard. (Ajay, personal 
interview, December 26, 2011)   
 
Ajay noted that protest was important in facilitating active participation 
among citizens, beyond the mere democratic formality of voting once in five 
years. Through the aggregation of large numbers of citizens, protest could play 
an important role in making the government listen to the public. This is was a 
critical function in the Indian context, where public opinion was often sidelined, 
until the swell of protests made it difficult for public authorities to ignore. Protest 
was cited by core group and several e-group members as an important means of 
dissent, and appeared as a fundamental component of Hasiru Usiru’s ideology.  
While ideology formed the cornerstone of its activities, core group 
members emphasised that it was an informal or unstated one, for several 
reasons: firstly, as I have already explained, the informal and networked structure 
gave rise to a sense of fluidity and uncertainty regarding the network’s objectives 
and mandate. The diverse and anonymous character of the e-group resulted in 
an inability to claim an overarching ideology, as the core group did not wish to 
exclude members on this basis. Moreover, efforts to forge a common identity and 
universal ideology were defeated by the silence and inactivity of e-group 
members, resulting in a sort of identity crisis for the core group. As the core 
group was reluctant to impose its ideology on others, it kept ideological 
discussions out of the public (i.e. online) realm, and instead emphasised goals 
and principles shared by the Internet community. By keeping its ideology 




There is also the sense that we want to keep it broad; we want to have 
some basic principles in place, [but] we don’t want it to be only such 
and such a person, you know, a feminist, a socialist, or whatever, to 
work with us. We don’t want to limit it like that. (Sheela, telephone 
interview, February 16, 2013)   
 
Sheela explained that whereas the network functioned according to 
certain basic principles and shared concerns, it was conscious of the need to 
downplay ideology in the interests of a remaining an inclusive space for citizen 
engagement. By allowing membership and participation irrespective of 
ideological affiliation the core group wished to distinguish itself from elite 
organisations such as think-tanks, as well as other forms of ‘closed’ civil society, 
such as Hindu nationalists, who propounded exclusive notions of belonging and 
identity. The imperative to remain accessible was particularly important given that 
greater public participation in civic affairs was one of Hasiru Usiru’s key 
mandates.  
A third, and more practical, reason for the lack of emphasis on ideology on 
a day-to-day basis was the limited time and resources at the core group’s 
disposal. As there was a general consensus on ideology, the core group 
preferred to spend its energies on pressing issues, a number of which confronted 
it simultaneously. As they were often resigned to act in a “fire-fighting mode”, 
members did not have the time or inclination to formalise their expressions of 
ideology—although some interviewees did consider that it might be a good idea 
to do so.  
Implications of Ideology: Contestations, Rigidity, and 
(Incompatibilities of) Traditional Methods of Activism  
This section has highlighted the centrality of ideology to the core group’s 
functioning, which, despite its informality, guided its activities in a fundamental 
way. As was expected, there was greater variation among the e-group regarding 
expressions of the network’s ‘ideology’ and its role in its activities. While those 




its ideology, the more peripheral members were either unaware of its influence, 
or believed that there was no ideology at all, and that the group functioned solely 
to save the environment. Yet others were critical of the core group’s socialist 
leanings, arguing that its rigid adherence to ideology was akin to a groupthink 
that was often dismissive of other viewpoints. Interviews revealed that varied 
interpretations among e-group members was indicative of the lack of debate and 
discussion regarding this aspect. When queried about this variance, some core 
group members noted ‘ideology’ was often frowned upon on e-groups in general, 
and that its negative connotations made them wary of using it in their online 
discussions:  
…sometimes on the e-group, as it stands, the word ‘ideology’ is like a 
bad word; [if] you have an ideology, you’re a zealot or something. 
(Sheela, personal interview, December 21, 2011) 
 
As the quote above reveals, one of the negative associations of ‘ideology’ 
was the link to being a zealot or some sort of fanatic, which made some e-
members uncomfortable. In addition, online observation revealed that an overt 
ideological emphasis was frowned upon by some e-members due to the 
association of ideology with politics and political philosophies. As politically 
charged discussions were often time-consuming and emotionally draining, some 
members wished to steer clear of these types of discussions altogether and 
focus their energies on collective actions. Sheela similarly explained that a 
section of the e-group preferred to focus on actions rather than their underlying 
ideological motivations that the core group emphasised. Such differences in 
viewpoints were inevitable in light of the diverse composition of the network, and 
necessitated a consensus regarding action items. In doing so, the core group 
was often compelled to downplay its ideological considerations while keeping in 
mind the larger objective of getting the work done. Echoing similar sentiments, 
core group member Anand pointed out that ideology was “obviously, a bit of a 
taboo on all the Internet groups, on the Yahoo group” (telephone interview, 
January 14, 2013), suggesting some sort of incompatibility between Internet 




civil society actors revealed that when adherence to ideological principles was 
taken to the extreme, overshadowing other considerations, it was deemed 
impractical and made people uncomfortable. It was for these reasons that the 
core group largely focused on doable action items rather than ideology per se, 
which accounted for the absence of ideology-related discussions on the e-group 
during the period of online observation.  
However, while the emphasis on ideology was downplayed in the interests 
of enhancing collective action efforts, it did not contribute to greater cohesion on 
the mailing list. This was, in part, due to the ideological “clashes” arising from the 
heterogeneous nature of the network, which produced tensions on the e-group, 
and had serious ramifications on collective action and collective identity. The 
open nature of the network often contributed to the airing of, and debate over, 
opposing ideologies. Online observation corroborated interviewees’ remarks 
about the existence of competing ideologies on the e-group. Two issues that 
regularly cropped up and evoked impassioned debates were that of privatisation 
and the role of ‘elites’ in decision-making. The core group and its supporters 
adhered to their anti-privatisation and anti-elitist views, while other members 
offered contrasting viewpoints. In interviews, the core group emphasised the 
importance of allowing dissenting viewpoints, despite the costs in terms of 
ideological unity and collective action. An e-group member closely associated 
with the core group told me that while expressing contrarian viewpoints per se 
was not discouraged, such ideas needed to be backed by facts in order to be 
considered acceptable. The core group stressed that debates arising from 
conflicting opinions were also useful in understanding different viewpoints, which 
could help them to hone their own arguments better: 
I think in terms of the bigger group, there are some really vocal 
opposers of what all we do. Personally I’m not against it because it 
gives you the sense that there is this point of view as well, and it also 
gives you an idea of, these are the things we need to be prepared for, 
we need to have our facts, arguments right so that these kinds of 
questions and doubts can be answered. So I’m not very against those 
kinds of things. Yeah, probably the tone or the boorish nature of some 
of the arguments can be irritating, but that is a very temporary thing. 





Venkat pointed to the value of having access to opposing viewpoints on 
the e-group, particularly in terms of expanding the core group’s knowledge on 
issues of concern, and helping them prepare informed counter-arguments. He 
added that it was not the ideological positions that caused friction online; rather, 
the tone, behaviour and etiquette involved in disagreements was the sticking 
point. Core group members insisted that the Yahoo group provided a valuable 
space for debate and expression of ideologically diverse viewpoints. However, 
several e-group members, both in interviews and on the mailing list archives, did 
not share this opinion—exposing divergent interpretations of such conflicts. 
Some e-group interviewees pointed to the intransigence among the core group 
regarding its ideological positions, as well as scepticism concerning new ideas, 
which left them feeling isolated. Observation of mailing list discussions also 
revealed a tendency rebuke ideas not entirely congruent with the core group’s 
ideology. The resultant online friction would be heightened when emotions and 
sentiment came into play, including the battle of egos associated with authors’ 
ideological positions.  
However, core group members were not aware of their propensity to insist 
on a certain viewpoint, nor did they recognise the level of disaffection that such 
actions caused. Instead, they believed that the e-group allowed for “healthy 
discussion”, without them having to “trumpet over certain other set of people" 
(Anand, telephone interview, January 14, 2013). However, the occurrence of 
tension became apparent when some members surfaced to express their 
reservations about conflicting ideologies affecting the network’s common goals: 
Off late, I’m getting the feeling that there’s room only for one “kind” of 
person on this list. The reason that I joined this group was to see if I 
can do anything to save Bangalore’s greenery. However, I now get the 
feeling that if I’m basically not a “left-leaning” intellectual, I’m basically 
persona non grata on this list. Sad.  
I find it very silly that we let our ideologies get in the way when what is 
needed are essentially practical solutions. This is given fact that I 






In the excerpt, the e-member discussed feeling alienated if s/he didn’t 
adhere to certain criteria that seemed to outweigh others on the list, viz., being “a 
‘left-leaning’ intellectual”. The emphasis on ideology at the cost of practical 
solutions was deemed pointless, as it tended to isolate, rather than unite, diverse 
components of the network. By privileging one type of viewpoint, it was pointed 
out that the network stood to lose choosing ideological considerations over the 
common objective of saving Bangalore’s greenery. This limitation was discussed 
in terms of a rigid adherence to ideology, which had both positive and negative 
repercussions.  
Core group member Shalini (personal interview, December 23, 2011) 
explained that its ideology had become more complex over the years, moving 
from a sole focus on street trees to issues of participatory democracy and urban 
governance. It had also become more “rigid”, which she explained in terms of the 
core group’s increased insistence on participatory planning and consultation prior 
to announcing government projects and proposals. A crucial way in which 
ideology influenced the core group was in its relationship with other civil society 
groups:  
I don’t remember having had a discussion to specifically discuss “what 
is our ideology?” But we have had discussions on who are the kinds of 
other groups we want to work with, why don’t we want to work with this 
person, why do we want to work with this person? And there, issues of 
ideology have been discussed, although we may not have used that 
word. (Sheela, personal interview, December 21, 2011) 
 
Sheela noted that the core group had never formally discussed its 
ideology, but operated within an informal understanding of it, which influenced 
decisions about which civil society groups to engage with (or not). For instance, 
the refusal to engage deeply with Praja stemmed from perceived contrasting 
worldviews, and well as objections of its heavy reliance on the Internet. Hasiru 
Usiru members appreciated Praja’s role as a repository of useful information and 
the presence of qualified members, who provided useful technical information via 




as lacking an emphasis on inclusivity, and noted a tendency to disregard local 
level governance processes. Moreover, attitudes towards the Internet as an 
exclusionary and limited domain extended to a similar perception of Praja as an 
elitist organisation.  
Such ideological incompatibilities were acknowledged by e-group 
members familiar with the core group, and confirmed by some Praja members, 
who highlighted the difficulties of collaborating with Hasiru Usiru. Some e-group 
interviewees pointed out that the rigid stance on issues, coupled with an 
“aggressive” style of activism, tended to dissuade individuals and groups from 
working with Hasiru Usiru. This included other civil society groups as well as the 
network’s own e-group members, for whom the emphasis on protests, instead of 
collaborative efforts with the government, proved to be a bone of contention: 
Actually, I was a very integral part of Hasiru Usiru, when we were 
protesting against a lot of government policies. But at the end of the 
day after I went home, there was no real solution, so it’s everybody 
complaining and cribbing. So it takes away your energy. So we said 
lets work on solutions rather than cribbing...So we [the CSO he is part 
of] don’t enter into conflict with any other power centres. Because only 
another power centre can challenge another power centre. Because 
we are powerless, we cannot challenge any other power centre. So the 
better thing is transform that power and make them understand. 
(Ramesh, personal interview, December 26, 2011) 
 
The interviewee noted that he was actively involved in Hasiru Usiru’s 
activities around the time of the anti-Metro protests, which generated much 
enthusiasm and support. However, when protests did not yield workable 
solutions, he broke away from the network’s activities, and focused on working 
with the government, rather than against it. His experiences pointed to the limited 
utility of protest and confrontational activism as a method of claim-making in the 
city. Whereas even critics readily conceded to the benefits of this style of 
activism, such as the pressure it placed on local authorities to act, locking horns 
with “power centres” with no real solution in sight was deemed counter-
productive. Instead, Ramesh channelled his energy into a CSO that collaborated 




system of engaging with, rather than challenging, the government was a 
fundamental schism between his and Hasiru Usiru’s style of activism.  
Other e-group members expressed admiration for the core group’s 
methods, but also acknowledged that they were difficult to emulate: 
I tried being active, I went for their protests, but what I noticed was, you 
need to be very persistent; you need to keep going to a lot of court 
hearing[s]. That method, their methods are very oriented by … what do 
you say, going to the court, following up with the court, lodging a PIL 
[Public Interest Litigation]. They have saved a lot of lakes that way. I 
am totally uneducated in these matters; I have never been to the court, 
not even once. So, what I realised was, I am not as effective with the 
group, I am not good enough for this route, where you go for 
protests… (Vineet, personal interview, December 21, 2011) 
 
E-group member Vineet noted that he had tried to keep up with Hasiru 
Usiru’s activities, but that they were unsuitable for him in the long term. As the 
network’s activities involved more traditional styles of activism, such as street 
protests and court litigations, peripheral members struggled to keep up with the 
demands of such activities. In particular, as he was an IT professional, he could 
not take leave from work to attend protests and court hearings on a regular basis. 
The long and arduous nature of activism often put off well meaning individuals 
like him, for whom Hasiru Usiru’s modes of engagement were often unsuitable. 
Not only could part-time civic actors not participate as it interfered with their 
professional commitments, Hasiru Usiru activities could not tap into their existing 
skills due to the focus on a more traditional civil society style of activism. This 
was a mismatch for the contemporary breed of civic actors, who had newer skills 
to contribute, such as ideas from around the world, IT expertise, and social 
contacts, which older activism forms could not or did not use adequately. While 
the network’s methods were incompatible with his way of working, Vineet was 
keen to continue to association with Hasiru Usiru, which he described as 
comprising knowledgeable and dedicated members. Like Ramesh, this dilemma 
was resolved by reducing his physical interactions with the group, while 
remaining active on the e-group—which enabled him to work on green issues of 




E-group member Rahul (personal interview, December 20, 2011) pointed 
out that Hasiru Usiru’s methods differed substantially from other environmental 
groups that he had worked with. Several groups viewed Hasiru Usiru as 
confrontationist, whose provocation of government officials was seen as 
detrimental to the larger cause. Another aspect that deterred him from 
participating actively was that differing opinions were not always respected, and 
that these often became shouting matches due to recalcitrant positions taken by 
members. The opinion that personal differences and ideological differences 
smothered good initiatives and dissuaded members from participating was 
intermittently mentioned on the e-group as well: 
Alas, the kind of infighting that I see on this group is one of the main 
reasons I have withdrawn from any active participation in Hasiru Usiru, 
and why I feel that nothing will get done. While we argue and scrap 
amongst ourselves, our appointed representatives exploit our 
weakness and go ahead with their agenda. 
I've wanted to say this for a long time, but desisted because every 
person on this group is deeply dedicated to the cause. But unless we 
have some unity of thought...the best of intentions can never be 
translated into any meaningful action. We will keep winning small 
skirmishes, and losing the wars. (#15502, March 21, 2012) 
 
The post pointed to the fact that infighting had forced members to 
withdraw from active participation on the mailing list, and if personal differences 
could not be left aside, it inhibited collective action. A quick look at the archives 
attested to the existence of such tensions since the groups’ inception, with 
periods of intense tension and discord, followed by a lull, until the next set of 
conflicts. This often boiled down to ego clashes among members, especially 
senior activists, some of whom were disinclined to back down or make 
concessions towards a meaningful debate. These ego clashes scared off 
peripheral members, who were disinclined to engage closely with Hasiru Usiru.  
E-group members overcame the incompatibility with Hasiru Usiru’s 
ideology and methods of activism, to some extent, by reducing physical 
participation and connecting to the network largely via the e-group. Some 




confined by any groupthink. Others referred to the advantages of remaining 
connected to the mailing list, such as using the information and knowledge 
generated in the online space to inform their own (related) activities and vice-
versa. All e-group interviewees, with the exception of one member, were also 
members of other email groups related to Hasiru Usiru’s interest areas, such as 
the environment, social movements, participatory democracy, etc. This enabled 
exchange of information and views across groups with similar interests, as well 
as bolstered possibilities of collaborative actions. In this regard, an e-group 
member noted that creating linkages between Hasiru Usiru and related civil 
society e-groups was important, as it could promote greater networking among 
citizens interested in city affairs. Being part of several groups was also cited as 
crucial to gaining exposure to various perspectives, and enhancing knowledge of 
civic issues.  
However, despite this inter-connectedness, interviewees noted that it was 
often difficult to convince other e-groups to collaborate with Hasiru Usiru due to 
perceptions of its activist style and ideological focus. In addition, issues such as 
lack of time, rules regarding cross-postings, and ego tussles constrained 
networking possibilities. While ideology emerged as a key factor limiting 
networking opportunities among civil society groups, some e-group members 
noted that the fault did not lie entirely with Hasiru Usiru.:  
But there are strong fanatics even in that [biking] group. So, biking 
group also discusses [road widening] because the road affects them, 
right, and they are totally ok with road widening. So it’s difficult to get 
even their mentality changed or think about it in the right way. So I 
know the challenges, I know both sides of [the situation]. I know why it 
is difficult for Hasiru Usiru to be less aggressive. Because it gets 
frustrating when somebody says, “my car doesn’t have space to go on 
the road”. So you don’t feel like talking to those people, you get very 
aggressive and annoyed. (Vineet, personal interview, December 21, 
2011) 
 
E-group member Vineet suggested that all e-groups had their share of 
moderates and “fanatics”, which sometimes constrained meaningful interaction 




of its members had staunchly believed that road widening was in their best 
interests. It had taken a great deal of time and effort before they could be 
persuaded to see the core group’s point of view, which reflected their intransigent 
position as well. Being part of both groups, Vineet said he understood why Hasiru 
Usiru came across as aggressive, as it was frustrating for members to deal with 
individuals and groups that refused to consider alternative viewpoints.   
Despite the limitations of the core group’s ideological rigidity, interviewees 
noted that it was often necessary, particularly in the context of unwavering 
opposition to its objectives, by both public and private individuals and entities. 
For instance, in the early days of its activism, Hasiru Usiru was often described 
as ‘anti-development’ by its detractors, due to its ‘extreme’ views on saving trees 
at the cost of ‘development’ projects. Core group members dismissed such 
allegations, with some pointing out that historically, movements in India that 
attempted to involve the poor and vulnerable sections of the population in the 
decision-making processes of large projects were often labelled this way. The 
core group took inspiration from large-scale people’s movements, such as the 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (the social movement against the Sardar Sarovar 
Dam being built across the Narmada River in Gujarat state) and the anti-POSCO 
struggle (the struggle against the South Korean steel corporation in Orissa state) 
that critics decried as ‘anti-development’. These social movements motivated 
Hasiru Usiru members in their objectives of inclusionary and environmentally 
conscious development in Bangalore. The core group’s passion and conviction 
was appreciated by e-group members, even those who did not necessarily agree 
with its methods or ideology:  
One thing I find is that there is lot of consistency in their approach. 
Although people may say that they are anti-development or the guys 
who are jholawallahs71, but I think that’s not necessarily true. I have 
                                                             
71According to the BRF Dictionary, a jholawala is a hippie communist. The term 
comes from two Hindi words, "jhola" which is the Hindi word for a particular type of sling 
bag and "wala" which is the Hindi word for "person". Therefore, the term actually means 
"Sling bag (bearing) person". Typical hippie communists in India are often seen with a 
sling bag on one shoulder, often consider themselves as "intellectuals", and are often 
associated with Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Delhi. For a tongue-in-cheek look at 




met a lot of them personally, they are not left-wing or Marxist or 
anything like that. They are normal people, who have some rigid ideas, 
so they think that we have to build the city around those concepts... 
(Sriram, personal interview, January 7, 2012) 
 
Supporters such as Sriram, who had worked with the core group closely in 
the past, noted that labels that were used to describe Hasiru Usiru were not 
always accurate. He described Hasiru Usiru as “consistent”, as the group had 
crystallised its ideas and approach, and conducted its activities based on these 
convictions. This had paid off to some extent, as some of the network’s ideas, 
such as opposition to blanket tree felling for road-widening, had gained 
acceptance among other civil society groups. Interviewees pointed to the 
network’s role in changing the discourse regarding the city’s development, and 
gradually bringing concepts that were once considered extreme into the 
mainstream. For example, ideas such as congestion fees in the central business 
district (CBD), bus prioritisation, greater consideration for trees and the 
environment while planning infrastructure projects, and space for pedestrians 
were increasingly being accepted and incorporated by city planners and 
residents. In such circumstances, with Hasiru Usiru’s ideas gaining greater 
traction in the city, its discourse could no longer be considered entirely “radical” 
or “extremist”. 
Conclusion  
The case study has shown that Internet use by civil society is hardly 
straightforward or simple, revealing a complex interplay of factors underlying an 
organisation’s decision on how (and how much) to leverage new technologies for 
civil society activity. In the case of Hasiru Usiru, the core group members viewed 
the Internet and its democratic potential with a pessimistic lens. This negative 
attitude towards the Internet was described in terms of three main themes, viz., 
the Internet as exclusionary, the Internet as amplifier, and the Internet as a realm 
of ideas, but not action. This negative attitude towards the Internet was both due 




offline community vis-à-vis online actions. In attempting to overcome the 
network’s Internet dependence, however, there had been little or no effort to 
utilise the Internet in a more strategic and creative manner. The limited 
consideration of how to integrate the Internet into its daily activities stemmed 
from the structural weaknesses of the network, including the inability to broad 
base its offline membership, limited volunteers and financial resources, and the 
‘fire-fighting’ nature of its activities. Another explanation for the limited utilisation 
of the Internet was its taken-for-granted nature in the city, wherein the “privilege” 
of Internet access inhibited its strategic use. To sum up, the pessimistic attitude 
towards the Internet as a tool for democratic engagement, combined with the 
other factors steered the core group away from using the Internet strategically, 
politically, or creatively.  
This case study has shown that access to ICTs does not automatically 
translate into a willingness or ability to engage deeply with new technologies by 
civil society. Hence, even within the context of a technologising city, where 
everyday life is pervaded by new media use, middle class and tech-savvy actors 
have refused to fully leverage the potential of the Internet. The rejection or 
refusal of the Internet by civil society actors, based on sceptical and pessimistic 
perceptions of the medium, challenges earlier assumptions of the civil society-
Internet relationship, and has implications for future studies of civil society in an 
information age. The significance of these findings and implications for theory 













CHAPTER 6: PRAJA–A CASE STUDY 
Introduction: History and Evolution of Praja 
Praja.in (henceforth known as Praja) is a citizen collaboration website 
created in 2007 to enable citizen participation, and the non-profit organisation 
(NPO) that operates around it (see image 4.1 in Appendix G).72 Praja, which 
means “citizen” or “political subject” in Sanskrit, was designed to be a bridge 
between democratic leaders/appointed administrators and citizens who knew and 
cared enough to participate in city-level issues (ibid). The platform, which is a 
blog-based discussion board, encourages a collaborative approach towards 
discussion and problem solving (Praja, 2009a). Based on the core theme of 
“know, care, participate”, Praja’s founders aimed to use the Internet to overcome 
the limitations of, and create an alternative to, traditional forms of citizen activism 
(Praja, 2008). To do this, weaknesses of traditional or old civil society that 
deterred citizens, particularly the youth, from participating in civic affairs were first 
identified, and Internet-based solutions proposed to overcome them. Analysis of 
interview data revealed that the following were deemed the main weaknesses of 
civil society, viz., the tendency to focus on narrow interests or causes, closed 
door lobbying, the personality-driven nature of the sector, and the perception that 
such activities were time consuming. By using the Internet to facilitate 
collaboration among activist citizens on local civic participatory projects, the 
platform was seen as a way to overcome some of the constraints of traditional 
civil society activity, particularly regarding citizen-government engagement, and 
to involve more citizens in matters of local governance (Praja, 2009a, b).  
Praja was originally conceived of as a purely Internet-based platform for 
members to discuss issues of mutual interest and to address civic problems 
(interviews). The site was co-founded by three IT professionals, who were keen 
to use their technical expertise to make civic engagement easier for citizens. The 
platform was—and continues to be—highly analytical in nature, with emphasis on 
the quality of content and data-driven interactions, achieved, in part, through 
                                                             




strict moderation for language and tone of discussions (interviews; observation of 
online discussions; Praja, 2009c). For instance, Praja’s posting guidelines for 
comments state: “No foul language, hate mongering or personal attacks. If 
criticizing third person or an authority, you must be fact based, as constructive 
as possible, and use gentle words. Avoid going off-topic no matter how nice your 
comment is. Moderators reserve the right to either edit or simply delete 
comments that don't meet these guidelines. If you are nice enough to realize you 
violated the guidelines, please save Moderators some time by editing and fixing 
yourself. Thanks!” (emphasis in original)73.  
Moving Beyond the Internet 
By 2009, there was a growing recognition of the need to move beyond the 
Internet and focus on translating online discussion into action (interviews; Praja, 
2009c). Towards this end, prominent users came together to “help evolve the 
website into a community” (Praja, 2010). As the platform gained more traction, 
these members took discussions further and collaborated to create and run 
projects or events (Praja, 2009b). Before a project—— roughly defined as 
“anything that goes beyond just discussions”—could be undertaken, it had to be 
based on discussions and a general consensus among the Praja Internet 
community (interviews; Praja, 2009c). A project that successfully moved Praja 
from the online to the offline domain was ‘BMTC Engagements-2009’, which 
aimed to facilitate interaction and engagement with the BMTC (Bangalore 
Metropolitan Transport Corporation), in order to understand its operations, and to 
relay citizen feedback (BMTC Engagements-2009 group page)74. The project, 
which opened on the site on May 1, 2009, allowed interested members to 
brainstorm, virtually and face-to-face, and plan activities to track BMTC’s 
initiatives, initiated regular interaction with BMTC officials, and provided a 
channel for constructive feedback to improve the transport corporation’s services 
(ibid). When the project was officially closed by the site’s admin on April 5, 2010, 
it was deemed a “landmark” project, having culminated in the much-publicised 






Mobilicity and Bus Day initiatives, the significance of which is described in the 
section on ‘Projects’. Planned as an ‘unconference’, Mobilicity initiated dialogues 
between citizens, city planners and administrators on sustainable transportation 
solutions for Bangalore, including Praja’s Bus Day proposal to the BMTC 
(interviews; ibid). Mobilicity developed into an almost annual event, and the Bus 
Day concept, under the aegis of BMTC became a monthly event in Bangalore, 
and has been replicated in other cities. Both events have come to symbolise 
Praja’s effort to move beyond the Internet and successfully engage with 
stakeholders on the ground.  
The Praja Society 
As the Mobilicity and Bus Day projects raised Praja’s profile among the 
public and media, members began to consider how to capitalise on this greater 
awareness (Praja, 2009c). Broadly, two main action areas were identified in this 
regard: (i) enhancing the website: by making it more user-friendly, organising 
discussions and information better, and presenting richer information in a less 
complex manner, and (ii) strengthening offline presence: through connections 
and partnerships with NGOs and other civil society groups, administrators, 
politicians, and academia. By early 2010, Praja’s key actors began to realise that 
the technology aspect, while still the defining feature of the initiative, would not 
be enough to create a cadre of civic issue enthusiasts (Praja, 2010a, 2010b). 
They decided to focus, instead, on undertaking a few projects, rather than on the 
platform per se, as projects were deemed to be “better retainers, have more 
loyalty value, and generate quality content on the website” (Praja, 2010a, p. 5; 
2010b). In other words, the new focus on projects arose from the realisation that 
offline activities would generate greater activity and commitment among 
members, which in turn, would produce greater quality content on the site. Post-
Mobilicity, the need for an advocacy group was felt, to complete the Praja 
“ecosystem”. Towards this end a society75 was created to build credentials via 
lobbying in the areas of urban civic issues, projects and campaigns (interviews; 
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Praja, 2010c, d). The “Praja Society”, which comprised 20 people from the 
website, was the “do-er” entity, which picked and promoted certain causes from 
the website, and was tasked with engaging with public authorities to bring 
projects to fruition. By the end of 2010, while the Society had evolved to function 
according to unique self-governing rules and an operating structure, it remained 
unregistered (interviews; Praja, 2010d). A key member highlighted that after 
several unsuccessful attempts at creating a formal structure, they decided to 
function as an informal group operating as per clearly stipulated formal rules.  
Advocacy by RAAG 
In October 2011, the Praja Society was re-named Praja RAAG (Research, 
Analysis and Advocacy Group), and the group undertook advocacy projects in 
the areas of public transportation, such as rail, bus, and cycling (interviews; Praja 
2011)76. A clear distinction was made between the Internet platform and the 
advocacy group, with their separate roles described in relation to a “funnel” (see 
image 4.2 in Appendix G):  
And this is how we see the full system to be; this is our Praja 
ecosystem. This is the picture that everybody connects with. It’s like 
the website is a funnel, and we, which is now RAAG, pick things from 
the funnel—whatever we like—and take projects forward. And we have 
partners, like CiSTUP, so [we] get on board partners, because we 
ourselves will not be able to do everything, and we prepare proposals. 
So this is one picture which defines us well. (Yogesh, male, 30s, 
RAAG. Personal interview, December 16, 2011). 
 
The funnel represented an open and virtual community to connect, 
communicate and collaborate, viz., the website, which was anchored around an 
advocacy group to evolve constructive proposals and undertake advocacy 
projects, viz., RAAG (interviews; Praja, 2010e, 2012). Within the Praja 
ecosystem, therefore, the website, website users, and RAAG members were 
envisioned as interacting and engaging with one another to further “analysis 
                                                             
76 Praja was officially registered as a society under the ambit of the Karnataka 
Societies Registration Act of 1960 on April 2, 2013 (Yogesh, personal communication, 




based advocacy for urban local causes” (Praja, 2012). One of the most notable 
projects undertaken by the Society/RAAG has been Namma Railu, the commuter 
rail project that is inching towards completion (interviews; blog posts; Francis, 
2012; Murthy, personal communication, January 9, 2014).  
Key Projects  
At the time of writing, although discussions on the site spanned a vast 
range of topics on urban issues in Bangalore and Karnataka, most active projects 
on the ground were related to transportation and mobility77. Key projects 
mentioned by interviewees were Mobilicity, Bus Day and Namma Railu, which 
are described briefly below: 
Mobilicity: Praja’s maiden project was the first edition of Mobilicity 
organised in collaboration with the Center for infrastructure, Sustainable 
Transport and Urban Planning (CiSTUP), of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), 
Bangalore, in November 2009 (interviews; Mobilicity 2009 group page).78 
Envisioned as a sustainable transportation ‘unconference’, Praja volunteers 
worked with CiSTUP to organise solution-focused workshops on public 
transportation. Designed in a loosely structured and people-driven format, the 
workshops covered a gamut of urban transportation issues, including 
crowdsourcing geo-data for public transportation information, urban planning, 
multimodal transportation, and road design standards, among others. Through its 
unconference format, urban planners, decision-makers, academia, civil society 
actors, and interested citizens were brought together to discuss urban mobility 
issues of relevance to them.  
Bus Day: One of the key tangible outcomes of Mobilicity 2009 was the 
idea of ‘Bus Day’ that was seeded during the event, and taken forward with the 
active support of public transport enthusiasts, including Praja members (Praja 
                                                             
77 As of January 10, 2014 As of January 10, 2014 non-transport related discussions 
included saving lakes, improving the condition of footpaths in the city, use of solar 
energy, town planning,  and active projects included The Cycle Day campaign, 
Intermodal Bicycle Connectivity, Support for Pedestrian Safety, and Disciplined Driver’s 






Bus Day home page).79 These volunteers helped the BMTC to conceptualise, 
plan and market a Bus Day event with the objective of encouraging more people 
to take the bus for their daily commute, instead of private vehicles. Since the first 
Bus Day in February 2010, the BMTC has observed Bus Day on the fourth day of 
every month, and the concept has been embraced by other organisations in the 
city (Praja.in, 2011). Encouraged by these results and the generally positive 
response to the event, Mobilicity has become a more or less regular affair, 
organised in conjunction with CiSTUP and the Department of Urban Land 
Transport (DULT).  
Namma Railu (Commuter Rail Service): Another successful project was 
the Namma railu (meaning “our railway” in Kannada) or the Bengaluru Commuter 
Rail Service (CRS), the local train service proposed by Praja as a solution to the 
shortage of viable public transportation options in the city (Namma Railu project 
page) 80.  Also referred to as the 'suburban' train service, the CRS idea was 
launched during Mobilicity 2010, with a proposal to run the local train service on 
existing railway lines, passing through city centres and connecting suburbs and 
towns around Bangalore. Spearheaded by RAAG, and with the support of the 
DULT, the advocacy efforts resulted in a feasibility study undertaken by 
consultancy organisation RITES.81 In June 2012, RITES submitted a draft report 
on the feasibility of the project to DULT, making a strong case for CRS, noting 
that it was essential for Bangalore's growing needs 
(http://praja.in/en/gyan/summary-june-212-rites-draft-report-crs).  On July 5, 
2013, with sustained lobbying, the project got primary approval from the 
Karnataka government (Malusare, 2013; Ramani, 2013), which asked the Central 
                                                             
79 http://praja.in/en/busday 
80 http://praja.in/en/nammarailu 
81 RITES Ltd., a Government of India Enterprise is a multi-disciplinary consultancy 





railway ministry to approve the CRS and to be an active partner in the newly-
created Bangalore Suburban Railway Company Ltd. (Sastry A. , 2013 ).82  
Other important projects seeded during subsequent editions of Mobilicity 
include non-motorised transport (NMT) advocacy, including cycling, and the bus 
priority system to speed up public buses (interviews; Mobilicity 2013 Brief). While 
Mobilicity has changed in format over the years, moving from the original 
unconference/bar camp format to a single round table-type event, the focus of 
the project has remained the same, viz., to propose solutions for sustainable 
development in Bangalore (ibid; blog discussions). 
Active projects include a pilot bus priority system, a program to enable city 
residents to use bicycles for last mile and intermodal connectivity, and a proposal 
to restrain traffic growth through parking/congestion charges in the CBD area, to 
name a few (Praja RAAG home page).83 While the focus has been city-wide 
solutions for sustainable growth, RAAG has also participated in smaller-scale 
activities, like proposing solutions to ease the traffic congestion around Mantri 
Mall in Malleswaram neighbourhood84, and reviewing designs by Tender SURE, 
an initiative that is about “getting the urban road right” (Tender SURE webpage)85 
(Murthy, personal communication, January 9, 2014).  
Partnerships and Awards  
A key factor that enabled Praja to sustain, scale up and expand its 
activities over the years was the emphasis on building partnerships and 
collaborations (interviews). Key members expounded the significance of building 
and maintaining partnerships to expand their area of operations, as well as to 
gain greater credibility and acceptance by civil society and government actors. 
                                                             
82 At the time of writing (January 2014), the progress made on the project had slowed 
down due to a lack of coordination among the various government agencies, which 
prompted the city's Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs) to submit a petition to the union railways ministry urging it to prioritize the project 
(Ray, 2014; Upadhye, 2014 ) 
83 A list of projects initiated by Praja RAAG is available at 
http://praja.in/en/groups/praja-raag 
84 See the Traffic Study @ Mantri Square Mall, Malleshwaram by CiSTUP (2011) 
85 TENDER S.U.R.E (http://www.janausp.org/tendersure.php) is an initiative of the 




Therefore, partnerships with academic institutions, citizens’ groups, Internet-
based civic actors, and the government became an essential part of the Praja 
ecosystem, enabling it to build on the resources of these partners, and vice-
versa. In particular, the association with CiSTUP, which began with the first 
Mobilicity event in 2009, was described positively in terms of shoring up Praja’s 
credentials, and distinguishing it from other civil society actors that may not be as 
data-driven in their arguments. The proposed alliance was thought to benefit both 
partners: while Praja would benefit from CiSTUP’s technical expertise and strong 
academic reputation, the institute would gain from greater creative inputs, 
networks and publicity. This tie-up with CiSTUP gradually developed into a long-
term relationship, with collaborations on a variety of projects, including academic 
reports and the annual Mobilicity event. As and when necessary, Praja also 
collaborated with other academic/research institutions to vet or ratify its reports, 
among other activities. Interviewees emphasised that these affiliations lent 
greater credibility to their actions, and were useful in expediting the acceptance 
of proposals by the government. As strategic partnerships were crucial in 
positioning Praja as a serious civil society actor, key actors undertook serious 
efforts to enhance partnerships with government, civil society, new media-based 
initiatives, and technical/research institutions.  
While trying to accrue more partners, Praja’s prominence continued to 
increase in the public sphere, culminating in several awards over the years. In 
2010, Praja won the best social media initiative of the year award by eGov 
Magazine (Egov, 2010; idontspam, 2010). In 2011, Praja received special 
recognition from Volvo at the Volvo Sustainable Mobility Award 2011 
(Doraiswami, 2011; silkboard, 2011), and in 2012, Praja’s Namma Railu project 
was declared runner up for the same award (kbsyed61, 2012; Volvo Buses, 
2012). These awards boosted Praja’s image in the local and national media, 
highlighted its activities in the mainstream and alternative media, increased 
members’ morale and sense of accomplishment, and placed Praja as a serious 




Participants and Motivations   
The ten Praja members I interviewed were all males, ranging in age from 
26 to 65+ years, and shared the common characteristics of belonging to the 
middle class and being actively involved in civic affairs. Of these, eight had an 
educational and occupational profile associated with either some branch of 
engineering, computer science, and/or software. The six RAAG members, who 
varied in age from 35-55+ years, were actively involved in on-the-ground projects 
and played a steering role in the organisation’s activities. They were also 
considered “stakeholders”, having contributed monetarily towards maintaining a 
common account in case the need for funds arose (although this resource pool 
had never been utilised). The four website members varied in age from 26 to 60 
years old. These interviewees were more than just bloggers on the site; three 
members were also involved with Praja’s offline projects and activities, whereas 
the fourth member had been intimately associated with its activities during the 
platform’s early days. Hence, they were able to speak with authority on issues 
relating to both the online and offline spheres of activity, while at the same time 
speaking with a measure of objectivity, due to their position outside the “inner 
circle” of RAAG membership.  
Two civil society actors (one male and one female) interviewed were 
senior members of a well-known NPO, which served as an umbrella group for 
some of the city’s RWAs. Both were prominent activists and had collaborated 
with Praja on a few projects, with activities mostly conducted offline. I was 
directed to these actors as my main RAAG collaborators were keen to 
understand the reluctance of these traditional or old civil society actors to 
participate on the Praja platform. Some RAAG members were worried about the 
lack of success in getting the NPO to use the site, as it impeded their efforts to 
synergise online and offline engagement. Discussions with these interviewees, 
therefore, focused primarily on the reasons for the lack of collaboration, which 
included an investigation on attitudes towards and use of the Internet for civic 




The RAAG collaborators were also keen to know how their associates in 
government viewed them, and put me in touch with interviewed three senior 
government officials (one female and two males) who had interacted with Praja. 
The officials were in their thirties to late forties, and were generally considered to 
be open to engaging with citizens, reform-oriented, proactive and responsive 
(interviews). Two officials were senior members of the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS), the highest cadre of civil service in the country, and one was a 
senior member of the Indian Police Service (IPS), another All India Service of the 
federal government. Despite their busy schedules, they consented to meet me, 
and were forthcoming about their experiences of interacting with Praja, 
highlighting both the benefits and limitations of Praja’s civic engagement 
activities. In the interests of interviewee confidentiality, I have removed identifying 
information as and when necessary when presenting findings or results.  
Participants were asked about how they came to be involved with Praja, 
and what the motivations were for their continued engagement. Given the 
diversity of membership, there were a variety of motivations for joining or 
engaging with Praja, which are briefly described below:  
For those members who already had a history of civic engagement and 
were open to adopting new technologies, the Praja platform provided an 
additional medium. It also introduced a new style of engagement, which aimed to 
overcome some of the limitations of old civil society activism, which enthused 
and encouraged members. A RAAG member, who was also an avid blogger, 
noted that the greater reach of the platform vis-à-vis an individual blog had 
motivated him to join when Praja will still a new experiment in engagement. For 
those who were already on the Internet, the site enabled a smooth transition from 
a passive to active participant:   
 
How I got involved with Praja is that I used to sit and read those blogs 
as part of my surfing routine, silently (laughs) for a while. And then I 
started posting some comments; on some issue you’d get really riled 
up, you’d want to satisfy the itch, you say something. And I don’t even 
know how I got involved, all of a sudden I was doing stuff. (Ashok, 





Ashok noted how he had begun to access Praja to make the shift back to 
Bangalore easier, and how, over a period of time, he unknowingly transitioned 
from a passive member to an active participant on the site. For those who 
already had access to the Internet, and were accustomed to the medium, the 
Praja platform was the natural medium of choice with which to engage on civic 
issues. For former non-resident Indians (NRIs), the motivation to engage with 
Praja was two-fold: firstly, after stints abroad, their return to India had revealed 
the large information gaps regarding public amenities and utilities in Indian cities. 
Some former NRIs began to participate on Praja as a means to overcome this 
lack of information in the public domain, which was crucial for a structured and 
meaningful urban life. What started as individual needs for information gradually 
extended to efforts to make government data available and easily accessible to 
other citizens. Another aspect was that upon their return to India, Praja provided 
NRIs a space that allowed their experiences of living overseas, including best 
practices in cities, to be shared and discussed, and translated into practical 
knowledge and action items for Bangalore.   
As individuals began to get more deeply involved with Praja, they 
described their engagement as relating to their role as active citizens in a 
democracy, as making the city more liveable, or as contributing to society. One 
interviewee talked in length about how his disillusionment with life as a software 
engineer spurred him on to look beyond the corporate sector to find fulfilment in 
civic activities. Overall, members expressed the view that they were working to 
help other citizens and to advocate for society as a whole. Several interviewees 
cited Praja’s information and research-based activities, and the focus on 
solutions as key reasons for their continued participation. Website member Uday 
(male, personal interview, July 5, 2011) noted that Praja was different from other 
sites as it emphasised collective problem-solving, rather then merely “cribbing” 
about city problems.  
Some interviewees highlighted that the online discussions were in contrast 




forums, which Praja strived to avoid through strict moderation for content and 
tone. Hence, discussions on the platform were described as being ‘neutral’, and 
steering clear of inflammatory or personal attacks. My observation of blog posts 
confirmed this view, with posts focusing on the issue at hand, rather than 
unsubstantiated critiques of individuals or personal philosophies. Discussion 
threads I observed were typically positive in nature, with members encouraging 
one another, and Praja’s achievements being shared as a source of collective 
pride. Further, members offered analysis, data, personal experiences, or other 
information towards solving problems, with the intention of taking forward 
projects on the ground. On certain issues diverse and opposing views were 
expressed, with some topics (such as privatisation of public utilities) eliciting an 
outpouring of varied and conflicting opinions. Such discussions, while fast-paced 
and intense, were, by and large, courteous and fact-based, despite the 
impassioned nature of the posts.  
Another factor that appealed to interviewees was the composition of 
members, who were described as being both committed and knowledgeable. In 
addition, the younger demographic of members was considered an advantage, 
as it distinguished Praja from the usual civil society actors, comprising RWAs and 
NGOs, who were overwhelmingly middle-aged and senior citizens:   
Let me put it differently: my interest with Praja was, there was this set 
of people who are highly knowledgeable—I’m talking about the Praja 
community at large—and a younger profile, definitely a younger profile. 
That aspect really attracted me, one doesn’t expect them to be activist, 
and being able to go out, and knock on the doors of Chief Ministers, 
and other [important decision-makers]. (Bhaskar, male, RAAG. 
Telephone interview, October 1, 2013) 
 
As the excerpt has shown, for some of the older members, the relatively 
youthful profile of the Praja community, and its ability to reach out and connect 
with decision-makers was a new and exciting aspect of civic engagement. The 
ability to foster public participation and citizen-government interaction was a 




structure and functioning of Praja, and its role as a space that somewhat plugged 
the gap in citizens’ participation in urban affairs are discussed below.  
Features and Functioning of the Platform  
RAAG member Yogesh (male, personal interview, December 16, 2011) 
explained that the impetus to create Praja stemmed from the idea of using 
technological solutions to make engagement easier for citizens. The site was 
described as providing a space for participation in local affairs, as well as a 
space where members could provide feedback to the authorities in a ‘safe’ 
environment. Praja took great pains to guarantee member’s privacy through 
anonymity or psuedonymity, if so desired. Through the adoption of online 
identities, members could involve themselves in debates and discussions without 
having to divulge their real identities. Key players stressed that privacy of 
members was paramount, and that only a handful of administrators had access 
to the member database. Members could choose how much to reveal about 
themselves, and there was a ‘culture’ of not using real names on the site. Such 
anonymity was described as providing a voice to people who were otherwise 
more comfortable being on the sidelines, and was crucial to the creation of a 
participatory culture.    
While anonymity was crucial during Praja’s early days, the shift from 
online to offline activities highlighted the limits of purely anonymous online 
engagement. This shift was particularly salient given the government’s 
preference for offline or physical engagement. In a follow-up interview, a key 
RAAG member pointed to the late realisation that offline activism necessitated 
physical contact, with government as well as other civil society actors. In this 
respect, a shift from complete anonymity became inevitable, at least for members 
who were running projects on the ground. As a senior government official 
explained, this face-to-face connect boosted Praja’s credibility as a serious civil 
society player, an aspect that is explained later in the chapter. As members could 
contribute asynchronously, as and when they had time, the site did not lose out 




activities. The flexibility afforded to members, and the asynchronicity of the 
medium were described as site features that could help overcome the limitations 
of physical participation.  
To ensure genuine and deep engagement, the website was designed to 
foster participation on issues that were considered important to members 
themselves. As majority of discussions on the site at the time of fieldwork were 
related to traffic and transportation, I enquired as to how discussion topics were 
selected. Interviewees noted that they chose to work on issues for a variety of 
reasons, such as whether the issue was of personal or professional interest to 
them, whether it affected them directly, or whether they had a sufficient level of 
expertise on the issue. The latter aspect was particularly important, due to the 
site’s reputation for serious and deliberate talk. This also ensured that members 
conducted adequate research prior to posting on the site, as they were reluctant 
to speak carelessly on issues. Moreover, as most members did not have time or 
energy to work on more than one issue at a time, they preferred to devote their 
time to issues of personal importance, particularly those issues that were under-
represented on the site.   
Issues chosen were demand-driven, and based on public opinion on the 
site, which RAAG member Yogesh described as a “democratic” way of 
functioning. Sanjeev attributed the focus on traffic-related issues to the primarily 
middle-and upper-middle class composition of members, whose primary 
concerns were quality-of-life issues, such as mobility within the city:  
…there are very specific issues that get people get excited about in 
Praja, I mean, general civic issues—if there is an umbrella term like 
that—related to transportation, water and electricity, stuff like that, stuff 
which bothers people in their day-to-day living, quality of life. So, if you 
think about it, Praja is essentially a community of people who can 
think, but they have full-time jobs outside of Praja. So inevitably the 
issues that if you see hog most of the Praja community are issues that 
would impact people like you and me. So, education or livelihoods, 
other areas which seem to be issues in the developmental sector, are 
not really discussed here. It’s kind of a natural phenomena, you can’t 
really do anything about it, because the kind of people who come on 
Praja are like that. (Sanjeev, male, Praja member. Skype interview, 





As the site operated on the notion of member-driven initiatives, members 
tended to focus on issues that immediately impacted them, and for which there 
was a major, visible need for solutions. Sanjeev pointed out that the emphasis on 
quality-of-life issues was a natural corollary of the middle and upper-middle class 
nature of membership. Traffic and transportation issues were of prime 
importance to these members, as the lack of mobility was one of the biggest 
hindrances to quality of life in Bangalore. In a similar vein, RAAG member 
Yogesh (personal interview, June 28, 2011) pointed out that the focus on mobility 
also arose due to the inability of the middle classes to buy their way out of this 
problem—unlike with other infrastructure limitations that could be overcome with 
additional resources. While the more affluent groups could buy water from water 
tankers or bottled mineral water, install solar panels, or use generators to power 
their homes and offices, they could not buy their way out traffic grid-locks. 
Further, the visibility of the issue, and the fact that a large percentage of the 
population encountered it on a daily basis, suggested that members were likely 
to discuss it the most. It was for all these reasons that Praja’s focus was often on 
general “civic issues” of the middle classes, which differed greatly from the 
human rights, environment, and livelihood concerns of the traditional or 
development civil society. Despite this middle class bias, Praja’s value lay in 
generating discussions on issues of significance to members, thereby inspiring 
citizens to participate in public life in ways that were meaningful to them.  
In deciding the research focus of the case chapter, I was guided by the 
research objectives of the thesis, as well as the need to choose categories and 
themes that could be compared and contrasted with those of Hasiru Usiru. By 
applying Saldana’s (2009, p. 186) focusing strategy of identifying a study’s 
“trinity” in the final stages of data analysis, I distinguished the following as the 
three main themes that merited further investigation: 
1) Praja as a space for public participation and citizen-government 
engagement 




3) Distinctions between Praja and traditional or old forms of civil society 
Space for Public Participation and Citizen-Government 
Engagement 
With regard to this first overarching category, three main aspects stood 
out during the post-coding and pre-writing stage (Saldana, 2009), which are 
discussed below:   
(a) Praja as a collaborative and interactive space for citizen participation in public 
affairs, facilitating the creation of an active, informed and involved citizenry  
(b) Praja as a space for fostering broader citizen engagement, involving urban 
citizens traditionally absent from such discussions, such as the youth and 
middle classes 
(c) Praja as a “constructive” space for citizen-government engagement, through 
the creation of a “non-coercive” and “non-threatening” environment 
Collaborative Space for Citizen Participation  
As a space for citizen participation in public affairs, Praja provided a 
framework within which concerted action among members could occur. The 
platform was a common space that allowed members to connect and discuss 
issues of mutual concern, and thereafter convert these to action items on the 
ground. Praja was also described as “collaborative”, due to website features that 
produced a multiplier effect, allowing each member to build upon another’s 
contribution in some way:  
[Praja’s] an enabler, it enables collaboration, it helps to leverage, is the 
word I would use, in the sense, my little effort, along with other 
people’s get multiplied, and you can have some distinct impact. Which 
ultimately, we all crave that we do, putting all this effort and getting 
some impact out of it. And I think, majority of people don’t care for the 
credit. (Ashok, personal interview, July 5, 2011) 
 
The success of the multiplier effect described by Ashok and others lay in 
the ability and willingness of members to build on each other’s efforts, without 




success or impacts of their actions, they reiterated that the final outcome, rather 
than credit for individual contributors, was what they strove for. As teamwork was 
emphasised over individual efforts, Praja members were happy to contribute in 
any way to projects that others were steering. With the focus being on collective 
achievements and not individual roles, no contribution was considered too small. 
At the same time, to acknowledge these efforts, each contributor was 
acknowledged in a project report.  
This collaborative aspect was enhanced by what some members referred 
to as the “crowd-sourced” nature of the site, which involved collating members’ 
suggestions to resolve local problems. This process was considered by key 
members as a highly effective, and expeditious, way of providing feedback to the 
authorities. RAAG members Yogesh and Murthy (personal interview, June 28, 
2011) noted that in many cases, this “collective intelligence of citizens” matched 
the solutions suggested by independent researchers and experts. In situations 
where Praja’s collective solutions were consistent with expert recommendations, 
members experienced greater confidence in the efficacy of the Praja model. On 
the other hand, some members noted that the very value of Praja lay in solutions 
and design inputs that emanated from citizens, which need not always be 
consistent with ‘experts’, who may not be always highly trained in their area of 
expertise (Ashok, RAAG, personal communication, July 27, 2014). In this way, by 
collecting citizen feedback on local issues and passing it on to the relevant 
authorities, Praja provided active and concerned citizens a channel for their 
voices to reach the government.  
Active citizenry was cited as important to build connections with the 
government—an aspect that Chapter 4 has shown was sorely missing at the 
local levels of urban government. The role of active and informed citizens also 
became decidedly crucial in a context where the local government was ill-
equipped to handle the demands of a globally connected city. Murthy (personal 
interview, June 28, 2011) described how RAAG’s information-seeking activities, 
such as filing requests under the Right to Information law, had exposed how the 




unreliable decisions in the process. Increasingly, this lack of coherence in 
government activities was becoming visible to the general public as well, he 
noted, which greatly impacted citizen confidence in the government. To remedy 
this situation, Praja members worked with government agencies to understand 
the rationale behind decision-making, to convince authorities to adopt optimal 
decisions, and to push it to involve citizens in decision-making. Praja operated 
with the understanding that an informed citizenry could put the necessary 
pressure on the government to improve its functioning. This was done in two 
main ways, firstly by engaging with government actors directly and providing 
them data-based options and holistic solutions. The second aspect involved 
supplying the relevant information they accessed and generated to civil society 
groups, which would then inform their engagement activities. By providing 
technical and other expertise to citizens’ groups and activists on the ground, such 
as during protests against the proposed widening of Sankey Tank road, Praja 
connected and informed citizens in both the online and offline spaces of civic 
engagement.  
Extended Space for (Middle Class) Citizen Engagement  
Praja was also described as a space where segments of urban society 
that were usually absent from civic issue discussions, such as the youth and the 
middle classes, could participate. RAAG member Krishna highlighted the 
potential of Praja to engage the youth in civic affairs, through the advantages 
afforded by the Internet: 
But, in all of these [RWA and industry meetings] you will find oldies and 
baldies. Invariably many of them don’t have the energy to take things 
forward…So, for any action you need the youth. These persons say 
those youth are not interested in such kind of things, they don’t come 
for such things. I say, [this is] not true at all. As many percentage of the 
people who are of the elderly, who are interested in these kind of 
things, same, similar or even higher number of youth are interested in 
the goings on of the city. And it is happening more. Because now they 
are finding there are no avenues for jobs or any future in the US, UK or 
anywhere, it’s all happening here, and because of which now they 
want to get into the thick of the action, ok? And so, you give them the 




a problem of mobility, they have other pursuits and things like that. But 
you give them the right kind of a platform and they can do it all from 
home and they are there, and that is what Praja is all about. (Krishna, 
male, personal interview, December 20, 2011) 
 
Citing the need to enhance youth engagement in civic affairs, Krishna was 
convinced that the right kind of platforms would play an important role in this 
regard. This was crucial for vibrant democratic participation, as middle-aged or 
senior citizens dominated current spaces of civic engagement. Although these 
actors had a wealth of ideas and experience, the interviewee (also a senior 
citizen) cited the need for youthful energy, which was abundantly available in 
Indian cities, to be properly channelled. He refuted the notion that the youth were 
not interested in civic affairs, arguing that new methods and practices of 
engagement were necessary to involve them. In this regard, he saw the value of 
Praja as providing a space for youth in civic affairs, by enabling engagement 
from remote locations, thereby overcoming mobility problems and other 
constraints that prevented meaningful engagement. He noted that Praja’s 
suitability as a platform for engaging the youth and young adults was evident in 
the fact that majority of its members were below 40 years old, and the average 
age was 30-35 years. To broad base its appeal among the youth, Praja had 
begun to reach out to younger audiences in colleges, youth fests, youth clubs, 
and via social media. Providing them the opportunity to access civil society 
spaces and information via the Internet, Krishna felt, would help revive and 
energise civil society practices that were currently dominated by the older 
generation.    
Some interviewees also described Praja as a space for enabling greater 
middle class engagement. While the urban middle classes in India were usually 
considered apathetic and disinterested in public affairs, the lack of formal 
systems of participation in cities compounded this problem.86 In this context, its 
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members viewed Praja as a political medium for the middle classes, a space 
wherein their voice could be organised and heard:  
I would argue that, in urban India, middle class is the most 
disenfranchised. People…don’t go to vote. It’s their own fault, I'm not 
condoning this [behaviour]. People just don’t go to vote, people don’t 
participate enough, and they have to participate, they're a big chunk of, 
they consume a lot of resources, they don’t get their voices heard, how 
can they expect to get their stuff done? So in that sense I feel this 
[Praja] is the, generally, educated middle class bunch. They’re just 
trying to get their [voice heard]. (Ashok, personal interview, December 
27, 2011) 
 
By providing this a platform to engage and express its concerns and 
opinions on significant public issues, the platform included the usually indifferent 
middle classes in participatory processes. Ashok acknowledged that the fault lay 
in this class’ disengagement with the political process, which was exacerbated by 
the absence of a bottom-up participatory culture in cities. Although the middle 
class was a crucial consumer and producer class, its voice had yet to be really 
reach political actors, in the absence of which their demands and concerns would 
remain unfulfilled and unresolved. Within this context, the Praja platform was 
described a good space for middle class experiments with engagement. Other 
members were quick to stress that despite its middle class composition, Praja 
was more than just a platform for middle class voice, as members worked on 
issues that would benefit the city as a whole. The idea that educated and tech-
savvy Praja members used the Internet not for personal gain, but to advocate for 
society as a whole, is discussed in the section ‘Attitude towards the Internet: 
Refuting the Elitist Argument’. 
A “Constructive” Space for Citizen-Government Engagement  
The third important theme in this section is the idea of Praja as a space for 
facilitating greater government-citizen engagement. By enabling such interaction 
in a structured and orderly environment, Praja was described as having the 
potential to overcome the limitations of traditional methods of feedback and 




direct engagement experienced by government agencies could be overcome by 
the asynchronous engagement opportunities provided by Praja. It was pointed 
out that the tendency for public interactions to get “crowded” with people and 
suggestions often made it difficult for authorities to undertake any meaningful 
follow-up actions. Instead, asynchronous engagement—either online or offline—
was thought to be a better option, as it enabled officials to sift through information 
provided by Praja members, and decide on a reasoned course of action 
thereafter. The site also provided government officers the advantage of 
anonymity, whereby they could engage with crowd-sourced suggestions, without 
revealing their identity. This element of cover also allowed government ‘insiders’ 
to play an important role in facilitating action by their respective departments. It 
was pointed out that on several occasions government insiders had helped 
expedite the resolution of complaints, provided information requested by 
members, or directed members to action taken by the government department. 
While such success was not always guaranteed, members were optimistic that 
member involvement and discussions on a consistent basis could increase the 
likelihood of government action.  
Members also described Praja as a “constructive” space, where the 
government could channel the expertise of citizens, while avoiding the pitfalls of 
direct engagement. Existing participatory mechanisms of government 
departments were described as ineffective, due to a variety of reasons. These 
included the existence of polarised opinions among civil society actors and their 
unwillingness to work together due to competing professional interests and 
philosophies, lack of incentives to participate, as well as the disorganised nature 
of such interactions, which often resulted in “shouting matches”, causing the 
government to beat a hasty retreat. One example was the Bangalore Electricity 
Supply Company’s (BESCOM) Chairman’s proposal to establish a citizen 
participatory council, which although well-intentioned, was not equipped to deal 
with citizens’ demands and expectations:    
So what happens is that government struggles. You don’t know who’s 
constructive, who’s not constructive. You don’t know how to 




and then you close the doors saying: “I don’t want to interact”. That's 
the problem with all the government folks. So a structured way of 
interaction, where you don’t have to sit in a hall, and take questions 
from 1000 people, and you get all kinds of questions—that is a gap 
that we’re trying to fill. (Yogesh, personal interview, June 28, 2011)  
 
Yogesh noted that the BESCOM Managing Director’s (MD) idea of 
creating the council stemmed from well-intentioned notions of harnessing 
citizens’ knowledge to improve the company’s functioning. However, due to the 
problems described earlier, including the chaotic nature of the initial meeting, and 
the lack of cooperation among civil society actors, the idea did not gain traction. 
Faced with such hindrances, and in the absence of alternative spaces of 
engagement, the government often backtracked from public interactions. Praja 
was seen as filling the gap in such instances, by providing a structured form of 
interaction on a platform that did not jeopardize the good intentions of 
government and civil society actors. This was deemed all the more important in 
light of the absence of meaningful and inclusive opportunities for public 
participation in the city, which has been discussed in previous chapters.   
Praja also acquired significance due to the mismatch between the city’s 
fabled position in IT and telecommunications and the lack of know-how of city 
administrators. Interviewees rued that those responsible for managing the city did 
not have the requisite resources, tools, or know-how to do so effectively, making 
the need for citizen input even more crucial. Several interviewees stressed that 
the lack of expertise within government was an anomaly in a city that had built a 
global reputation based on its IT, science and knowledge capabilities. Some 
interviewees also referred to the glaring deficiencies of local politics and 
politicians, due, in part, to the special political representation accorded to 
disadvantaged groups. These aspects have already been discussed in the Hasiru 
Usiru chapter. In fact, there were intense debates on both Praja and the Hasiru 
Usiru mailing list in April 2011 on the issue of reservations in the local council. 
Arguments in these online spaces were not much different from those made for 
and against the Mandal Commission Report in 1989-1990 (see Kumar, 1992). 




to redress the current and past injustices of lower castes and other historically 
suppressed groups, while opponents pointed to a decline in the quality of 
government and political institutions as political appointments were based on 
reservations rather than merit.87 In this situation, RAAG member Krishna 
envisioned Praja as an invisible yet crucial “platform of the upper house”, akin to 
the upper house of the legislature, playing a crucial role in improving the quality 
of democratic debate: 
That is the upper house, platform of the upper house. Because…the 
quality of people who get elected to the lower house, we saw enough 
of them, including the Mayor. When she was going to New York for 
some conference or something, some newspaper reporter asked her: 
“What are you going for?” She said she doesn’t know (laughs)! That’s 
the level. So, the elected representatives, till such time as, you know, 
evolves, is going to take little time before we get quality people into it, 
and till then, or even beyond, then at that stage this will get upgraded 
to our upper house. This will be the virtual upper house. It is not 
recognised, doesn’t exist. But this is the platform of the upper house. 
And we discuss things here and now; eventually we expect many of 
these people in the lower house, we will be able to convince them. 
(Krishna, personal interview, December 20, 2011) 
 
The interviewee noted how a reform-oriented IAS officer described Praja 
through the analogy of the ‘upper house’, and went on to elaborate why this was 
an apt comparison. He noted the similarities between the upper house and Praja, 
comprised of non-elected members who were knowledgeable, had access to 
information, and arrived at decisions based on consensus. Further, like the upper 
house of the legislature in India, He Praja served as a space for reasoned 
debate, and applied pressure on the government to make rational choices. 
Another similarity, according to Krishna, was the Praja, like the upper house, 
played a crucial role by compensating, to some extent, for the low calibre of 
people elected to the city council’s lower house. As discussed above, the current 
electoral system, based on reservations, is designed to empower historically 
marginalised communities in the political sphere. However, the system is also 
criticised for sacrificing quality, due to the entry of groups into the lower houses 
                                                             




of city and state legislatures with no prior political experience, or educational or 
other qualifications to participate in the complex arena of politics. The position of 
city Mayor was one such reserved post, and the controversy surrounding 
reservation of seats in ULBs is discussed in part two of the Discussion chapter. 
Until this system evolved or improved, he envisioned Praja playing the important 
role of providing expertise to government, in its role as “the virtual upper house”. 
While Praja was just making inroads in this direction, there was hope that, over 
time, there could be greater synergy between the organisation and council 
members, which could translate into efficient and judicious policy-making.  
Overall, Praja as a space for public participation and citizen-government 
engagement was seen as providing an alternative to flawed existing models and 
practices of engagement. By creating an interacting platform for generating 
citizen expertise and inputs, allowing groups in the city that usually shunned 
engagement, and by facilitating greater citizen-government collaboration, Praja 
was seen as an Internet-enabled solution to improving existing administrative 
and political systems in the city. Interviewees pointed to several advantages of 
the Internet-based platform in encouraging public participation. These included 
the ability to get majority of preparatory work done online, overcoming time and 
space constraints; the flexibility to contribute according to members’ personal 
schedules, which lowered the entry barrier for participation; anonymity or 
pseudonymity reduced anxieties about personal attacks or retribution by 
disgruntled government officials; and the creation of a community that could 
guide and support members, who could then collaborate and leverage off each 
other’s efforts. Another advantage of an Internet-based platform was that 
individuals situated outside Bangalore could still contribute expertise and ideas 
regarding the city’s development. Although the Internet played a crucial role in 
enabling this new form of civic engagement, key members stressed that it was 
not just ICTs per se, but what I term the “Praja model” that made it a unique and 
potentially powerful tool. These, and other attitudes towards and use of the 




Attitudes Towards and Use of the Internet for Democratic 
Engagement 
Praja was praised for its ability to promote citizen participation, despite 
members’ busy personal and professional lives:  
The thing that it does, in an Internet-based model, the beauty is that 
you can actually, practically contribute part-time and do something. We 
have not had to leave our jobs. Four years we’ve been doing it, while 
doing our jobs, and it fits in really well. And we can get more people in. 
So what happens is, we have full-time things, on ground, it deters a lot 
of people. This lowers entry barrier. Twenty minutes a day is good 
enough. Or two hours a week is good enough. And we’ve had plenty of 
people contribute, without expecting anything, simply because it 
enables them. I think it's a very powerful medium. Not Internet as such, 
this way of collaboration is very powerful. We have just scratched the 
surface of it. (Yogesh, personal interview, June 28, 2011) 
 
Yogesh noted that the online platform fit in with members’ work routines 
and their lifestyles, and that this flexibility had lowered the entry barrier to 
participation. He and RAAG member Murthy, both IT professionals, had been 
able to fit Praja activities into their hectic schedules for the past few years, 
without compromising on either. The option to contribute part-time and in ways 
that were convenient to members, without compelling them to participate, were 
described as the reasons why Praja appealed to its members. While describing 
the benefits of an Internet-based model, however, he hastened to add that was 
not just the Internet itself, but Praja’s unique approach to engagement that had 
made it an interesting civil society case, with great potential. Interviewees 
highlighted ways in which Praja’s activities blended online and offline synergies 
and skills, and how its processes were designed to facilitate logical thinking and 
concerted efforts. In-depth conversations with members provided a 





The Praja Platform: A New Model for Civic Engagement  
At the crux of the model was the idea of facilitating engagement in a 
structured manner by collecting citizen feedback, collating various viewpoints and 
workable suggestions, and presenting this to the government as a report and 
other follow-up actions. Information played a key role in this model, in different 
ways and at different stages of a project or activity: in the initial stages, online 
members were responsible for gathering information from disparate sources on a 
particular topic, analysing the compiled data, and presenting it on the platform in 
a systematic and simplified manner. Thereafter, discussions would be facilitated 
on a topic based on this data, with other members weighing in on the issue or the 
project. Once discussions had gained enough traction, the person(s) in charge 
would create a report based on workable suggestions received, with the objective 
of providing the best possible recommendations to the government. In this way, 
inputs provided were described as ‘data-driven’, ‘collaborative’, and ‘rational’, 
indicating the seriousness with which activities were undertaken.  
Information also played a crucial role at the time of interacting with the 
government, which was referred to as informed activism or “information-based 
activism”. Interviewees referred to early interactions with public authorities, where 
they were told to prepare more detailed reports and return to the discussion 
table—a tactic that would inevitably delay their progress. The frustration at such 
delays resulted in revised procedures within the organisation, which included 
generating extremely detailed reports, and attending meetings armed with the 
most up-to-date information. Such extensive preparation and attention to detail 
effectively reduced opportunities for delay, as in the case of the Commuter Rail 
report, where authorities could find no ground to refute their recommendations. 
This approach was described as ‘information-based activism’, which involved 
empowering citizens with information, providing them a rational basis for their 
engagement.  
In enabling informed engagement, key members were also mindful of the 
need to balance the requisites of transparency with participation. This was 




and, if possible, offline) to encourage greater participation and the generation of 
new ideas. Later, if a government body invited Praja to provide it 
recommendations, inputs from the respective blog(s) were collected and 
organised, with a few lead members taking the issue forward, based on collective 
suggestions. By the time of physical meetings with government officials, 
participation was narrowed down to a smaller group of interested persons. The 
outcomes of these meetings would be posted on the site later, in the spirit of full 
disclosure, and members were encouraged to comment on the same, thereby 
creating a cycle of participation. By providing opportunities to contribute at 
different stages of a project, the Praja process generated a sense of ownership 
of an issue among members, and was deemed an inclusive model.  
Another aspect of participation that the model promoted was the 
empowerment of civic groups on the ground, who could take forward the 
preliminary work done on the site. Members reiterated that as they were not 
unduly concerned about publicity, the model encouraged citizen stakeholders to 
unite and carry an issue forward, with or without Praja. The emphasis on creating 
and placing quality content in the public domain was to facilitate participation by 
additional actors in the public sphere. The notion that any member of the public 
could use the content created was an extension of the platform’s role as an 
extended space for citizen engagement. RAAG members emphasised that the 
structured interaction promoted by the model encouraged collaboration among 
members and non-members, which helped civic actors to overcome the isolation 
they normally felt:  
If you look at how RWAs normally work, they are totally isolated, they 
don’t have the empowerment to go up and talk to certain people; there 
are people from RWAs today coming on [the Praja platform] and 
talking about things, posting photographs, identifying issues in their 
area, and they have started making reports of their area, the drain 
covers have gone, and then there are advices and comments on this, 
then they go and speak with people: they get a platform to express 





Murthy and few other members spoke of how the platform, by enabling 
civic actors to converge, express themselves, and gather information and advice, 
helped them overcome the isolation they often felt while undertaking civic 
activities. They noted how RWA members and other old civil society actors, who 
were usually overlooked by the administrative and political establishment, were 
now energised by the multiplier effect of the Praja platform. Other ‘ignored’ civic 
actors that joined Praja included “Letters to the Editor-kind-of-guys” (Yogesh, 
personal interview on June 28, 2011) and concerned citizens, who realised the 
potential of this new means of engagement to make their voices heard. These 
and other strengths, and limitations, of the platform, as perceived by the 
participants, are discussed below.  
Strengths and Limitations of the Platform  
Plugging the Participation Gap in the City  
Conversations with interviewees revealed their perceptions about the 
strengths and weaknesses of Praja, including, the platform, its structure and 
decision-making, and its offline processes. With regard to the platform, a crucial 
role appeared to be the provision of a space where issues could be discussed 
and taken forward, which was lacking in big cities in India:  
…if you look at a village—my parents live in a smaller town, almost a 
village—so there, people know each other. They live in [a province], 
which has decent local governance, panchayats are empowered and 
all that. So, people have to get together, panchayat elections are a big 
deal, there is money, to get things done. There, the good thing is that 
everybody knows each other. So if you want something, you know 
whom to go catch. In a city, so if you want to influence policy-makers, 
one thing you will notice in the city is that the number of people per 
representative [is huge]… In a city, I think the challenge is to be able to 
get together. You need to have a critical mass, if you need to influence 
anything. So, in this I think, Praja’s main role is a platform, it’s a space 
where it is easier to get together with people. (Ashok, RAAG, personal 
interview, December 27, 2011) 
 
As the excerpt has highlighted, one of Praja’s key strengths lay in the 




advocate on issues collectively. The ability to bring people together was 
especially important due to the complex nature of representation in cities, in 
which a single corporator could represent tens of thousands of residents, and 
where the considerable distances constrained people from the same 
constituencies from physically coming together as lobby groups. The proximity to 
decision-makers in villages was contrasted with the difficulties of getting a critical 
mass to influence policies in cities, a situation that was exacerbated by the 
absence of public participation mechanisms in urban areas. In a small way, Praja 
helped to fill this gap through the creation of a virtual meeting space, which 
connected people, allowed them to share experiences, and provided avenues for 
offline participation and advocacy. Praja also played a key role as an information 
repository, helping to overcome the lack of readily available information in the 
city. Ashok added that the provision of such public and accessible data on the 
platform was essential, particularly as people in cities tended to go online and 
look for solutions.  
Another strength lay in the ability to connect geographically dispersed city 
residents, whose “collective intelligence” could be channelled to provide city-
specific solutions. This notion of “collective wisdom” was referred to frequently by 
RAAG members, who viewed it as a critical element in determining the city’s 
future, with Praja paving the way for such collaborative actions. A co-founder 
explained that by enabling citizens to share their ideas and information, the aim 
was to trigger a shift in mindset from individual to collective thinking, which would 
ultimately benefit the entire city. Such collective wisdom was enhanced by 
making expertise freely available on the platform, which distinguished Praja from 
other spaces where expertise was treated as “closely guarded IP [intellectual 
property]” (personal interview with Murthy, RAAG, on June 28, 2011).  
These aspects played a crucial role in facilitating greater public awareness 
and participation in local affairs, and were described as enhancing participatory 
aspects of democracy in the city. Other advantages of the Praja model were 
discussed in terms of the structured nature of participation, benefits of anonymity, 




with government. As mentioned earlier, the involvement of government officers 
was another strength of the platform, and members were buoyed by online 
interactions, and offline impacts of this engagement. Interviewees expressed the 
sentiment that government officials engaged with Praja in different ways, and that 
there was a genuine effort to listen and implement practical solutions. In the 
absence of immediate results, this type of engagement bolstered members’ 
confidence about the potential success of the initiative.  
Site Design/User Interface 
With regard to site design, members concurred that one of the strengths 
was that it allowed only constructive and data-driven discussions, which invoked 
a sense of responsibility for what one wrote, and fostered a collective approach. 
This was often distinguished from the finger pointing and “cribbing” associated 
with online civic groups. Senior citizen Raghavan (male, personal interview, 
December 13, 2011), was appreciative of the site’s features and affordances, 
describing it as “a very good platform”, and that he was “totally impressed” when 
he accessed it for the first time. While it provided a good outlet for discussion, 
and was a “social website”, he was grateful that it was not for personal or trivial 
issues, like Facebook. Interviewees also concurred that the benefits of the 
platform accrued from the management of the site, notably in terms of software 
and content. Although the software needed improvement, Raghavan noted that 
given the voluntary nature of the activity, the people in charge were doing their 
best to handle it. The management of content by an efficient team was also 
considered a strength of the platform. Raghavan noted that while there were no 
restrictions on topics introduced, moderators deleted posts unrelated to issues of 
concern or unproductive posts. This had happened to him in the past, and he 
considered such moderation “a good thing”, as it contributed to a well-managed 
site. He contrasted the platform with examples of badly managed online spaces, 
and noted that Praja’s strength lay in managing content by moving discussions 
towards tangible outcomes and steering clear of unproductive talk.  
Beyond the commonly agreed upon strengths of the site described above, 




strength or limitation. For example, while some described the site design as easy 
to use, other members described it as complex and inhibiting participation. 
Contrary to my expectations, the senior citizens I spoke to had experienced no 
major difficulties in navigating the platform, nor were they constrained by the 
rules of online engagement. Senior citizen Shashi (male, personal interview, 
December 13, 2011), who had relatively little experience of computers and the 
Internet before he joined Praja, pointed out that the site allowed for easy 
discussion and information sharing. While he noted that Praja was a place for 
knowledgeable people and the exchange of practical ideas, he did not think that 
the high quality of discussions deterred participation. Other senior citizens too 
described the site as being relatively effortless to manoeuvre, with easy 
procedures fostering a feeling of inclusion. Website member Uday (male, 
personal interview, July 5, 2011) noted that two elderly members would initially 
participate on the platform with the help of others, until they slowly learnt how to 
use the website independently and confidently. Their experiences, he said, 
indicated that, with time and effort, exclusion of digitally disconnected groups 
could be overcome. In this way, while a certain amount of Internet savviness was 
required to navigate the site, this did not automatically restrict participation.  
However, while technical expertise per se was unnecessary to participate, 
some members noted that the user interface was not very user-friendly, and that 
the site had never been ‘easy’ to use. Website member Sanjeev, who was a 
computer engineering degree holder, noted that the platform was daunting for 
new members, which often discouraged people from joining:   
None of the other guys in the group are usability experts, so I don’t 
think there was ever a point where it was brilliant in terms of usability. 
This website has never been easy to use… 
I mean, this is a problem we have been facing for the last three years, 
and we still haven’t got out of it…There is some sort of learning curve 
that is associated with becoming part of the community, and that’s just 
how it is… 
I guess the point that I’m trying to make is that it requires some sort of 
commitment, to get used to the way things work on Praja. I won’t be 
that: “Ok, let’s just start”, and I started posting. (Sanjeev, Skype 





Sanjeev noted that as usability experts had not designed the site, it had 
never been very user-friendly, thereby requiring some “commitment” in order to 
understand how to use it effectively. While this did not involve being 
technologically proficient, it required some time and patience in learning how to 
navigate the site, understand its rules, and contribute meaningfully. Likewise, 
RAAG member Yogesh noted that one of the site’s limitations was its design, 
which “is very good for guys who are regulars, but it’s very bad for new guys. It’s 
hostile to new people” (personal interview on December 16, 2011). He explained 
that he had wanted to change the design, but since a majority was already 
comfortable with the existing interface, they had voted against doing so. This 
aspect was reflective of the participatory nature of the platform, where decisions 
were taken via majority vote, and which, like any other democratic process, had 
its strengths and limitations.  
‘Democratic’ System of Functioning 
The majoritarian principle of the platform, wherein a discussion post or a 
project was initiated based on majority consensus, was both a source of pride 
and concern to members. As a source of pride, this system gelled well with 
Praja’s larger democratic goals, and was considered indicative of the 
‘democratic’ nature of the platform. RAAG member Aman described himself as 
often being in the minority, as his views differed from the majority on a variety of 
issues. Nonetheless, he compared Praja’s style of functioning to India’s 
democratic system, which provided a conducive atmosphere for diverse opinions 
to flourish, and operated on the basis of majority vote:  
See this is what the strength of India is, diversity actually makes you 
stronger. But you need to have an environment where people can 
express views, but somewhere we need to draw a line which views 
become dominant or the official view. For example, in democracy we 
always agree that majority rules. So, most of the time I’m in a 
minority—my views are a little bit different—I can’t expect to be the 
majority view, so my views will remain minority, however good, or 
rational, or right they are. So even if the majority is wrong, their views 




impose [its views]—this is the problem with the Lok Pal bill. (Aman, 
Skype interview, January 21, 2012)  
 
Aman noted that despite being in the minority, he considered the diversity 
of opinion, reflective of various people’s experiences, as a core strength of the 
site. The real danger, he noted, was when the minority undemocratically 
enforced its view—which he saw as the fundamental flaw of the Anna Hazare-led 
anti-corruption campaign. Aman’s critique of the campaign was reflective of 
concerns voiced by prominent individuals about Hazare’s efforts to centralise 
power, and his insistence that his version of the Lokpal Bill be accepted. Critics 
charged such tactics with sending a “you are either with us or against us” 
message that was denounced as anti-democratic (Daigle, 2011; Patnaik, 2011; 
Roy, 2011).88 Praja members who criticised the anti-corruption campaign often 
extended this argument to include traditional civil society in general, arguing that 
activism and protests often embodied similar ills. Praja was different, Aman said, 
because members tried to convince—but did not impose—their views on others, 
emphasising consensus over an enforced obedience. On the contrary, diversity 
of views and opinions on Praja, emanating from the diversity of membership (in 
terms of socio-economic background and geographic dispersal of members), 
was described as generating new ideas and binding members together in a non-
coercive manner. The multiple viewpoints aired on the platform were also 
described as a counterbalance to the dominant voice of the mainstream media, 
which often subdued alternative voices and perspectives.   
Alienation and Isolation   
A contrasting viewpoint to above sentiments was that the diversity of 
opinion was often quashed by the majoritarian principle of functioning, which 
sidelined certain opinions or action agendas. For instance, the emphasis on 
                                                             
88 Other criticisms of the campaign include its unrepresentative nature, Hazare’s 
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mobility at the cost of other pressing issues in the city, was disconcerting to some 
members:  
…town planning is most important but it is very surprising, though it is 
so evident to me, that town planning is more important than just 
discussing buses. Because buses are there in a wrong plan, what is 
the use? People don't realise this… So that is how I write radical town 
planning, and see how many reads I got? Point [ratings by other 
members] is only very less, because people are saying, “what is he 
talking?” (laughs). (Raghavan, personal interview, December 13, 2011) 
 
Website member Raghavan spoke of the alienation he felt when issues 
that he thought were crucial, such as town planning, did not gain traction due to 
the majority’s concern with traffic and transportation. He pointed out that the lack 
of support for his ideas and concepts resulted in feelings of isolation, as evinced 
in the matter-of-fact statement: “in Praja a lot of people are not with me, [only] 
few of them”. RAAG members acknowledged this imbalance in choosing topics, 
with some expressing the desire to deviate from the mobility-centric nature of 
discussions. However, they were also hard-pressed to balance between issues 
of personal interest and what majority of the members wanted to discuss. 
Yogesh (personal interview, December 16, 2011) noted that choosing an issue 
was “a balance between what will sell and what we want to do”, and that they 
often had to concede to the majority demand, else they would lose out on 
writers/members. He noted how they had tried to introduce less popular—but no 
less significant—issues, such as water, which did not gain enough traction on the 
site. As the success of the site depended on people’s contributions, choice of 
issue was often decided by what people liked to talk about. This was then 
balanced out by issues that RAAG members considered noteworthy or of social 
importance. This often resulted in the more immediate, visible issues such as 
transportation taking centre-stage, at the cost of pressing, long-term issues such 
as urban planning. In this way, while the consensus-based approach was critical 
in moving forward based on public demand, topics on which there was no 




Another aspect of isolation was the lack of follow-up and support, 
particularly if a member was working alone on a project. Senior citizen Raghavan 
(personal interview, December 13, 2011) described how he had received little 
support from members, and had to conduct most of his activities alone, which 
severely dented his morale and enthusiasm. In addition to the difficulties of 
engaging with the relevant authorities (such as catching hold of officials, delays 
due to being given the runaround, and the involvement of multiple agencies), the 
absence of relevant information, and the lack of companionship or support during 
such offline activities made the process more daunting. While he knew that key 
members were busy, he opined that if they reached out and supported lone 
crusaders like him, it would encourage more members to participate offline. In 
the absence of such joint efforts, he was sceptical of the outcomes, noting that 
action on the ground was “a big journey”. The isolation was more acute as he 
was often the only person working on his interest issue, and though he received 
inputs from others, the lack of offline support, such as when he did his fieldwork 
or to meet government officials, was weakened his efforts considerably. In this 
instance, Praja failed to live up to the expectations of its key members in helping 
traditional civic actors to overcome the isolation they normally experienced in the 
course of their activities.  
High Quality Discussions, the Invisible Barrier and Lack of Public 
Participation  
Another aspect that was seen as both a strength and a limitation was 
Praja’s role as a limited or specialised domain for “high-level discussion”. As the 
intention was to create a site for intelligent discussions, the bar was set high in 
terms of quality of content. An unintentional corollary of the emphasis on 
reasoned debate was that it excluded the general public, who may not have the 
time or wherewithal to participate according to its rules. The resultant challenge, 
therefore, was to get more people involved without compromising Praja’s 
reputation as a brand for reasoned debate:  
So what has happened is, which is also, in a way, a challenge is that, 
it’s become a place where there’s a brand saying: “Only when you talk 




you know, [we] are saying: “You're not allowed to come”. You're 
allowed to come, but naturally it has become a self-selecting place, for 
guys who are a little more aware, where they have collected [data], 
and nobody has set any bars. So nobody can say: “You guys, you 
don’t allow me”; nobody can say that. At the same time, the quality of 
content that is there, you can see for yourself. It's actually of very good 
quality. So this means that, our audience is those people. So we’re not 
a ‘for-everybody’ kind of site. So if guys actually start that, if they come 
in and start that, cribbing about the drain next to my house, then they 
quickly realise: “Oh, I'm at the wrong place”. So we have a lot of cases 
of the guys, they’ll start, they’ll come, and if they don’t have that 
perspective [they don’t fit in]. So the bar is in a way, sometimes we get 
this complaint, the bar is set too high. That's a challenge that we have: 
how do we get more people in. (Yogesh, personal interview, June 28, 
2011) 
 
Yogesh noted that as a constructive attitude was paramount on the site, it 
often restrained casual visitors and members of the general public from 
engaging, which limited membership. Although the co-founders had intended to 
make the site open and accessible, over the years, Praja had developed a 
reputation as a site for serious talk. This prevented people with frivolous 
complaints from participating, as they soon realised the nature of involvement. In 
this sense, Praja was a limited domain, restricted to committed members that 
were more predisposed to serious discussion. While this was not intentional, 
Praja’s reputation as a site specialising in quality debate meant that key 
members had to retain the level of discussions and content, while faced with the 
challenge of getting more people to participate on the site. 
Lack of public participation was a frequent complaint among civil society 
interviewees in general, who noted that public apathy was detrimental to the 
overall efficacy of civil society.89 RAAG member Bhaskar (telephone interview, 
October 1, 2013) pointed out that the low percentage of citizens active in civic 
issues vis-à-vis the general population was a “global phenomenon” and part of 
“human nature”. In such a situation, interviewees, noted, it was only natural that 
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general public have been discussed in detail in the Hasiru Usiru case study in the sub-




civil society activities in the city were dominated by a small group of actors that 
contributed to various causes simultaneously. The limited number citizens active 
in the civil society sphere, while not a new problem, continues to be a cause of 
concern due to the changing context within which civil society sector operates, 
and the various challenges facing it (see Goswami and Tandon, 2013). The 
challenges involved in increasing participation were evident during my working 
stint in this sector, where efforts to drum up public support and action were met 
with limited success. Although media-led initiatives succeeded, to some extent, in 
encouraging participation, such activity was mostly transient, falling short of the 
committed and regular attendance and participation that CSOs hoped for in the 
long run. Such problems plagued Praja as well, with more readers than actual 
contributors on the site, and key members had begun to discuss how to scale up 
operations without compromising on the quality of discussion. While one 
dimension involved greater participation among existing members, another 
challenge was to involve people who were not yet exposed to or active in public 
life, which was the bigger challenge. Discussions were on-going within RAAG 
about ways to increase membership as well to encourage greater participation 
among existing members. Some ideas under consideration included creating a 
version of the site for mobile phones for easier access, as well as to generate 
more publicity, especially among the youth, to encourage greater participation 
among this tech-savvy audience. 
A challenge with respect to its existing membership was that members 
who were accustomed to traditional modes of civic activity often found it difficult 
to adapt to Praja’s rules of engagement. RAAG member Ashok (personal 
interview, December 27, 2011) discussed this issue in detail, and pointed out 
some prerequisites for members to successfully leverage the platform. These 
included accepting the egalitarian nature of the platform, wherein an idea, and 
not a person, was afforded priority. This was difficult for older members, who 
were used to being given respect on account of their age and experience. Ashok 
acknowledged the value of expertise and reputation, but noted that everyone was 




for people who didn’t “care for respect or deference”, and those who did needed 
to work within this new reality.  
Members also needed to learn how to structure online talk to the best 
effect, as unstructured talk risked alienating potential supporters, particularly 
those who had time constraints. Ashok suggested that contributors must learn to 
make a point succinctly, and in a clear and simple language, in order to facilitate 
productive discussions. This was not an easy adjustment, as this type of 
engagement would take time and effort, as it compelled members to be more 
focused in thought and word. Another new rule of engagement was to be a team 
player; as discussed earlier, Praja members valued a sense of teamwork and 
community, and group over individual recognition. Hence, it was crucial that 
members appreciated divergent viewpoints, and collaborated with other 
members. This involved a change in mind-set for members accustomed to 
working independently or garnering individual media or other attention. 
Although the online platform continued to be central to RAAG’s activities, 
in mid-2013 the group made a conscious decision to dedicate more time to offline 
projects than the website (Yogesh, personal communication, February 26, 2014). 
This change in direction emanated from the growing recognition of the need to 
move beyond the Internet, if Praja was to be considered a serious civil society 
actor in the city. To this end, attempts were made to connect with government 
and civil society actors working on related issues or having similar concerns. The 
development of these on-the-ground connections as part of the expanded Praja 
model is described in the next section.    
On the Ground: Government and Civil Society Connections  
“Tactical Linkages” with Government   
RAAG members described engagement with government authorities in 
terms of finding the right organisation to work with, which depended, to a great 
extent, on the head of the establishment, and the personal rapport built with 




easy accessibility and a spirit of openness and cooperation in considering 
outsider involvement. In the beginning, locating such public authorities was 
mostly a matter of trial and error, until they found an agency within which there 
was some acceptance for their efforts by the top brass. Over a period of time, 
they realised that it was more expedient to work with officials willing to engage 
with them, and that projects could be created or tweaked to facilitate this buy-in. 
One of the key factors influencing the acceptance of Praja’s proposals was the 
attitude of the head of a government department, and its organisational culture. 
To build fruitful relationships with the necessary government authorities, 
therefore, it was imperative that members identified and tapped into responsive 
and proactive officials. The experiences of engaging with the government 
revealed several types of government officials, among whom they connected well 
with particular type. These were officials with a clean (uncorrupted) image, who 
were knowledgeable, and open to interaction with citizens. Only a small segment 
of government officers belonged to this category, and in working with this ‘right 
type’ of government official, a good rapport was identified as playing a critical 
role. By establishing a buy-in from these officials, Praja could count on some 
level of official support for its activities. RAAG member Aman noted the 
importance of engaging the government, but also highlighted the limitations of 
this strategy, particularly in the absence of risk-averse leadership (Aman, male, 
Skype interview, January 21, 2012). He discussed the difficulties of engaging 
with the BMTC, and noted that, in the Indian system, the limited incentives for 
government officers to participate in civil society initiatives was to blame for their 
lacklustre involvement.  
Experiences such as these convinced RAAG of the importance of finding 
the right officials to work with, and only agencies where officers identified with 
Praja’s goals and actions were approached to collaborate. While linkages with 
government was an important aspect of their work, over a period of time key 
members made a strategic decision to forge relationships with government only if 
the need arose. Hence, they turned to prospective contacts in government when 




relationships without context, as this was considered a waste of time for both 
parties: 
We have learnt that [there is] no point in trying to make our 
relationships without context. So, per-project basis, for a larger project, 
you get more time, you get to build lasting relationships. Like [Mr. A] is 
one such case. I don’t know what he saw, but here and there, he sees 
some value, and he connects. Like [Mr. B] connected, but there was 
nothing we could offer to him. We met him three, four times, still he’s 
open. But we didn’t invest in him, because we didn’t have any specific 
project to connect with…So why waste your time? And when you're 
objective, it works better. So more deep in your areas than [wide]… 
(Yogesh, personal interview, December 16, 2011) 
 
Yogesh noted the utility of establishing contact on a per-project basis, 
“investing” in government officers only if there was potential for either party. This 
was preferred to maintaining linkages on a permanent basis, which involved time 
and energy that both sides not have. In cultivating relationships with government, 
therefore, they preferred to engage on a deeper level and strengthen ties 
selectively, rather than build superficial contacts in a large number of 
departments. In this way, RAAG member Murthy added, the linkages with 
government authorities were “extremely tactical”, and there was no obligation to 
continue the alliance beyond the mandate of that particular activity (personal 
interview, December 16, 2011). He contrasted Praja’s tactical linkages to 
government with NGOs, who usually created institutional linkages with, and were 
aligned to, particular government departments. These, and other distinctions 
from old civil society actors are discussed in the section “Distinction between 
Praja and Old Civil Society”.  
Despite the absence of formal methods of engagement, and the relatively 
small number of government officials, the fact that there was some government 
response was a source of motivation to members. Additionally, any tangible 
outcomes of such engagement were further inspiration to members to continue 
their efforts, despite the slow pace of progress. Website member Uday (male, 
personal interview, July 5, 2011) noted that the knowledge that posts were being 




some offline actions that arose from issues aired on the site, including the 
improvement and upkeep of public utilities such as parks. These outcomes 
convinced him that despite Praja’s relative invisibility in the public sphere, the 
government was considering its suggestions. The notion that Praja was 
somehow making a difference in the city encouraged him to continue 
participating, despite the limitations within which they worked.  
Civil Society Connections: Successes and Limitations  
In the shift from purely online to offline activities, building connections with 
individuals and groups on the ground was recognised as critical to extending 
Praja’s network, as well as to the empowerment of the civic groups themselves. 
Civil society connections were viewed in two main ways, the first being to help 
groups on the ground, and the second aspect was to get more groups to 
participate on the platform. In the first approach, Praja’s involvement included 
connecting disparate groups working on similar issues, and assisting them 
through the provision of information or any other strategic support, such as 
preparing reports, advocacy actions, etc. The idea was to create small teams to 
provide solutions and assistance, without getting unduly involved in how the 
other civic actors took the issue forward: 
So either way, we don’t care; it works well, we produce—there could 
be parallel effort, there could be duplication, there could be people 
building on what we build, but that seems to be working well so far. We 
have had enough examples, things we have produced and talked, they 
have been done the same way or taken forward…its ok with us. We 
know people come and read, and we don’t want people to tell us that 
they’re coming and reading, it works beautifully well for us. (Yogesh, 
personal interview, June 28, 2011) 
 
Yogesh noted that in contributing to the city, Praja was keen to enable 
other groups and individuals to build on its work. Although members were aware 
of examples where their work had been taken forward—by both government and 
civil society—they were not concerned if Praja was acknowledged or not. 




welcomed citizens and government using this data in any way they liked. In these 
matters, he noted that Praja’s contentment with being on the sidelines and not 
wanting to claim publicity or glory seemed to have worked well for them. An 
example of this first type of civil society connection is Cycle Day, which was 
launched in October 2013 in conjunction with the DULT, citizens groups and 
cycling communities (srinidhi, 2013; see also Praja’s Bangalore Cycle Day home 
page).90 The initiative aimed to encourage cycling and walking as part of 
residents’ daily lives, and to ensure that cyclists and pedestrians—and not just 
motor vehicles—enjoyed the streets (dvsquare, 2013). As more individuals and 
organisations joined as partners, they took the initiative forward to make it the 
biggest sustained cycling promotion campaign in Bangalore, with monthly 
editions in different parts of the city (The Times of India, 2014; Yogesh, personal 
communication, May 23, 2014).  
The second aspect of collaborating with civil society involved convincing 
old civil society actors, in particular, members of a prominent NPO, Citizens for 
Bangalore (CFB)91, to use the site to facilitate seamless interaction between the 
online and offline realms of civic activity. During the first round of interviews, this 
plan was in its preliminary phase, and RAAG members Yogesh and Murthy were 
enthusiastic about the prospect of getting CFB, which acted as an umbrella 
group for RWAs in Bangalore, onto the website. The rationale behind providing 
CFB a separate space on the site was to scale up Praja’s activities by creating 
additional linkages with the group’s various members on- and offline. The project 
was envisaged as simultaneously benefitting CFB by providing its members the 
technical and data support that would inform their engagement activities. This 
was to be a more formalised approach to Praja’s existing connections with CFB 
and similar groups on the ground, which included providing technical and other 
expertise for ongoing activities, such as the Sankey Tank road widening issue. 
CFB stood to gain through access to relevant information, supporting and 
contrary viewpoints, and other types of assistance that would help it to 
                                                             
90 http://praja.in/en/blrcycleday. See also the Facebook page: 
https://www.facebook.com/blrcycleday 




confidently approach the concerned authorities. As for Praja, it stood to gain by 
moving closer to its goal of creating networks of groups working in tandem on 
local issues. RAAG members also expressed the hope that the initiative would 
provide a common space for CFB to work on issues that its members cared 
about, making it a relevant space for citizen engagement.     
When I returned to Bangalore for the second round of interviews, I 
enquired about the progress of this project, as I had not seen any such activity on 
the site. Interviews revealed that the project had not materialised due to the 
reluctance or inability of CFB members to migrate onto the Praja platform. While 
there had been no frank discussions between the two parties regarding the 
failure of this project, RAAG members put forward several possible reasons, 
including the non-tech savvy nature of CFB’s members, who were mainly senior 
citizens. Secondly, the lack of progress was attributed to the fact that CFB was a 
dispersed group, comprising of different sub-groups that worked on various 
issues in different parts of the city. In such a scenario, critical decisions such as 
embracing new technologies and adapting to new systems of citizen activism 
would take time, effort, and a certain degree of readiness, to be reconciled. 
Another suggested reason was that while CFB members were appreciative of 
Praja, they could be hesitant to interact on the platform due to the fear of losing 
their own identity. As both parties had avoided pursuing the matter further, RAAG 
members could only hypothesise about reasons for the project’s failure, despite 
collaborations continuing on the ground. As they were keen to understand why 
this project did not take off, they connected me with CFB members so that I could 
investigate this aspect. As expected, interviews with CFB members revealed that 
attitudes towards new technologies for activism, and a combination of other 
factors, made them reluctant to migrate onto the platform. This put a dent in 
Praja’s offline expansion plans, and was a serious challenge to its efficacy, which 
is discussed in the next section on the strengths and limitations of Praja’s 




Relationship with Government and Old Civil Society: Strengths 
and Limitations 
Experiences of Engagement with Government  
As the previous section has shown, RAAG members built expedient 
connections with government officers only if both parties saw mutual value in 
such alliances. More important than connecting with government for the sake of 
doing so was whether their proposal interested the government. Over a period of 
time, RAAG had come to realise that if the other party was not interested, it 
would be a waste of time and energy to try and build a partnership without mutual 
interest. This sentiment was also expressed by government officials I spoke to, 
who found Praja a useful vehicle to disseminate information to the public, engage 
with citizens and explain their intentions and views, obtain feedback and gain 
greater insights into public opinion, and enhance transparency within their 
organisations. A senior official explained that he interacted with Praja due to a 
shared commitment to open data, empowerment of citizens with such data, and 
more participatory governance. Rajeev (personal interview, December 28, 2011) 
noted that in interacting with Praja, he was guided by the belief that sharing 
information was the best way of involving citizens in governance. He highlighted 
how he had provided information to Praja members that would ordinarily be 
denied by the guarded Indian bureaucracy. He also encouraged government-
citizen interaction in the belief that it would dispel misconceptions among both 
sides, and bring them together in productive ways:  
…as happens with any civil society groups, when they came in contact 
with me they have their own suspicious, they had their own 
reservations, they had their own stereotypes about government 
functioning. So by interacting with them I have been able to open the 
system to them, throw open the system to them, and remove some of 
the stereotypes—some of the stereotypes, not all—make them, in a 
way, a partner in the task which we are doing. (Rajeev, personal 





Rajeev recalled that during his period of engagement with Praja, members 
would initially come in with certain stereotypical ideas of government, which he 
endeavoured to correct. He explained that he did this by involving them in the 
system within which he operated, and encouraged them to understand its 
strengths and weaknesses. He was convinced that greater citizen-government 
interaction was the key to removing the stereotypes and prejudices that 
constrained mutual efforts. By opening up the system to Praja members, the 
police officer said he was able to create a partnership that was based on a more 
grounded understanding of how action items could be taken forward. As physical 
interactions were crucial to engender such an understanding, government 
officials preferred to engage with Praja offline, although they did check the site at 
regular intervals. Senior government official Sita noted that while the site 
performed a useful function, it was the real, not virtual, engagement that 
government valued:  
…if Praja was just an Internet community, it would definitely, as I have 
mentioned earlier also, its impact would have been quite limited. Praja 
as an Internet community, extending beyond the Internet and actually 
engaging with us, is what actually [is] giving value to it. If it is only 
anonymous number of people there I wouldn’t know. But if I know 
[them] and these people, with these names, they come, and I interact 
with them, and therefore, I warm up to the idea. But if you really say 
there may be so many other groups also, even in Bangalore, which are 
just Internet-based, then what kind of impact can they have? (Sita, 
female, personal interview, 30 December, 2011)    
 
Like the other government officials, Sita noted that she was comfortable 
with the Internet and open to learning new technologies. However, more than this 
personal affinity to technology, what drew her to engage with Praja were its 
offline activities. Rather than interacting with anonymous people online, she 
valued Praja’s efforts to extend outside the Internet and engage her in face-to 
face meetings. While acknowledging that the platform played a useful role in 
eliciting public opinion and involving citizens in civic affairs, the follow-up on the 
ground differentiated Praja from “just an Internet community”, and was a crucial 




appreciated as a vibrant civil society group, comprising educated members that 
were concerned about the city, and whose site enabled citizens to converge and 
voice opinions easily or with little effort. Government officers were also 
appreciative of the efforts made to move from online to offline advocacy, which 
distinguished Praja from a purely Internet-based civil society entity, such as a 
mailing list or discussion board.   
At the same time, having worked with Praja at close range, these officials 
were also able to objectively highlight certain limitations. For instance, Rajeev 
pointed out that Praja members sometimes insisted on implementation of their 
ideas, which they deemed superior to those of the government. Government 
officials suggested that the low regard for their ideas stemmed from the opinion 
that corporate or private views were qualitatively better, as well as from 
suspicions regarding government motives, which tended to put off even 
supportive officials. Another limitation of Praja was that some members were 
impatient for quick results, without understanding the constraints within which 
government functioned:   
And the other thing is that ideas travel ten times faster than the actual 
implementation of ideas, not ten times, but hundred times, or thousand 
times faster. Telling a solution how to solve a problem is a five-minute 
or ten-minute, or one hour job; actually executing it may take ten years 
or one year or depending upon…. So there comes the intolerance. And 
that intolerance sometimes alienates the people, like me, who with 
good intention become a part of it and who are a part of government, 
but with good intentions. (Rajeev, personal interview, December 28, 
2011) 
 
Rajeev described the impatience of Praja members as a type of 
“intolerance”, which arose from an unfamiliarity of the ground realities of the 
government machinery. The insistence that ideas be implemented at a certain 
pace, which was unreasonable by government standards, had sometimes 
alienated well-intentioned officers like him. He pointed out how ideas travelled 
much faster than their implementation by the government—a discrepancy that 
was starker in the virtual world, where ideas constantly travelled across space 




the corporate world, who were used to a faster pace of policy implementation—to 
overlook the complexities of the government sector. He added, however, that 
while these were typical civil society fallacies, not all Praja members displayed 
such characteristics. In fact, the more discerning members counselled their less 
experienced colleagues in this aspect.  
The official’s narrative pointed to the baggage that civil society actors 
carried into their interactions with the government, which were referred to by 
some Praja members as well. For instance, in the early days, meetings with 
officials were often unproductive due to aggressive attitudes of some members. 
Thereafter, procedures were changed to make interactions with officials more 
streamlined, less crowded, and based on facts rather than emotions. Some 
members also highlighted that through Praja’s activities they had come to realise 
that government officers were indeed intelligent and agreeable, with knowledge 
resources at their disposal, and interested and involved in civic issues. To further 
improve the relationship with government, officials suggested that Praja 
members make greater efforts to connect with government agencies offline. It 
was thought that a more grounded understanding of government strengths and 
limitations would inform Praja’s activities and bolster the relationship. Another 
senior civil servant, Chandrasekhar, said he was concerned that most members 
were not experts in areas they were active in, and stressed that they needed to 
be aware of this fact:  
Next [limitation] is the knowledge base they have. It is limited, and half-
knowledge is dangerous. They should clearly put a disclaimer 
informing about their qualification to deal with the issues. A software 
engineer knows little about [department-specific technical] issues! 
(Chandrasekhar, male, email interview, December 30, 2011) 
 
The interviewee had been closely involved with Praja, and described his 
interaction as a fruitful one, noting that it allowed him to interact with an informed 
public. Although he praised the people driving it as “committed” to the public 
interest, he highlighted that they often lacked the necessary qualifications to deal 




worked on prominent public infrastructure projects. A limited knowledge of the 
system and of the issues they worked on put them at a disadvantage, and was 
also dangerous, given the critical issues they worked on. He highlighted that 
members should work within an understanding of this limitation, and state it 
clearly on their website too. While Sita also raised this issue, mentioning that 
Praja members were not “technically competent”, this was not seen as a 
problem, because as citizen contributors, they were not expected to be. Although 
she hoped to see a greater cross-representation of members, as new people 
could inject greater vigour and novelty into interactions, she was aware that this 
was difficult, considering the constraints within which members worked. In this 
regard, she was truly appreciative of Praja’s endeavours in the public sphere, 
noting that members spent much time and effort in areas that were unrelated to 
their professional lives:  
First of all, I must say, considering that they are all engaged in some 
other work and I find it quite, you know, I must appreciate, that they are 
spending some time in something, which is not in the line of their work. 
It’s not that they are consultants or something in [this field], etc.; they 
are people with some jobs, in some other thing. So it is out of their 
interest, they are contributing to this sphere of work. I find that very 
good. (Sita, personal interview, December 30, 2011)     
 
For the interviewee, the dedication of Praja members was especially 
remarkable given that they had full-time jobs or were otherwise occupied, and 
that there were no tangible benefits for them. These factors served to reinforce 
the point that despite Praja’s shortcomings, government officials engaged with it 
due to members’ contribution towards the public good. While Praja had made 
progress in connecting with and enhancing collaboration with some government 
agencies, interviewees pointed out that developing such linkages was a 
challenging task. The problems of engaging with government agencies, as 
described below, guided RAAG’s decision to limit its interactions to select 
agencies on a project-basis only. 
While Praja was initially keen to expand it’s online and offline linkages with 




limitations of government agencies, such as the lack of an Internet culture, which 
was mentioned earlier. As RAAG member Krishna explained, in the absence of 
institutional linkages with government, members relied on their personal rapport 
with senior officials to push projects forward. Often, responses from agencies to 
issues raised on the platform were only on the prompting of these senior officials. 
This limitation was exacerbated by the fact that mid- and lower-level government 
officials are not trained to interact with civil society. Further, officials that did 
respond (on the prompting of senior officials) did so via email, rather than post on 
the Praja site. This was noted as a problematic area of engagement that needed 
to be addressed, as it limited the utility of the site. Another drawback was the 
limited number of senior level officials engaging online: while officials accessed 
the platform on a regular basis, they were reluctant to participate on it. One 
possible reason was a fear that engaging openly would be akin to opening up a 
Pandora’s Box. Krishna (personal interview, December 20, 2011) explained that 
their efforts to engage with the head of the BBMP had failed, possibly due to the 
unpreparedness of the agency to deal with public scrutiny. With an increasingly 
vigilant civil society, encouraged by the progressive Right to Information law, 
officials were concerned about the domino effect of allowing citizens access to 
their department’s inner workings. This explained why the head of the BBMP, 
with its reputation for large-scale corruption, non-transparent and inefficient 
functioning, was reluctant to engage with Praja.  
Adding to these concerns was what government official Rajeev referred to 
as the lack of maturity in public discussions in the country, where a frustrated 
public often indulged in unproductive language and hostile behaviour. The risk of 
encountering such talk prevented him from engaging with the public on the 
Internet:  
I don’t interact online, for the simple reason that I tell you if I was to 
interact online, the kind of reactions [that] would come would hurt, 
tremendously. Because not everyone is responsible, not everyone 
understands the issues. [A] lot of them understand, but I have never 
interacted online, and most of my interactions had been face to face. 
They had a number of meetings with me, and we could solve many 




like a beating boy, it’s very difficult. The stereotypes are too strong. 
(Rajeev, personal interview, December 28, 2011) 
 
Rajeev noted that even on a well-moderated online space like Praja, not 
everybody posted sensibly, and he was afraid to become a whipping boy or a 
scapegoat. He, therefore, preferred to communicate with Praja offline, pointing 
out that issues had been resolved amicably in this way. While Praja was a good 
example of a responsible site due to its strict moderation, he stressed that un-
moderated or poorly moderated online communication in general was dangerous, 
and limited productive citizen-government engagement. When asked what 
constrained online engagement, officer Chandrasekhar added that he limited his 
posts as colleagues and peers thought that such interactions were for publicity. 
Moreover, he was aware that he had to be careful of what he said, as his online 
footprint could not be erased.  
This section has shown that while Praja had succeeded, to a certain 
extent, in engaging with government, it faced—and continues to face—several 
hurdles. RAAG understood that for government, the risks of such engagement 
often outweighed the benefits, and hence, did not mind when some agencies 
took undue credit for outcomes in which Praja had played a key role. However, 
what concerned them the distortion of their concepts and ideas by agencies, 
which was an unresolved peril of associating with government: 
That is fine, we’re not trying to make money out of it. I would be very 
happy if somebody takes things and improves things, and the net 
improvement is seen. I don’t really care for the credit. And I think most 
people [on Praja] don’t really care for the credit. Where the issue 
becomes complicated is where your concepts get distorted so much 
that you don’t recognise it anymore. The BPS [BMTC’s Bus Priority 
System], in trying to make it different from Praja’s, I think they have 
distorted it so much they’ve just thrown out all the good parts (laughs). 
They have stripped out so many elements; we really don’t know what it 
is anymore. So that’s an unfortunate side-effect… (Ashok, personal 
interview, December 27, 2011) 
 
In the BMTC example mentioned in the excerpt, what rankled members 




members had painstakingly worked on. As discussed earlier, while government 
agencies were keen to be recognised for the translation of ideas into successful 
projects, most Praja members did not care as much for the credit. Rather, there 
was a sense of satisfaction that their ideas were usefully converted into 
practicable concepts and plans. However, there was considerable concern when 
their concepts were distorted, which was an unavoidable consequence of 
engaging with the government. On the whole, however, Praja had met with 
considerable success in the projects in which it collaborated with government, 
and government interviewees appreciated its efforts, particularly its move from 
the online to offline spaces for advocacy. This, however, was in contrast to civil 
society interviewees, including members of CFB and Hasiru Usiru, who 
considered Praja’s limited offline presence as its main liability, and preferred to 
stay away from it for this reason. These and other weaknesses of the relationship 
with old civil society is discussed in the following section.         
Challenges of Engagement with Old Civil Society  
A serious challenge to the engagement with traditional civil society actors 
was their reluctance to engage with ICTs and participate on the Praja platform. 
RAAG member Krishna (personal interview, December 20, 2011) hypothesised 
that the reluctance of CSOs, such as Citizens For Bangalore (CFB), to participate 
on the platform could be either due to the unfounded notion that individual or 
group identities would get diluted, technical difficulties that arose as a result of 
discomfort with new technologies, or an unclear understanding of the mechanics 
of posting on the site. Lakshmi, a prominent civil society actor and CFB member, 
acknowledged that there was a reluctance to engage deeply with ICTs within 
organisations that she was closely involved with:  
There is still the reluctance to go computer savvy. The old guard, they 
don’t want to do it. Though they are all email savvy, and SMS savvy, 
and all that. [But] they still like to hold on to some of their old [ways of 
doing] things, so therefore it hasn’t moved forward. But otherwise, all of 
us are at least email savvy, if not Facebook, and Twitter, and whatever 
else. It’s just a question of integrating the whole thing. (Lakshmi, 





Lakshmi noted that although members of the CFB used email and other 
ICTs to connect and network, they were reluctant to fundamentally change their 
methods of engagement. The unwillingness of the “old guard” to fully embrace 
ICTs is partly explained by the composition of NPOs, which are dominated by 
retirees and senior citizens. While Lakshmi recognised the importance of 
integrating the online and offline spheres of activity, she noted that such 
seamless interaction would only happen once there was some consensus on this 
aspect among decision-makers—political, administrative, and in civil society. This 
point was also emphasised by her CFB colleague, Shailesh (male, telephone 
interview, September 26, 2013), who noted that the limitations of interacting with 
the government via ICTs discouraged Internet use among activists. He 
highlighted two types of problems, the first being the lack of facilities in 
government offices, and the second being the absence of an established Internet 
culture within the government. Often, Internet responsiveness was based on 
individual officers who used their personal email IDs to communicate with 
citizens. While this was useful to communicate personally with an officer, this 
posed serious problems when s/he left the organisation, as there could be no 
one to fill the vacuum, due to the absence of an official email ID. Even in cases 
where email IDs existed, they were either non-functional, or officials did not 
respond to emails, leaving citizens frustrated. Shailesh insisted that the lack of 
both Internet culture and facilities boiled down to a non-IT savvy government, 
which did not encourage Internet use for government-citizen engagement. In 
such a situation, he and his colleagues used the Internet and email to connect 
with each other, other activists, and the media, but were reluctant to use ICTs, 
including the Praja platform, to interact with the government.    
Related to old civil society attitudes towards the Internet was the emphasis 
on offline presence and action, which was distinguished from Praja’s new style of 
Internet-based engagement. CFB member Shailesh noted the potential of civic 
activity via the Internet, but stressed that it “should not be an academic exercise” 




efforts, the crucial factor in the success of Internet-based civil society was 
whether online actions were being “translated into reality”. In this regard, the 
relatively limited follow-up action on the ground was considered a serious 
weakness, a limitation also recognised by RAAG member Bhaskar, who 
described himself as an “activist” who worked “with RAAG at a distance” 
(telephone interview, October 1, 2013). Bhaskar was keenly aware of the online-
offline dichotomy, and described his role as integrating Praja with offline spaces 
of activism in the city. Towards this end, his main objective was to get RAAG 
involved in issues that he was fighting for on the ground, and to make the Praja 
community at large more sensitised to those issues. Although he described 
Praja’s work as “activism at some level”, he stressed that his main objection was 
its lack of action at the ground level: 
My difference of opinion with Praja is that it became a debate society, 
more than anything else. I have nothing against it, I have nothing 
against blogging, talking about issues; it is still activism at some level. 
You spread the word, so that more and more people know about it, 
people talk about it. But the reality is that the community needs to take 
some hard action, and hard actions on the ground are necessary, 
otherwise we don’t get exposed to that society. That is my fundamental 
issue with Praja… (Bhaskar, telephone interview, October 1, 2013) 
 
Bhaskar explained that while Praja did engage in offline activities, these 
were mainly related to transportation issues, and that majority of the action was 
conducted on the platform. He emphasised that online activity was a limited type 
of civil society action, as firstly, participants did not get to see what society was 
really like on the ground, as the Internet provided only a one-dimensional view. 
Secondly, since government largely functioned offline, there was a real need to 
connect with it on the ground in order to have a larger impact. While RAAG was 
created with this intention, he felt that more needed to be done to forge 
sustainable connections with government, the absence of which he considered to 
be its “Achilles' heel”. More real life actions, such as communicating via the 
telephone or meeting face to face were considered key factors in influencing and 




Praja’s lack of connect with government on the ground prevented it from pursuing 
issues thoroughly, and was considered an ineffective means of citizen 
engagement.  
Key RAAG members noted that obstacle to greater collaboration included 
the divergent understandings of “action” and “engagement” by Praja and 
traditional CSO actors, and the latter’s insistence that action be judged according 
to its own criteria. Yogesh explained that he had spent much effort trying to 
convince CSOs to participate on the platform, and was particularly keen to get 
Hasiru Usiru on board due to their intersecting interests. However, he realised 
that some of the unfeasible expectations of Hasiru Usiru core group members 
during these interactions made collaboration problematic: 
But there are some thoughts on his [a Hasiru Usiru core group 
member] side, which are a little unrealistic, like he would say, “You go 
to all the slums and ask them”. And my thing is: “Who do you talk to, 
just 10-15 people?” And my response is: “Look, anyway, we’re not 
good at talking to a lot of people and taking their opinion; let’s do the 
best of where we can actually reach. So these 1000, 2000, or 
whatever, 10,000 people who are elitist, or what-not, at least them lets 
reach first”. (Yogesh, personal interview, December 16, 2011) 
 
In the excerpt, Yogesh pointed out that he considered some of Hasiru 
Usiru’s expectations unrealistic and impractical, particularly as Praja’s identity 
and stakeholders were different from the activist network. Whereas both entities 
discussed their primary goal in terms of enhancing public participation in civic 
affairs, Hasiru Usiru’s focus was on marginalised groups in the city. On the other 
hand, Praja catered primarily to the Internet-enabled sections of society, and 
considered its forte in terms of reaching out to this segment. In this context, as 
Hasiru Usiru’s insistence of reaching out to slum dwellers was not within Praja’s 
mandate nor did it cater to its strengths, Yogesh expressed doubts about the 
efficacy of such a plan. Although Praja’s offline activities were increasing in 
frequency, they were necessarily limited by the organisation’s structure and 
objectives. RAAG members noted that old civil society actors did not consider 




The platform thing hasn’t sunk in basically, they are all looking at us as 
an activist organisation; that is the typical mistake people make. What 
we are trying to say is that we are an enabling platform, and we 
advocate...So what we’re trying to do is advocate certain things…so 
when people come and say: “You should have an ideology, you have 
to do this, you have to do that. Ideologies keep you going, if you're an 
activist organisation. You need it to keep the goal. We have a goal as 
well, we want to be the platform which will advocate sustainable 
concepts, which will increase your quality of living—very broad goals, 
many things can fit in that. (Murthy, personal interview, December 16, 
2011) 
  
Murthy noted that Praja’s detractors compared it to a traditional CSO, 
expecting it to function with an overarching ideology, and a commitment to offline 
action. However, as Praja was an “advocacy”—and not an “activist”—
organisation, critics overlooked that it was not beholden to activist ways of 
functioning. RAAG members distinguished Praja from traditional CSOs by virtue 
of its focus on advocacy instead of activism, and an emphasis on goals instead 
of ideologies. These and other distinctions are discussed in the section 
‘Distinction between Praja and Old Civil Society’.  
CFB member Shailesh also brought up an unanticipated reason for the 
reluctance to engage with Praja, viz., issues of language and localness. He noted 
that CFB members preferred to meet and debate among themselves in the local 
language, Kannada, whereas Praja activities were conducted in English, which 
was a source of discomfort: 
Yeah, what has happened is that people who are more information 
gathering, we debate among ourselves. Because they [Praja] are not 
used to local: see we are all born and, I’ll tell you very openly, most of 
us are local Kannadigas or local Bangaloreans. We communicate to 
people in our own language, civic activists and other things. Praja is 
more towards migrant population. And, they are good people, they also 
do, but unlike us, we get to the bottom of the problem, they don’t go to 
the bottom, we interact with the government. Compared to us. I’m not 
saying they are not doing a bad job, but they are more towards the IT 
savvy, more intellectual also. (Shailesh, telephone interview, 





Shailesh noted that members of the NPO were ‘locals’, who preferred to 
communicate with each other and the government in Kannada. On the other 
hand, the cosmopolitan membership of Praja was viewed as catering to the 
migrant sections of the city, notably those in the IT industry. He acknowledged 
Praja’s contributions to civil society and social change, but noted that there was a 
tendency to work at a superficial level, rather than resolve an issue at the 
grassroots, which involved engaging with government. To engage with the local 
government, Kannada was essential—and in the absence of the widespread use 
of the local language, Praja’s work was seen as deficient. In fact, the ability to 
speak in Kannada and the issue of language has re-emerged as a sensitive 
issue in Bangalore in recent years, particularly with the influx of migrant workers 
from all over the country. As explained in the section on Bangalore, language 
politics, while not new in Karnataka, has assumed a new prominence due to the 
city’s increased importance in the global economy. The increased cosmopolitan 
mix of the city has fuelled discontent among Kannada activists and some long-
time residents over the erosion of local culture and identity, and the issue of 
language has been a by-product of these tensions, with hardliners calling for 
greater use of Kannada in Bangalore (Satish, 2008; Vittalamurthy, 2011). My 
own experiences corroborated what interviewees expressed with regard to 
language and government engagement, viz., that fluency in Kannada provided a 
greater sense of connectedness when liaising with government officials, and 
could ensure a greater buy-in from old civil society.  
The preference to communicate with one another in the local language 
and a shared sense of localness among old civil society actors separated them 
from Praja in other ways as well. One was the perception that Praja catered to 
the migrant population of the city—which could be due to the fact that several 
prominent members were from the IT industry and resided in Bangalore, but 
were not originally from the city. Secondly, the rules of engagement and level of 
discussion gave the impression that Praja was geared towards people who were 
both IT-savvy as well as more “intellectually” inclined. A combination of these 




platform, which in turn discouraged CFB from engaging with what seemed a 
restricted domain of participation. In addition, the view that Praja did not have 
much influence over government and could not effectively change the latter’s 
perspectives or outcomes dissuaded traditional CSO members from engaging 
deeply with Praja. Further probing revealed fundamental ruptures between old 
civil society and Praja’s Internet-based new civil society, which are described in 
the next section.    
Distinction between Praja and Old Civil Society 
Praja was created with the aim of using the Internet to overcome the 
limitations of, and thereby create an alternative to, traditional or old civil society 
forms such as NGOs, RWAs, and activist groups. While key members were keen 
to forge alliances with old civil society, they also clearly distinguished themselves 
from these actors in several ways. For example, Praja’s systematic model of 
research-driven advocacy was considered distinct from the cacophony of 
traditional forms of engagement. RAAG members explained how Praja’s solution-
driven advocacy differed from activism that was ideologically driven, which made 
the latter more inflexible. Further, Praja’s collaborative approach towards 
government was contrasted with the confrontational approach preferred by some 
old civil society actors. These, and other differences, are explained in detail 
below.  
Engagement vs. Activism 
Members’ described Praja’s interactions with the government as 
“constructive”, in which they let data speak for itself, and provided detailed 
options that government could choose from. This, members stressed, was 
different from providing final solutions, and insisting that government adopt the 
same, as in the case of traditional activism. Praja’s style of civic engagement 
emanated from members’ understanding of their limited role as civic actors, and 
the notion that government had to take the lead in public affairs, being the only 




collaboration, rather than conflict, with the government. Interviewees often 
referred to the Anna Hazare-led anti-bribery campaign as an example of 
confrontational old civil society, noting that campaigns that made little or no effort 
to cooperate with government could not fully achieve their goals. Praja members 
worked with the conviction that getting government buy-in and support was 
crucial to move projects forward, and that, conversely, antagonising government 
was detrimental to its cause. Interviewees highlighted the futility of traditional 
forms of activism such as protest, which were often subverted or ignored by the 
state, forcing activists to “yell and scream, and be a nutcase” (personal interview 
with Ashok, July 5, 2011). In contrast, Praja’s collaborative approach was 
considered successful, as it did not threaten government actors. Interviewees 
highlighted that a key factor in this style of engagement was the tone of voice 
that Praja members used, which was low, balanced and neutral:  
Lot of activists, and a lot of people who volunteer tend to get into a 
situation where the people who are listening to us become defensive 
about what they did. But one thing that’s common amongst all the 
Praja guys is that that is not our goal. We understand, we try to 
understand, where the other guys are coming from, and as opposed to 
just judging them, we would want to work with them. (Sanjeev, Skype 
interview, January 7, 2012) 
 
By eschewing an aggressive voice, Praja tried to avoid making the 
government defensive, focusing instead on understanding the other party’s point 
of view. In this way, members preferred to build trust by working with government 
actors, whom they described as more intelligent and well informed than citizens 
often assumed. This type of engagement, which was described as “constructive”, 
made them realise that there was comfort in knowing that government comprised 
knowledgeable and committed individuals. Overall, Praja’s constructive advocacy 
was contrasted with the aggressive and confrontational activism of old civil 
society. One of the reasons put forward for the latter’s inflexible and non-
conciliatory tone was the emphasis on ideology, which Praja members depicted 
as being at the cost of flexibility and improvisation. Ideology, then, became 




Different Expressions of Ideology  
RAAG members distinguished between themselves and activist groups in 
the city, notably Hasiru Usiru, by dint of the influence of ideology on their 
activities.92 In the first round of interviews, references to ideology centred on its 
limited influence in Praja’s activities and discussions, and how this differentiated 
it from other civil society actors. The second round delved deeper into this 
aspect, particularly with regard to its impact on Praja’s relationships with 
traditional CSOs, especially Hasiru Usiru. A key member explained that ideology 
did not figure in Praja’s genesis; instead the motivating factor was to use the 
Internet to enable greater participation in civic affairs:  
What I saw with us running it together was that, ok, this group was built 
not on the basis of any ideology, saying: “we all love trees”, or “we all 
love cars”. It was a just a bunch of guys through Internet, and the 
common thing probably was either to do something and to buy into this 
Internet base, talking, meeting, virtual kind of concepts. (Yogesh, 
personal interview, December 16, 2011) 
  
The mention of trees and cars in the excerpt was likely to be with 
reference to Hasiru Usiru, whose core mandate was environmental protection, 
with an emphasis on saving street trees and eschewing private modes of 
transportation. While ideology was not an overarching consideration in Praja’s 
activities, interviewees clarified that it was not ideology neutral, but pluralistic, as 
the model balanced between members’ ideologies in providing data-driven 
solutions to civic issues. Key actors realised that members could not entirely be 
separated from their ideologies. Hence, although the platform was data-driven, 
members could discuss ideologies or philosophies, as long as discussions were 
logical and fact-based. However, as the emphasis was on optimal solutions, 
members had to make compromises while working together to generate 
consensus-based options. Members often shed their ideological baggage in this 
process, as ideas were debated on their merits rather than ideological 
underpinnings:  
                                                             




We don’t go there as an ideology, overtly speak, saying this is what it 
is. But we try to be as logical as possible. If data points don’t support a 
certain ideology, then there is no point clinging on to the ideology, 
because we want to move away from ideology. (Murthy, personal 
interview, June 28, 2011). 
 
Murthy noted that while members could be guided by ideology in 
introducing and discussing topics, the ideological focus was shed if it was not 
supported by data. As the process of gathering member feedback to the 
government was based on data rather than ideology, the process was described 
as “logical”, rather than “ideological”. Hence, Praja members described their work 
as rational, based on facts and data, and citizen feedback, and therefore, subject 
to change, based on changing realities on the ground. This was contrasted with 
activist groups that ‘clung’ to their ideological moorings, which limited the scope 
of their activities to ideologically sanctioned projects and actions.    
Another way that Praja distinguished itself from old civil society was its 
focus on optimal, research-based solutions rather than ideology-driven ones. 
Interviewees pointed out that while Praja did incorporate values expressed by 
members, this was different from the activism that was often distinguished by a 
more rigid adherence to ideological perspectives. An advantage of the limited 
role of ideology was the flexibility afforded to members in their activities, which 
was contrasted with the rigidity of old civil society. With ideology not being a 
primary concern, members could work faster and better, rather than ensuring 
solutions fit in with their ideological framework. RAAG member Krishna criticised 
the rigid adherence to ideology of old civil society, stating that it often clashed 
with pragmatic solutions to pressing social issues. He was particularly critical of 
Hasiru Usiru’s inflexible positions on several issues, which prevented its core 
group from collaborating with Praja. Other members, too, critiqued Hasiru Usiru’s 
ideological rigidity for restricting potential collaborative actions. RAAG member 
Yogesh described some of his interactions with Hasiru Usiru core group 
members, which served to cement his belief that ideology in these cases was 
“false attempts to justify what one does”, as well as a convenient excuse to not 




that was seen as characteristic of activist groups in general inhibited the mutual 
cooperation that Praja desired.  
A related issue highlighted by some RAAG members was that the 
emphasis on ideology and a ‘consistent’ viewpoint by activists groups prevented 
them from considering dissonant opinions. RAAG members Yogesh and Murthy 
noted that another key difference between Praja and traditional civic actors was 
the former’s emphasis on flexibility, including the ability to change one’s stance 
or opinions depending on which provided the best solution. They considered one 
of Praja’s key strengths to be the option it provided members to change their 
viewpoints, based on the learning and information exchanges that occurred 
during interactions. They noted that as Praja was not rooted in any particular 
ideology, the dissemination of different viewpoints could influence changes in 
attitudes and behaviour among members. Over a period of time, they said, most 
RAAG members had learnt to accept contrarian arguments based on their merits, 
and were open to shifting attitudes towards issues and causes. This was 
contrasted with activists, who “look for more support for what they always believe 
in”, making it difficult for RAAG to connect with them (Yogesh, personal interview, 
December 16, 2011).  
Yogesh explained that he had experienced such changes in perspective 
during his interactions with Hasiru Usiru, causing him to reconsider some of his 
initial views on privatisation, for instance. Such flexibility, he said, was testimony 
to their belief that “the more you know, you change!” However, as activists could 
not understand this type of evolution in thought and action, they tended to 
dismiss such flexibility as being inconsistent. In a similar vein, Murthy discussed 
Praja’s “agility” or “flexibility” with pride, noting that it allowed members to tailor 
their goals and methods to suit different audiences. This allowed Praja to 
advocate a multiplicity of citizen-advocated concepts and follow a variety of 
actions to achieve its goals—which distinguished it from activist and other 




Attitudes towards the Internet: Refuting the Elitist Argument   
As the Hasiru Usiru chapter has shown, civil society actors’ perceptions 
and ideologies influenced, to a great extent, whether and how the Internet was 
used, even in an information/new media-rich environment like Bangalore. The 
core group viewed the Internet as an exclusionary medium that further alienated 
marginalised populations in the city. In this context, Praja was seen as an elitist 
organisation, catering to the middle and upper-middle classes, due to its large-
scale Internet use and engagement activities. Moreover, the core group and 
closely allied members viewed Praja as undertaking activities in areas of the city 
that they resided or worked in, which included more affluent neighbourhoods and 
gated communities. These reasons and the perceived ideological 
incompatibilities combined to make the core group wary of Praja’s actions and 
intentions, which prevented meaningful engagement between them.  
Praja’s key members were aware of these frictions, but disputed the 
notion that using the Internet was elitist, arguing that their activities were for the 
benefit of the whole city, rather than the middle and upper class groups that the 
organisation was largely comprised of. Members refuted the notion that activities 
were conducted only in affluent neighbourhoods, arguing that they worked with 
any group and community that approached them for assistance. In fact, all 
interviewees with whom I discussed this issue, including RAAG members, 
website members, and government officers, shared the view that disadvantaged 
groups and communities also stood to benefit from Praja’s activities. Thus, while 
interviewees acknowledged the digital divide in the city, they pointed out that 
Praja’s activities tried to represent the interests of those who did not have the 
time or resources to participate in civic affairs:  
So you can take things up on behalf [of others]. The thing is, the good 
thing about the Internet is, guys who can afford to have Internet, are 
probably at a level where they can afford to give you some time. Some 
people say: “Hey, you can't go the masses.” The masses, the poor that 
you want to go to, they don’t have time. If a guy has ten minutes free 
he’ll go and try to make ten more rupees. Guys who are on the 




but they can give 25 minutes. It's a perfect medium, according to my 
mind. (Yogesh, RAAG, personal interview, June 28, 2011) 
 
As the above excerpt indicates, the idea that Praja was an elitist medium 
was dispelled by noting that members undertook activities on behalf of groups 
and individuals in the city who did not have the time or resources to do so. 
Yogesh decried criticisms that the platform did not reach out to “the masses”, 
noting that the urban poor did not have the time to deal with issues of 
governance and reform, since they were faced with pressing concerns of 
livelihood and survival. On the other hand, he was grateful that people who 
accessed the Internet usually had some spare time to engage with civic issues. 
Several members referred to the commuter rail project (Namma Railu) as a prime 
example of the non-elitist nature of Praja’s activities. Both supporters and 
detractors of Praja considered Namma Railu—which would greatly benefit 
commuters in a city choked by traffic jams and pollution—a landmark project. 
RAAG members pointed out that this crucial project would not benefit the project 
leaders per se (who commuted by their private vehicles), but would benefit all 
users of the rail system. In this way, their work was also described as a type of 
“philanthropy”, where issues were taken up on behalf of other city residents, with 
the objective being systemic reforms and not personal gain. Retirees and website 
members Raghavan and Shashi (personal interview, December 13, 2011) 
similarly pointed out that members dedicated personal resources, time and 
energy to make a difference to city affairs. In particular, they were appreciative of 
the role of younger members, who contributed to Praja amidst their frenetic daily 
schedules. They praised members’ contributions towards improving urban 
systems, which, they stressed, should not be downplayed by attaching labels 
such as ‘elite’ or ‘exclusionary’.  Hence, although interviewees acknowledged 
Praja’s limited access to (middle class) civil society and citizens, the elitist 
argument was refuted on the grounds that members were working for the benefit 




With regard to its composition, RAAG member Ashok acknowledged that 
the platform largely represented the middle classes, but denied that it was elitist, 
as members tried to find sustainable development solutions for the whole city:  
I think if I were to characterise whatever I’ve seen on Praja so far; 
people, in general, if there's a theme, people want a more sustainable 
[development], the vision seems to be something which is more 
sustainable: generally, people like public transport, generally people 
want to see less pollution, people want better quality of life. That’s 
something which everybody wants. Somebody says: “I want parks”. 
They don’t say: “I want parks for middle class people”…maybe there's 
some skew, but this is just a bunch of people trying to do the best they 
can, there's no intentional stuff [bias], I'm fine with it. (Ashok, personal 
interview, July 5, 2011) 
Ashok noted that, overall, Praja members pushed for changes that would 
benefit the city as a whole, based on an overarching vision for sustainable 
development. And whereas some discussions concerned issues that were 
reflective of middle/upper class priorities, such as neighbourhood parks, this did 
not detract from members’ concerns for the city’s less affluent residents. 
Moreover, as the platform was not intentionally an exclusionary medium, and 
members were genuinely driven to effect sustainable change, interviewees 
believed that the elitist label was unfounded. Further, in terms of composition, the 
site was described as being “inclusive, no doubt about it” (Raghavan), as it 
comprised members from different backgrounds, who combined their expertise to 
tackle civic and political issues. Raghavan was referring to the mix of old and 
new civil society actors in Praja, who blended traditional civil society expertise 
with technical know-how, as well as other personal and professional skills. To 
bolster his argument that Praja was not an elitist space, he made the distinction 
between experts and aam aadmi (the common man), and reiterated this 
distinction several times: 
For example, this is a tool, I have a car, you have a car, a small car but 
how much of the car do you know? Have you designed it? No, you are 
using it. So, this is a vehicle, and those people here, people are 
fortunate to have these kind who people here, and who works on the 




…So don't confuse with this and aam aadmi; no, this is done for the 
aam aadmi. And the professionals have to do it… (Raghavan, personal 
interview, December 13, 2011) 
 
Experts who designed tools, such as cars, were to be distinguished from 
the aam aadmi, or the common person, with little or no technical know-how, and 
for whom the car was fashioned. In a similar manner, in Praja, technical expertise 
was necessary to leverage the Internet effectively, which in turn enabled users to 
participate in activities that would benefit a variety of social groups and 
communities. In this way, professionals had an important role to play in the 
creation and maintenance of the platform, which then enabled activists and 
others on the ground to take issues forward. By pointing out the distinction 
between creators and users of a technology, and the fact that the technology 
professionals created a medium that regular civil society actors could use, 
Raghavan contested the notion that Praja was an elitist medium. Similarly, 
Shashi acknowledged the limited Internet use among grassroots workers, but 
noted that Praja members tried to help them by providing data, technical 
expertise, and any other assistance that was requested. Further, several civil 
society actors, such as NGO members/volunteers, RWA members, etc. who 
were Praja members served as useful liaisons between online and offline 
activities. In these ways, by helping grassroots workers make use of expertise 
available on Praja, Internet-enabled action could not be seen as entirely elitist.  
Yet others challenged the notion that the Internet in India was a very 
limited domain, highlighting the country’s recent strides in new technologies. 
RAAG member Aman (Skype interview, January 21, 2012) acknowledged that a 
certain amount of resources was necessary to use the Internet effectively, but 
pointed out that the higher mobile phone uptake and increased literacy, 
particularly among the youth, meant that new technologies were increasingly 
more accessible.93 He argued that although the majority of the population was 
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not yet connected to the Internet, the vast potential of new technologies to effect 
change meant that it was not a purely elitist medium either. Government officials 
I spoke to also rejected the view that Praja was an elitist group on account of its 
Internet base, as new technologies were increasingly available to ordinary 
citizens across the country: 
See, today everybody is using technology. If a person, like a vegetable 
vendor, is using a cell phone, do you say he is elitist? So, there is a 
platform available, as long as the platform is kept alive by provoking 
debate and on various issues that concern citizens, I feel that’s a good 
thing. And, as I said earlier you really cannot, ok, see, you may say 
you are not really working at the grassroots level…But we also require 
somebody working together to promote, to force the government to 
come out with some policies, or translating or taking government 
policies and giving them wider reach and publicity. So, to that extent I 
really don’t think using technology can be considered as elitist, in any 
manner. (Sita, personal interview, December 30, 2011).     
 
Government official Sita argued against terming technology use or the 
Praja platform as ‘elitist’ for the following reasons: firstly, with increasing access 
to new technologies, the Internet could no longer be seen as an elitist domain. 
Secondly, the productive way in which Praja used the Internet, to provoke debate 
and participation on citizen-related matters, served the public interest. She added 
that while Praja may not actually work at the grassroots level, it played an 
extremely important role in the area of urban transport as a lobby group. Greater 
computerisation and the increasing use of ICTs within government was also a 
positive factor, and government officers and personnel were slowly learning to 
accept and adjust to new technologies in their work. Here, it is important to note 
that the government interviewees emphasised that despite Bangalore’s ‘IT City’ 
label, most government and civil society actors still preferred physical 
interactions and activities, and it was in this respect that Praja’s offline activities 
were all the more crucial.  






Another set of arguments rejecting the elitist angle was propounded by 
interviewees who reasoned that Internet-enabled initiatives were more realistic 
than elitist, given the rising Internet penetration in India. Describing Praja as 
“investing in the future”, website member Sanjeev (Skype interview, January 7, 
2012) opined that while the Internet may be elitist in India at the moment, this 
would not be the case in the near future. He thereby refuted the elitist notion, 
arguing that Praja’s value would be understood once the Internet became more 
routinised in the Indian context. Ignoring the Internet on the grounds that it was 
exclusionary or elitist was considered a short-sighted strategy for civil society, 
particularly in light of the benefits accrued in terms of public participation, 
information sharing, citizen-government engagement, etc. Praja’s short-term 
successes in this regard prompted RAAG member Yogesh to defend the online 
medium, decrying the notion that an Internet-based space was automatically 
elitist as a “myth”. In a similar vein, RAAG member Murthy criticised the ‘Internet-
as-elitist’ angle as “rhetoric”, noting that those who “think that anything done on 
the Internet is elitist” were imprudent (personal interview, June 28, 2011). He 
noted that people who made such claims often belonged to old civil society, and 
like Praja members, represented a higher socio-economic segment of the 
population that could “afford to think about others”.  In this way, he pointed to the 
irony of the elitist argument made by traditional civil society actors, who were 
reasonably well off themselves and had access to new technologies as well.  
RAAG members were aware that the Internet was a sticky point in 
establishing and cementing connections with old civil society, as it was guided by 
ideological and other considerations:  
In fact, everything is people’s perceptions, convictions, and what their 
worldview is. In the past, we have spoken to many people, but 
somehow, we have not been able to convince them, they think this will 
not work. So, for some reason, they have not taken the approach that 
Praja has. But we’re fine, because people do come (laughs) with prior 
convictions. (Aman, Skype interview, January 21, 2012)   
 
Aman pointed out that as civil society actors’ perceptions, convictions and 




they had remained unconvinced by Praja’s arguments. Such incompatibilities 
effectively stymied collaborative efforts, and created ruptures between older and 
newer forms of civil and political engagement. In such a situation, the creative 
and strategic use of the Internet to meet common civil society goals, viz., to 
facilitate greater public participation and citizen-government interaction, was 
impeded by the lack of cooperation from within civil society itself. While key Praja 
members were keenly aware of the limitations of traditional civil society, they 
recognised its crucial role in democratic engagement. This led to efforts on 
Praja’s part to engage with old civil society groups, online and offline. However, 
the inability to connect the two spaces of engagement proved to be a serious 
limitation. In the absence of large-scale civil society buy-in, Praja had been 
unable to execute its ambitious expansion plans—which included creating a 
network of offline actors, involving more CSOs in its activities, and building 
partnerships with like-minded actors that believed in them. The limited synergies 
between Praja and old civil society highlighted the challenges facing Praja, and 
the complexities arising from the intersections between older and newer, 
Internet-enabled spaces of engagement.  
Conclusion  
The case study of Praja reveals both the successes and challenges 
confronting civil society actors as they leverage the Internet to create new spaces 
for citizen engagement. By using the Internet in a creative and strategic way, 
Praja provides interested citizens an alternative channel to engage with each 
other and the government. This common space allows citizens to participate in 
an environment that is safe, as members need not reveal their identity or 
participate on the ground, if they so wish. Moreover, this common space is 
always accessible via an Internet connection, and members can participate 
based on their convenience. Such flexibility is particularly important in cities such 
as Bangalore, where large distances and busy schedules constrain people from 
physically coming together as lobby groups. Where Praja has been most 




crowd-sourced ideas from the platform towards implementation on the ground. In 
ensuring that projects move towards this stage, strategic tie-ups with various 
government and non-government actors have been crucial. A recent example is 
the petition submitted to the Union Railways Minister on June 29, 2014 for the 
speedy implementation of Namma Railu by Praja RAAG, in association with its 
various project partners, including NGOs, apartment associations, and academic 
institutes, among others (kbsyed61, 2014). Such efforts ensured that the Minister 
highlighted the issue in his budget speech for 2014-2015, along with measures 
that would move in the direction of the suburban rail service envisioned by the 
project’s proponents.94 Another example of a collaborative effort advancing 
Praja’s initial work is the Street Meet, wherein members met at busy intersections 
to observe and record various—often-dangerous—hindrances faced by 
pedestrians on a daily basis (observation; silkboard (2011a, 2011b). Notes taken 
at these observation exercises were submitted to a task force working to improve 
major junctions for commuters and pedestrians who change buses (Yogesh, 
personal communication, April 11, 2014). Comprised of various civil society 
actors, the task force collated citizen feedback and was in the process of 
preparing a comprehensive report on junction safety in the city (Murthy, personal 
communication, April 12, 2014). While the platform operated as a repository of 
information and producer of content (which was available online for anyone to 
use in any manner), RAAG was the advocacy arm, which operated more like a 
“regular NGO” on the ground.  
However, the case study has also shown that Praja faced notable 
setbacks in its efforts to liaise with traditional civic actors, highlighting 
disjunctures between newer and older civil society actors and methods. While 
Praja members were keen to establish and reinforce connections on the ground, 
divergent attitudes regarding the role of ideology and the Internet in activism 
undermined collective efforts. Whereas Praja members tended to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach when liaising with other civil society actors, the lack of 







reciprocity effectively stymied meaningful engagement. The stereotypical 
depiction of Praja as an elitist organisation was a serious setback, which 
exposed the limitations of Praja’s ambitious expansion plans. It also convinced 
key members that they would need to channel their energies towards groups that 
appreciated their work and methods of engagement. This changing attitude 
towards partnerships began to guide future plans, which focused on partnering 
with like-minded civic groups, and with government agencies outside Bangalore 
that did not usually get much attention from civil society and the media.  
While Praja had made great strides in its information and advocacy efforts, 
members rued the limited participation on the platform, despite Bangalore’s 
relatively large Internet-connected population. In this regard, many interviewees 
noted that Bangalore’s promise as ‘IT City’ had not entirely extended to the realm 
of civil society, despite the existence of factors conducive to a fruitful civil society-
Internet relationship. The case of Praja has shown that even creative and 
strategic Internet use by civil society in a media-rich city such as Bangalore is 
constrained by several factors. Among these, the incompatibilities between older 
and newer forms of civic and political engagement and newer, Internet-enabled 
forms have been a serious limitation. However, Praja’s recent successful efforts 
in liaising with civil society groups, such as Cycle Day, point out that it has been 
able to overcome these limitations, to a certain extent. By avoiding past 
mistakes, and learning how to navigate the complex civil society field, Praja 
provides an example of how new, Internet-based entities can create niche 
spaces of engagement in urban civil society, over a period of time. Moreover, 
Praja’s increased acceptance by civil society and government actors also points 
to its evolution as a serious civil society player in the city. In this way, while but 
one case, Praja’s experiences raise important and exciting questions about the 
possibilities of online and offline civil society synergies, and the role of Internet-
based CSOs in Bangalore city. Further, its experiences and challenges hold 
value in light of the spread of ICT-driven social initiatives in Bangalore, providing 
possible approaches and explanations to reconciling civil society methods and 




CHAPTER 7: COMPARING THE CASE STUDIES 
Chapters 5 and 6 explored the interactions between the Internet and civil 
society actors in Hasiru Usiru and Praja, respectively. This chapter continues this 
line of investigation, providing a comparison of the two case studies based on 
their relationship with and use of the Internet. The salient differences that emerge 
between the cases point to the utility of conducting qualitative case study 
research to investigate hidden or invisible complex social phenomena.  
In exploring the relationship between ICTs and civil society, Hasiru Usiru 
and Praja were chosen as case studies due to the perceived similarities between 
the two, viz., their Internet-based structure and activity, a focus on providing 
spaces for greater public participation and citizen-government engagement, and 
the emphasis on traffic and transportation (mobility) issues, which made them 
visible actors in the online and offline public spheres. However, as the case study 
chapters have revealed, while the cases were similar in some ways, the value of 
comparison lies in investigating the stark differences between the two, in terms of 
their attitudes towards and use of the Internet for civic engagement. The 
following aspects of the cases are discussed in this section: structure 
(organisation), attitude towards and use of the Internet, the role of ideology, 
attitudes towards middle-classeness, elitism and civic activity, modes of claim-
making, nature of online discourse, and structural design and deliberation.  
Experiences of Structural Advantages and Constraints  
In terms of structure, both organisations have a large number of peripheral 
members that participate mainly online, and smaller groups working on specific 
projects on the ground. Both Hasiru Usiru and Praja have a core of active and 
well-connected members, who function online and offline to create linkages with 
citizens and government, and to manage overall operations. As both groups 
function on the premise that citizen participation is a crucial aspect of democracy, 
their online spaces are open and accessible to all. Whereas Praja allows its 
discussions and information to be visible to anyone, login (via moderator 




users adhere to strict site usage guidelines to make discussions constructive, 
fact-based, and congenial. Membership to the Hasiru Usiru e-group requires 
approval to access the group’s information and participate in discussions. 
However, this is just a formality, due to the group’s belief in universal access and 
participation.  
At the time of fieldwork, both groups were struggling with the strengths 
and limitations of their respective Internet-based structures, albeit in different 
ways. Hasiru Usiru faced a dilemma over how to reconcile its online and offline 
dimensions, in particular how to make its online space more effective and more 
aligned to the sentiments of its core group. As the case study has shown, 
interviews revealed contradictory expectations of membership from core and 
non-core group members, with confusion arising due to the open nature of the 
network. To peripheral members, the e-group provided a platform to connect 
them to the network, thereby overcoming physical and time constraints. E-group 
members referred to the “voluntary” nature of the network, citing the flexibility it 
provided in terms of participation as one of its core strengths. The e-group 
presented peripheral members an alternative space of participation and 
connectivity, overcoming, to some extent, the disconnect felt when physical 
participation proved challenging. However, core group members decried these 
‘benefits’ of flexibility as a convenient substitute for actual participation, revealing 
deep schisms regarding notions of participation, membership and identity. In this 
situation, the core group’s expectations of a more committed membership were 
at odds with its requirements of an open and informal networked structure. As the 
core group was reluctant to formalise the network, the absence of a formal 
structure inhibited commitment due to the lack of enforceable guidelines 
regarding participation. In the absence of accountability, rules and/or incentives 
to participate, some peripheral members said they could not commit to the 
physical demands of Hasiru Usiru’s activities while being employed full-time. 
Core group members acknowledged that the lack of participation and 




members (core and e-group), and that the issue would remain unresolved while 
the network’s structure remained the same:  
Yeah, that has been the biggest stumbling block, and there’s simply 
not much we can do, other than what we are trying to do….I personally 
strongly feel that the network should remain a network. And it should 
not be institutionalised, or it should not be made into an NGO, where 
few people are taking decisions, and other people just listen to the 
people who make the decisions. So, in the absence of wanting to do 
something like that, the frustrating aspects of being part of this 
network, for now, continues. I think we’ve not been able to crack it. It 
has been a big stumbling block; it has been in many ways our failure. 
But we just have to move forward, we just have to keep doing things. 
At least that’s the way I see it, we just have to keep doing things the 
way we have been. (Anand, telephone interview, January 14, 2013) 
 
Despite the disconnect some members felt with the e-group, the core 
group did not wish to compromise on its ideal of collective decision-making, and 
hence resigned itself to working within the Internet-based networked structure. 
Another explanation for this detachment was the growth trajectory and changing 
composition of the mailing list from a close-knit and ideologically homogenous 
group to a large and diverse crowd of newcomers who joined during and after the 
Metro protests of 2009. The lack of ideological unity, impersonal character, as 
well as the lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities of members in an 
informal set-up made the core group uncomfortable. The reference to the e-
group as “a beast, which is not very clear…” (Sheela, personal interview, 
December 21, 2011) indicated uncertainty about the e-group’s role with regard to 
Hasiru Usiru’s mandate. At the same time, the core group was also faced with 
the challenge of scaling up its offline operations, in which it was constrained by 
the absence of a dedicated pool of members, as well as organisational 
limitations. These factors generated a deep-seated concern among the core 
group regarding the network’s structure and who and what it actually 
represented. Such concerns regarding the network’s structure and functioning 
were all the more relevant in light of Hasiru Usiru’s increasing prominence in the 




Praja was originally conceived of as being limited to an online platform, to 
make engagement easier for citizens. However, the realisation by key actors that 
true engagement could occur only with a combination of online and offline 
actions was the impetus for the creation of RAAG. Like Hasiru Usiru, RAAG 
members too grappled with the issue of whether to continue with an informal set-
up or to formalise their activities. Key actors spoke of the attempts made to 
function as a regular organisation, including appointing office-bearers, raising 
funds, conducting monthly status reviews, and setting goals. They also attempted 
to work within a set of formal rules, including how to raise and spend money, use 
of Praja’s name on a written document, how to remove a member, etc. However, 
as several attempts at registering Praja as a formal organisation did not succeed, 
members decided to abandon that plan, but continued to work within a set of 
formal rules. A key RAAG member noted how, after a series of discussions, it 
was decided to retain the existing informal set-up, as members were 
apprehensive of a formal structure. After attempting to convince them, he too 
gave in, conceding that the Internet base and its premise of flexibility, was not 
amendable to a set structure:  
The moment you have a formal group, it’s a little more serious. So I 
saw some hesitancy, saying, why do we have to get into a formal 
structure? So I tried to push saying: “No, if we want to do more lets be 
serious, with some roles, like, we’ll have a President, we’ll have a 
Treasurer”. [But] that’s not what everyone wanted. Because of the 
nature of the group itself, the promise on which was built, is not 
amenable to a set structure as well. (Yogesh, personal interview, 
December 16, 2011) 
Thus, key members had to alter their expectations regarding formalisation, 
based on the majority’s apprehension that a formal structure would contravene 
the flexibility and informality that the Internet afforded. Similarly, over a period of 
time, they also came to the conclusion that working towards one small goal at a 
time, rather than a long-term vision, would be more suitable for an Internet-based 
and diverse group. Interviewees noted that working with short-term goals, such a 
particular project or event, helped to attract more volunteers, who converged 




over conflicting ideologies, as short-term plans were result—and not ideology—
oriented. Moreover, as members worked on a voluntary basis, with limited time to 
contribute to Praja, it was thought that long-term goals would be “overkill”, 
scaring away potential contributors. For these reasons, Praja continued to 
operate as an informal entity for six years, before finally registering itself as a 
society in 2013.95  
In recent years, the emphasis has been on expanding its offline activities, 
and RAAG has undertaken several projects on the ground, in conjunction with 
government and other civil society actors. From mid-2013 onwards, there was a 
conscious decision to invest more of RAAG's time on projects than the website, 
resulting in a slight decline in posts from RAAG members (Yogesh, personal 
communication, February 26, 2014). As the focus shifted to offline activities, it 
became essential that the level of online activity be maintained, if not increased. 
However, Praja had to deal with a situation wherein the number of writers 
(contributors) was disproportionately smaller than the readers, who were akin to 
passive members (Murthy, personal interview, June 28, 2011). As explained 
earlier, this was attributed to the unintentional entry barrier created by the 
emphasis on a high standard of debate and discussion. While the online medium 
provided greater flexibility to participate, the unofficial yardstick for discussions 
dissuaded persons who were less inclined or able to devote time and energy to 
the research and preparation that participation on Praja mandated. This, 
combined with the general apathy towards civic issues displayed by citizens, 
impeded efforts to encourage existing readers to contribute more, as well to get 
new members on to the site. To try and overcome this situation, RAAG members 
strove to “market themselves” and increase their profile among IT savvy 
audiences, hoping to encourage them to participate in civic affairs. The apathy of 
the middle class, Internet audiences posed a great problem for Hasiru Usiru as 
well, whose core group decried such inertia. This resulted in the core group’s 
shift in activities to non-Internet enabled populations, from whom it could expect 
                                                             




a degree of commitment and participation, rather than what they viewed as self-
serving ‘Internet people’.  
Attitudes towards Middle-classness, Elitism and Civic 
Engagement   
While both organisations are comprised of predominantly English-
speaking middle class members, core members in each respond to this identity 
in different ways. RAAG members were relatively comfortable with this identity, 
as Praja’s mandate and Internet-based structure did not permit deep 
engagement with the city’s less well-off sections. As Praja catered to the Internet-
enabled sections of society, its efforts to liaise with CSOs on the ground, 
including Hasiru Usiru, were an effort to overcome its limitations in this aspect. 
On the other hand, Hasiru Usiru’s discomfort with its Internet-based structure 
arose as its ideological beliefs clash with this limited character. Hence, while 
Praja had no objection to involving more Internet-connected, middle class 
citizens, noting that this was their forte, Hasiru Usiru was trying to overcome its 
middle class nature through greater grassroots engagement. Hasiru Usiru’s 
negative perception of Praja as elitist therefore, arose partly from what it 
considers the latter’s unhealthy dependence on the Internet, which made it a 
limited space for civic activity.    
 
However, even Hasiru Usiru’s attempts to broad-base its offline activities 
were hindered by the general lack of involvement of the general population in 
civic affairs. As some interviewees pointed out, Hasiru Usiru’s stakeholders, in 
general, did not have time to participate in protests and other civil society 
activities, being preoccupied with issues of survival. It was argued by several 
interviewees that the poorer classes were less concerned with governance-
related issues, such as accountability, transparency, etc., which were mostly 
intangible benefits. This was more so as politicians provided them tangible 
benefits, such as money, cooking items, clothes, (even alcohol!) in the run up to 




elitist issue, for the same reason that the poorer classes often did not have the 
wherewithal to participate. As Mawdsley (2004) showed, the middle classes in 
India have been closely intertwined with environmental issues in the country, with 
recent attention focused on their role in urban areas. Whereas Hasiru Usiru’s 
strategy was to counter the middle class dominance of environmental and other 
socio-political issues through greater involvement of poorer groups, Praja’s 
strategy was to use the Internet to reach out and involve the middle classes in 
sustainable development issues. The emphasis on changing the city for the 
better, Praja members argued, was proof that it was not an elitist organisation. 
Members highlighted examples wherein Internet-enabled middle class citizens 
had effected systemic changes, such as the launch of the commuter rail, which 
would benefit less well-to-do groups in the city. Similarly, by taking up issues 
such as the Public Distribution System (PDS)96, pedestrian safety, Bus Day, etc., 
which represented the interests of the less affluent social groups, Praja members 
countered notions of the Internet and Internet use as elitist. The divergent 
attitude towards the Internet and its use for civic activity was a source of friction 
between the groups, and the incompatibilities with respect to the Internet, 
ideology, and modes of engagement are discussed below.  
Incompatibilities regarding the Internet and Ideology  
As the Hasiru Usiru core group viewed the Internet in terms of an 
exclusionary and limited space, Internet-based CSOs were seen as perpetuating 
existing societal divisions by limiting access to groups on the wrong side of the 
digital divide. To some core group members, Praja’s “excessive” use of the 
Internet was a key factor in their decision to dissociate from it. To others, Praja’s 
‘elitist’ nature was also on account of its composition, wherein its main actors 
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were perceived to be a group of affluent, middle/upper-class individuals who 
worked on issues that were in their own interests: 
Yes, there are very qualified transportation people [in Praja], so they 
have done lot of stuff on commuter rail, beautiful, there’s lot of 
information there. Some of them now even check Hasiru Usiru 
regularly, so there is some sort of cross-linkages. But they look at 
Hasiru Usiru as Hasiru Usiru is too leftist, or they are too extreme 
(laughs). And most of the Hasiru Usiru people feel the same way about 
Praja. Because they are too elitist-that’s the word. That’s what I feel, I 
don’t know how true it is. (Ajay, e-group, personal interview, December 
26, 2011)  
While Praja was commended for its technical expertise and data-driven 
arguments, it was considered a restricted group working on members’ interest 
areas, rather than the common good. Ajay pointed out that there were cross-
linkages between the two groups, but that there was also a type of perceived 
incompatibility between them. Whereas Hasiru Usiru gave the impression of 
being too “extreme”, Praja was considered “elitist”—which Ajay admits was a 
perception, rather than an objective fact. Praja’s arguments were also described 
as being too “intellectual”, thereby excluding a large segment of the citizenry. 
Such incompatibilities prevented meaningful collaboration, despite the 
affordances that the Praja platform provided, and the groups’ intersecting 
interests. Praja members, too, were aware of the limitations of their platform, 
particularly in terms of enabling ordinary citizens to participate, which prompted 
them to identify ways to lower the entry barrier: both intellectually, and 
technically, by making it easier to use. This proved to be a difficult quandary to 
resolve, as they did not wish to compromise on the quality of discussion while 
increasing participation. While they recognised this limitation of the platform, they 
countered the notion that it was elitist by mere virtue of being Internet-based. 
Rather, by enabling members to take forward issues on behalf of others and in 
ways convenient for them to participate in civic affairs, Praja’s work was 
described as a type of “philanthropy, at a basic level” (Yogesh, RAAG, personal 
interview, June 28, 2011). The notion of Internet as elitist was refuted as a “myth” 
and a type of “rhetoric”, and the ideological objections posed by civil society 




Unsurprisingly, differing attitudes towards the Internet produced divergent 
way in which the Internet was used for civic engagement. While describing the 
benefits of an Internet-based model, Praja’s core members were quick to note 
that it was not just the technology per se, but the organisation’s unique approach 
to engagement, and its method of collaboration that made it a useful model. The 
core members highlighted that ICTs by themselves were not empowering, but 
tools whose value derived from how and for what they are used. In this way, 
Praja avoided a hard technologically deterministic approach97, as it 
acknowledged the role of the people in shaping technology and making it work 
for them. Conversely, this stance can be applied in Hasiru Usiru’s case too, as its 
limited success in using its online spaces could be traced to, among other things, 
the core group’s inability or disinclination to understand and leverage the Internet 
to a great extent.   
The two groups significantly diverged with regard to the role of ideology in 
their activities, which produced friction and limited avenues for interaction. As 
discussed in the case study chapters, key Praja actors described the platform as 
ideology plural, and not ideology neutral. Although they believed that members’ 
ideological leanings play an important role in influencing actions, the emphasis 
was on generating practical solutions, rather than satisfying members’ ideological 
imperatives. The decision to sacrifice ideology was considered suitable in light of 
the benefits accrued in terms of ‘flexibility’, ‘agility’, and efficiency. The disquiet 
about the rigidity of mooring one’s actions around unchanging ideological beliefs, 
as traditional civil society actors were wont to do, arose from the focus on data-
driven solutions. Through this approach, Praja preferred to let the data take 
centre-stage, emphasising the “logical”—rather than “ideological”—in its 
activities. Moreover, in light of the Internet-based structure, with its large and 
diverse audience, short-term goals, rather than a long-term, ideologically centred 
vision, was deemed appropriate to mobilise and retain members.  
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In a similar way, the Hasiru Usiru core group had come to recognise that it 
was constrained by its Internet-based structure to underplay its ideological focus 
online. The heterogeneous nature of the e-group, where members were united 
by a common cause, viz., preservation of trees, rather than any ideological 
motivation per se, meant that the core group could not, and did not, want to 
impose its ideology on other members. In this situation, in order to retain the 
inclusive and collaborative nature of the network, ideology was downplayed in 
favour of collective approaches to problem solving. While this was considered 
expedient, some core group members expressed dissatisfaction that the negative 
connotations of ideology online compelled them to side-line their political 
inspirations:    
I don’t think it [ideology] is a bad word, but every time you bring up the 
word or talk about it there is a group of people who very strongly 
oppose it… there is this sense that, because e-group is so large and 
varied, there is a sense that, “why do you want to talk about ideology? 
Why do you want to talk about all this? Let’s just make sure the work 
gets done. That’s it.” So they think that the means are not as important 
as the ends. And there have been several discussions, several people 
have come up and said: “let’s not get into these discussions on 
ideology, it’s not worth it, we need to focus on the issue”. I mean, for 
people like me, it’s like: “what issue are you focusing on if you’re not 
thinking about your politics?” Everything is political. (Sheela, core 
group, personal interview, December 21, 2011) 
As a section of e-group members preferred to focus on actions rather than 
grapple with the underlying ideology, which was deemed a time-consuming and 
sensitive issue, the core group refrained from ideological discussions online. 
However, as Sheela pointed out, to the core group, the means was of utmost 
importance, and she questioned how people could undertake actions without 
having an internal politics guiding them. The staunch belief that each civic actor 
must work with an internal politics or overarching ideology was also one of the 
basic objections that the core group had about Praja. This difference in 
orientation became clearer as I spoke to key actors regarding the reasons for 
their emphasis on public transportation. In Hasiru Usiru’s case, the issue was 
viewed primarily through a social equity lens, and activities undertaken to bridge 




population. Alternatively, on the Praja site, the focus on traffic issues was 
discussed as arising from popular demand, as it was a pressing and visible 
middle-class concern that affected members’ quality of life. In this way, the focus 
on resolving transportation problems emanated from very different lens, and 
while both groups were working towards sustainable transportation solutions for 
the city, the basic philosophical differences rendered cooperation improbable.   
Incompatible Modes of Claim-Making  
Another related area where the two case study organisations differed 
substantially was their methods of engagement, which I present in terms of 
‘modes of claim-making’. Claim-making by civil society is the means by which 
civic actors pursue shared interests, by presenting claims before governments, 
businesses or other actors, from which there will likely arise conflicts (Dörner & 
List, 2012; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). A variety of claim-making repertoires exist, 
which vary based on place, time, structure of the political system, and nature of 
the actors involved, to name a few (see also Haunss, 2007). The case study 
chapters have shown that Hasiru Usiru and Praja varied greatly in their modes of 
claim-making, with the former employing forms of action and self-presentation 
common to social movements, while the latter chose a newer style of Internet-
based engagement. Interviews and observation pointed to significant differences 
in the ways key actors from both organisations conducted their activities, and 
differentiated themselves from the other’s modes of claim-making. Praja, for 
instance, took pride in what members called its “constructive” approach to 
engaging with government (and other CSOs), which was differentiated from the 
more aggressive activism of groups such as Hasiru Usiru. Constructive 
engagement meant a conscious effort to keep the “tone down” or neutral when 
talking to government officials, to let the information presented speak for itself, 
and to provide detailed options/alternatives, without pressuring the government 
to choose a final solution. This was distinguished from conventional civil society 
actors who tried to impose their viewpoints on the government, thereby 




the Anna Hazare-led anti-corruption campaign, which was at its peak during the 
second round of fieldwork, as an example of a flawed, antagonistic civil society. 
Their concern about the campaign’s increasingly aggressive approach was 
reflective of a sentiment voiced by a section of prominent civil society actors, who 
viewed Hazare’s tactics as unproductive and even ‘undemocratic’ (see Daigle, 
2011; Roy, 2011).  
Some RAAG members also noted that their methods enabled citizens to 
participate in a safe environment, where they would not be physically or 
psychologically threatened:  
The idea is, how do you get citizens to participate? First thing, give 
them the ability, give them the space. That has been provided. Space 
is there, you give them a space where they don’t feel threatened, 
which is through anonymity, and online identities, things like that, that 
is also there. And, the participatory nature is also there; you get to 
discuss, you get to talk, without having any commitment to come and 
do anything. We never force people to come and say, stand there 
holding a placard. (Murthy, personal interview, June 28, 2011) 
 
By ensuring members’ privacy, Praja was thought to be a conducive 
environment for participation in civic affairs, without the obligation of physical 
involvement. This non-coercive space, where members would not be “forced” to 
hold placards and endanger themselves was distinguished from the methods of 
activist groups. Such a comparison was possibly related to the collective action 
of citizens and civic groups, including Hasiru Usiru, protesting road-widening and 
tree cutting on Sankey Tank road, which had reached a crescendo during the 
period of fieldwork. In July 2011, police forcibly evicted, and in some cases 
manhandled, and arrested protesters, including women and eminent citizens, 
with no plausible charges against them (The Hindu, 2011, Vincent, 2011). In a 
move that was widely condemned, protesters were physically dragged away from 
the protest site and held in police stations until the evening, with charges against 
them dropped only after sustained intervention by prominent civil society activists 
(Mudalgi, 2011). In such a situation, key Praja members were wary of being 




safety, as well as compromise existing relations with the government. While 
some members viewed their role as representatives of citizens’ ‘voice’ as clearly 
distinguished from those on the ‘frontline’ of activism, others Praja noted that in 
some situations protest was clearly necessary:  
I don’t know what a typical NGO is, but people tend to take a more 
confrontational stand, in general: “Oh, you're cutting down trees”. 
Maybe it’s the way to do something, because once people cut the tree 
down you can’t bring it back. But in Praja you won’t find too much 
support for this: “Oh, let’s go protest”. But I think for some things you 
have to protest. (Ashok, RAAG. Personal interview, December 27, 
2011) 
Overall, while members were appreciative of the benefits of Praja’s 
collaborative approach, they did acknowledge that protest was necessary at 
certain times. As Ashok noted above, sometimes confrontation prevented the 
authorities from bulldozing their way through disputed activities, such as 
indiscriminate tree felling.  And although there was not much support within Praja 
for such protest action, members did see why other groups were forced to take to 
the streets and prevent illogical government actions. Some Praja members 
opined that the absence of collective action had diluted its activities. For 
instance, website member Sanjeev pointed out that the reluctance to protest had 
resulted in the lack of a strong collective voice, which limited Praja’s ability to 
generate the required impact in city affairs. Here, Hasiru Usiru’s methods, 
despite their limitations, were considered vital to create “noise”, and use it as a 
“stick” to prod the government into action:  
And also, I feel that, I may be wrong on this, but I feel that over a 
period of time Praja has created, like the point that I said about not 
being aggressive, but being constructive – so with whoever Praja has 
actually interacted, Praja has been successful in doing that. I am not 
so sure about other groups like Hasiru Usiru, or whether they have 
managed to do that. [But] the other thing is, that I think in the current 
system there is a place for Hasiru Usiru as well. It is (laughs) because 
they create so much of noise that people get scared about doing wrong 
things. I mean, they have kind of a stick, but that stick is also needed 





Sanjeev noted that by creating noise and demanding government action in 
full public and media view, groups like Hasiru Usiru put the government on the 
defensive, goading it to action. This sentiment was also expressed by some 
Hasiru Usiru’s e-group members, who expressed admiration for its methods of 
claim-making but found they were unable to work within this framework. While 
the emphasis on protests and court cases had proved effective in bringing lake 
and tree protection to the mainstream consciousness, interviewees told me that 
such methods were often incompatible with their own strengths and inclinations. 
Interviews and observation also revealed that Hasiru Usiru’s emphasis on protest 
as a legitimate means of dissent had alienated it from some civil society groups 
and actors who believed cooperation would be more advantageous than 
confrontation. Hasiru Usiru e-member Vineet (personal interview, December 21, 
2011) strove to provide a balanced view of the two groups, describing both roles 
as important, and attributed their distinctive working styles to different underlying 
philosophies. As both groups embraced different modes of claim-making, which 
produced varied strategies of public participation, each played a different, but 
important, role in the city. While Hasiru Usiru’s methods tended to question the 
underlying power structures and their decision-making rationale in the interests of 
a more equitable system, Praja’s activities focused on working within its own and 
the government’s limitations to advocate concepts in a collaborative manner. 
These divergent approaches, and their underlying influences are also visible in 
the nature of interactions on their online spaces.  
Nature of Online Discourse 
Both groups are moderated to ensure that spam, and abusive or other 
detrimental posts do not overwhelm the online space, and to ensure that only 
topics relevant to the groups’ mandate are discussed. In this way, moderation 
was more of a light or invisible type, designed to create a conducive environment 
for discussion, rather than to curtail free speech. During the period of 
observation, discussions on Praja were conducted largely in the absence of 




little or no personal animosity among members. While this could be due to the 
fact that ideology was not the platform’s driving force, it could also be attributed 
to the clearly stipulated policy on language and decorum. Under this policy, 
which was cemented over a period of time, antagonising or acrimonious posts 
could be edited or deleted entirely. An examination of the archives revealed that 
in its initial stages, tensions began to emerge over the nature and language of 
posts, and how to fairly and reasonably monitor comments. To resolve such 
issues, a moderation system was launched on August 6, 2009, which enabled 
the community to participate to ‘flag’ content deemed unfit for publishing (tech, 
Moderation launched on Praja [Blog post], 2009). In this way, the moderation 
system was designed to work in a democratic and transparent way, and to retain 
the “no-nonsense flavour of Praja” (ibid). When more tensions became apparent 
as it expanded, the moderation system was updated, with members’ inputs, to 
stem the “flood of opinionated, offtopic, philosophical and ideological preaching 
type posts on Praja”:  
Clearly, such hassles are to be expected. But it will be great to hear 
from members, especially the ones who do not write as often (mostly 
readers) on what they would like to see implemented. 
Remember, we wish to stay as open as possible. But we want to avoid 
becoming an "anything goes" place, our wish is to attract smart and 
constructive citizens, and the "influencers" of the society, like netas98, 
babus99, journalists and activists. 
Essentially, it would be good to put some systems in place before 
things get worse. (tech, July 27, 2009) 
 
In this way, moderation on Praja was designed to keep the site relevant 
and interesting, with self-moderation encouraged to avoid wasting moderators’ 
time. Thereafter, moderation evolved to include a spam control feature, in light of 
the deluge of spam posts, wherein posts by new users had to be approved by 
admin first (tech, Spam Control Feature [Blog post], 2010 ). In the early stages, 
this feature, in conjunction with the institution of a panel to decide the suitability 
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of posts, gave rise to frictions along the way. Such frictions occurred when users 
questioned the rationale of moderation with regard to their posts, or were unable 
to self-moderate to the extent that the moderators or admin envisioned. RAAG 
member Ashok noted the difficulties faced by members, especially those 
accustomed to conventional modes of civic activity, as they adjusted to new rules 
of engagement on the platform. In particular, getting “old-timers” to structure their 
online talk, to make it relevant to other members, and to introduce topics relevant 
to Praja’s mandate, were some areas where conflicts arose. Over a period of 
time, however, as members understood the rules of engagement on the platform, 
and became accustomed to working within this framework, there were fewer 
occasions for strife. This could be the reason that moderation did not appear as a 
contentious issue on Praja during the observation period, as there was already 
an established convention within which members participated.  
The Hasiru Usiru e-group also functioned largely with a light touch 
moderation policy, which was intended to screen for spam, and to filter out 
offensive posts, as well as posts not related to the network’s mandate. As there 
was no formal policy document available on the site, features of its moderation 
policy were identified based on an examination of messages on the forum. 
Messages revealed that policy elements were derived through a process of 
collective brainstorming, and that the policy developed in a consensual manner. 
The main task of moderators included approving membership so that bots, etc. 
did not get in, and to ensure that posts were not offensive in nature, with the 
objective of preventing flaming, which had happened for brief periods in 2011 
and 2012, before moderators intervened. Moderators were also involved when 
the form of posts was deemed “offensive”, like posting a link, without an 
explanation of the issue, or cc-ing to multiple lists (unless the situation was grave 
enough to warrant the attention of several groups simultaneously), or when a 
member’s digital signature was far longer than the content of the post, to name a 
few. Moderators would display their comments at the end of the offending post in 
square brackets to notify the member and advise him/her not to repeat the 




to discussions on other e-groups of which he was a member, including Praja. 
Core members opined that such actions diverted members’ attention to other e-
groups, without an adequate discussion of the topic on Hasiru Usiru itself. 
Although the purported intention of the offending member was to link debates 
relevant to both groups, to make Hasiru Usiru members understand other points 
of view, and to avoid cluttering the e-group with too much information from other 
sites (interviews, observation), the disregard for the moderation policy—rather 
than the topic or content of the message—incensed the core group, which placed 
the member on “moderation watch” (#17212, May 7, 2013). As has been 
discussed in the Hasiru Usiru case study, core group members asserted that 
content was not moderated, and that the discussion of ideologically opposed 
viewpoints was accepted. In cases, including the one above, what had irked core 
members was the disregard for the group’s posting etiquette, and the 
disparaging, or condescending tone of the author(s).  
While abusive or unproductive content was prohibited, members were 
expected to self-moderate in this regard, which often resulted in acrimonious 
exchanges and name-calling on the mailing list. Friction on the group regarding 
the tone and language of mails arose as content was not moderated (that is, 
mails were not edited or deleted by moderators), resulting in unproductive posts 
that often produced a chain of rancorous messages, before the issue was 
resolved or died down. While messages contrary to the core group’s ideological 
orientations did appear in discussions, observation revealed that there appeared 
to be less tolerance for viewpoints that challenged the core group’s assumptions. 
On several occasions, disaffected members pointed out that views critical of or in 
contrast to the core group were not well received, and that proponents of such 
views were subject to verbal attacks. An e-group member noted that in the past, 
“a lot of forcing of opinion used to happen”, which changed with the influx of new 
members, whose new ideas broadened the scope of the network’s discourse 
beyond the core group’s ideology (Vineet, personal interview, December 21, 
2011). Overall, interactions on Hasiru Usiru were more fraught with tensions than 




interactions. On the other hand, Praja’s emphasis on cooperation, in conjunction 
with its strict moderation system, created an online environment that was more 
positive and conducive to collaboration. In this way, I have argued that the 
groups’ respective modes of claim-making influenced, to a certain extent, the 
nature of their online discourse. Another factor that could account for the 
difference in the nature of deliberation and discussions was the structural design 
of the online spaces themselves, which is explained below. 
Relationship between Structural Design and Deliberation  
Praja member Sanjeev, who had also been a Hasiru Usiru e-member in 
the past, suggested that structural design played a role in influencing the nature 
of online discussion. His experiences allowed him to make a more informed 
comparative assessment of both online spaces, including how structural design 
influenced interactions. He noted that whereas Praja’s open-access platform 
made members more responsible for what they said, this was not always the 
case in Hasiru Usiru, where email-based communication provided the freedom to 
say things that “should not be said on a public forum”:  
And I think since it’s an open forum, Praja, one has to be lot more 
responsible towards what they are writing. So there is a lot of respect 
for what the other person has to say. I also have been a part of Hasiru 
Usiru, and I sometimes feel that’s not the case. I mean, email as a 
platform gives full liberty to say things which should not be said on a 
public forum. (Sanjeev, Skype interview, January 7, 2012) 
 
Sanjeev’s observations pointed me to arguments contending that the 
structural design of online spaces significantly affected the type and quality of 
discussions taking place within them. Authors such as Wright & Street (2007), 
Zhang (2007), and Black (2011) have pointed out that the structural 
characteristics controlled by creators, such as forms (bulletin boards vs. email 
lists), openness (with/without registration), diversity (homogeneous vs. 
heterogeneous participants), regulation (with/without moderators), and so on, 
influenced the deliberative aspects of an online group. Black (2011) noted that 




creating an environment in which participants felt safe, respected, and listened 
to, would be the most productive choice. In Praja’s case, the platform was 
designed to facilitate structured public participation by uniting disparate actors, 
and providing them a safe and convenient space for civic engagement. Here, the 
three co-creators, with their technological/software backgrounds, played a critical 
role in designing the system towards these ends. This is what Wright & Street 
(2007) have referred to as the “politics of technology” (p. 855), wherein the 
political choice in the creation of technologies plays a key role in the deliberative 
potential of Internet spaces. As the Praja platform’s strengths and limitations 
have already been discussed in detail in the case study, they are briefly revisited 
here with reference to the role of design in fostering deliberation.  
A key feature that influenced the quality of discussions was the element of 
anonymity, wherein members could choose whether to remain anonymous or to 
adopt pseudonyms in their interactions on the platform. A co-founder noted that 
the choice to remain anonymous was significant as it gave members a “voice” in 
public affairs, without the accompanying fear of possible repercussions by 
government or civil society. Moreover, in the absence of time and other physical 
constraints, members could practice reasoned deliberation, bolstered by the 
group’s policy of promoting group over individual recognition, which gave 
members less impetus to say or do things for publicity or personal gain. Members 
also had the choice to use real names and identities, which became common in 
due course as they interacted with and became more familiar with one another in 
the physical world, and developed a sense of camaraderie. Key members also 
revealed their identities over a period of time as they moved towards a greater 
offline presence, where advocacy mandated real interactions with government. A 
combination of offline collaborations and morning meetings (which were 
discontinued), allowed greater interaction among active members, and produced 
a sense of “community”:  
Benefits are in terms of community, that is our USP, and over a period 
of time that will become our, umm, like, if there is competition from any 
other kind of a platform, this community will become our, umm, I mean, 




and it kind of becomes a snowballing problem, so suppose if you want 
to be part of a community, where would you want to start a 
community? You would rather be a part of a community that is already 
effective. I think community is one of the biggest assets that we have 
right now. We are still trying to leverage it in some way or the other. 
(Sanjeev, Praja e-member, Skype interview, January 7, 2012) 
For Sanjeev, therefore, one of Praja’s biggest successes was the creation 
of a “community”, which he described as its USP (Unique Selling Point). The 
attempts to foster community, and the benefits derived from being part of the 
Praja community were also referred to by some other interviewees. The site was 
described variously as a community for learning, sharing, and problem solving, 
which allowed like-minded people to connect and collaborate on issues of mutual 
interest. Praja was also described as a platform wherein one could interact with a 
variety of perspectives, thereby building tolerance for other viewpoints and 
ideologies. RAAG member Aman (Skype interview, January 21, 2012) noted that 
the diversity of opinion on Praja encouraged members to consider and respect 
others’ points of view, rather than a type of enforced obedience to a dominant 
viewpoint. The sense of community, diversity of participants, acceptance of 
competing perspectives, and the personal connections between members, 
contributed to the overall orderly nature of discussions on the site, despite the 
occurrence of regular disagreements. In these ways, online and offline methods 
and tools combined to create design features that encouraged deliberation and 
decisions based on some sort of mutual consensus.   
Above all, however, there was one key design factor that influenced the 
quality and nature of discussions, viz., the moderated (regulated) nature of the 
site, which weeded out unproductive posts or posts that did not adhere to its 
strict and detailed content policy. Members appreciated this aspect, pointing out 
that there was a healthy respect on the site for other’s opinions due to the 
constructive environment conscientiously created by the moderators. E-member 
Shashi (personal interview, December 13, 2011) noted that while moderation 
played a key role, there were overall very few instances of people deviating from 
the online decorum, as “everybody realizes their own responsibilities”. This type 




interview, December 28, 2011), who noted that only well-moderated online 
groups could enhance citizen-government engagement.  
On the other hand, the Praja platform also suffered from some design 
flaws that inhibited deliberation, such as the site’s user interface, which required 
a certain amount of time to adjust to. Learning to use the site effectively, and 
adjusting to its data-driven style of discussions, required some level of 
commitment, which could deter interested readers from contributing to 
discussions. Government official Chandrasekhar (email interview, December 30, 
2011) suggested that Praja consider using Facebook to encourage greater public 
participation in its activities. The positive experiences of Facebook use by some 
local government departments, such as the Bangalore Traffic Police100 (Dev, 
2011; Saxena, 2011) and Bangalore Electricity Supply Company or BESCOM101 
(Laveena, 2013; Mohan, 2013), prompted officials to consider Facebook, with its 
user-friendly features, for citizen engagement. This issue was discussed on Praja 
as well, with the need for department-specific Facebook pages cited due to 
Facebook’s ‘cool’ factor among the youth, its greater reach among cyber 
audiences, its agenda-setting role for mainstream media, and the ability for 
citizens to interact with government in real-time (murali772, 2011). In addition, as 
the BESCOM head explained on the platform, a shift to Facebook was necessary 
as:  
There are so many civic websites, and it’s not possible for anybody in 
BESCOM to keep searching the sites and responding to the issues 
raised.  
So, we have Facebook page and website. (namma bescom or md 
bescom manivannan) Kindly post in that. (mani1972, July 19, 2012)102 
 
As it would be unfeasible for civic agencies to visit various public forums 
(both online and offline), a Facebook page provided the optimum solution to 
interact with the public and generate feedback. Studies have shown that 







government agencies adopt Facebook to “be where the users are”, and for the 
opportunities the social networking service provides for rapid dissemination of 
information and dialogue with the public, which traditional communication 
channels do not provide (Hofmann, Beverungen, Räckers & Becker, 2013; 
Magnusson, Bellström, & Thoren, 2012). However, as Praja was designed to 
engineer serious and analytical discussions, this limited its appeal to a smaller 
group of committed people. Its user interface was distinct, therefore, from the 
Facebook interface, which is more conductive to one-off contributions, as well as 
for online and offline mobilisations, rather than sustained discussion. Praja co-
founder Yogesh (personal interview, December 16, 2011) explained that as the 
weakness of the interface became clearer, he had attempted to change the site 
layout. However, other members, who were already comfortable with the site 
design, resisted these efforts. Overall, despite the limitations of the user 
interface, other structural features of the platform, notably its structured 
discussion format, the option of anonymity, diversity of viewpoints and 
participants, and its strict moderation policy fostered a climate favourable to 
online deliberation.   
In Hasiru Usiru’s case, the expansion of the mailing list from a smaller, 
ideologically homogeneous group to a large and scattered heterogeneous entity 
proved problematic for deliberation. As explained in the case study chapter, due 
to its diverse composition, the mailing list was no longer representative of the 
larger ideology within which the core group operated. Not wishing to alienate 
interested members, the core group endeavoured to steer clear of explicitly 
ideological discussions on the mailing list. Moreover, as some e-members had 
expressed reservations about ideological discussions on the group, discussions 
tended to revolve around practical, actionable items. In recent years, the e-group 
has functioned more as a space for information sharing, posting of news articles 
and event-related information, rather than debates or discussions. This irked 
some core group members, who opined that in the absence of meaningful debate 
and follow-up action, the mailing list had ceased to be of value to the larger 




members further stripped it of a deliberative character. The consequent lack of a 
robust online forum prompted some core group members to reduce their 
engagement on the e-group, and focus on discussing important issues within 
smaller groups:  
Maybe because the nature of the e-group, is more become just 
information sharing, so I feel that maybe I [can be] involved in 
something else. So I’m not so active in terms of posting information. 
Even engaging in debates only if something really makes me angry. 
That’s really when I usually respond otherwise just I speak about it with 
people I know. (Sheela, core group, personal interview, December 21, 
2011) 
 
Unfortunately, the reduced participation on the mailing list by core group 
members further limited its deliberative character, as it lowered opportunities for 
interaction and informed discussions. Alpay (2005) has noted that for email 
groups to successfully produce an outcome, the following conditions are 
expected to exist: (i) members share common aims, goals or objectives, (ii) 
group members openly perceive themselves as being a group, and (iii) group 
members expect to interact to reach an effective decision. In the Hasiru Usiru e-
mail group, however, limited interactions between members, including in face-to-
face situations, and the absence of shared goals and shared group identity 
negatively affected group dynamics. This, in turn, hindered the quality of 
discussions, reducing the effectiveness of the group and its decision-making 
processes.  
While discussions were generally amiable, an impolite or provocative 
comment by a member could quickly descend into a flurry of heated exchanges. 
Discussions on opposing ideas and ideologies often turned into impassioned 
debates, accompanied by a burst of repartees and verbal jousting. Several posts 
also reflected that “ego battles” accompanied staunch positions during debates, 
with the result that issues could not be resolved in an amicable manner. In such 
cases, as highlighted by an e-member below, the absence of a definitive 





So the debate in front of this group is straightforward: What is the 
standard for accountability that we want to maintain on this list? After 
all, writing emails to Hasiru Usiru is a privilege but it is less of a 
privilege than public office. So perhaps we would want to have more 
relaxed standards of accountability than the Parliamentary standard. I 
ask this question genuinely with no predetermined answer to offer. But 
it might be a good way to go about drawing the line of what is an 
acceptable argument and what is a personal attack. (#15633, April 3, 
2012) 
 
This post was in response to a series of sharp exchanges between two 
members; while both agreed that robust disagreements were integral to 
intellectual freedom, it highlighted the need to clarify the kind of language that 
would pass muster on the forum. This distinction is important for email groups 
due to the absence of certain communication methods, such as non-verbal cues, 
delayed or incoherent discussions, and the lowered sense of social presence, 
which increased dissenting views online (Alpay, 2005; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). 
The presence of disagreement and heated debate online in itself is not 
necessarily a bad thing, with proponents pointing to its advantages as a 
productive tool for robust analysis and free speech (see also Papacharissi, 2004; 
Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). This sentiment was also raised by an e-member, 
whose participation often provoked others to confront and debate issues: 
Firstly, I fully subscribe to what Salman Rushdie has stated as 
"Freedom of thought is not a tea-party, not a place where people sit 
about politely and make gentle, inoffensive, tedious chit-chat. True 
intellectual freedom, from which artistic freedom derives, is a rough 
and tumble thing, and strongly argued disagreement is its hallmark, not 
meek agreement or acquiescence". (#15640, April 4, 2012) 
 
Although the mailing list did allow for uninhibited and diverse discussion, 
the lack of clear guidelines to distinguish between heated talk and uncivility 
(Papacharissi, 2004), the lack of respect for collective values by some members, 
and the tendency to stick to one’s entrenched positions dampened the discourse. 
I also observed that viewpoints that conflicted with the core group were often 




these situations, the opportunity that an online discussion group provided its 
members to understand others’ views and to re-evaluate their preconceived 
opinions (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009) was lost. To sum up, the lack of a cogent 
moderation system, the core group’s rather perfunctory engagement with the 
mailing list, and the limited consideration for its design features combined to 
reduce deliberation opportunities on the Hasiru Usiru e-group.   
Conclusion  
This section has undertaken a comparative look at how two prominent 
Internet-based CSOs in Bangalore, Hasiru Usiru and Praja, approach and use 
the Internet for civic engagement activities. The two cases vary significantly in 
their practices and priorities of ICT use, which are both influenced by, and in turn 
influence, their attitude towards the Internet as a tool for democratic engagement. 
The comparative analysis has revealed that the attitude towards the Internet or 
ICTs by key actors subsequently impacts the structure and design of online 
spaces. For instance, the positive attitude to the Internet displayed by Praja’s key 
actors is visible in the attention paid to the platform’s design as an interactive 
space for public participation. On the other hand, the Hasiru Usiru core group’s 
pessimistic view of the Internet as exclusionary, as an amplifier, and as a realm 
of ideas rather than action, precluded meaningful consideration of its online 
space. Along with ideology or the basic underlying motivations of actors, design 
influenced civic actors’ modes of claim-making, which in turn influenced the 
nature of online discourse. Hence, the Hasiru Usiru core group’s primarily 
socialist leanings, and its negative view of the Internet as exacerbating social 
divisions, produced an emphasis on offline activities. Further, its assertive modes 
of claim-making, combined with a limited consideration of the email group’s 
design features, resulted in reduced opportunities for online deliberation. In 
contrast, Praja’s emphasis on collaborative modes of claim-making, in 
conjunction with a measured consideration of platform design features, fostered 




Notwithstanding the challenges facing Hasiru Usiru and Praja in their 
relationship with the Internet, and despite their structural and contextual 
constraints, they have persisted in their quest for a more participatory society and 
polity. The sincerity of both groups to their stakeholders and target audience, and 
to the larger goal of democratic engagement is without question. Both occupy an 
important role in Bangalore’s public sphere, contributing to the public good by 
propagating ideas of sustainable, citizen-oriented development. Their 
significance in the city’s civil society space, and the impact of their activities on 
the urban fabric renders an examination of their activities, and the Internet’s role 
in them, important and timely. The Internet’s role in influencing social change 
becomes all the more significant due to the technology-rich context within which 
these organisations operate. With increased access and usage of ICTs by civic 
actors in the global South, appropriating technology strategically involves 
moulding the freely available technologies to suit their goals (Surman & Reilly, 
2003). Given the vast potential of ICTs to contribute to a CSO’s goals, if used 
properly and in tandem with local needs (see Dilevko, 2002), strategic use of 
technology “is amongst the most pressing [issue] that civil society faces in the 
information society” (Surman & Reilly, 2003, p. 10). The larger significance of this 
comparative analysis, theoretical and practical implications of the thesis, and 












CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions  
This study is among the first of its kind to undertake an in-depth and 
grounded examination of ICT-enabled civic engagement in the Indian context, 
particularly from the point of view of the actors themselves. The intersections 
between ICTs and civil society—excluding the recent surge of interest in new 
citizen activism and protests—is a relatively under-researched area in India. In 
particular, there is a dearth of grounded, ethnographic research on how civil 
society actors interpret and grapple with new technologies in their civic and 
political engagement efforts. In giving primacy to personal narratives and stories, 
the study follows Ganesh & Stohl’s (2010) detailed qualitative enquiry of activists’ 
reflections on and interpretations of ICT use. In doing so, they focused on the 
ways in which activists’ experiences conformed with or departed from 
universalised or normalised expectations that have become embedded in 
scholarly accounts of contemporary collective action and technology (ibid, p. 53). 
In a similar manner, through detailed examination of two civil society cases, this 
thesis has critically re-examined some assumptions associated with the Internet-
civil society relationship, and its democratic potential in Bangalore.  
The cases vary significantly in their practices and priorities of ICT use and 
attitudes towards the Internet for civic engagement. This indicates that an 
interplay of various, complex factors decide how and whether the Internet is 
successfully leveraged for civic engagement, even in a media/IT-rich 
environment such as Bangalore. The case of Hasiru Usiru (and experiences of 
other old civil society actors) has shown that access does not automatically 
translate into a willingness or ability to engage deeply with new technologies by 
civil society. Pessimistic attitudes towards the Internet prevented the tech-savvy 
core group from fully leveraging the email group’s potential. In Hasiru Usiru’s 
case, the advantages of being positioned in India’s premier ‘IT City’ are undone 
by the network’s structural deficiencies, its ideological orientations, and 




are relevant in light of the commonly held belief that new technologies are 
uncritically and automatically embraced by civil society in its democratic quest.  
In Praja’s case, the innovative and strategic use of the Internet, combined 
with increased advocacy activities on the ground, has rendered several 
successful instances of online-offline collaboration. Through a combination of the 
platform and its advocacy arm, RAAG, Praja has been able to overcome some of 
the limitations that afflict old civil society, while simultaneously attempting to build 
bridges with these actors. However, the case study reveals that Praja also faces 
considerable obstacles in its efforts to liaise with traditional civic actors, who are 
resistant to new ways of engagement. The difficulties of adapting to new rules of 
engagement online, particularly among active old civil society actors, who are 
generally middle-aged and above, and the preference to communicate in the 
local language, rather than English, have produced significant fissures between 
older and newer, Internet-based civil society actors. In addition, Praja’s limited 
connections with government and at the grassroots deterred several old civil 
society actors from participating in its activities. Moreover, the limited 
participation on the platform, despite Bangalore’s relatively large Internet-
connected population, reveals the challenges faced by new civil society, even in 
a networked and media-rich city.  
In terms of theoretical contributions, the thesis highlights the prominence 
of class, particularly the role of the new middle classes, in the current ICT-civil 
society relationship in India. It does so by charting the emergence of a ‘new civil 
society’ in India, and distinguishes it from older civil society forms by dint of its 
middle-class priorities and ICT use. This ‘new civil society’ is overwhelmingly 
comprised of educated, urban, English-speaking middle class citizens, who are 
drawn to action via ICTs (Singh, 2013; Singh, 2014a). New civil society actors 
also prefer to engage in civic and political life in ways that often exclude existing 
systems of politics and government, and which are expressed in ideology-neutral 
terms (Jodhka & Prakash, 2011; Singh, 2013; Singh, 2014a). However, this new 
civil society is not an entirely homogeneous category, and distinctions can be 




includes a new type of citizen activism, with urban middle class constituents 
participating in the political arena outside the space of state and 
old/developmental civil society (Singh, 2014a). This new citizen activism in India, 
notably in its most spectacular and visible form of new protest movements, has 
been able to forge alliances and plan modalities of social action via the 
connective power of ICTs (Ahmed & Jaidka, 2013; Bute, 2014; Singh, 2014a). 
The anti-corruption protests in 2011-2012, and the anti-rape protests in 2012, 
which were led by middle-class citizen activists, are the most prominent among 
various examples of ICT-enabled middle class activism in the 2000s and 2010s. 
As the variety of ICT-based civil society initiatives in Bangalore demonstrate, new 
civil society includes members who are either tech-savvy or believe in the 
potential of ICTs for change.  
Through the course of the case study analyses and comparisons, the 
thesis also identifies another component of the new civil society, viz., a set of 
techno-middle class actors that uses ICTs to engage in the more ‘routine’ 
aspects of civic and political engagement. Shying away from engaging in protest 
activities, for a variety of reasons, this “techno-middle class” prefers democratic 
engagement in ways that are different from new citizen activists as well as old 
civil society actors and methods. Praja, with its emphasis on using ICTs for 
making information more accessible to the public, improving government data 
management practices, and facilitating greater citizen-government engagement, 
is representative of this new techno-middle class. Praja’s key members are 
largely from new economy industries and corporate backgrounds, and 
emphasise information- and technology-based solutions to civic and political 
issues. As part of new civil society, the new techno-middle class leverages ICTs 
for the more routine matters of citizen engagement, while working offline 
simultaneously to achieve its goals.  
New civil society actors are also evident in the Hasiru Usiru e-group, in the 
form of young (20s-30s), tech-savvy members interested in social and political 
reform. Although engaged with issues that often fall into the realm of traditional 




and networks, and prefer methods of engagement that are deemed apolitical and 
collaborative. On the other hand, the Hasiru Usiru core group comprises 
members from old civil society, including those focused on human rights, 
environmental and social justice, and accountability and good governance, which 
Singh (2014a) refers to as ‘developmental civil society’. Interviews with members 
of this civil society category revealed a reliance on modes of claim-making 
common to activists and social movements, with an emphasis on questioning the 
underlying power structures and their decision-making rationale. Among this 
group there was also a deep scepticism of the Internet as a democratic agent, 
and a preference for physical spaces of citizen deliberation and engagement. 
This echoes the observations made by Gurumurthy (2008) that traditional 
development activity has taken place at some distance from the information and 
communication technologies for development (ICTD) discourse and action.103 
Hence, although comprised of tech-savvy members and mediated by the 
Internet, the Hasiru Usiru network emerges as an example of old civil society that 
is struggling to make sense of its role and identity in an information society 
context.   
By defining and elucidating the differences between developmental or old 
civil society and variants of new civil society, the thesis sheds light on the 
changing landscape of civil society in India, and the significant role of new 
technologies in this evolution. Another theoretical implication of this study relates 
to the use of ICTs for political engagement, and the changing nature of political 
activism in India, evidenced in the rise of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Delhi, 
with pan-India ambitions. The party originated in the non-party anti-corruption 
movement that burst onto the national scene in 2011, reflecting an outpouring of 
(mainly) middle class anger at endemic corruption, and fuelled by alternative and 
social media, mainstream media, and increased citizen access to information. In 
September 2012, the campaign split into the parent non-party movement led by 
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Anna Hazare, and AAP led Arvind Kejriwal—the latter created as a vehicle of 
alternative politics, reflecting the younger cohorts desire to enter and reform the 
political arena (Singh, 2014).  In the evolution from a civil society movement into 
a full-fledged political party, with resounding victories in the Delhi state elections 
in 2013 and 2015, AAP has changed the political landscape, and the relationship 
between the middle classes and the political system. Critical to AAP’s success 
has been growing proportion of young middle class voters, and their increasing 
ability to influence their peers and public discourse through social media and the 
Internet (Advani, 2014). Although this is a spillover from the anti-corruption 
campaign’s middle class youth base (Singh, 2014a), the youthful profiles of 
AAP’s candidates, and the various online and offline platforms used to recruit 
and retain young members, reflects the strategic importance of youth voters to 
the party (Advani, 2014; Dhapola, 2013). The growing interest of middle class 
youth in political affairs is a reflection of its politicisation by the new citizen 
activism of the anti-corruption and anti-rape campaigns. Bouyed by the promises 
of AAP’s alternative politics and its easy access via social media, urban youth 
are transforming the uneasy relationship between the middle classes and 
electoral politics in India. This has exciting implications for both theory and 
practice relating to the use of ICTs by tech-savvy middle classes for political 
engagement, and the potential impacts on democratic politics.    
In terms of practical implications, the thesis underlines the necessity, 
rather than the option, of the effective appropriation of ICTs by civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in their engagement and advocacy efforts. In the case of 
traditional civil society, this involves becoming ICT-literate, which involves, firstly, 
an acknowledgement of the unease with ICTs, and the subsequent 
transformation in organisational culture to overcome this discomfort (see 
Michelson, 2006). Once there is an internal shift in thinking, CSOs can move on 
to the next step, which is identifying the means by which ICT use can achieve 
organisational goals and objectives, in ways that align with their underlying 
ideological motivations. This also involves identifying existing barriers to effective 




undertaking training in strategic ICT use actions. This involves being aware of the 
range of technology options available, and updating knowledge and skills in 
areas that most benefit these organisations, such as running online campaigns, 
collaborative project management, data protection, and secure online 
communications (United Nations, n.d.). In light of the relative ease of Internet 
availability in Bangalore, CSOs can also tap into the vast range of civil society 
networks that impart technical know-how, and can give them the confidence to 
learn and experiment with new skills and ideas. This could also serve to build 
new alliances and strengthen existing ones, which could generate new ideas and 
activities, as well as a deeper consideration of the implications of technology use 
for groups and their struggles. On the other hand, new civil society groups, who 
are already closer to the goal of strategic ICT use, should aim to make their 
online spaces and platforms more accessible, inclusive, and aligned to the needs 
of old civil society as well. This involves moving beyond English-only 
communications, and developing platforms that works for local groups and 
communities. Further, given the technical skills possessed by new civil society 
members, they could participate in imparting such skills to old civil society, 
through formal or informal partnerships with government, businesses, and other 
civil society actors. These initiatives could create additional linkages between old 
and new civil society, bring newer and alternate voices and actors into the online 
public sphere, thereby strengthening public discourse. Through these 
recommendations, it is hoped that civil society can understand, reflect on, and 
overcome barriers—internal and external—to deploy ICTs creatively and 
strategically, and in ways that are both equitable and sustainable.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions  
While the thesis is written with the authority that comes with an insider’s 
perspective and familiarity with the context, having worked in the civil society 
sphere in Bangalore, it has its limitations. Firstly, the study has a middle-class 
bias, which stems from the fact the online spaces studied are English-based, but 




limitation by interviewing civil society actors who worked with or for poorer and 
marginalised groups, in order to obtain a more comprehensive perspective of the 
context. However, due to the constraints of time and finances, the focus was on a 
middle class demographic that could be easily contacted via email, or personal 
contacts, and who were proficient in English. Moreover, this was also a 
demographic that I was more familiar with, and I followed a senior researcher’s 
advice about recognising my limitations (in this case, with regard to language), 
and choosing a demographic that I could talk to extensively. Future research 
could overcome this limitation by exploring the use of ICTs among the ‘digital 
fringes’, as these are often invisible and innovative at the same time (Shah & 
Jansen, 2011). These are individuals and groups who are invisible to most actors 
within government and the NGO sector, and whose marginality is based on a 
series of socio-economic disempowerment, such as caste, class, gender, 
language, and location. Scholars have begun to explore the connections 
between digital technologies and citizen action such as tribal activists, slum 
dwellers, youth with disabilities, and children, among others (Cortesi & Gasser, 
2015). Future research by groups on the fringes in Bangalore city would shed 
light on such hitherto underexplored groups, and would be a step towards 
overcoming the urban and middle-class bias of the thesis.  
Second, while the political system plays a crucial role in civil society 
activities, I could interview only senior government officials, but was unable to 
interview any elected representatives. I was able to meet the former through 
personal contacts and snowball sampling. Moreover, they also fell into the 
middle-class category, which allowed for some kind of connect and familiarity of 
circumstance, etc. However, in the case of elected representatives, despite 
repeated efforts, I was unable to meet the handful I had set out to interview. This 
can be attributed to the fact that elected representatives are notoriously difficult 
to approach and meet in Indian cities, but also due to the lack of connecters. For 
a more comprehensive understanding of the ICT-civil society relationship, future 
research will also have to consider the perspectives and role of government 




A third limitation is that this study took place in a single location, and it 
remains unknown whether the findings can be generalised to other countries in 
the region or elsewhere in the world. It is important to note that the theoretical 
discussions and implications of the study are conditioned by the historical and 
socio-political conditions within which the ICT-civil society relationship developed 
in the Indian context. Further, as cities respond differently to globalisation trends 
according to local circumstances, the experiences of civil society within 
Bangalore’s techno-social environment need not be reflective of those in other 
contexts. Nonetheless, although confined to a single city, this study is a critical 
extension of literature that is typically North America and Euro-centric, and 
limitations of context can be overcome by studying other techno-cities in India 
and developing Asia for a better understanding of the phenomena in different 
contexts.  
To sum up, the thesis has employed a grounded, qualitative approach to 
map the experiences and practices of civil society actors in relation to ICT use in 
Bangalore city, India. It has focused on the attitudes towards and use of ICTs by 
these actors, as well as considered the benefits and limitations of ICT use in a 
developing city context. The thesis has placed the middle classes at the centre of 
new ICT-enabled efforts to renew civic and political engagement, and has termed 
this demographic as the ‘techno middle-class within a ‘new civil society’. Further, 
it has examined the techno-social and political conditions that shape ICT-enabled 
civil society activity in Bangalore, thereby highlighting the importance of context 
in civic and political engagement. This study has contributed to the emerging 
literature on ICTs and civic and political engagement in India, and paves the way 
for future research in this area in other Asian contexts.    
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Appendix A:  Sample Invitation Letter to Resource Persons 
 
Dear Dr./Mr. /Ms. name of invitee: 
 
Greetings!  I am a PhD student of the Department of Communications and New Media at the 
National University of Singapore (NUS), currently conducting my PhD research entitled “E[n]-
visioning the megacity: Contestations of technology and governance in Bangalore”. This 
research focuses on the ways in which the techno-centric imagination of cities influences urban 
governance forms and priorities – as well as resistance to them - in the developing world. This 
involves a study of new governance forms such as eminent-citizen task forces, and their visions 
for the city, as well as the competing visions of local actors on whom such techno-centric urban 
development impinges.  
In this regard, your organisation is one of the civic groups whose experiences I am keen 
to study, and would like to seek your consent to participate in an in-depth interview sometime 
between May to July 2011. The interview will cover questions about you/your 
organisation/coalition’s role in protesting against projects and policies that reflect the current 
paradigm of techno-centric development, and the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) in these activities. I would also be grateful if you could suggest the names of 
members of your organisation/coalition whom I could interview in this regard. The Interview Guide 
is provided in the attached sheet.   
Your participation in this study is extremely valuable and will greatly enhance the 
outcome of this research. A Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form is also attached for 
your reference and signature. Should you have questions, I can be reached by email at 
anuradha.rao@nus.edu.sg or anu.rao6@gmail.com or telephone number ______________.   





Department of Communications and New Media 





Appendix B: Sample Participant Information Sheet & Consent 
Form 
Participant Information Sheet & Consent Form 
 
Project title: E[n]-visioning the megacity: Contestations of technology 
and governance in Bangalore 
 
Principal Investigator and co-investigator: 
Principal Investigator: Mrs. Anuradha Rao. 
Co-Investigator: Dr. T.T. Sreekumar, Assistant Professor, Department of Communications and 
New Media, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. Phone: (65) 
65163148. Email: sreekumar@nus.edu.sg. 
 
1. What is the purpose of this research?  
You are invited to participate in a research. This information sheet provides you with information 
about the research. The Principal Investigator (the research doctor or person in charge of this 
research) or his/her representative will also describe this research to you and answer all of your 
questions. Read the information below and ask questions about anything you don’t understand 
before deciding whether or not to take part. 
 
This study seeks to understand the ways in which new urban governance forms, such as 
eminent-citizen task forces, and priorities (in the form of policies and projects) shape and are 
shaped by, the IT environment/paradigm in Bangalore. It also focuses on the ways in which the 
“technologization” or “IT-ization” of Bangalore impacts the civil society activity or activism, and the 
ways in which civil society (individuals and organisations) understands and engages with new 
media technologies for collective action. 
 
2. Who can participate in the research? What is the expected duration of my 
participation? What is the duration of this research? 
Adults (21 years and above) who are involved (directly or indirectly) in activities relating to Praja 
and Hasiru Usiru, which are centred on urban issues/ governance processes in Bangalore.  
Each interview is expected to last 1 hour. This research will be conducted during December – 
January 2012 in Bangalore city and in the peri-urban areas surrounding the city.  You will be 
interviewed at your place of work or a mutually convenient place decided upon both parties in 
advance. 
 
3. What is the approximate number of participants involved? 
There are approximately 25 people to be interviewed during this research period. 
  
4. What will be done if I take part in this research? 
The principal investigator will conduct a face-to-face, in-depth interview that should last for 1 hour 
approximately. With your consent, the interview will be recorded using a digital-voice recorder. If 
you are uncomfortable with the idea of being audio-taped, written notes will be taken instead. If 
you agree, the PI may approach you for a follow-up interview (face-to-face or computer-mediated) 




you agree, the principal investigator may also conduct a brief question session after this 
observation session. The interviews will be conducted in English. 
 
5. How will my privacy and the confidentiality of my research records be protected? 
Only the principal investigator and the co-investigator will have all your identifiable information 
(e.g. names, email address, contact numbers, and organization details), which will not be 
released to any other person. Your name and surname will never be used in a publication or 
presentation. Other Identifiable information (such as organization details) will not be used without 
your express consent. Any electronic data will be stored on a laptop that is password protected, 
whereas hard copy data will be stored inside a suitcase with a combination lock. All recorded 
interviews (audio-tape and manual) will be transcribed and interview data will be destroyed five 
years after the completion of research or after publication of the thesis and article(s) based on it. 
 
6. What are the possible discomforts and risks for participants? 
There are no anticipated social, psychological, political, economic or other risks associated with 
participating in the interview. 
 
7. What is the compensation for any injury? 
No injury is anticipated. There will be no compensation for any injury. 
 
8. Will there be reimbursement for participation? 
As a participant, you will receive a souvenir upon completion of the interview. 
 
9. What are the possible benefits to me and to others?  
There is no direct benefit to you by participating in this research. The knowledge gained will 
benefit future research on urban governance issues and civil society activity in Bangalore and 
other developing cities that adopt a pattern of “high-tech”-led development. 
 
10. Can I refuse to participate in this research? 
Yes, you can. Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary, and you can withdraw 
from the research at any time without giving any reasons, by informing the principal investigator. 
 
11. Whom should I call if I have any questions or problems? 
 
Please contact the Principal Investigator, Mrs. Anuradha Rao or the co-investigator, Dr. T.T. 
Sreekumar at +65 65163148 (office phone) or email sreekumar@nus.edu.sg for all research-
related matters. 
 
For an independent opinion regarding the research and the rights of research participants, you 
may contact a staff member of the National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board 





Project title: E[n]-visioning the megacity: Contestations of technology and governance in 
Bangalore 
 
Principal Investigator with the contact number and organization: Mrs. Anuradha Rao, 
Department of Communication and New Media, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National 
University of Singapore. Phone: +65 81891502.   
 
I hereby acknowledge that: 
 
1. My signature is my acknowledgement that I have agreed to take part in the above 
research.  
 
2. I have received a copy of this information sheet that explains the use of my data in this 
research. I understand its contents and agree to donate my data for the use of this research. 
 
3. If my comments are quoted in the Principal Investigator’s academic publication, my 
surname and first name will not be disclosed. However, I agree to disclose the following personal 
identifiers: Organisation Name / Position / Disagree – I do not wish to disclose any personal 
identifiers. 
 
4. I can withdraw from the research at any point of time by informing the Principal 
Investigator and all my data will be discarded. 
 
5. I will not have any financial benefits that result from the commercial development of this 
research. 
 
6. I consent to be audio-taped during the interview: (Yes/No) 
 
7. I agree to be re-contacted for this research project, if necessary:  (Yes/No) 
 
8. I agree to participate in an observation session(s) by the principal investigator:    
(Yes/No/Not applicable) 
 
9. I agree to a post-observation follow-up interview, if necessary: (Yes/No/Not applicable) 
 
 














Appendix C: Sample interview guide for experts/resource persons 
INTERVIEW GUIDE (DRAFT) – FOR ABIDe TASK FORCE MEMBER 
 
Background to interviewee’s involvement and role in the task force 
 
Vision for the city & techno-centric governance: 
What are ABIDe’s visions for Bangalore city?  
Where and how does technology, particularly high-tech and other new technologies, fit into this 
vision?  
How do these visions shape the policy priorities of the task force? 
How do the internal dynamics (relationship among task force members) affect the imaginations 
of, and priorities for, the city? 
 
Mega-projects and the ‘worlding’ of the city:  
 
What is ABIDe’s stance regarding mega-infrastructure projects that are aimed at making 
Bangalore a ‘world city’? What do you see as the implications of these projects? 
What are the linkages between ABIDe and JNNURM (policies) in terms of such mega 
infrastructure projects? Which projects does ABIDe approve and not approve of, and why? 
What is ABIDe’s role in decision-making regarding these projects, and how does it negotiate 
various types of interests? 
 
Democratic processes and urban governance: 
 
How do you see ABIDe’s role in local democratic processes? How does it impact urban 
governance? 
How do you respond to criticisms of the task force being elitist, unaccountable, or 
unrepresentative?  
How does ABIDe ensure internal and external accountability? 
What do you see as the merits and limitations of the task force in governance processes? 
 
Relationship to “expertise” and civil society:  
 
What is the role of “experts” in the task force?  
How do you view the role of “civil society” as members of ABIDe?  
Which civil society groups does the task force interact with, and what is it relationship with civil 
society? 













Appendix D: Sample Interview Guide for Case Study (Praja) 
INTERVIEW GUIDE (DRAFT) – PRAJA CASE STUDY 
 
Role in Praja & ICT engagement  
 
 Your background, issues that you are interested in & how you came to be introduced 
to/involved in Praja 
 
 What is/what do you see as your role in Praja? 
 
 How do you participate? 
o Active online and offline participation  
o Active online participation  
o Active offline participation  
o Role as information provider  
o Role as gathering people together  
 
 (How) does your IT (technology) background play a role in this? 
 
 What do you see as the role of the Internet (the platform) in these activities? 
 
 Perception of technology and technology use [do you think the Internet is an elitist 
medium? Why or why not?] 
 
 What are the anticipated and actual gains (of the Internet-based platform)? 
 
 What are the impacts on collective actions? 
 
 What are the limitations and benefits of this platform? 
 
Overcoming limitations [For people who are not Internet-savvy (including older members) or do 
not have immediate access to the Internet] 
 
How did you learn to manoeuvre the website and participate on the platform? 
 
What has your learning curve been like?  
 
How do you manage this activity? 
 
What is your experience of using the website, as a way to fruitfully channel your real-life 
experiences?  
 
Do you see Praja as being useful in this work?  
 










Appendix E: Examples of Coding and Memos 
Example of initial coding:  
 
Excerpt from interview of a resource person/expert: 
 
“It’s very simple. The city is – and this is the controversial part – the city is run by 
politicians from specific background. The political leadership is overwhelmingly 
Kannadiga, even though the city is not. The political leadership is overwhelmingly old 
Bangalore, even though the city is overwhelmingly new Bangalore. So you have the 
structural imbalance; now how does the political leadership, which doesn’t have cache in 
most of the city, deal with that portion of the city? Who in the BBMP corporation can go 
and talk in Electronic City? They need this bridge layer. So they appoint the bridge layer, 
to say you guys should be able to talk to these other people, and you are already able to 
talk to us, therefore you are the bridge.”  
 
Initial codes:  
 
Continuance of task forces 
Dichotomy between old and new Bangalore  
Influence of IT on cosmopolitanism   
Task force as bridge between two Bangalores  
 
Example of intermediate coding 
 
Hasiru Usiru:  Attitude towards Internet for collective action  
Core group Non-core group 
Media refusal/pessimism: Core group 
refuses to use the Internet more widely 
because it is seen as a: 
 
- Limited or exclusionary domain  
(class-related) 
- Amplifier (amplifies voices of powerful) 
- Focus on non-Internet related activities 
that do not exclude main stakeholders 
(contrary to current scholarship) 
- Related to group ideology 
Utility of the Internet viewed in terms of:  
 
- Connectivity  
- Information dissemination  
 
However, limitations are also 
acknowledged:  
 
i.- Limits to collective action (Realms of 
ideas vs. realm of action; armchair activism 
or slacktivism) 
 - Limits to mobilisation: Amplifier 
(restricted to only those already interested 
in an issue) 
 
Example of memo  
 
(Interview excerpt below) 
 
“I’m not completely sure what model Praja works on, but for me personally and for some 
of us, the very heavy reliance on Internet, I don’t think that is something that I would ever 
be happily a part of. Because for me, that excludes way too many people. Maybe you’re 




sense unless you’re reaching out more. I mean, I think an Internet group has its role, but 
that role is limited, so if I’m going to spend all my energies on that limited role, I’d much 
rather spend that time doing something else. I know they do a lot of offline work also, but 




While some members of Hasiru Usiru do engage with Praja, the interviewee is reluctant 
to do so due to certain differences between the organizations that she sees as 
irreconcilable. These differences I have categorized in terms of discourse (she sees 
Praja as catered towards (upper)-middle class interests, Vinay sees it as a forum where 
the view of Bangalore as global or world-class gets reinforced), ideology (Hasiru Usiru 
has a more left-leaning, socialist worldview, whereas Praja appears as a champion of 
privatization/private interests), and role of the Internet. 
 
While Praja’s contribution in terms of technical information is acknowledged, the heavy 
reliance on the Internet, which is seen as an exclusionary and limited domain, makes the 
interviewee reluctant to engage with them on common issues. Praja is referred to in 
terms of the ‘civil society’ described earlier: tech-savvy, urbane, educated, English-
speaking middle class. Praja’s efforts at advocacy are also frowned upon, as their 
engagement is with a similar demographic, such as the ‘experts’ in ABIDe, which Hasiru 
Usiru views as an illegitimate actor in the city. Hence, whereas the goals of both 
organizations coincide in some areas, for the interviewee the means – rather than the 
ends - is paramount (code: means vs. ends). Praja is indirectly referred to as “para-
citizenry”, a group that is claiming to be representative of the city’s interests; which is 
akin to the claims of representativeness by NGOs discussed in an earlier code [Civil 
society vs. political society / Civil society and the Internet / The idea of representation]. 
She argues that Praja needs to be more reflexive about its role and to acknowledge that 
processes are as important as the final outcome, and that’s its members must realize 
that they are not Bangalore’s voice.  
 
Focused codes to emerge from this memo:  
 
Vis-à-vis Praja: Incompatibilities in discourse, ideology and the Internet  
Praja as civil society, not political society/ para-citizenry 













Appendix F: Diagrammatic Representation of Main Categories 




























































Appendix G: Images (Website Screenshots) 
 































































Image 7.2: Screenshot of www.ichangemycity.com 
 
 
 
